The African Triangular Confederation: Between Strategic Choice and Tactical Possibility
On May 18, 2024, the foreign ministers of Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali announced at the end of a meeting in Niamey that they had finalized a draft treaty to establish a confederation among the three countries. These countries are currently governed by military regimes that came to power through coups against democratically elected civilian presidents.
This treaty is expected to become final once ratified by the leaders of the three countries, which seem united by their opposition to France and the expulsion of its military forces, replacing them with alliances with Russia. They also face common challenges related to security and development issues.
In September 2023, the presidents of Mali, Colonel Assimi Goïta, Niger, General Abdourahmane Tiani, and Burkina Faso, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, signed a pact described by Mali’s Foreign Minister, Abdoulaye Diop, as a blend of military and economic efforts among the three countries.
The signing of this pact came less than two months after a military coup ousted Niger’s President Mohamed Bazoum. The transitional military authority in Niger faced threats of military intervention from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) if the coup leaders did not reverse their actions and reinstate Bazoum.
Mali and Burkina Faso were also under ECOWAS sanctions due to their military coups. In Mali, Goïta and his associates had overthrown interim President Bah N’Daw, and earlier, the late civilian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. In Burkina Faso, Traoré and his associates had overthrown Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, who had himself come to power by ousting civilian President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré.
This context suggests that the foundational pact of the tripartite alliance might be a maneuver to alleviate pressure and sanctions, allowing the military rulers to consolidate their control. It might also be strategic, laying the groundwork for a new phase that breaks from the past.
The Triangular Alliance: Context and Objectives
The joint pact signed by the leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger on September 16, 2023, forms the “Sahel States Alliance,” referencing the “G5 Sahel” group established in 2014 in Nouakchott, Mauritania, amid escalating terrorist activities and significant threats.
The G5 Sahel initially included Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad, with a joint military force established a year later. However, signs of the group’s fragmentation appeared when Mali announced its withdrawal in mid-May 2022, protesting its denial of the group’s presidency.
In early December 2023, Burkina Faso and Niger also announced their withdrawal from the G5 Sahel, citing several reasons, including the pursuit of independence and dignity incompatible with their current participation.
Thus, the three countries exited the G5 Sahel, leaving it with only Mauritania and Chad, prompting these two countries to consider dissolving the group. In a joint statement in December 2023, they referenced applying Article 20 of the founding agreement, which allows for the coalition’s dissolution upon request by at least three member states.
The three withdrawing countries viewed the G5 Sahel as a French-dominated coalition, increasingly rejected both popularly and officially in the region, in favor of closer ties with Russia. Consequently, the bonds between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have strengthened, rooted in their military-led governments’ anti-France stance, perceived neo-colonial practices, alliances with Russia, and shared crises.
These shared factors led to the creation of the “Sahel States Alliance,” a new unified framework for the new military regimes, built on the concept of “sovereignty.” The founding charter of the alliance comprises 17 articles, naming it the “Liptako-Gourma Charter.” Article 1 states the aim to establish the Sahel States Alliance (AES) for collective defense and mutual assistance.
Article 6 of the charter stipulates that any attack on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of one member is considered aggression against the others, obligating mutual assistance, including the use of armed force to restore security.
Article 11 opens the alliance to any country sharing similar geographical, political, social, and cultural realities and accepting its objectives. Besides forming a political and military alliance, the three countries aim to expand their partnership and cooperation into a broader confederal union, including economic dimensions.
The Confederation and Economic Partnership Enhancement
Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso prepared for their withdrawal from ECOWAS, announced on January 28, 2024, following a recommendation from their economic ministers meeting in Bamako in November 2023. These ministers recommended establishing a joint airline, a shared investment bank, and exploring a monetary and financial union.
Similar to their G5 Sahel exit, the ECOWAS withdrawal was closely tied to their stance on France. These countries view ECOWAS, founded in May 1975 to create a large, unified trade bloc, as influenced by France, given that most member countries are former French colonies.
ECOWAS’s handling of recent military coups among its member states showed a degree of double standards. The response was harsher towards Niger and Mali but less severe for Burkina Faso, which experienced two coups within eight months. In Guinea, the sanctions were milder, with a cooler stance compared to other countries, leading the military rulers in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso to see ECOWAS’s actions as influenced by French interests.
For the three countries that expelled French forces, ECOWAS’s stance was stricter, while in Guinea, where the coup leader Mamady Doumbouya is perceived as a French ally due to his education and military service in France, the response was milder.
In addition to security and military aspects, the new confederal union prioritizes economic development, reflecting in the countries’ openness to new partners to overcome their landlocked challenges. They heavily relied on ECOWAS ports for trade and now seek alternatives.
In cooperation with Russia, Mali launched the construction of the “largest solar power plant in West Africa” near Bamako on May 25, 2024, expected to increase Mali’s electricity production by 10%. Burkina Faso signed an agreement with Russia to build a nuclear plant aimed at meeting energy needs, as only 22.5% of its population has access to electricity.
Niger has similarly strengthened ties with Turkey and Iran, receiving Turkish drones and signing a deal with Iran for 300 tons of uranium worth $56 million, with the first batch of 50 tons expected by August.
The Moroccan Atlantic Initiative: Economic and Development Stakes
In his speech on the 48th anniversary of the Green March, King Mohammed VI of Morocco proposed an international initiative to provide Sahel countries with access to the Atlantic Ocean, emphasizing that their problems cannot be solved by security and military measures alone but require joint cooperation and development.
Morocco is ready to provide its infrastructure to these countries, viewing the initiative as a potential economic transformation for the region. In December 2023, Marrakesh hosted a ministerial meeting to coordinate the initiative, involving the foreign ministers of Morocco, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. They agreed to form national working groups to propose implementation plans for the initiative.
This initiative is expected to offer economic and developmental opportunities for Morocco and the landlocked Sahel countries, addressing their isolation by providing access to maritime routes for trade.
For instance, Mali’s economy relies heavily on agriculture and mining, similar to Burkina Faso’s, where agriculture accounts for over 75% of exports and mining provides significant revenue and jobs. Niger, preparing to export its first oil shipment, faces challenges due to its soured relations with Benin, necessitating alternative routes like Togo.
Chad’s economy depends on agriculture, oil, and natural gas, with significant reserves and production. These countries’ substantial resources remain underutilized partly due to political and security instability but also due to the lack of maritime access.
Mauritania’s strategic Atlantic coast makes it a vital link in this initiative, connecting Morocco and the landlocked Sahel countries. The initiative aims to establish strategic partnerships for mutual economic benefit, with Morocco investing in these countries and providing access to its advanced infrastructure and dual maritime routes.
Opposition to France and Closer Ties with Russia
During a visit to Mali in February 2023, Burkina Faso’s Prime Minister suggested forming a federation between the two countries, resonating with historical attempts to create a West African federation at the end of French colonial rule, which ultimately failed due to internal conflicts and likely French interference.
The current military regimes in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso see France as continuing to “colonize” them through numerous agreements favoring French interests at the expense of these poor nations. Hence, the call for a confederal union echoes past efforts to resist French dominance.
The “Liptako-Gourma” charter, the basis for the new Sahel alliance, references a development authority established in 1970 for economic integration among the three countries. This historical context suggests that the current military leaders view past structures as foundations for new, more independent alliances.
Thus far, the three countries are advancing in establishing their confederal union and triangular alliance, aiming to expand them to include other countries. In late May 2024, Niger’s defense ministry announced unprecedented joint military exercises involving the armies of Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Togo, reflecting efforts to bring new members into the alliance.
This step highlights shared security challenges and economic needs, especially for the four landlocked countries. However, the Russian-French rivalry looms large, as the three countries have aligned with Russia, and Chad shows increasing rapprochement with Moscow, marked by joint military operations and mutual visits.
Togo remains partially aligned with France but joined the Commonwealth in 2022, signaling a desire to diversify partnerships. This step reflects a broader move to reduce dependency on a single traditional partner and broaden diplomatic and economic horizons.
Conclusion
Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have successfully embodied the strategy that “the best defense is a good offense.” They withdrew from the G5 Sahel group, viewing it as a coalition aligned with France, and also left the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for the same reason. In response, both organizations called on the withdrawing countries to engage in dialogue to overcome their differences. The G5 Sahel group had adopted a passive stance towards the series of military coups in three of its member states and insisted that none of them take over the rotating presidency.
Following the triple withdrawal, the G5 Sahel group is now effectively defunct, with only Mauritania and Chad remaining. Chad, in particular, is rapidly aligning with Russia, suggesting that the formal dissolution of the G5 Sahel might only be a matter of time. As for ECOWAS, which had threatened military intervention in Niger to reinstate ousted civilian President Mohamed Bazoum—a stance it did not take with the coups in Burkina Faso and Mali—the withdrawal of three member states does not threaten its disintegration but does affect its unity and the future political stability of its member countries. It becomes easier for a country to experience a coup, withdraw from the organization, and thereby escape punishment.
Conversely, ECOWAS’s double standards in dealing with coups have weakened its position. Initially a strong force that could both threaten and negotiate to restore civilian rule, it has now lifted most sanctions on these countries and adopted a conciliatory tone to persuade them to reconsider their withdrawal.
The withdrawal of the three countries and their announcement of forming a Sahelian States Alliance and a Confederation—focused on economic and developmental cooperation—raises the question of whether this move is strategic or merely tactical. The future might see the military leaders of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso staying in power for extended periods, organizing presidential elections in which they run and are elected, thereby transitioning from interim phases to a semblance of normalcy while keeping the coup leaders in power. Elections would then become a tool to re-elect these leaders, as they view a return to civilian rule as a regression.
Alternatively, civilians might return to power through elections, dismantling what the military built and reinstating traditional alliances, thus ending the strategic dimension of the tripartite alliance and confederation.
A third scenario is that “what was taken by force can only be reclaimed by force,” possibly leading to a new wave of counter-coups. These new military leaders might call for a renewed alliance with France, reverting to the previous status quo during civilian periods, which would result in the decline of Russian influence in favor of the current dominance.
