Currently, Islamic movements lack an organizational presence in power, although there are Islamic figures participating in the current government, most notably the Prime Minister, Hamza Abdi Barre. In general, political Islam, Sufism, and most of the Salafi movement recognize the government in Somalia, while jihadist movements fight the ruling system and deem it illegitimate from an Islamic perspective.
Introduction
From the margins to the center of events, this is how the role of Islamic movements in Somalia transformed after the collapse of the central state in 1991. Following the end of the repression and persecution by the military regime under General Mohamed Siad Barre (1969-1991), Islamists gained considerable influence in the post-1990s period.
The emergence of Islamic movements was linked to waves of Islamic missions that came in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly from Cairo, alongside educational institutions from Saudi Arabia, giving rise to Islamic currents affiliated with the Salafi school in Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Initially, the Muslim Brotherhood dominated other Islamic currents in terms of numbers, supporters, and influence within the Somali Islamic scene. The Sufi movement gained recognition in the early 20th century for its battles against Western colonialism (from the UK and Italy), although its role diminished after the country’s independence in July 1960 due to a lack of organizational renewal and its association with the military regime, which utilized it to suppress its Islamist opponents, especially during the 1970s and 1980s.
Historically, the emergence of Islamic currents in Somalia can be traced to two phases:
- The Pre-Independence Phase: Liberation movements emerged in response to Western colonialism, particularly after the Berlin Conference agreement in 1884 that divided Somalia. However, the spark for Islamic movements started with the Dervish Movement led by Sayyid Mohamed Abdullah Hassan, who led the first liberation movement against colonial rule (by France, Italy, and Britain) for 21 years, from 1899 to 1920. He is known for his affiliation with the Salihiya Sufi order (a branch of Sufism in Somalia).
Sufi movements also emerged in southern Somalia, such as the uprising led by Sheikh Hassan Barsane (1853-1927) and Sheikh Ahmed Maday (who died in 1900), associated with the Qadiriyya order, who fought against Italian colonialism. The struggle of Sufi movements in the south continued until around 1930, expanding to include both cities and rural areas, supported by the Somali clans, particularly the Bimaal tribe.
The Italians employed brutal force to quash liberation movements by 1924, targeting and assassinating leaders of these revolutionary movements. Historians note that the fall of Somalia into the hands of the Italian and British colonizers was completed after nearly a century of resistance by the Somali people, beginning with the treaty between Britain and the Somali tribes in Berbera in 1827, with the full suppression of Somali liberation movements occurring in the south by the Italians in 1927.
- The Post-Independence Phase: This phase began specifically after the end of the civil government era after independence (1960-1969) with General Mohamed Siad Barre’s ascent to power in a bloodless coup, adopting a socialist revolution in an Islamic environment adhering to the Shafi’i school. Consequently, Islamic movements emerged in response to the wave of Communism that characterized Barre’s regime. The Islamic movements quickly became the first victims of the socialist regime, despite the initial calm of the new regime. However, contradictions and distances soon emerged between the Islamists and the socialist regime, escalating after the military government adopted absolute equality in inheritance on January 11, 1975. Leaders of Islamic movements considered this move an affront to Islamic principles, as the colonialism that ruled Somalia for nearly a century could not impose such measures on Somali society.
Active Islamic Movements
Currently, Islamic movements lack an organizational presence in power, yet individuals from these movements participate in the government, particularly Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre. Generally, political Islam, Sufism, and the majority of the Salafi movement recognize the Somali government, while jihadist movements oppose the ruling regime, deeming it illegitimate from an Islamic perspective.
Nonetheless, Islamic movements in their various forms currently exist in a state of dormancy or stagnation; despite over three decades passing, they have not reached the level of political activism and experience found in some Arab countries. The main active Islamic movements are three:
- Political Islam (The Muslim Brotherhood): The Islamic movement in Somalia (the Muslim Brotherhood) was founded by five individuals: Sheikh Mohamed Ahmed Noor Gruerei, Dr. Ali Sheikh Ahmed Abu Bakar, Dr. Mohamed Yusuf Abdallah, Sheikh Ahmed Rashid Hani, and Professor Abdallah Mohamed Abdallah in a house in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. They announced the establishment of the Reform Movement, following the Brotherhood’s approach in 1978, and became a member of the International Muslim Brotherhood in 1987, representing it in the Horn of Africa. Since the 1990s, it has been considered one of the strongest Islamic movements with a direct impact on Somali society.
The movement plays a major role in civil society organizations, having organized a comprehensive reconciliation among the tribes in the capital, paving the way for the successful 2001 Arta Conference, resulting in the election of the first Somali president abroad (Djibouti), Abdi Qasim Salad Hassan, post-civil war, contributing to efforts to pull Somalia out of its crises.
The Islamic movement, like others, has been affected by the country’s political and security turmoil; the emergence of Islamic courts was the last straw for the movement, causing schisms between those opposing and supporting participation in the administration of the Islamic Courts Union, created from various ideologically diverse Islamic courts in 2006. Ethiopian incursions in 2007 exacerbated the internal crisis. About 40 leaders and members of the movement declared the dismissal of the Islamic Reform Movement’s leadership, appointing a new administration, which was rejected by both the former leadership and the Brotherhood’s guidance office. However, the dissenters insisted on their position, forming an independent organization called “New Blood,” while retaining the official name “Reform Movement.”
Several factions emerged with the same idea but different political orientations, transforming the Islamic movement into a broad, fragmented current divided among various entities claiming ties to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. This broad movement currently includes:
- The old wing, known as the “Islamic Reform Movement,” which comprises traditional leaders, remaining the main branch of the Brotherhood.
- “New Blood,” the reformist wing that split from the Reform Movement in 2007 amid internal crises since early 2002. It was reestablished in 2013 in Mogadishu after some members of the Reform Movement joined the new movement.
- “The Reform and Change Movement,” founded by Sheikh Mohamed Gruerei in 2015, after announcing his split from “New Blood,” due to disagreements about the management of the movement.
- The Islamic Gathering Movement or Al-Sheikh Group, named after Sheikh Mohamed Maalim Hassan. The group has mostly dissolved, but some of its figures remain influential in the Islamic community.
The Muslim Brotherhood dominates various aspects of Somali society and is regarded as the primary driver in the educational and developmental sector, despite existing internal divisions. Furthermore, individuals associated with the movement occupy leadership positions in the Somali government, most notably Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre, and hold positions in Mogadishu’s municipality.
- The Salafi Movement: The salafi approach began to spread in Somalia from the 1950s to the 1970s, with Sheikh Nuruddin Ali Alo (who passed away in 1996) establishing the roots of Salafi thought in the city of Galcayo in northeastern Somalia. The city of Ayl became a center for early members of this current. Sheikh Nuruddin founded the “Anwar Sunnah” group in Somalia, to which he belonged in Egypt, and engaged in the Somali government where he became director of religious affairs in the Ministry of Justice. However, he did not establish any political party or public movement, limiting his work to elite circles.
Another salafi orientation is represented by “Ahal” group, which disbanded after some of its leaders became more “extremist,” notably the group leader Sheikh Abdi Qadir Mahmoud due to the influence of Shukri Mustafa’s ideology that denied the legitimacy of Muslim societies. This radical wave sparked Islamic discussion and debate, leading to the formation of the “Islamic Group” in 1980 shortly after the announcement of the reform movement, with Sheikh Mahmud Isa Mahmud becoming its first president.
In 1982, the Islamic Union was founded, stemming from a new Salafi orientation that would serve as an unifying structure for the Salafi school in Somalia, after a merger between the Islamic Group in southern Somalia and the Islamic Youth Unity movement in the north led by Sheikh Ali Warsame, a graduate of the Islamic University in Medina.
The Islamic movement in Sudan, led by Sheikh Hassan al-Turabi, sought to unify Islamic forces in Somalia. Al-Turabi aimed to establish a network of Islamic organizations linked to Sudan across Africa, with Somalia prioritized in his plan. Sheikh Hassan Taher Owies, in his memoirs “Amir of the Mujahideen in the Horn of Africa,” recounts that in early 1982, the Islamic groups in Somalia were invited to Sudan for unification. The existing Islamic movements in the Somali landscape at the time included: the Reform Movement (Muslim Brotherhood), the Takfir Group, the Islamic Group (Salafi) in southern Somalia, and the Islamic Youth Unity (Salafi) in the north. The Islamic Group and the Islamic Youth Unity accepted the invitation, aligning with the universal ambition of the Islamic movement in Sudan.
The Islamic Group in the south merged with the Islamic Youth Unity in the north, moving from a new Salafi orientation that formed a unifying structure for the Salafi school in Somalia, under the leadership of Sheikh Ali Warsame. Thus, one could argue that Salafi da’wah began to spread through Somali society. However, this merger under the banner of “Islamic Union” lasted no longer than six months due to doctrinal differences; nonetheless, the United Movement persisted as a separate entity due to the ongoing affiliation of its members and gained increasing momentum due to its opposition to the regime initially and for the clarity of its ideology, thus attracting this orientation.
Like other Islamic organizations in Somalia, the Islamic Union faced challenges of survival and adaptation to the changes in the country post-central state collapse. Its influence expanded eastward and southward, but both internal and external factors led to its fragmentation after the Ethiopian intervention and related events in the Jubbada Hoose region of southern Somalia in 1996, which crippled the power of the Islamic Union and undermined the “jihadist” project of the Salafi school.
Despite the ongoing debate regarding whether the Islamic Union is a jihadist current, this idea was not absent from its projects before the state collapse. After the country’s fragmentation, the group was contested with multiple factions, one of which was “jihadist” and influenced by events in Afghanistan, although the missionary current remained predominant, while jihadist pockets lingered within the union for a while. Following the emergence of Al-Shabaab, the jihadist wing joined forces with it.
Similar to the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafi Islamic Union fractured into various groups, belonging to different schools of thought, including the Wada’e and Madkhali schools, among others with ties to the Yemeni Salafi school, currently active in Somalia, starting to establish its Salafi incubators in the suburbs of Mogadishu.
Currently, the Salafi current consists of several groups, mainly:
- The Group of Adherents to the Book and the Sunnah, established in 1996; it is a large but politically fragile organization united by Salafi affiliation and the belief in the necessity of organized joint action led by influential missionary figures in Somali society.
- The unorganized Salafism, known as “Madkhali” or “Wada’e,” characterized by a rejection of organizational collective action.
- The jihadist Salafism, which aligns with the Salafi approach of the adherents but is at odds with the “jihadist” approach as adherents’ leaders refuse to link the violent ideology adopted by Al-Shabaab to the Salafi school, reflecting the distance between the armed movement and the Salafi missionary organization in thought and methodology.
Considering the prevailing political interactions in the region, the Salafi current generally has a considerable popular base, thanks to its missionary, academic cadre, and engagement in trade, making it capable of remaining influential in both the social and political frameworks within Somalia. Moreover, it possesses the intellectual and methodological structure that allows it to approach politics despite the challenges posed by existing political and clan-based power-sharing regarding state positions in the federal and regional system.
- The Jihadist Current: This refers to Al-Shabaab, loyal to Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria.
Al-Shabaab Movement: Initially, the “Al-Shabaab” movement was an armed faction of the Islamic Courts Union, emerging in the wake of warlords in the country between 2004 and 2006. The movement declared its separation from the Union in 2007 following the Ethiopian military invasion of Somalia in late December 2006.
Historically, the indications of the birth of “Al-Shabaab” from Al-Qaeda began with the visits of the first generation of Somali Islamists to Kandahar and Kabul in Afghanistan for military training during the 1990s. The Somali and Yemeni arenas presented probable primary targets for Al-Qaeda. The “East Africa” cell set up its headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya, under the leadership of Al-Qaeda’s military commander, Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri, who began preparations to establish camps in Somalia in late 1991. Islamists with ties to Al-Qaeda engaged in the war against American forces operating under the UN mission “UNOSOM” in 1993. However, following the conclusion of the mission in Somalia in 1995, Al-Qaeda dissipated and failed to attract followers or recruit new fighters due to social complexities, primarily the clan structure of Somali society, and the refusal of high-ranking leaders in the Islamic Union to support the internationalization of jihad against America and its allies in the region. Sheikh Hassan Taher Owies, a founder of the Union, stated that he refused to pledge allegiance to Al-Qaeda and to the Taliban’s Amir Mullah Muhammad Omar months before the events of September 11, 2001, engaging in discussions with leaders in the organization about this matter, who informed him that he had missed a significant opportunity to be appointed as the Amir of Al-Qaeda in East Africa by refusing to offer allegiance. Owies justified his stance by stating that he wanted financial and military support from Al-Qaeda without interference in the jihadist issues in Somalia. Consequently, Al-Qaeda sought to coordinate with other members of the Islamic Union, particularly the second generation of Islamists, marking the beginning of the establishment of the strongest Al-Qaeda branch in the world in terms of offensive planning, expansion, and military strength.
The “Al-Shabaab” movement represents the most notable jihadist entities with a Salafi orientation in Somalia, predominantly driven by the second generation of Islamists, despite initially accommodating first-generation leaders. However, due to internal fractures and violent shake-ups affecting its structure, leadership currently consists predominantly of second-generation individuals, such as Ahmed Abdi Godane “Abu Ubaidah,” who was previously a member of “Ras Kamboni Brigades.” The movement presently controls vast areas in southern Somalia but has lost substantial territories in central and northeastern parts of the country as of 2023.
Islamic State in Somalia (ISIS): In October 2015, former Al-Shabaab leader Abdi Qadir Mu’min declared his allegiance to ISIS with a group of fighters from Al-Shabaab numbering no more than 30, a move that signaled the formation of a new armed jihadist organization in Somalia. This declaration marked the first of its kind since media speculation at the beginning of 2016 suggested that Al-Shabaab intended to announce its allegiance to ISIS similarly to Boko Haram in Nigeria. However, it appears that the upper leadership of Al-Shabaab remained determined to remain allied with Al-Qaeda, to which it declared loyalty in 2012.
The reasons behind the expansion of the Islamic State in Somalia include a rise in internal fractures that initially surfaced as a temporary crisis within Al-Shabaab but transformed into field purges that led to a decline in its military and operational role in the region. Notably, the organizational structure of Al-Shabaab began to weaken following the death of its spiritual leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, in a US airstrike in southern Somalia at the end of 2014. The spiritual void created by Godane’s absence, combined with the strong emergence of ISIS in Iraq and its victories there, hastened the defection of a small group from the parent organization.
Furthermore, the vital and strategic location of Somalia makes it significantly important for ISIS to solidify its presence in Africa, competing with Al-Qaeda in the region. Somalia serves as a safe transit zone for transporting fighters and military equipment from the Middle East to Somalia and then to Libya, eventually reaching Boko Haram in Nigeria, which pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2015.
Despite the declaration of loyalty from a group of former Al-Shabaab fighters to the Islamic State, the new organization is still in its formative stages, with estimates of its size ranging between 800 and 1,000 fighters. There are security reports indicating that the organization has started expanding in northeastern Somalia, training new batches of fighters, with over 300 recently completing their military training.
Abdi Qadir Mu’min heads the organization in Somalia, but it has not officially announced any known administrative structure like other armed groups with ideological affiliations, and accurate information regarding its military capabilities remains unclear, including whether it poses a military threat to Somalia and its immediate neighbors, and the likelihood of surpassing Somali and African forces in central and southern Somalia.
Al-Shabaab is regarded as one of the strongest jihadist organizations in Africa and the Horn of Africa, controlling extensive areas in southern Somalia, as well as being active in northeastern Kenya, launching attacks on border towns between Somalia and Ethiopia. Although the Islamic State branch in Somalia is small, it has become a pivotal meeting point and financial hub for members of the organization in Africa, suggesting a potential shift toward a jihadist center that attracts many foreign fighters, according to Western security circles.
Fourth: The Sufi Current:
In the period leading up to Somalia’s independence in 1960, there were two types of Sufi orders: First, the old or traditional orders characterized by multiple leaderships and decentralized management, such as the Qadiriyya order.
The second type consists of centrally-led orders influenced by the reformist and renewal movements that occurred in the Islamic world between the late 17th and late 19th centuries, including the Ahmadiah order and its branch, the Salihiya, which are influenced by the teachings of Sayyid Ahmed bin Idris.
Some of the most significant Sufi orders currently in Somalia include:
- The Qadiriyya Order: Founded by Sheikh Abdul Qadir al-Jilani, one of the most famous Sufi saints, it is among the oldest Sufi orders that reached East Africa with Yemeni traders and immigrants. It spread in coastal cities like Merca (which some residents believe Abdul Qadir himself visited and passed away there), Zeila, Mogadishu, and Harar. The followers of the Qadiriyya in East Africa engaged in religious and scholarly activities, establishing scientific and religious centers represented in zāwiyahs and scientific associations, producing groups of students and jurists who contributed to the spread of Islam in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Tanzania, and Somalia.
- The Ahmadiah Order: Established by Sayyid Ahmed bin Idris al-Fasi, who died in 1837 in “Sabia” located in the southern region of Saudi Arabia today. The order was introduced to East Africa by Sheikh Ali Miah Dirjiba, who died in 1917, gathering many followers, particularly from the middle Shabelle valley. Sheikh Abdul Rahman, known as “Mawlana,” was the first sheikh of the Ahmadiah Order in southern Somalia, being a student of Sayyid Ahmed bin Idris, meeting his teacher in Mecca. Other notable figures in the Ahmadiah Order, such as Sheikh Hassan Maalim, were also among the followers of Sheikh Abdul Rahman, with Sheikh Ali Miah establishing a scientific center in Marka.
- The Salihiya Order: Related to Muhammad bin Saleh, who died in 1919, and is a branch of the Ahmadiah order. Sheikh Muhammad established a center for the Salihiya in the Shabelle region near the towns of Jowhar and Bal’ad. One of the most significant followers of this order was Sayyid Muhammad Abdullah Hassan, who led the resistance against British colonialism in northern Somalia.
- Other Sufi Orders: Various other Sufi groups are present in the country, such as the Rifaiyyah, some of which bear local names corresponding to their imams and sheikhs. The activities of these orders continue throughout the year, although their influence in political and social affairs is limited.
The current experience of Sufi orders is confined to advocacy and the traditional promotion of Islam in the Horn of Africa. They are generally criticized for their approaches not keeping pace with modern times. Conversely, the role of Sufis has been gradually growing recently, especially after increasing criticism of their ideology. Proponents of Sufism are becoming increasingly concerned with enhancing their presence within state institutions, renewing their activities, and becoming more cohesive than before as they feel challenged from two sides: the military challenge posed by Al-Shabaab and the ideological challenge represented by the Salafi movement in general.
Islamic Movements and Political Interactions
The prevailing characteristic of most Islamic movements in Somalia is weakness and fragmentation due to the fragility of their organizational structure.
One manifestation of the widespread division within Salafi currents is the mutual accusations of apostasy, as well as purges and assassinations based on takfir views and fatwas. Some assassinations may not be far from political objectives, as is the case with Al-Shabaab’s assassinations of certain scholars, especially since the movement has a global political agenda. The Sufi current lacks a significant role in both the social and political spheres, as its activities are limited to traditional religious matters, failing to capitalize on the prevailing void to enhance its presence or influence.
The Muslim Brotherhood movement appears more fragmented and divided than others, due to the divisions and factions that have affected it. Therefore, the future of the Islamic component remains ambiguous, especially after the rise of the jihadist Salafi current, which has effectively diminished any potential role for the Islamists, specifically the Brotherhood and Sufis. The interests of the Brotherhood intersect with those of the federal government, while the Sufi movement is accused of complicity in the fight against the jihadist current on the battlefronts, particularly in the Galguduud and Mudug regions.
The transformations witnessed in Somalia since 2000 have highlighted the active participation of Islamic movements, especially the Brotherhood represented by the Islamic Reform Movement. The movement is noted for its role in facilitating the Arta Conference held in Djibouti in 2001. In the last two decades, the Reform Movement and the group adhering to the Book and Sunnah engaged in politics with their popular and advocacy weight, responding to the desire of some of their cadres to enter political space. Many of them have succeeded in holding sovereign parliamentary and executive positions, albeit sometimes constrained by clan sharing practices impeding active political engagement.
The Brotherhood is thus the most present in the political process, with prospects to bolster its role in power through participation in parliamentary and presidential elections with influential individuals and figures. The Brotherhood currently maintains a significant presence in the federal government, with Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre being a prominent member of this current, while many are assigned key positions in local administrations, including the mayor of Mogadishu, Yusuf Hussein Jim’ale. They are also active members of the judiciary and in foreign political representation.
Consequently, the growing role of the “New Blood” movement, interwoven within state structures, has a promising future for remaining at the helm of power and close to decision-making circles, supported by its prominent leaders and competencies in the social and political fields. However, this current’s participation is criticized for lacking organization, and it has not formed a political bloc in parliament or government, which could undermine its political efforts in the future if another current ascends to power. This has indeed transpired in the 2017 elections, won by former President Mohamed Abdullah Farmajo, which saw the Brotherhood’s role decline in the political landscape, reducing it to an observer status despite influential figures from it holding political weight in Farmajo’s government (2017-2022).
Regarding the Sufi movement, though its role has diminished in several sectors of public life in Somalia and it currently lacks significant popularity, with the balance tipping in favor of political Islamic currents, Sufi thought remains latent among a broad spectrum of Somali society. Its political role has diminished since confrontations between it and the Somali army were resolved in the central regions after it turned its arms against the military and security forces of the Galguduud region in 2022, a shift that thwarted the political project of the Sufi movement, represented by the “Ahal Sunnah Wal Jama’a” organization. This latter organization had a political and security influence in the central regions, aligning behind the Somali army and federal government to counter Al-Shabaab, but after its influence was contained, the organization has been unable to engage in political activities, especially in the 2022 elections. Currently, it lacks any agenda or political project paving the way for its return to the political sphere unless conditions change in its favor.
In general, both the “New Blood” Brotherhood movement and the “Group of Adherents to the Book and Sunnah” Salafi movement are the most impactful and cohesive in the political scene, although there is a lack of party pluralism, alongside the absence of actual political experience for Islamic movements overall, especially regarding participation in the political process and contributing to the construction of the modern Somali state.
Regarding the armed jihadist current, its future largely hinges on its response to the surrounding conditions and the challenges it faces, including its willingness to enter into a political partnership with the federal government and engage in direct negotiations to resolve a conflict that has persisted for nearly two decades. However, should the armed jihadist movements continue their current state, the geopolitical transformations in the Horn of Africa will likely not permit the existence of entities with ties to Al-Qaeda and ISIS, given the federal government’s focus on eliminating public security threats and quelling Al-Shabaab’s insurgency in the south and ISIS’s presence in the northeast. The more the federal government can restore the ranks of its armed forces and engage in joint military defense agreements with foreign countries with interests in the region, the sooner these organizations may face their demise, especially in their current extreme “jihadist” form.
Islamic Movements and Future Directions
The influence of Islamists in the Somali political landscape will likely continue on an individual basis due to their connections to the power circles; however, they currently lack a tangible and clear project to impact the power structure and contribute to the democratic transformation and building of state institutions. Even philosophically, they have not proposed alternatives concerning the governance system nor have they participated in any actual political experience, meaning that any future influence of the Islamic current, either moderate or extremist, depends on renewed transformations within the internal dynamics of Islamic forces.
Three scenarios outlining the political role of non-jihadist Islamic movements can be identified:
- Political Participation and Cooperation with the State: Since President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s arrival, the federal government has been pushing Islamic movements to cooperate with state institutions, seeking to absorb their influential figures to stand alongside it against armed Islamist movements, hence contributing to state consolidation efforts. This, in turn, would provide those figures with opportunities to play larger roles in governance and assume future governmental posts, possibly allowing for the formation of politically impactful Islamic parties, or at the very least, providing a positive political climate and environment for future political engagement for Islamists.
- Continuation of the Status Quo: This implies that most Islamic movements (the Brotherhood, Salafis, Sufis) remain in their current state, without exerting significant influence in the political scene due to the absence of a political project, alongside a diminishing standing within the public sphere due to deep internal disagreements affecting their cohesion and unity. This scenario seems more likely currently amidst the political and security crises facing Somalia due to complications within its administrative system stemming from tribal and sectarian politics.
- Fragmentation and Marginalization: Islamic movements experienced marginalization during the military regime (1969-1991), facing persecution and harassment; their members were imprisoned, but they breathed easier after the military’s fall in 1991. Nonetheless, internal disputes and stagnation remain today’s most significant risks. Should they engage in confrontations with the authority, other powers, or among themselves, the possibility of oblivion looms, leaving them marginalized without success in their project.
As for jihadist movements, particularly Al-Shabaab linked to Al-Qaeda, its future and persisting strength as an influential force are tied to numerous factors; one is the weakness and inability of the Somali government to confront movement challenges effectively or address crises that strengthen it. Notably, the African Union forces are preparing to withdraw from Somalia after almost 13 years of presence, though it remains unclear how Somali forces will deal with various threats in the country, given that these forces are still not adequately equipped to take on this responsibility. Moreover, the international effort to curb Al-Shabaab’s funding is slow, with the UN expert committee noting that the group continues to receive money through donations and that several international reports implicate states in its support.
The Islamic State in Somalia similarly faces an uncertain fate if the federal government and Puntland region manage to limit its influence in areas like “Al-Miskad” mountains and Gelgula hills. Generally, the activities of the organization are limited to Puntland, highlighting a notable shift toward solidifying its presence there as its control wanes in its core regions in Iraq and Syria. It aims to achieve regional gains across Africa, having recorded significant successes in this regard, particularly in parts of Mali, Mozambique, and Somalia, setting the stage for expanding its financial operations and resuming foreign operations, potentially altering the dynamic and returning to the forefront of international anti-terrorism agendas.
ISIS’s revenues in Somalia reportedly surged from about $70,000 per month in 2018 to $2.5 million in 2021, exceeding $2 million in the first half of 2022. According to a report by the UN monitoring team in February 2023, the ‘Krar’ office, which coordinates ISIS operations in Africa and is headquartered in Somalia, was sending cryptocurrency payments of $25,000 monthly to the ISIS ‘Khorasan’ province in Afghanistan.
In conclusion, any failure by the federal government in Somalia or international bodies to eradicate Al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia will lead to the continued existence of these armed groups and potentially bolster their capabilities. Al-Shabaab may expand and consolidate its victories while extending into new territories, while ISIS could emerge as a financial hub, particularly in Africa. A report from International Crisis Groups indicated that US security officials believe “Mu’min” is the current leader of the Islamic State in Somalia, though the organization has not officially confirmed this. Other reports suggest that US security agencies exchanged intelligence with their Ethiopian counterparts concerning ISIS in Somalia, especially regarding the possible presence of its leader, Abu Hafs al-Haashimi al-Qurashi, in Puntland. Thus, the organization has managed to form a foundational nucleus in Puntland, penetrating the social fabric of the region, with its leader belonging to the Majirteen clan residing there, providing the organization an edge in thwarting security plans targeting its existence based on its clan ties and the challenging mountainous terrain.
Conclusion
Islamic movements in Somalia play an essential role in the fabric of Somali society, and their influence has grown significantly post-2000, thanks to their political and social impact, especially from Brotherhood, Sufi, and unarmed Salafi currents. Nevertheless, the rise of the jihadist current has eclipsed this influence, leading to a decline in their role in confronting adversaries and diminishing their advocacy activities across the country. Consequently, the future of Islamists hinges largely on how they engage with prevailing political issues and their ability to reclaim their role and influence by revising their policies concerning facing adversaries from jihadist currents on one hand, and providing a political vision for potential active participation in the political process and governance on the other. In summary, the fate of political Islam is reliant on its understanding of the current reality and adaptability to new alterations regarding Somali affairs and the regional environment.
As for the jihadist current, particularly Al-Shabaab linked to Al-Qaeda, military pressures exerted by the federal government against it, particularly in southern Somalia, are likely to increase. Government forces have pushed Al-Shabaab to alter its combat strategy from one of attacking the government to defending its territorial gains and preventing the loss of more land and cities, thus avoiding a loss of control over southern Somalia, thereby affecting its influence in northeastern Kenya and Tanzania, and impairing its ability to create threats in Uganda, Ethiopia, and Djibouti.
The Islamic State faces a similarly uncertain threat potential in Somalia and the region, arising more from its future ambitions than from its current capabilities. It has played a substantial role as a regional financial hub and has major involvement in expanding operations throughout the African continent, aspiring to establish regional dominance in Puntland as a preliminary step towards becoming the most powerful presence throughout Somalia. However, this goal appears challenging considering the limited tribal grounding of the organization and Al-Shabaab’s opposition, alongside local authorities’ efforts to curtail its expansion.
