On January 17, 2025, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) proposed an initiative to halt the escalating conflict in northeastern Syria between Turkey-backed factions and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The initiative includes the PKK’s agreement to withdraw its forces from the Kurdish self-administration areas in northern Syria in exchange for the SDF retaining control in northeastern Syria, under a federal governance framework. Alternatively, it seeks to ensure a significant share for the Kurds of Syria in shaping the new political system in the country. The PKK’s call is linked to an attempt to neutralize the military pressures from Turkey-backed groups on the SDF, which has been conducting a military operation called “Dawn of Freedom” since November 30, 2024, aimed at dismantling the Kurdish project in Syria.
There appears to be a desire within the PKK to alleviate pressure on the SDF, especially in light of regional and international shifts resulting from the fall of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. One of the most significant consequences for the Kurdish self-administration has been the calls from European powers for the Kurds to disarm and engage in the new Syrian landscape, which in the PKK’s view translates to the erosion of the gains achieved by the SDF over the past decade.
Multiple Motivations
The PKK’s initiative can be understood within the context of several pressing factors that impact the Kurdish self-administration in northeastern Syria and pose increasing threats at the current time. The major factors include:
Increased violence from Turkey-backed factions against the SDF: Over the past two months, there has been a rise in the violence perpetrated by Turkish-affiliated Syrian factions against the SDF, including groups like Ahrar al-Sham, the Al-Ahmad, Hamzat, and Sultan Murad factions, all of which are funded by Turkey. Clashes between Turkey-backed factions and Kurdish forces have intensified since the fall of Assad’s regime as the former has sought to capitalize on the situation in Syria by calling for the dismantling of the Kurdish self-administration and threatening direct intervention in northeastern Syria. This culminated in a threat from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on December 25, 2024, to the Kurds of Syria to disarm or face dire consequences.
Turkey’s strengthened influence in Syria following Assad’s fall: Turkey has successfully repositioned itself in Syria after the rise of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, enhancing its influence amid a noticeable decline in Iranian and Russian presence. This has created a fertile environment for Turkey to escalate pressures on the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), particularly given the silence of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the transitional Syrian government’s indifference to Turkish military movements against the Kurds in northeastern Syria, allowing Turkey to operate with relative autonomy against Kurdish entities.
Diminishing Western support for Syrian Kurds: The PKK’s initiative is closely tied to the noticeable decline in the positions of Western countries that support the Kurdish self-administration in northern Syria. While the European Union has called on the Kurds of Syria to disarm and engage in the new Syrian order, there are concerns about the stance of the U.S. administration under Donald Trump, which declared Syria as a “non-friendly state” and suggested that “there is no U.S. interest in maintaining American troops in northeastern Syria,” in addition to supporting Erdoğan’s policies, with whom he has a close personal relationship.
Simultaneously, Kurdish concerns increased following the visit of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander General Michael Kurilla to northeastern Syria on January 17, 2025, during which he emphasized the need to repatriate foreign ISIS fighters. This call, according to many observers, could disrupt the SDF’s calculations, as they view the management of detention centers for thousands of foreign fighters as a key leverage point. This seemed to align with Washington and Ankara’s shared call for the repatriation of foreign fighters tied to ISIS, which would undermine the SDF’s strategic leverage in their relationships with the West and their continued support.
Opening space for mediation efforts between Turkey and the SDF: Some estimates suggest that the PKK’s initiative aims to create room for mediation efforts to reduce tensions between Turkey and the SDF, especially following the involvement of Masoud Barzani, the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, who is close to Ankara, in the current crisis. His meeting with SDF commander Mazloum Abdi on January 16, 2025, aimed to neutralize Turkish pressures on the SDF.
The PKK’s initiative also comes amidst efforts led by the Kurdish National Movement and the ruling party’s partner in power to end the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, including a call in October 2024 for the release of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in exchange for him addressing the Turkish parliament, declaring the dismantling of the PKK, and engaging in peace negotiations with Turkey— a proposal that was welcomed by Öcalan and significant Kurdish forces.
Containing Syrian government’s support for Ankara: The PKK acknowledges the special relationship between Ankara and the new Syrian administration under Ahmad al-Shara, which currently relies on Turkey to meet some of its critical needs, particularly in energy, in addition to needing Turkey’s role to boost the image of the Syrian administration.
This can be seen in the statements made by Syrian Foreign Minister Assad al-Shaibani on the eve of his visit to Turkey on January 15, 2025, where he emphasized Damascus’ rejection of any “threat” targeting Turkey from its territory, referring to the Kurdish fighters in northern Syria. In this context, the PKK may aim to prevent Turkey from justifying its interventions against the Kurds in northeastern Syria or to increase pressure on Ahmad al-Shara’s administration to exclude the Syrian Kurdish stream from the future Syrian equation.
Obstructive Challenges
The PKK believes that its presence in northern Syria serves as one of Ankara’s justifications for continuing its military interventions against the Kurds in Syria. Thus, it can be interpreted as the PKK offering tactical concessions to avoid the significant pressure faced by the SDF, both politically and on the ground, as well as proposing an initiative that includes the possibility of withdrawing from northern Syria in exchange for securing the gains of Kurdish self-administration.
However, several challenges indicate the likelihood of failure for this initiative. The first is the weakened trust between Turkey and the PKK, which poses a primary obstacle to the success of the PKK’s initiative; Turkey continues to classify it as a terrorist organization, while significant leadership within the PKK insists on the necessity of continuing the use of hard power against Turkey, viewing it as one of the critical approaches to protecting the Kurdish project in the region. The second challenge is that the current developments in Syria following Assad’s fall represent, in Turkey’s view, an opportunity to eliminate Kurdish aspirations in the country and dismantle the Kurdish institutions formed after 2011 in northeastern Syria. Consequently, the PKK’s initiative may face an unwelcoming stance from Turkey.
The third challenge is the diminishing role of key players on the Syrian scene, particularly Moscow and Tehran, alongside the lukewarm Arab stances towards the Kurdish self-administration, which could mirror negatively on the fate of the PKK’s initiative. The fourth is Ankara’s insistence on accusing the Kurdish People’s Protection Units—which form the backbone of the SDF—of being the Syrian branch of the PKK, designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey; this positioning implies that Turkey views the SDF as a terrorist group. The fifth challenge is the lack of support from the new Syrian administration for the initiative, although the SDF has recently attempted to open dialogue channels with al-Shara in the hope of achieving a political settlement that guarantees them self-rule or mitigates Turkish pressures.
Missing Interaction
In conclusion, the PKK’s initiative regarding the potential withdrawal of its forces from northeastern Syria arises from an awareness of the threats and risks faced by areas under SDF control due to Turkish threats and its allied factions, as well as their implications on the future of Kurdish self-administration. However, the success of the PKK’s initiative remains contingent upon Turkey’s responsiveness, an outcome that seems unlikely given Turkey’s desire to continue employing hard power against the PKK and its affiliates in northern Syria and Iraq.
