Non-state armed actors are an integral part of interactions in the Middle East, having emerged as a result of accumulating and worsening internal conflicts and foreign interventions, which have led to the expansion of their influence at the expense of central governments. Recently, different approaches can be observed in dealing with these armed actors in the region. While some parties seek to integrate them into specific political or military frameworks, as is the case in Syria (with the agreement between President Ahmad Al-Sharaa and the Syrian Democratic Forces), there are other attempts to weaken them, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. Additionally, there are efforts aimed at calming and containing these actors, as seen in Iraq.
These approaches reflect new dynamics in the regional conflict and are based on various motivations—some related to intersections between regional and international strategies, and others tied to internal transformations in the states where these groups are present, their military strength, and their level of influence within their geographic surroundings.
Integration Trends:
Integration trends are among the most notable developments concerning armed actors, particularly in Syria, where warring parties are seeking to restructure the conflict and explore more sustainable solutions away from continued fighting. A prominent example of these integration efforts is the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and their agreement with President Al-Sharaa on March 10, 2025, which provides for the integration of all civilian and military institutions of the Kurdish autonomous administration within the framework of the Syrian state.
The main motivations for integration stem from an awareness among armed actors that internal competition could complicate the situation and lead to strategic defeats. Therefore, moving toward inclusion in larger alliances is considered a step to reduce friction with adversaries and achieve relative stability in areas under their control—especially for the SDF, which seeks to align mutual interests between Kurdish forces and certain Arab factions. Moreover, this approach comes as a response to international pressures. The United States, which supports the SDF, encourages these factions to join broader alliances to facilitate the administration of the areas under their control, particularly in northeastern Syria.
However, this process faces several challenges, the most prominent being ideological and political differences. Although Al-Sharaa and the SDF agreed on military and political cooperation, ideological and political divergences remain a major obstacle and may lead to internal cracks within newly formed alliances. These divisions could also be exploited by external actors to dismantle such coalitions. Furthermore, the significant roles played by regional powers like Turkey and Iran in the Syrian arena may pose barriers to any integration process. For example, Turkey views the SDF as a threat to its national security due to its ties with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and therefore seeks to undermine any efforts to enhance the SDF’s influence through alliances.
Cases of Weakening:
In contrast to integration trends in Syria, there are efforts to weaken other groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. These two groups play central roles in regional conflicts and are perceived as Iranian proxies. However, recent shifts in regional political and military calculations have prompted some actors to attempt to curtail Tehran-aligned groups, as follows:
1. Hezbollah in Lebanon:
Efforts to weaken Hezbollah have taken several paths, most notably the increasing international pressure on Lebanon in recent years, whether through economic sanctions or diplomatic isolation. Consequently, Hezbollah—once highly influential within Lebanon’s state institutions—has faced significant challenges amid the country’s crippling economic crisis, which has weakened the group’s ability to provide services and financial support to its followers, leading to a decline in its popularity among Lebanese society.
Additionally, Hezbollah has suffered successive blows from Israeli military operations, which have destabilized the group after the loss of many of its top- and mid-level leaders. Israeli strikes on Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon have also limited the group’s military capabilities, contributing to a decline in its regional effectiveness and influence.
2. The Houthis in Yemen:
The Houthis are accused of being one of Iran’s arms in the region. Thus, the efforts to weaken them are part of Western and Israeli strategies to reduce Iranian influence. In this context, the U.S. airstrikes ordered by President Donald Trump since March 15 reflect this strategic goal. These strikes also serve as an indirect message to Iran, signaling that the United States will not tolerate attempts to expand Tehran’s influence or destabilize the region. At the same time, these strikes reflect the Trump administration’s desire to affirm the U.S. role as a major military and diplomatic power in the region. However, the American strikes may increase military tensions in the region, especially since the Houthis possess relatively advanced military capabilities, as evidenced by their announcement of an attack on the U.S. aircraft carrier “Harry Truman”—a move that signals the potential prolongation of U.S. military operations against Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen.
De-escalation Efforts:
In contrast to the trends of integration in Syria or weakening in Lebanon and Yemen, some other countries in the region are leaning toward de-escalation with non-state armed actors, as is the case in Iraq. Iraq is seeking to restore internal stability after years of war against ISIS and protracted internal conflicts, while also trying to avoid becoming entangled in current regional tensions stemming from the war in Gaza.
Popular pressure against the continuation of internal conflict and armed chaos—prevalent in Iraq for years—is one of the main drivers behind de-escalation efforts. Moreover, the Iraqi government is working to normalize relations with armed factions, especially those backed by Iran that had previously controlled vast areas of Iraq. This is being done by integrating them into official security forces or granting them political and legal status to ensure their peaceful participation in political life. Recent reports even indicate that some of these factions are, for the first time, willing to disarm.
The move toward de-escalation in Iraq also reflects the shared desire of international and regional actors—particularly the United States and Iran—to reduce tensions at present. Washington seeks a stable Iraq as a strategic ally in the region, while Tehran aims to maintain its influence in Iraq, albeit in a manner that avoids further military escalation.
Given that Iraq represents a significant battleground in the Iran-U.S. rivalry, achieving de-escalation there could help reduce regional tensions. However, this also represents a serious challenge, as it is difficult for Iranian decision-makers to relinquish influence in Iraq, especially in light of the setbacks they have faced in Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.
Potential Implications:
As a result of the different approaches to dealing with non-state armed actors, the potential implications for the Middle East vary depending on whether the chosen path involves integration, weakening, or de-escalation. Each approach could influence the stability of concerned countries, the balance of power in the region, and broader political, security, and economic dynamics. The most prominent implications include:
1. Redrawing the Political Map:
Integrating or weakening certain armed actors will reshape the political landscape in countries like Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq. This could lead to relative stability in some areas but may also trigger new conflicts among groups that were excluded or feel marginalized—particularly in Syria. Despite the integration trend representing a significant shift in Syria’s conflict dynamics and a step toward stabilization (especially given the agreement between Al-Sharaa and SDF leaders, which sets a deadline for full implementation by the end of the current year), the risks of exclusion remain.
2. Reducing Iranian Influence in the Region:
Weakening Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen is likely to diminish Iran’s regional influence, thereby affecting the balance of power between Iran and other regional actors. Curtailing Iran’s proxies is a primary objective behind the efforts to weaken Hezbollah and the Houthis, whether through international pressure, military strikes, or local policies designed to reduce their political and military influence. This is driven by the threats Hezbollah poses to Israel from Lebanon’s southern border and the threats the Houthis pose to international maritime traffic in the Red Sea.
3. Enhancing Stability in Some Countries:
De-escalation efforts with armed actors may contribute to a degree of internal stability, thus improving prospects for development and reconstruction in countries previously ravaged by conflict. Iraq, for example, stands to benefit from de-escalation as a path to greater stability and a positive transformation in its internal conflict management. The Iraqi government is attempting to strike a balance between domestic and international interests while reducing the influence of Iran-aligned factions, such as Kata’ib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, which continue to challenge Baghdad’s authority.
Conclusion:
The motivations behind the varying approaches to dealing with non-state armed actors in the Middle East are diverse—ranging from integration to mitigate conflict, to weakening to curtail Iranian influence, to de-escalation to reduce foreign intervention. These motives reflect the evolving geopolitical dynamics of the region and the complex interplay between international and domestic pressures, making the political and security landscape of the Middle East one of constant transformation and flux.
