In this article, we discuss the Oslo Agreement thirty-one years after its signing, examining what remains of its provisions after all these years. While both Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) know that the agreement no longer exists on the ground—remaining only on a theoretical level—both continue to cling to its commemorative image to achieve their goals. Israel wants to maintain its memory to implement its policies and evade national Palestinian rights, shifting the burdens and consequences of its occupation of Palestine onto the Palestinian Authority (PA). Conversely, the PA’s goal in clinging to Oslo is to preserve the document of its existence.
This context necessitates revisiting the texts of the agreement to determine if there are still provisions for the PA to adhere to, and whether a death certificate can be issued for it after being effectively killed by Israel. This requires delving into its terms, as the Oslo Agreement was based on mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO and contained seventeen articles, outlining negotiations for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza in two phases: a preparatory phase and a transitional phase.
It is essential to emphasize that the first phase, known as the “preparatory phase,” began in October 1993 and lasted for six months. During this phase, negotiations were held on two axes: the first involved the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho, which was to conclude within two months. A peaceful transfer of authority was to occur from Israeli military and civil administration to designated Palestinian representatives until elections for the Palestinian Council could be conducted. The duties of the PA were not to include external security, foreign relations, or settlements in areas from which the Israeli army would withdraw. Regarding internal security, it was to be the responsibility of a Palestinian police force formed from Palestinians within and outside the territories, alongside a committee for joint security cooperation. Following the signing of the agreement, Israel was to gradually withdraw over four months.
The second axis of the first phase stipulated the formation of a transitional Palestinian governing authority in the form of an elected Palestinian council, which would exercise powers and authorities in specified and mutually agreed areas for a duration of five transitional years. This council would have jurisdiction over all of the West Bank and Gaza in areas such as health, education, culture, social affairs, direct taxes, and tourism, in addition to overseeing the new Palestinian force, except for issues reserved for final status negotiations, such as Jerusalem, settlements, military sites, and Israelis present in the occupied territories. The agreement specified that elections for the legislative council should occur under international supervision agreed upon by both Palestinian and Israeli parties, with the process to be completed within nine months of the agreement taking effect, specifically by July 13, 1994. The agreement also detailed who had the right to participate in these elections, particularly from Jerusalem. However, the electoral system, campaign rules, media organization, the council’s composition, membership numbers, and the limits of its executive and legislative powers were all left for side negotiations between the parties. Following the transfer of powers, the council was to establish institutions serving development.
In contrast, Israel did not commit in the text to carry out negotiations to complete the withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. Instead, it reoccupied Area “A,” which was under the PA’s authority per the agreement’s provisions, and prevented construction in Area “B.” This was the first commitment within the agreement that Israel violated by withdrawing PA powers from Area “B.”
From what has been stated, we find that this phase is one of the simplest, yet after more than three decades, the PA has retained only a formal existence, often described as “authority without authority.” Israel has circumvented all its provisions, retracting what Oslo granted the PA in terms of territories and powers, and even civil affairs, which it reverted to the “civil administration” led by Major Ghassan Aliyan. Furthermore, following Hamas’s victory in the second elections in 2006, the legislative council was effectively paralyzed, culminating in President Mahmoud Abbas’s announcement on December 22, 2018, regarding its dissolution. Additionally, all issues that were postponed for discussion have been overshadowed by Israeli policy on the ground, making it difficult to address them due to the challenge of changing the status quo, as evidenced by the situation in Jerusalem, which has been Judaized and effectively handed to Israel by former U.S. President Donald Trump, who declared on December 6, 2017, that Jerusalem, both East and West, is the capital of Israel. On May 14, 2018, he opened a temporary U.S. embassy building within the existing consulate in Jerusalem. Moreover, settlements have expanded significantly during Oslo’s duration, with Israel having pursued settlement growth leading to around one million settlers controlling over 80% of the West Bank area.
It is worth noting that the second phase, the “transitional phase,” which begins after the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho, is supposed to last five years during which free and direct general elections would be held to select members of the Palestinian council overseeing the transitional PA. By that point, the Palestinian police would have taken over responsibilities in areas vacated by Israeli forces, particularly those populated. The document calls for regional economic cooperation through working groups in multilateral negotiations. As for the final status negotiations, the document specifies that they should commence within no more than three years, aiming to address outstanding issues such as Jerusalem, settlements, refugees, security arrangements, borders, and other issues of mutual interest to both parties, all based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
From the above, it is evident that the core issues of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict were not included in the agreement but rather postponed; reaching an agreement was only possible by deferring these issues, including Jerusalem, the right of return, settlements, and borders, to final status negotiations. However, after over three decades, these issues remain unresolved, becoming subject to the policy of the status quo. The Palestinian side is obliged to implement the agreement’s provisions under international and regional pressure, driven by the PA’s desire to maintain its existence for various political considerations and the personal interests of its official leadership in staying in symbolic power, while Israel continues its policies, ignoring the agreement and international law, manipulating time to change the remaining aspects of Jerusalem and the West Bank for further Judaization and eventual annexation through settlement expansion and land confiscation.
Thus, the timeframe for Oslo was set within the agreement’s texts, but Israel did not adhere to this deadline and effectively ended the agreement from the very first day by failing to address the central issues that were postponed. Israel aimed to buy time to achieve its objectives in the West Bank and Jerusalem until the territories became inundated with settlers and settlements.
In summary, the sabotage of Oslo by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu since the mid-1990s, alongside the lack of recognition of Palestinian national rights, especially the Palestinian state, coupled with Israeli practices in the West Bank and Gaza, particularly concerning Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa Mosque, the theft of Palestinian people’s funds by Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who creatively devised cuts to clearance revenues to the extent of reducing them to zero, the blockade of Gaza for more than seventeen years, and the ongoing abuses of prisoners in Israeli jails by National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir led Hamas to its actions on October 7 to liberate itself from occupation and its practices. Had Israel committed to implementing genuine peace, Hamas could not have justified the need for resistance and combat; rather, Israel is the cause of the upheaval, and its practices over more than seventy-six years have fueled the continuation of resistance. If Israel’s aim in signing Oslo was to achieve peace, it would have adhered to the peace process and ended its occupation of the Palestinian people.
The sole constant is that Oslo was imposed on the Palestinians, as stated by the late head of the Palestinian negotiating team, Ahmed Qurei. However, the question emerges: after Israel’s effective destruction of Oslo, why does the PA still cling to its one remaining provision—the “orphan” of security coordination with Israel? Is it still imposed upon them?
