The Libyan revolution in 2011 paved the way for the spread of numerous armed groups, as Libya houses a large number of these factions with a high degree of autonomy. Following the ousting of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime due to the Arab Spring revolutions, the country descended into a prolonged civil war and became susceptible to foreign influence amid ongoing fighting, political strife, a lack of democracy, and stagnation. From 2014 onwards, Libya experienced continuous political unrest, accompanied by acts of armed violence, resulting in the division of the country into two competing factions governed by separate administrations. Throughout the civil war, which lasted over a decade, many foreign powers supporting the rival factions and competing for control over natural resources flooded the country with weapons and mercenaries. Russia emerged as a key player in the Libyan drama, supporting the authorities in the eastern part of the country and their Libyan National Army. This study will be divided into three sections: the first examines the multifaceted goals and motivations behind Moscow’s interest in Libya; the second reviews Russia’s role in Libya; and the third reveals the gains Russia has made in Libya.
Russian Motivations Towards Libya
Libya is strategically located on the Mediterranean Sea, possesses some of the largest oil reserves on the African continent, abundant gold reserves, a population of just 6.5 million, and immense natural resources along a coastline with vast potential. Russia has set its sights on Libya for a long time, viewing it as a sphere of influence in the Mediterranean, at the heart of the world and a center for international conflicts, especially since the emergence of conflicts over energy ownership intensified these struggles. During the “Potsdam Conference” held in Berlin in 1945 during World War II, “Joseph Stalin” attempted to gain control over the region of Tripoli in Libya to no avail, as the United States rejected this prospect fearing Libya would become a launchpad for communist expansion in Africa. In the 1970s, relations between Moscow and Muammar Gaddafi opened further, with Russia supplying massive amounts of military equipment to bolster Gaddafi’s military activities, including the construction of advanced missile bases.
After Vladimir Putin assumed the presidency in 2000, he sought to improve relations with Libya once more. Those ties strengthened following Putin’s visit to Gaddafi in 2008, where he forgave over $5 billion in Libyan debt in exchange for contracts worth billions of dollars in energy, arms, and railways. Following Gaddafi’s ousting, relations between Russia and Libya soured, particularly after Russia vetoed a vote on Security Council Resolution 1973, which opened the door for NATO’s military intervention in Libya. Following Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012, he accused the West of destroying Libya and killing Gaddafi, claiming this violated the legality of Resolution 1973, which called for the protection of civilians and not regime change.
In 2015, General Khalifa Haftar emerged in the Libyan scene, and Russian diplomacy actively sought to reactivate its ties with Libya, secretly supporting Haftar while publicly denying any relationship with him. Russia aims to establish a stable and permanent presence in Libya, close to the eastern Mediterranean coast, complementing its expanding presence in Syria. Thus, Russia entered the Libyan conflict through the private security forces of “Wagner,” which are non-regular troops not officially part of the Russian army, but require official approval for operations outside Russia. Despite this, Russia has engaged with all actors in the Libyan conflict, both through the internationally recognized Government of National Accord led by Fayez al-Sarraj and through retired General Khalifa Haftar, allowing it to position itself as a decision-maker in the Libyan conflict. Putin’s grand strategy essentially has two aspects:
First: Russia seeks to offer an alternative to the U.S.-led international order in the post-Soviet era, by restoring multipolarity to the international system.
Second: Putin aims to ensure that Russia is genuinely recognized as a great power—on par with the United States or China—whose counsel is sought once again on global issues.
The Russian Role in Libya
Although Libya does not constitute a vital interest for Russia, it is drawn to Libya for economic and geostrategic reasons. Following Russia’s control over vast areas of Syria, their attention turned to Libya to establish a foothold. Russia began sending weapons, military equipment, and mercenaries known as the Wagner Group, often described as a private military contractor operating unofficially but in coordination with the Russian government, to support Haftar, who controls eastern Libya against the western-backed Government of National Accord. The Wagner Group’s presence has been broadly noted in statements from leaders in various countries, extending its significance beyond a mere private company bringing in mercenaries, transforming it into a tool of direct Russian intervention in Libya. Russia’s military role in Libya has focused on training local networks to handle Russian and post-Soviet weaponry, and Wagner forces have actively engaged in combat operations in Tripoli to support a halted offensive by local forces on the capital, tipping the balance of war in favor of Haftar’s forces, nearly leading to the downfall of the Tripoli government.
The presence of the Wagner Group alongside the Libyan National Army became apparent for the first time at the beginning of the siege of Tripoli in April 2019. However, the group has been active since at least 2018, controlling strategic oil fields and providing technical support to the Libyan National Army. Wagner intensified its activities following the general offensive launched by Libya’s National Army to regain control in April 2019, initially remaining minimal during the first phase, which included southern regions, before escalating after the capture of Sebha and the attack on Tripoli. Wagner fighters continue to support Haftar while being allowed to use the country to manage three airbases for transporting extracted gold from Wagner-controlled Libyan areas to Russia, which faces severe Western sanctions due to its military invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Despite the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, this did not lead Russia to reduce its endeavors in Libya; throughout 2023-2024, Russia still controls Libya’s main oil production facilities, thus enabling the Kremlin to influence global oil prices. The sustained Russian presence in Libya underscores the Kremlin’s belief that North Africa is a region of vital importance with vast untapped resources that could support Russia’s long-term economy.
The enhancement of Russia’s military presence in Libya serves multiple needs, including:
- Control over strategic infrastructure
- Advising local security forces and providing intelligence
- Influencing public opinion through social media
Russian Gains in Libya
Economic factors are among the primary reasons for Russian support for Haftar’s forces, as Russia has a long-standing history of economic interests tied to Libya. In 2008, Vladimir Putin went so far as to cancel Libya’s debt, which amounted to approximately $4.5 billion, in exchange for purchasing Russian arms worth $3 billion. Additionally, the Russian railway company and Gaddafi’s government signed a contract worth $2.6 billion to construct a 550-kilometer railway line between Sirte and Benghazi. Moscow was also set to benefit from $150 million in construction projects, along with an estimated $3.5 billion in energy sector deals. In direct response to the Libyan uprising in 2011, Russia withdrew from Libya and lost contracts valued at around $9 to $10 billion. Currently, major Russian companies, predominantly from the oil and gas sectors, such as “Tatneft,” are interested in returning to the Libyan market.
Russia shows significant interest in Libya due to its 46.4 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, the largest in Africa and the tenth largest worldwide. Libya, along with its ports and oil stations, has long been a primary energy source for Italy, southern France, and other southern European countries. These factors make Libya a competitive source for oil in comparison to others, especially since oil extraction in Libya and delivery to European markets is cheaper. Moreover, any cessation of Libyan oil production results in rising global prices, indirectly benefitting Russia, hence Moscow hopes to play an increasing role in the Libyan economy.
The Russian presence in Libya also grants leverage over Europe, given Libya’s position in Northern Africa, approximately 390 nautical miles from Malta and 486 nautical miles from the southernmost point of Italy, Lampedusa, with thousands of kilometers of shared borders facilitating crossings with neighboring African countries. Therefore, Libya’s impact on developments both within and outside its borders is significantly important. In line with its approach in other conflict regions, Moscow does not appear interested in negotiating a peace agreement in Libya, as long as it can strategically outmaneuver the West while ensuring access to ports and energy. The Russian presence in Libya will provide it with substantial leverage over Europe in the long term, allowing it to control two strategic files for Europeans: the first being energy and the second being the refugee issue, which continues to be a major concern for many Europeans.
Moreover, the Russian intervention in Libya serves as a precursor for expansion into the African continent. Russia’s economic motivations for entering Africa are apparent, given its shortage of certain minerals such as manganese, bauxite, and chromium—all crucial for Russian industries. Russia also has expertise in the energy sector that it can offer to oil-rich African nations. It has projects in Cameroon, Ghana, and Nigeria and seeks to acquire stakes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Additionally, Russia is offering nuclear energy technology to several African countries, including plans to build Egypt’s first nuclear power station financed by a $25 billion loan. Thus, Russia aims to be part of the equation in Libya and establish military bases along its coasts, positioning itself as a launchpad into the African interior and a cornerstone for protecting its interests.
Conclusion
The retreat of American influence on many international issues has allowed several countries, such as Russia, China, and Turkey, to assume broader roles in influencing the international system, making them more capable of intervening in regional and international conflicts, establishing military presence, and expanding into numerous countries. The American withdrawal has given Russia an added impetus to establish itself in Libya and pursue its interests, solidifying its presence in the Middle East and North Africa while maneuvering more effectively regarding energy and refugee issues with European countries. Russia has exploited the discrepancies in the political vision of European Union countries regarding the crisis to its advantage, strengthening its position in Libya and undermining that of EU nations.
Moscow’s alignment with Haftar’s forces in the Libyan crisis has also brought it closer to Gulf states, notably Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt. This will enhance Russia’s position and presence in the Middle East by gaining support from key countries in the region, resulting in gains across various fields through its active military and diplomatic participation in regional affairs. Furthermore, through its intervention in Libya, Russia seeks to achieve several economic interests, especially in oil, infrastructure, and future reconstruction sectors. Consequently, enhancing its presence in Libya will grant Russia greater access to the Middle East and Africa, making Libya’s deep-water ports in Tobruk and Derna logistically and geostrategically beneficial for the Russian navy, especially when paired with its base in Tartus, Syria.
References
- Jennifer Holleis | Maria Katamadze, “Libya: Russia’s Wagner Group Makes Further Inroads,” DW, available at [link to the article].
- Gregory Aftandilian, “The Fate of the Wagner Group in Syria, Libya, and Sudan,” Arab Center Washington DC, available at [link to the article].
- Federica Saini Fasanotti, “The Wagner Group’s Web in Libya,” GIS Reports Online, available at [link to the article].
