The Russian Federation and North Korea, both nuclear states, are reaching a military agreement that includes clear signals of mutual defense; President Vladimir Putin has threatened to use nuclear weapons during the war with Ukraine; North Korea has reiterated its readiness for war with South Korea and threatened to strike the American mainland with nuclear missiles; and China currently possesses the fastest-growing nuclear arsenal in the world, with comprehensive efforts to develop its nuclear capabilities that could signal a shift in its nuclear policy that has been in place for decades, driving it to become a nuclear pole seeking to surpass the current pole, the United States, which is also striving to maintain its global nuclear lead. Furthermore, the nuclear doctrines of India, Pakistan, and North Korea acknowledge the principle of first use of nuclear weapons even in the event of a conventional war; calls from some right-wing extremists in Israel have emerged advocating for a nuclear bomb to be dropped on Gaza; and voices from Europe are demanding a protective nuclear umbrella for the European Union independent of NATO. All these factors indicate a new and different reality in Asia and other parts of the world, particularly the Middle East and Europe, and suggest that a new nuclear nightmare is looming, with its main features appearing in the Asian continent.
These features are not solely linked to the verbal threats of nuclear weapon use, which had largely receded in the past three decades; they are first associated—with internal debates occurring in several conflict zones in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East—with the potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by new states in the medium to long term. Secondly, they relate to the unprecedented development of declared nuclear states’ nuclear capabilities, both strategic and tactical, as well as all possible delivery systems, meaning the nuclear triad by land, air, and sea, integrated with advanced new technologies and artificial intelligence. Thirdly, this is linked to a newly established nuclear arms race aimed at achieving varying objectives, which will surpass the intensity and participants of the similar race between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
There is no doubt that the reasons for this scenario are numerous, particularly for the Asian continent. Here, there are five declared nuclear states: China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel, with Russia likely added due to its Eurasian geography. The continent also includes countries allied with the United States through bilateral or collective defense agreements, notably Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines, which benefit from an American protective umbrella, whether traditional or unconventional.
The continent is rife with latent conflicts that could evolve into armed conflicts at any time. In the east: the crisis over China’s reunification with Taiwan, disputes with several countries in the South and East China Seas, the ongoing crisis on the Korean Peninsula, and historical conflicts and new disputes between China and Japan. In Southeast Asia: maritime disputes between various ASEAN countries and China, with these countries divided among American, Chinese, and independent allies, and numerous issues affecting maritime security and trade routes in Australia and Southeast Asia. In the south: the Sino-Indian border conflict and the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir, both of which have led these countries to acquire nuclear weapons, along with competition to establish ports and military bases in island nations in the Indian Ocean, as evidenced in Sri Lanka and the Maldives. In Central Asia: Afghanistan with its endless security issues, and the fierce competition among regional and international powers active in Central Asian republics, as new international balances begin to reshape in this region, alongside changes in the strategic landscape in the South Caucasus. In Western Asia, within a Middle Eastern geographical context, the crisis over the Iranian nuclear program and Iran’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons plays out amid a complex regional security and military environment, affected by various conflicts, particularly the repercussions of the Israeli war on Gaza, as well as Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons since the 1960s.
At the heart of these competing and conflicting interactions, which are not without cooperative elements even among adversaries, massive changes have begun to emerge in the traditional security environment that had stabilized relatively since the end of World War II. For example, there is a rapid military modernization in China, coinciding with an expansion of its regional influence and an enhancement of its international status. Additionally, there is a semblance of a Sino-Russian alliance aimed at restructuring the international system with all the strategic consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war. There are heightened security threats due to North Korea’s brinkmanship policy in East Asia. Substantial changes are occurring in defense policies and industries to enhance deterrent capabilities in Japan and South Korea. New contexts are forming for security and defense alliances among Asian countries with similar approaches and visions, whether directed against China’s rise or aligned with that rise. There is also a U.S. military re-deployment in Asia and new security or defense agreements or strategic partnerships with some of these nations. Indeed, the majority of these regional and semi-regional conflicting interactions in Asia occur within a broader context of U.S.-China competition for global leadership in the future, a rivalry that has extended to encompass everything and every domain.
All these developments, alongside the competitive and conflict-driven interactions, raise a tremendous array of questions and scenarios about nuclear weapons within the research and discussion context. It is no longer surprising to hear talk about an impending “nuclear nightmare” or a lethal “nuclear specter.” In this regard, several specific points can be raised:
The first point concerns the possibilities of countries like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan becoming nuclear states, particularly since they possess the nuclear capabilities that could allow them to do so within a short timeframe. This stems from threats faced by Japan from conventional and nuclear missiles from North Korea, China’s strong military position in the region, and escalating conflicts over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Similarly, South Korea faces nuclear threats from its northern neighbor, and Taiwan is at risk if China attempts to forcibly annex it, especially given the vast conventional military power disparity favoring China over the three.
While Japan and South Korea are under the protective umbrella of extended U.S. deterrence through joint defense agreements, Taiwan does not officially enjoy this advantage. Moreover, these three nations, like all of Washington’s allies in Asia, harbor genuine doubts and limited confidence in American deterrence, which may not be guaranteed under many circumstances. Thus, they might consider the option of nuclear armament for purely security reasons under certain internal and regional conditions. If the security approach serves as a rationale for states acquiring nuclear weapons based on the fundamental principle that “proliferation begets proliferation,” this mirrors the historical context through which the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons following the U.S. use in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, then China, the UK, and France obtaining it due to the Soviet nuclear threat, and ultimately India acquiring it due to the Chinese threat and its defeat in the 1962 war, followed by Pakistan acquiring it due to the Indian threat and its defeat in the 1971 war.
The second point pertains to China and the United States. Intelligence reports from Washington, along with Chinese behavior regarding nuclear capability development, indicate that China has shifted to a different approach to nuclear weapons since 2021, aiming to acquire capabilities that match American capabilities by the middle of the next decade and potentially altering its nuclear policy to include the initiative for use. China is also expanding its nuclear triad, including new submarines capable of striking deep into the U.S. In response, the United States is modernizing its nuclear capabilities across various fields, not only to counter China but also Russia, which is undergoing qualitative improvements to its nuclear capabilities under the experience of the Ukrainian war, amidst the collapse of arms control agreements with the United States. The rationale for this U.S.-China nuclear arms race isn’t solely grounded in security perspectives; there is also a normative dimension equally significant—enhancing international status through nuclear leadership, both in terms of quantity and capability.
The third point concerns the other declared nuclear states in Asia. The nuclear race does not end with the competition between China, the United States, and Russia; just as nuclear proliferation generates further proliferation, the modernization of a hostile nuclear state’s capabilities prompts the other rival to take similar actions. Thus, any Chinese development will be met with corresponding Indian advancements, knowing that there are four countries with a nuclear triad: the United States, Russia, China, and India. Therefore, India will begin developing all launch systems, particularly submarines, and work on enhancing its capabilities and stockpile to achieve effective nuclear deterrence against China. Likewise, Pakistan is expanding its nuclear capabilities to deter India. North Korea is similarly persistent in improving its nuclear arsenal and delivery systems, driven by fears of a potential conventional or unconventional war against it, which may involve the United States.
The fourth point relates to the nuclear policies and doctrines of declared states, necessitating analysis and adaptation to current transformations. Various issues arise here; first, the principle of first use of nuclear weapons, which presently dominates nearly all nuclear states, including those that have not officially declared it, such as China. The second issue concerns the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons and the conditions for their use, particularly what constitutes the nature and timing of a response or second strike if nuclear deterrence fails and a state uses nuclear weapons. The third issue pertains to the manner of deploying these weapons—crucial for decisions regarding nuclear military mobilization and procedures for activating launch systems equipped with operational nuclear warheads, raising questions about who makes these decisions and how command and control of nuclear weapons are managed.
All the aforementioned points represent just a fraction of the numerous realistic questions and hypothetical scenarios, leaving us in a state of uncertainty and ambiguity, much like the prevailing uncertainty regarding the developments within declared nuclear states as they enhance their capabilities and arsenals utilizing advanced technologies for modernization on land, in space, and above and beneath the oceans. However, it is certain that a “nuclear nightmare” is on the horizon if these competitive and conflicting interactions continue to follow the same trajectory in the coming years!
