The geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa has long been shaped by the strategic positioning of competing states vying for access to maritime trade routes and influence over key regional ports. The proposal made by Djibouti’s Foreign Minister, Mahamed Ali Youssouf, on August 31, 2024, to offer management of the Port of Tajoura to Ethiopia adds a new dimension to this ongoing competition. Djibouti’s offer comes at a time of increasing tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia, particularly following the memorandum of understanding Ethiopia signed in January 2024 with Somaliland to access the Port of Berbera. This article aims to analyze the motivations, implications, and broader geopolitical consequences of Djibouti’s offer to Ethiopia. Is this a genuine strategic vision for de-escalation, or merely a calculated geopolitical maneuver?
Ethiopia and the Dream of Naval Power
Since losing its coastline with Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia, a landlocked highland state, has actively sought ways to secure direct access to the Red Sea and international maritime routes. Moreover, since 2018, under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s leadership, it has championed the slogan “from river to sea” and aimed to establish a naval force. Currently, Ethiopia relies on Djibouti for most of its exports, which are routed through the main Port of Djibouti. However, its efforts to diversify its trade access points have led to friction and conflict in the Horn of Africa, especially with Somalia. The agreement with Somaliland to utilize the Port of Berbera sparked controversy, as it pertains to a semi-autonomous region of Somalia aiming for international recognition.
In a documentary broadcast on state television on October 13, 2023, Abiy Ahmed claimed that the landlocked nation of Ethiopia must acquire a port on the Red Sea to free its approximately 120 million inhabitants from a “vast geographical prison.” He recalled an Ethiopian warrior from the nineteenth century who declared the Red Sea to be the country’s “natural boundary.” Abiy Ahmed noted that Ethiopia once boasted a navy and two ports, Massawa and Assab, which were lost along with its coastline in 1993 when Eritrea became independent. Therefore, he believes the time has come to correct what he perceives as a historical wrong. He emphasized that “this is not a matter of luxury, but of existential significance.” This statement clearly reflects what Abiy has been secretly advocating since his rise to power.
Djibouti’s offer regarding Tajoura represents a calculated move to provide Ethiopia with an alternative that could ease rising tensions. The Port of Tajoura, opened in 2017 and developed with the participation of the Italian Technital Group, is located west of Tajoura, one of Djibouti’s oldest cities and its third-largest, with a population of about 45,000. According to Djibouti government sources, the country has invested approximately $90 million in the development of the port. Its strategic location is ideal for servicing inland areas, capable of accommodating vessels weighing up to 65,000 tons. Additionally, it has been designed to handle up to four million tons of potash annually, in addition to access to the Tajoura-Behelo North Corridor road.
Djibouti’s Strategic Interests
Djibouti’s offer to Ethiopia can be viewed through the lens of its broader geopolitical ambitions that transcend mere economic considerations and aim to enhance its position as a significant and influential actor within the regional landscape. Despite being a small nation, Djibouti occupies a unique strategic location at the crossroads of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, making it a critical hub for global maritime trade. Djibouti has always sought to maintain its dominance as a major center in this vital domain, playing a pivotal role in facilitating trade between African nations and others across the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. Indeed, the title “Queen of African Ports” bestowed upon Djibouti underscores this ambition. However, in recent years, a significant challenge—perhaps unexpected—has emerged from the Port of Berbera in Somaliland, posing a direct threat to this hegemony. The port has experienced a dramatic surge in both performance and strategic importance, rising in rankings to become one of the most efficient ports in East Africa and the Horn of Africa. According to the World Bank’s Container Port Performance Index, Berbera Port advanced to 106th globally, up from 144th in 2022. In contrast, the Port of Djibouti has seen a substantial decline, dropping from 26th to 379th, raising concerns about Djibouti’s future commercial prospects.
In this context, Djibouti’s offer to Ethiopia regarding the management of the Port of Tajoura serves as a strategic step to counter Berbera’s growing influence. The Port of Tajoura is ideally located to cater to Ethiopia’s commercial needs, being geographically closer to the Ethiopian border, making it a strong competitor to the Port of Berbera. By granting Ethiopia management rights in Tajoura, Djibouti seeks to strengthen its relationship with its main trading partner, Ethiopia, which depends on Djibouti for nearly 90% of its exports. Through this move, Djibouti also aims to lessen Ethiopia’s interest in turning to Berbera Port and to bolster Djibouti-Ethiopia cooperation, thus contributing to controlling Somaliland’s maritime aspirations.
Beyond the commercial and geopolitical dimension, Djibouti hopes that its role as a regional mediator in the tense conflicts of the Horn of Africa will enhance its diplomatic standing on the African stage. The region has recently experienced increasing tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia over issues of maritime sovereignty and trade. This move also coincides with seasoned Djibouti Foreign Minister Mahamed Ali Youssouf’s efforts to bolster his chances for candidacy for the presidency of the African Union Commission. Youssouf faces notable competition from prominent figures such as Somalia’s Fawzia Aden and former Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga, adding an important diplomatic dimension to Djibouti’s initiative.
Managing Regional Conflicts
It is well-known that tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia are not new; the imperial state absorbed the Somali Ogaden region and militarily invaded Somalia between 2006 and 2009. However, the issue of maritime access has heightened the geopolitical risks in the Horn of Africa. Somalia views Ethiopia’s dealings with Somaliland as a challenge to its sovereignty, while Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions are driven by what it calls “economic inevitability,” which involves securing reliable and diversified access to the Red Sea. Some may view Djibouti’s offer as a diplomatic gesture, providing Ethiopia with a viable alternative to Berbera while reducing friction with Somalia. However, Djibouti’s move is also part of a broader strategy to align with major global powers, notably China. As Djibouti enhances its role as a key logistical and commercial hub within the Belt and Road Initiative, this offer to Ethiopia connects with larger global geopolitical currents. China, already having a military base in Djibouti and heavily involved in infrastructure projects there, may see this development as an opportunity to further solidify its influence in the region.
Security Implications
For Ethiopia, the offer of the Port of Tajoura presents an economic opportunity while also posing a strategic dilemma. On one hand, this offer provides Ethiopia with access to another major port, allowing for diversified trade routes and reducing over-reliance on a single port. The newly developed Tajoura-Behelo North Corridor would provide modern and efficient infrastructural connectivity between Ethiopia and Tajoura Port, facilitating the flow of goods and exports such as potash, limestone, and iron ore. Furthermore, accepting this offer could complicate Ethiopia’s relationship with Somaliland and weaken its negotiating position in future discussions regarding the use of Berbera Port. Ethiopian leadership will need to balance the benefits of this offer with the potential impacts on its diplomatic relations with Somalia, which remain fragile, and the overall implications for the Arab national security system.
In conclusion, Djibouti’s offer to Ethiopia is a clear attempt to assert its dominance as a key maritime center in the Horn of Africa while positioning itself as a diplomatic intermediary in regional conflicts. The Port of Tajoura, with its modern facilities and proximity to Ethiopia, may provide a practical solution to Ethiopia’s longstanding maritime ambitions, while also serving Djibouti’s strategic interests by countering increasing Somaliland influence. At the same time, the proposal is deeply intertwined with Djibouti’s approach to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the shifting geopolitical landscape of the region, especially with Egypt’s increasing involvement in its strategic vicinity in the Horn of Africa. However, Ethiopia’s response will undoubtedly impact power dynamics in the Horn of Africa for years to come.