Iran and Syria After Assad: Caution and Anticipation

In December 2024, in a record time that astonished both Iranians and others in the region and the world, the Baath regime in Syria fell. This change significantly impacts Iran and its allies in the region; Syria has allied with Iran since the 1980s, making it the sole partner for Iran in the Arab world which strived to balance the threats posed by Iraq, and later by the U.S. and Israel. Iranian support for the regime against its internal and external opponents was built on prior strategic cooperation between the two countries and Syria’s significant role within the resistance axis. The fall of Assad raises intense internal debate regarding its causes and strategic implications, as well as directs discussions in Iran about its future policy towards Syria and the players within and around it. This paper focuses on Iranian perspectives—since what could be termed as an “Iranian vision” has yet to fully mature—regarding recent developments in Syria and their effect on Iran and the resistance axis. It also seeks to anticipate potential Iranian orientations and relevant changes in the coming months and years.

Regional Setback Iranians were shocked by the rapid advance of the opposition on one hand and the weakness of the regime and its military forces on the other; they had expected the Syrian Arab Army to withstand this advance as it did at the beginning of the Syrian war with the support of its allies in later stages. Given the magnitude of the loss and the heavy burden on Iran and its allies grouped under the name “resistance axis,” intense and widespread debates about the event’s causes and implications have surfaced and continue.

Iran’s interest in Syria dates back to the 1980s when Syria supported Iran in balancing Iraq due to its own motivations, including the rivalry between the Syrian and Iraqi Baath parties and their leaderships. Throughout the eight-year war, Iran found no international or regional support other than Syria, which trained the Iranian army on utilizing Soviet missiles and prevented Iraq from using its territory for oil exports—steps critical for Iran’s missile balancing against Iraq and imposing financial pressure on it. This marked the beginning of Iran’s energy supplies to Syria, which increased during the Syrian war.

Bilateral relations soured in the 1990s due to Syrian-U.S. rapprochement following the Gulf War and Syria’s participation in the Madrid conference in 1991, along with subsequent negotiations with Israel. The two countries entered a phase of disagreements over shared issues such as the Lebanese dossier, while Iran experienced internal changes and growth in relations with the Arab world, which limited its reliance on the Syrian ally in the Arab region. However, the events of September 11 surprised both countries, bringing with it the threat of American military presence after the occupation of Iraq, which resurrected the 1980s threat in a new guise and rekindled rapprochement between the two countries as they faced a common threat.

Alongside the American threat, cooperation in supporting Lebanese resistance during the 2006 war and Palestinian resistance at that time strengthened ties and elevated regional coordination between the two countries. The Arab Spring posed difficult choices for Iran; while Tehran supported the Arab Spring revolutions, it wavered in its stance on the Syrian revolution due to ongoing debates within its strategic circles regarding the Syrian events. Iran was divided between supporters and opponents of regime support, with figures like President Ahmadinejad and the Chairman of the Expediency Council, Hashemi Rafsanjani, opposing such support, while others, like General Soleimani and Ali Shamkhani, head of the Supreme National Security Council at the time, advocated a pro-regime position. This division was evident in Iranian society, including the elite circles, expressing support for Syrians’ aspirations to rid themselves of an oppressive regime while simultaneously fearing the alternative and its implications for Iran and its allies. Thus, the Iranian stance on Syria was divided, necessitating prolonged discussions and further developments in Syria itself for Tehran to settle on one interpretation.

Three developments in the Syrian situation covered the beginnings of Iranian discourse and pushed Tehran towards supporting the regime. Internally, the emergence of Salafist currents and their sectarian rhetoric—particularly their blend with Syrian elements—heightened Iranian fears, and secular opposition did not alleviate those concerns. For instance, Iranian figures circulated remarks by Burhan Ghalioun regarding the future of relations with Iran and Hezbollah negatively. Regionally, the boycott of Syria by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states, along with the withdrawal of their ambassadors in August 2011 and their support for the opposition, was met with an Iranian narrative viewing the Syrian developments as a conspiracy against the resistance axis. Internationally, the U.S. invitation for the Syrian president to leave sent a clearer signal to Iran about the unfolding events, raising concerns over the primary threat to its national security—namely, the U.S. Consequently, discussions within Iran gradually tilted towards supporting the regime before the Supreme National Security Council decided to intervene in favor of Damascus at its request. The aim was clear: to maintain the regime to secure the resistance axis against its enemies and to preserve Syria’s balance against Israel.

Increasing Costs Iran gradually adjusted its policy over the course of the Syrian crisis. Tehran had no pre-prepared answers for a developing crisis that presented new questions for Iranian decision-makers at each stage. After the Syrian request, Iran initiated limited operations to train Syrian forces in guerrilla warfare, which was not part of the Syrian Arab Army’s experience, and the regime urgently needed it to halt the armed opposition’s advances. The situation evolved with non-Syrian movements entering both sides of the conflict, supporting the armed opposition on one hand and the regime on the other. Iran’s allies, including Hezbollah and various Iraqi factions, joined support for the regime in the second phase of the conflict. When it became evident that the situation was difficult despite the significant efforts from Iran and its allies, and in the face of substantial regional and international support for the Syrian opposition, Russia entered the fray in a third phase of the conflict that could be characterized as internationalization.

This produced a new reality that forced the armed opposition and their backers to adapt to regional and international understandings after their military efforts faltered on the ground. The Astana process commenced with Turkish-Iranian-Russian understanding and oversight, resulting in agreements that halted fighting on most fronts and ended it near Idlib. As the war progressed through its three phases, the regime’s weakness and its continuous need for support to survive became clear. With the enforcement of U.S. sanctions under the “Caesar Act,” the economic situation worsened, considerably limiting the regime’s ability to rebuild and reform its military and security systems. Thus, the burdens of supporting the Syrian ally increased for Iran.

In addition to the rising costs of maintaining the Syrian ally, the regime was not effectively contributing to support resistance forces following the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation—which was a subject of open Iranian debate post-fall—; Iranians and their Lebanese and Palestinian allies had anticipated, despite knowing the difficulties facing the Syrian Arab Army, a more significant involvement through activating the Golan Front. The opportunity for such a move was ripe after the initiation of the Al-Aqsa Flood operation and the near-total distraction of the Israeli army on the southern front (Gaza Strip). Iranians understood the regime’s fears, but they also recognized the negative impact of the internal Syrian situation on Syria’s capacity to operate within the resistance axis’s framework. The cost of maintaining the ally became greater and did not match the expected outcomes nor align with the changing regional reality.

The Fall and Content of Setback Assad fell in record time. There was not enough time for Iran and its allies to analyze the situation and reconsider their possible responses, as clearly expressed by the Supreme Leader in Iran, and Iranian officials’ visits to Damascus were merely part of the process of understanding recent developments and assessing the Syrian government’s and army’s situations against the armed opposition. Iranian actions barely exceeded declarations of support for a government that seemed incapable of controlling its military forces. As soon as opposition forces entered Damascus and the regime collapsed, the Iranian narrative began adapting to the new reality. In fact, the regime’s fall represents a strategically substantive setback for Tehran for six reasons:

1. Supply Route: The Syrian regime, although significantly limited and not meeting Iranian expectations, remained a supporter of the resistance movements and its front directed against Israel. It kept the supply route open despite receiving strikes from Israeli aircraft attempting to thwart resupply efforts to Lebanese resistance. Iran lost with the regime’s fall one of the easiest routes to supply its Lebanese ally with the necessary capabilities to balance and confront the Israeli threat, although it was not the only route. The Secretary-General of Hezbollah mentioned the loss of the supply route as one of the most significant negative aspects of the regime’s fall.
2. Substantial Ally: The regime, despite not effectively operating on the Golan front, represented a weight against the Israeli threat considered in any confrontation between the resistance axis and Israel. The military actions Israel undertook after the fall indicated a collapse of the balance between the two sides. Despite the Syrian Arab Army’s weakness, Israel knew there was a supportive front including Iran, Hezbollah, and others in case of confrontation. Accompanying Israel’s expansionist actions in Syrian territory was a systematic effort to destroy Syria’s military infrastructure to prevent future rebalancing.
3. Regional Balance: Despite the Syrian regime and army’s weakness, they remained a factor in regional calculations within a regional axis that balanced capabilities against others. The regime’s weakness did not imply a reduction in its influence on the calculations of opponents and enemies of this axis. The regime’s fall, among other implications, signifies a decline in the weight of the regional resistance axis. While the extent of this impact is debated both within and outside Iran, the reality of the decline remains.
4. Hostile Alternative: Despite Iran’s strategic calculations in supporting the regime, its association with one side in the Syrian conflict fostered animosity towards it from the view and discourse of the armed opposition that took power in Damascus. This animosity was evident during the war and is likely to remain in the foreseeable future. Although Ahmad al-Shara asserted that Syria cannot continue to ignore a large regional country like Iran, he and many opposition leaders have been clear in viewing Iran as an interfering party in Syrian affairs. Discussions about Iran’s legitimacy to intervene at the invitation of a legitimate government fall into historical narratives that add little to its relationship with the alternative.
5. Neighboring Threat: While Iran’s official view of moderate Islamic political groups is generally positive, it fears the resurgence of terrorist groups at the regional level, especially in neighboring countries to Syria in the upcoming phase. Countries like Iraq and Lebanon, part of the resistance axis, will bear unnecessary strategic burdens in this stage.
6. Threat to Shrines: Although this does not fall under strategic developments, it influences strategic calculations; a key part of the narrative directed at the internal audience in Iran’s support for Assad’s regime focused on the sectarian actions of extremist groups targeting Shiite shrines. Volunteers in Syria were called “defenders of the shrine,” reflecting community interest in the issue. The regime’s fall means the Iranians have lost contact with those shrines. The new rulers in Damascus preventing Iranian access to Syria indicates a disregard for this sensitive issue for Iran and Shiites.

Alongside the negative ramifications indicating a strategic setback for Iran and the resistance axis in the region, there are also positive aspects that can be observed in indirect outcomes. These can be summarized in four points:

1. The fall of Assad relieved Iran and its allies of the heavy financial and military-security burdens required to maintain a regime that could no longer participate effectively in the resistant work alongside resistance axis members. Hence, the regime’s fall translates into a decrease in the costs of supporting it financially and militarily.
2. At the identity level, Iran will no longer be viewed as a supporting party to the regime in the eyes of the opposition. Despite the likelihood of continued negative views towards Iran, the new Syrian reality imposes its challenges on the new rulers in Damascus, and they may find a supportive Iran in the coming months and years if they do not alienate Iran and its allies—namely, the resistance axis.
3. By relieving Syria of its heavy burdens, Turkey assumes the role of supporter for a besieged Damascus that requires assistance in various economic and military aspects of life. Thus, the Syrian burdens weigh heavily on Turkey and provoke Arab concerns—previously focused on Iran—about Turkish encroachments in the Arab region. This suggests that Assad’s fall may diminish Arab-Turkish-Western pressure and focus on Iran, shifting to highlight tensions and pressures following Turkey’s “victory.”
4. The Syrian war has shackled Iranian diplomacy in the region and led to regional polarizations that undermined Iran’s regional cooperation. The fall of Assad positions Iran at an equal distance from the parties in Syria, liberating Iranian diplomacy from the previous entrenchment and facilitating regional engagement with various parties related to Syria and other issues.

As previously mentioned, these are indirect positive outcomes that fall short of matching the negative repercussions in Iran’s regional calculations; however, they contribute to Iran’s repositioning regarding the new Syrian situation and influence Iranian visions and policies towards Syria.

Discussion on the Future of Syria Following the regime’s fall, a discussion ignited within Iranian strategic circles concerning the causes of this event and its implications, with particular attention on what would be best for Iran and its allies moving forward. The causes received extensive discussion, covering economic and military conditions, rampant corruption, the stagnation of the regime, and its refusal to reform, among other factors. Many Iranian officials also addressed the role of enemies and competitors of the resistance axis in the unfolding events. The Supreme Leader mentioned the role played by a neighboring country—Turkey—without naming it, and referred to the bombings carried out by the U.S. and Israel as entities benefiting from Syria’s weakening as active players in the regime’s downfall. Alongside the ongoing discussion about the causes, the implications and examples of them for Iran and its allies garnered even greater focus. The inquiry into the future can be divided into two sections: where Syria is heading and likely scenarios, and Iran’s capacity and ability to adapt to the internal Syrian situation and its regional framework.

In the extensive discussion concerning Syria’s future, several scenarios can be distilled based on two main determinants: first, whether Damascus can impose its hegemony over all Syrian territory—by force or agreement—or not. This determinant can take various forms, and many situations could be drawn between its extremes, summarized in two images: the direction of Syria towards national reconciliation or internal conflict. The second is the acceptance and external support—regionally and internationally—of Damascus’s centrality, or the move towards empowering other parties and weakening Damascus. Thus, four scenarios are delineated:

1. Damascus successfully establishes control over all Syrian territory, with regional and global acceptance and support. This scenario is ideal for the powers dominating Damascus and its regional backers, chiefly Turkey. In this case, Syria returns as a significant state that balances Israel and gradually regains sovereignty over its northern and eastern territories through consensus or force. It would also work to regain control over Kurdish areas in a manner that satisfies the Kurdish powers there.
2. Damascus succeeds in maintaining territorial control but faces rejection from the region and the world, leading to the empowerment of other parties. This situation resembles the state of the Syrian war post-2011, which could result in varying future scenarios.
3. Damascus remains weak and embroiled in internal conflict while the region and international community attempt to improve the situation through external agreements. This scenario replicates the Syrian condition and the role played by the Astana Group in reducing internal conflict since 2016.
4. Weakness persists in Damascus alongside internal conflict, with regional and international divisions in support of different factions in Syria; this constitutes the worst-case scenario for Syrian stability and its neighboring countries.

Each of the regional and international players possesses tools to push towards each of the aforementioned scenarios militarily/safely and economically/financially. The regional and international options regarding Syria have yet to crystallize, remaining only in their conceptual frameworks. Moreover, the new Syrian reality remains uncertain in terms of direction and objective. Some indicators may surface in the short period following the regime’s fall to prefer one of the mentioned scenarios. The internal Syrian reality also holds significant sway in directing regional and international policies. In other words, if Damascus leans towards control and imposes its hegemony by force, or if it leans towards national consensus—through the recently announced national dialogue—it will have ramifications on future regional and international orientations. Furthermore, with the resistance axis’s exit from Syria, Arab conflicts may surface similarly to the case in Libya, with Turkey considered one party in this conflict wherein some fear the new rulers of Damascus and the regional influence of their stability, while others view the stabilization of the Syrian situation as a launchpad for improving their regional standings.

In light of the overall uncertainty surrounding key determinants regarding Syria’s future, the clarity of positions remains limited but crucial in attempting to anticipate the future. It is evident that Israel and the Western coalition behind it do not desire the return of Damascus as a dominant force in the region, as demonstrated clearly by their systematic destruction of the Syrian army’s capabilities. They would rather push for internal conflict to keep Syria weak. The same goes for the United States, which is currently establishing a new military base in the Kurdish region in northern Syria. For Turkey, stability under the new ruling authority is necessary under circumstances that prevent Damascus from engaging on equal terms with Ankara and require it to withdraw from northern Syria. Arab opinions regarding the new developments in Syria are polarized, with some in support contemplating improvements in Syria’s regional position, while others view it as an imminent threat to its internal stability. Regarding Iran, the situation remains far from clear, except in broad objectives.

Iran and the Future of Syria Iran, having suffered a regional setback, discusses the future of the Syrian situation and its effect on itself and its allies moving forward. To understand Iran’s policy and its future possibilities, it is crucial to remain aligned with the aforementioned calculations of profit and loss. The supply routes and balancing against Israel remain essential considerations for Iran in its relationship with post-Assad Syria. The Supreme Leader in Iran expressed this notion when he anticipated that “the valiant young people of Syria will expel the occupiers from their land.” Iran is also concerned with mitigating the risks of Syrian instability on Iraq and Lebanon specifically, in addition to seeking agreements with the new government regarding Shiite shrines and sites in Syria. The Foreign Minister expressed this general stance by asserting that Syria’s stability and territorial integrity are in jeopardy, which poses a risk to its neighbors as well. He reiterated his country’s repeated calls for forming an inclusive government and restoring unity to Syrian territory.

In this broader context, Iranian perceptions regarding the future of Iranian-Syrian relations diverge. Some speak of a significant loss in Syria, while others view the situation as temporary, asserting that Syria has a strategic interest in reconciling with Iran. A series of points indicate the ongoing discourse and demonstrate future possibilities. Many within the Iranian strategic community do not see a conflict between Iran’s broader objectives in the region with any future Syrian government wanting to restore its sovereignty over the entire territory and expel occupiers from its southern, eastern, and northern regions while building power balances against the Israeli threat in the future. These individuals believe that Iran can reach agreements with the new Syria concerning key issues relevant to both parties.

Conversely, another group warns against this view, regarding it as naive, stating that those in power in Damascus define Iran as an enemy they have contended with for the past years. They claim that the political identity of the armed opposition dominating Damascus is built on animosity towards Iran, viewing it only through the lens of a hostile other rather than through the lens of a shared strategic interest, if it is recognized at all. Moreover, numerous international and regional players favor a destroyed Syrian vision over a Syria reconciled with Iran, referring to regional and international actions against Assad’s government. The first group responds by asserting that animosity towards Iran is a thing of the past, and reality will impose itself on Damascus. While the historical enmity between the two sides continues to weigh on relations and quick rapprochement, there are numerous strategic interests shared between them across many dimensions that bring the two countries closer despite regime changes. They cite the past relationship, noting that the solid Syrian-Iranian ties prior to the 1979 Revolution did not prevent renewed cooperation after that revolution due to the higher interests of both countries.

Between these two perspectives are various visions and proposals reflecting the uncertainty gripping the Iranian discourse and complicating its ability to define its priorities towards post-Assad Syria. The aforementioned strategic and symbolic objectives would dictate Iranian priorities if the Syrian situation were stable and clear in direction. Given the ambiguity in the Syrian situation, it is more likely that Iranian priorities will align with developments within Syria. The Supreme Leader’s advisor, Ali Larijani, was explicit on this matter, stating that Iran’s relationship with Damascus hinges on its behavior. If that behavior is rational—if they assert that they are defending the unity of Syrian territory and that they wish to give everyone their rights while establishing a democratic system—then Iran has no problem supporting them. Thus, predicting Iranian positions and policies can be made according to changes in the internal Syrian situation and regional and international stances.

Therefore, the vision and policy of the government in Damascus take on utmost importance regarding Tehran’s future forecasts. If the evident animosity in the discourse emanating from Damascus wanes and is not translated into aggressive policy towards Iran and its allies, Tehran is likely to seek channels for engagement and rapprochement with Damascus while working on shared strategic interests. However, if hostility towards Iran and the resistance axis dominates Damascus’s policies, Iran will have little incentive to work with Damascus according to shared priorities, such as enforcing Syrian sovereignty against occupiers and balancing surrounding threats, especially Israel. This is why Iran expressed satisfaction with Ahmad al-Shara’s statement that Iran is a powerful regional state with which Syria cannot lack a relationship. Ali Larijani noted that their behavior indicates they do not want to proceed like in the past, advising a patient approach to observe their actions.

Regional priorities also have a direct impact on shaping and directing Iranian positions. Discontent and negativity regarding Iran’s exclusion from the Aqaba (December 2024) and Riyadh (January 2025) meetings on Syria were apparent in Tehran. The evident effort to keep Iran away from significant issues in the region indicates a lack of positive engagement from Iran with the outcomes of those meetings. Internally, Iran has a strategic interest in fostering a positive relationship with Syria, alongside its capacity to play a positive or negative role in external understandings surrounding Syria. Observers of Iran’s regional policy understand that a significant portion of it has focused over the decades on thwarting policies aimed at isolating Iran regionally.

On the international front, Iran fears that a coordinated international push will lead Syria to normalize relations with its primary regional enemy, Israel. For Iran, Syria holds a unique significance compared to other countries that have normalized relations previously. It is a neighbor to Iran’s allies, and its normalization would increase Israeli-American security/military pressure on the resistance axis. This development could impose limits on Iran’s pursuit of building strong relations with the new Syrian regime. In the broader context, it seems more plausible that Iran will view any imposed Western agreement in Syria with suspicion unless it is part of an international balance including both non-Western global and regional powers. Previous experiences tell Tehran that the Western agenda in the region does not align with Iran’s vision and tends to serve Israel’s interests. The recent meetings in Aqaba and Riyadh were held without Iranian, Chinese, or Russian attendance, solidifying concerns about Western attempts to impose their vision on Syria’s future.

Generally, considering the main scenarios proposed for Syria’s future, a non-hostile Syrian stance, along with balanced regional and international negotiations regarding Syria leading towards stability and reconstruction as a significant regional power—an unlikely scenario due to its misalignment with Israeli and Western priorities—would be welcomed by Iran, which would likely seek to strengthen its relations with Damascus in pursuit of strategic cooperation on matters of mutual importance. Iranian Foreign Minister expressed support for this direction, broadly announcing his country’s backing for the “stability, independence, and territorial unity” of Syria.

If Syria plunged into an internal conflict fueled by neighboring countries and Israeli-Western forces, without drawing animosity from Iran and its allies in Damascus’s stances, Iran is likely to leverage its regional relationships and influence to support Damascus, should this support align with its strategic priorities, foremost among which is balancing against the Israeli enemy. Additionally, Tehran is likely to advocate for restoring Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity against the occupiers of substantial Syrian territories. However, should a trend of Syrian hostility toward Iran and its allies in neighboring countries persist, and should regional and Western forces attempt to isolate Iran in efforts to target or weaken the resistance axis, Tehran will likely reorganize its strategies to secure its goals first and protect and uphold its allies second; this would be far removed from Tehran’s strategic priorities in the region but could become a reality imposed on it and its allies.

Conclusion Iranians were shocked by Assad’s fall and began adapting to the new situation in the region thereafter. The downfall of Assad signifies a significant setback for Iran’s regional policy and that of the resistance axis. It is likely that the stage of adaptation to the new Syrian developments will continue for a while before Tehran arrives at a clearly defined policy regarding Syria. Considering their internal discussions, various and contradictory views on the Syrian reality and the resulting Iranian policy are emerging. Official statements, as well as informal discussions, indicate a state of caution and anticipation concerning Syria before establishing a course. Officially, remarks from the Foreign Minister, along with statements from one of the Supreme Leader’s closest advisors about the behavior of the new rulers in Damascus, constitute a primary determinant of Iran’s policy towards post-Assad Syria, reflecting that state of caution. Additionally, Syria’s policies regarding Iran and the resistance axis are closely tied to the determinants and alignments of regional and international factors. Should there be regional and international pressures prompting Syria to confront Iran and its allies, Tehran is unlikely to engage in normalization processes with the new regime in Syria. Conversely, should Syria focus on restoring its territorial integrity and balancing the Israeli threat while removing it from the occupied Syrian lands, it is plausible that Tehran would strive to normalize its relations with Damascus and even support it on those mentioned fronts.