The Iranian armed forces (the army) are showing a particular interest in expanding military cooperation with their Pakistani counterparts, a trend that cannot be separated from a series of changes imposed by recent developments in the regional landscape. These include the repercussions of the fall of the Syrian regime under President Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, the widening gap between Islamabad and the Revolutionary Guard, the increasing inclination of the Iranian armed opposition to exploit the Iranian regime’s vulnerabilities to launch further attacks, and the escalation of tensions between Islamabad and Tehran on one side and the Afghan Taliban on the other.
In this context, Iranian Chief of Staff Mohammad Baqeri visited Pakistan on January 19, 2025, for two days, during which he met with Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Army Chief Asim Munir. This was Baqeri’s third visit of its kind; he previously visited Islamabad in July 2018 and October 2021, and Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir visited Tehran in July 2023.
Multiple Motivations
The Iranian army’s interest in enhancing cooperation with the Pakistani army can be explained by several motivations as follows:
Expanding Iranian Army Influence Against the Revolutionary Guard: It appears that a new phase of competition between the army and the Revolutionary Guard is set to begin in light of the noticeable decline in the Revolutionary Guard’s role externally, resulting from the new realities imposed by the war initiated by Israel in the region, starting October 7, 2023, until the ceasefire in Gaza on January 19, 2025. In this context, the army might be seeking to bolster its military capabilities, which explains its move to enhance cooperation with the Pakistani army and benefit from Pakistan’s military expertise, as well as capitalize on Islamabad’s fears of the radical tendencies fostered by the Revolutionary Guard, especially regarding its strong support for the Shiite “Zainabiyoun” militia. This militia was created and trained to participate in the internal conflict in Syria alongside Assad’s forces and is expected to seek the return of some of its members to Pakistan after its failed mission in Syria following the regime’s collapse. This could explain the two armies’ interest in announcing their participation in the upcoming naval exercises “Aman 25,” to be held by Pakistan.
Activating Iran’s “Defensive Diplomacy” with Neighboring Countries: Iran aims to strengthen regional alliances, particularly with neighboring countries like Pakistan, to address shared threats by enhancing military and security cooperation amid rising regional and international tensions. This aligns with the desire of Iranian President Masoud Bezhakian to develop relations with neighbors, considering it a priority for the current Iranian government, in addition to the growing pressures on Iranian influence, related to Tehran’s attempts to build relationships with key regional players.
Addressing Threats from ISIS Against Both Countries: Iran and Pakistan express concerns about the potential infiltration of ISIS elements into their territories following developments in Syria that began on November 27, 2024. This period witnessed the advance of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, the Syrian National Army, and other armed factions into Aleppo, Hama, and Homs, culminating in the fall of Assad’s regime in December 2024. Tehran sees this possibility as a strong threat, especially given ISIS’s attempts to retaliate against Iranian strikes on its positions in Syria, as well as its efforts to respond to terrorist operations it has carried out within Iran itself. Notably, in October 2018, Iran directed missile strikes against ISIS locations in eastern Euphrates in response to a terrorist attack during a military parade attended by former President Hassan Rouhani in Ahvaz in September 2018.
Islamabad shares these concerns with Tehran, believing that the organization may seek to exploit the escalating instability to widen its activities and renew its terrorist operations, particularly amidst the sectarian tensions between Sunni and Shia that have intensified recently.
Targeting Opposition Groups: The Iranian army does not rule out that armed cells and organizations belonging to certain ethnic-nationalist opposition groups, such as Jaish al-Adl, could carry out more operations inside Iran in the near future, especially since there are indications that these groups are beginning to identify vulnerabilities within the regime, resulting from the significant regional blows it faces, in addition to the internal crises that subsequent governments have failed to contain.
In this regard, Tehran and Islamabad seem to be aiming to learn from the lessons of the limited direct military confrontation that erupted between them from January 16 to 18, 2024, when Iran conducted direct military strikes against armed Iranian opposition sites, especially Jaish al-Adl inside Pakistan, in response to a terrorist operation that occurred during a gathering at the grave of former Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani. This response led Pakistan to launch parallel attacks two days later against bases of Pakistani opposition groups like the Balochistan Liberation Front within Iran.
This suggests that the two countries are trying to avoid relying on direct confrontations again by improving military and security coordination, monitoring opposition movements, and possibly conducting joint strikes against them in the future. In fact, one topic of the discussions Baqeri had in Islamabad focused on confronting these organizations, as Baqeri and Asim Munir emphasized the need to firmly address terrorist elements and organizations to ensure security and stability along their shared border.
Exerting Stronger Pressure on the Taliban: Tensions between the Afghan Taliban and both Pakistan and Iran have escalated recently. The border disputes between the Taliban and Iran continue, alongside disagreements over water shares from the Helmand River. Moreover, armed clashes broke out between Taliban forces and the Pakistani army, with the former attacking specific points inside Pakistan on December 28, 2024, in response to military strikes conducted by the Pakistani army inside Afghanistan just three days earlier.
In this context, during Baqeri’s visit to Pakistan, efforts were made by both Iran and Pakistan to send direct messages to the Taliban, indicating that its insistence on continuing its current approach in managing disputes with both nations would push them to enhance security and military coordination against it, possibly leading to joint strikes on its territories targeting groups aiming to attack sites in both countries.
The Possibility of War
Ultimately, it can be said that while the Iranian and Pakistani armies are heading towards increased coordination, a crucial variable may play a role in determining the course of this cooperation in the near future. This pertains to the potential outbreak of direct war between Iran and both the United States and Israel due to the ongoing unresolved disputes surrounding nuclear and missile programs and regional roles.
Such a potential conflict, which could see heightened likelihoods with the return of U.S. President Donald Trump to the White House, would likely compel the Pakistani army to maintain the status quo or adjust its level of coordination with Iran while awaiting the outcomes of any potential confrontation between the two parties in the foreseeable future. Pakistan would be one of the first countries keen to interpret and anticipate the possible scenarios stemming from any military engagement that may erupt near its borders.
