Undoubtedly, the expansion of the BRICS group in 2024 has increased Africa’s weight in international affairs and has contributed to the ongoing discussion about the complexities of multipolarity. The development of strategic and commercial relations between BRICS and Africa also reflects the practical interest in the continent from major powers and the founding members of the group—China, India, Brazil, and Russia.
Daria Zelenova, the head of the African Strategy Study Center for BRICS countries at the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has written about how the objective enhancement of the continent’s global standing is linked to these practical demands, and whether there is room for more African voices in BRICS.
With the accession of Egypt and Ethiopia to BRICS, African countries within the alliance now extend from the southern part of the continent to the northeast, opening up opportunities for deeper relationships, new financial agreements, and logistical pathways. This is likely to reduce investment risks and encourage significant investments in the region. The expansion of Africa’s presence appears beneficial for each BRICS member individually: for China and India as the largest investors in Africa, for Russia as a political power interested in promoting a multipolar world, and for Brazil, which has a historically unique relationship with Africa.
Ethiopia’s Position in BRICS Raises Questions:
A closer look at Ethiopia’s position in BRICS raises questions about whether membership in the group will bring about a transformation for a country where 27% of its 126 million inhabitants live below the poverty line. Will this open up new opportunities for economic growth, contribute to regional stability, and increase Addis Ababa’s influence on the global stage?
Historically, Ethiopia’s accession to BRICS seems quite natural, as it supported national liberation movements in Africa and remained a focal point for the struggle against colonialism after the independence of many African countries in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Nelson Mandela and a small group of early African National Congress rebels received military training there.
In 1963, after the establishment of the Organization of African Unity, headquartered in Addis Ababa, the city became the symbolic capital of newly independent Africa as a whole. In this context, Ethiopia has significant potential to renew its role as Africa’s “voice” in BRICS. While it is not a member of the World Trade Organization, it now seeks what can be termed an alternative development path.
Moreover, Ethiopia’s position on the global stage is characterized by non-alignment, as evidenced by its voting in the United Nations General Assembly concerning the Ukrainian crisis, indicating one of the friendliest stances toward Russia among African nations.
Economically, a brief analysis of the relationship between China and Ethiopia shows that Ethiopia is a key link in the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. In 2023, foreign direct investment from China to Ethiopia formed 39.1% of the total foreign direct investment in the country.
According to AiData, between 2000 and 2021, there were 311 active Chinese projects in Ethiopia. This rapid economic growth not only attracts Chinese investments but is also directly linked to external factors, creating significant dependence on China.
The same can almost be said about India, which is Ethiopia’s second-largest trading partner and foreign investor. Although Ethiopia’s trade routes do not lie directly within the geographic scope of the north-south transport corridor, the country benefits indirectly from Indian infrastructure along this trade route. Ethiopia is also developing infrastructure cooperation with the United Arab Emirates, which joined BRICS this year.
Thus, many experts view Ethiopia as already economically integrated into the infrastructure of BRICS countries, and its invitation to the group seems a natural step.
Egyptian Leadership and Its Participation in BRICS for Economic Reasons:
Egyptian leadership has motivated its BRICS participation for economic reasons rather than political ones. Faced with a severe economic crisis, opinions in the media vary on what this participation will mean for the Egyptian economy. It is expected that the proposal of various technological projects through the New Development Bank of BRICS, of which Egypt has been a member since December 2021, will help boost Egyptian exports in line with its desire to access new technologies within the group.
How Will the Inclusion of Egypt and Ethiopia Affect Regional Security?
But how will the inclusion of Egypt and Ethiopia affect regional security? On one hand, integration within BRICS should enhance stability in East and Southern Africa. On the other hand, the conflicting interests between Ethiopia and Egypt regarding the construction of a dam on the Nile River could heighten tensions in Northeast Africa, while some observers hold high hopes for BRICS to mediate in resolving this conflict.
Increasing African Participation in BRICS:
To enhance the role of Africans in BRICS, further work is required on tools and mechanisms for representing small and medium-sized African countries within the group. One way to address this issue is through cooperation with the African Union. This cooperation can take various forms; through close collaboration with the African Union, BRICS can tackle a greater challenge: how to remain within the flexible framework of an international club while promoting African interests. Currently, 17 African countries have already expressed their interest in joining BRICS, but the alliance lacks the institutional capacity to incorporate everyone as full members.
For Africa, cooperation between the African Union and BRICS may be intriguing, as access to new technologies and infrastructure could help resolve the long-standing problem of lack of integration on the continent.
South Africa raised this issue, which is reflected in the Johannesburg II Declaration in paragraph 34, reaffirming mutual support for the Agenda 2063 and African integration efforts, including the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area.
The declaration also emphasizes “the importance of strengthening the partnership between BRICS and Africa to open mutually beneficial opportunities for expanding trade, investment, and infrastructure development.” Deeper integration could potentially lower import tariffs and non-tariff barriers on African exports within the framework of BRICS. In some BRICS countries, import tariffs on agricultural products reach 35%, and reducing these tariffs is expected to increase trade between nations and enhance the competitiveness of African countries.
The Continent Seeks Alternatives within the Group:
Meanwhile, African representatives actively participating in various BRICS events in Russia assert that the continent is seeking alternatives within the group. This does not imply anti-Western stances but rather different economic paths, new methods for innovation, research, and real solutions to issues such as climate change, green energy, food sovereignty, and enhancing local knowledge systems.
All these topics are of crucial importance to Africa, and analyzing how and to what extent BRICS addresses these global issues can be done through the group’s declarations.
A recent study conducted by the African BRICS Strategy Study Center at the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences indicates that, despite the extensive thematic agenda of global issues included in the group’s discussions, the host countries of the summits highlight what they consider national priorities. For instance, the Russian declaration in 2020 featured themes of historical memory and combating Nazism, while South Africa’s unique contribution to the BRICS declaration emphasized ideas of African unity and climate change, aligning perfectly with South Africa’s national priorities. It will be highly interesting to see what new African nations will bring to the agenda when their turn to host BRICS summits comes.
Currently, South Africa is no longer the only African member of BRICS, a fact that is likely to change the country’s stance as it may focus more on its regional interests within the group. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zimbabwe, and Angola have applied to join BRICS, and as members of the Southern African Development Community alongside South Africa, they all have a chance to strengthen their positions on the multilateral level. This potential new cooperation is seen as a field of genuine strategic importance for South Africa.
Finally, the presence of three major African regional powers in BRICS doesn’t fully represent the continent, and Nigeria poses another challenge as it has not submitted a formal application but has previously expressed interest in becoming part of BRICS.
Understanding these complex dynamics suggests that potential cooperation between BRICS and the African Union could be beneficial, but it comes with its own challenges, such as the issue of foreign funding for the African Union and its weak institutional arrangements. These vulnerabilities in the African Union may raise questions about the effectiveness of integration between BRICS and the African Union.
