The African Union and Partnerships in Security Sector Reform

Security reform and enhancing the African Union’s efforts have recently emerged as significant issues, particularly with the increasing challenges related to this vital and important reform. The African Union has been committed to supporting security sector reform within African countries, but the limited coordination of this effort with some leaders of the continent has remained an obstacle to advancing this partnership between the African Union and its member states.

In this context, the article aims to highlight ways in which the African Union can establish effective partnerships with other community and civic bodies to achieve greater alignment between policies and adopt a more cohesive security approach.

It is noteworthy that the African Union’s mandate for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, framed in 2006, alongside the African Union’s framework for security sector reform in 2013, grants the Union a central role in supporting security sector reform in member states. The framework also sets out the main goals for security sector reform, which include enhancing professional training to bolster the capacities of security institutions and establishing civilian oversight bodies, such as parliamentary committees, to regulate security forces’ tasks.

The security sector reform framework expands within the (PCRD) framework, recognizing that member states implement security sector reforms under a diverse set of circumstances; as part of conflict prevention, reconstruction, and the emphasis on sustainable development.

In Guinea-Bissau, for example, security sector reform is part of broader state-building and stabilization efforts. In the Sahel region, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali are implementing significant security sector reforms aimed at supporting efforts to combat insurgents and armed groups that continue to threaten the region’s stability.

Regarding the security sector reform framework, several African Union committees participate in discussing requests from member states during Peace and Security Council (PSC) sessions and exploring support options.

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration:

As part of executing established plans, numerous African nations have carried out disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration operations for armed groups, alongside security sector reforms that recently reshaped the defense and security sectors. This is part of the management of political affairs, peace, and security under the African Union Commission, which has taken on the responsibility of coordinating efforts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Its responsibilities include implementing the African common policy on defense and security and the framework for sustainable development, which includes security sector reform. Among its responsibilities are directing the process of drafting policy documents and disseminating technical expertise in security sector reform within member states.

As for the African Peace and Security Council, it strategically engages with member states by issuing official notifications and internal statements, as well as sending high-level delegations during regional visits. For instance, in February 2022, the Council issued a statement urging the South Sudanese government to mobilize national efforts to fund the long-awaited unification and deployment of troops from training camps. While these commitments primarily respond to specific requests from member states, they are crucial for ensuring political support for security sector reform initiatives in African countries.

The African Union has made progress in security sector reform since adopting the Reconstruction and Development Program framework and the Initiative for Security Sector Reform. The Union has participated in supporting security sector reform processes in many member states, including Madagascar, where it has been holding high-level meetings since 2014 to discuss ways to reform the security sector. The Union sent experts from the African Union Liaison Office (AULO) to the country and helped establish a security sector reform unit in 2017 within the African Union mission in Somalia, in addition to efforts to reform the security sector in Mali, Guinea-Bissau, the Central African Republic, and others.

Additionally, the African Union has developed operational guidelines to direct the implementation of specific elements concerning security sector reform. These guidelines focus on critical implementation areas, carrying out needs assessments, creating codes of conduct for African security institutions, and aligning national security legislation. Despite the progress made in implementing the mandate for security sector reform, several challenges remain.

Security sector reform is a costly, long-term process involving a set of activities and determining the correct number of forces, training methods, and means of developing the necessary infrastructure, along with reequipping security institutions to carry out their roles. The African Union’s lack of adequate financial and human resources limits its capacity to support security sector reform across all its member states. In many cases, this support includes sending security sector reform experts to work with governments.

Support for security sector reform from the African Union has also become contingent on the interests and goals of the governments of member states, as the process is inherently political. The lack of political will and acceptance from governments can slow down reform progress, which has previously stalled in several countries, particularly in The Gambia and Sudan due mainly to internal conflicts and the absence of political will.

Various multilateral bodies provide support for security sector reform to African countries, including the United Nations, the European Union, regional economic communities, and regional powers, which now facilitate memoranda of understanding (MoUs) and strategic frameworks that activate the African Union’s partnerships in security sector reform, alongside the efforts of international powers and non-African organizations as part of broader cooperation regarding peace and security issues.

Entering Partnerships for Security Sector Reform:

Within the framework of the African Union’s security sector reform policy, there is a significant importance in entering and activating these partnerships. The integration between the African Union’s partners and partners for the implementation of security sector reform at the national, regional, and international levels is deemed important and necessary.

The African Union has engaged in substantial efforts to reform the security sector with regional and international actors, which form its missions to assess needs as illustrative examples of collaborative efforts. The Union has also conducted needs assessment missions for security sector reform in partnership with the UN, the EU, and other relevant regional bodies. It collaborated in joint assessment missions to Mali in 2015 and The Gambia in 2017. The joint needs assessments yielded varying outcomes in countries like The Gambia and Madagascar, providing frameworks for bodies to identify avenues of support and establish frameworks to assist in implementing reforms. However, the process in Mali initially stalled, preventing the African Union and its partners from making effective progress, indicating that the organization’s needs assessments function well, but collaboration opportunities are not always successful.

The African Union’s partnership with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to support security sector reform efforts in Lesotho, which began in 2016, represents collaborative efforts to reform the security sector. Together, the two entities organized a technical workshop on security sector reform that assisted in mapping the process. In 2018, the African Union carried out a joint needs assessment mission in Lesotho with the SADC preventive mission, followed by deploying a security sector reform consultant in 2021 to work with the mission and the government of Lesotho. The African Union’s cooperation with the SADC illustrates the growing importance of other partnerships with regional economic groups, which have become increasingly vital in supporting security sector reform. This importance is reflected in the role played by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in promoting security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau and South Sudan.

Information exchange platforms and coordination mechanisms support joint efforts and keep security sector reform partners informed about concurrent initiatives on the continent.

The main information exchange platforms of the African Union are the basis for the African forum on security sector reform, held every four years since 2014, and the annual steering committee meeting on security sector reform. These meetings include the African Union Commission, African Union institutions, regional economic groups, regional powers, African Union member states, the UN, the EU, multilateral donors, and civil society organizations.

The African forum on security sector reform aims to assess developments in the field and streamline security sector reform within other peace and security operations. The steering committee meeting on security sector reform, which includes a similar range of actors, provides a platform for facilitating the exchange of information and enhancing coordination of ongoing security sector reform operations at both national and regional levels, aiming to align security sector reform efforts and provide recommendations for member states.

It can be said that countries undergoing security sector reform typically establish national committees to coordinate their initiatives, helping implementing partners complement existing processes. The African Union liaison offices can play this critical coordinating role, acting as a link between the host country and the African Union Commission and multilateral and bilateral partners in implementing security sector reform.

In this context, partners collaborate with the African Union to implement security sector reform to assist the Commission in enhancing its overall operations for security sector reform. The joint project between the UN and the EU from 2013 to 2015, titled “Building the African Union’s Capacity for Security Sector Reform,” is a good example of these partnerships.

The project facilitated the dissemination of the African Union’s security sector reform policy framework, preparing operational guidelines for security sector reform, while partners also supported the African Union’s security sector reform operations within member states. For example, the International Security Sector Advisory Team provided human resources and technical support for the African Union’s work in Madagascar, sending a security sector reform advisor in 2017 to assess security sector reform processes in the country, and the team dispatched advisors to assist the African Union in organizing a high-level workshop to raise awareness and train on the security sector reform process in Madagascar in July 2018, allowing the African Union to assess progress made in security sector reform efforts in the country.

Partners have also contributed to enhancing the African Union’s operational capacity in security sector reform by providing funding either to the African Union Commission or to ongoing security sector reform efforts in member states. The African Union’s support for security sector reform has been presented in cooperation or parallel with the efforts undertaken by other national, regional, and multilateral actors, creating multiple channels for effective partnerships.

However, there are points of divergence between the African Union and other bodies, including their levels of financial and human resources, security sector reform priorities, support strategies, and political interests. It is essential for the African Union to manage its relationships with partners to ensure that those with greater financial resources and technical expertise are not marginalized. Therefore, an important part of the African Union’s efforts to strengthen support for and reform the security sector in member states must be accompanied by providing added value to security sector reform partnerships.

Factors Hindering the African Union’s Effective Engagement with Partners in Security Sector Reform:

If partnerships among those supporting security sector reform processes are ineffective, the pathways and outcomes of these processes may be adversely affected, leading to uncoordinated efforts and difficulty in effectively allocating skills, creating implementation problems, possibly leading to duplicated efforts and diminishing the effectiveness of security sector reform operations.

Despite the cooperation avenues outlined above, the African Union’s partnerships in security sector reform have faced significant challenges, with some of the most notable obstacles being:

  • Ineffectiveness of Coordination Mechanisms:
    Within the African Union’s security sector reform framework, the responsibility for coordinating support for security sector reform ultimately lies with the governments of member states. For this reason, governments often establish national bodies for security sector reform. Task forces focused on security sector reform may become ineffective in member states due to a lack of political will and institutional deficits, and leaders may not view security sector reform as a national priority or fully understand the requirements.

Another issue is a lack of financial resources and suitably skilled personnel. In The Gambia, for example, the government did not allocate any budget for the National Security Office in the 2020 national budget, leading it to rely on donor funding, resulting in a shortage of personnel and resources. In some cases, political leaders may tend to use national security sector reform coordination mechanisms to leverage their influence. This was the case in South Sudan, where actors considered these mechanisms as a means to support specific political activities.

In the Central African Republic, the primary focus of security sector reform efforts was on the police and military. The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad made significant progress in training police officers to improve police work in training camps, but this progress was not matched by adequate capacity for prison officers to detain individuals who had been arrested by the newly trained police officers.

  • Lack of Strategic Alignment:
    Diverse political interests among the African Union and other stakeholders in peace and security undermine the alignment of security sector reform with broader goals of peacebuilding and state-building. Several respondents noted that this challenge is particularly prevalent in negotiating, mediating, and signing peace agreements. In some instances, the African Union, regional economic groups, and regional powers will negotiate peace agreements that include resource-intensive provisions for disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and security sector reform, hoping their partners will finance them. Challenges arise when these provisions do not meet partners’ priorities and political objectives, and when there is ineffective coordination regarding strategy.

Recently, donors have become hesitant to fund the implementation of security sector reform processes when they do not have political backing for specific provisions in peace agreements or political settlements. The 2018 revitalized agreement designed to end the conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) serves as an example, recommending the establishment of gathering camps for screening individuals and recruiting them into the security sector. A lack of funding for the camps led to dozens of soldiers abandoning them due to hunger and poor living conditions. Additionally, the inconsistency of policies in the host country further exacerbates the varying political priorities of partners in security sector reform; when a country struggles to clarify and implement its security sector reform priorities because of these differences, those supporting the processes may not effectively engage in ways that undermine national priorities and interests.

  • Challenges in Strengthening Partnerships:
    The African Union acknowledged the limitations of uncoordinated security sector reform efforts, noting in the three-year draft security sector reform strategy (2021-2023) that enhanced partnerships are a critical pillar for supporting security sector reform operations on the continent. The African Union should leverage its significant role in the continent to address ambiguities that hinder these partnerships. If pathways to enhance partnerships can be identified, this will facilitate a better understanding of how to capitalize on its role and ensure it is not marginalized. Three potential mechanisms for doing so are strategic engagement, enhanced coordination mechanisms, and deeper engagement with civil society organizations.
  • Diminishing Opportunities for Strategic Engagement:
    Political engagement can be bolstered through high-level participation by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, the Peace and Security Council, and special envoys and representatives collaborating with regional economic communities and regional mechanisms. Security reforms should be coupled with advocacy and political involvement at varying levels.

The African Union, increasingly along with regional economic communities and governance mechanisms, is positioned to advance the security sector reform strategy, as it possesses a significant degree of political legitimacy in promoting the peace and security agenda on the continent. Partners with financial resources and technical expertise can address the resource-intensive technical aspects of security sector reform, such as training and building security infrastructure; however, these technical components are highly political.

This creates an entry point for the African Union and regional economic communities and mechanisms to facilitate engagement on these issues, calling on the host country to ensure that security sector reform processes reflect national needs; given their political legitimacy and authority to convene meetings, the African Union and regional economic communities are well-placed to persuade host countries to develop national strategies for security sector reform, providing a framework within which supporters can operate and to which they can direct their support.

Opportunities to Enhance Partnerships for Security Sector Reform:

It should be noted that several key mechanisms contribute to enhancing partnerships between the African Union and partners for more effective security sector reform, among which are:

  • Strengthening Coordination Mechanisms and Experience Sharing:
    The African Union can utilize its political legitimacy to support coordination mechanisms for the host government. This is a critical step in preventing duplication and fragmentation of efforts while ensuring that the partners supporting security sector reform processes recognize the priorities of the host country. By partnering with regional economic communities and mechanisms, it can also enhance engagement with parliamentary committees responsible for security and defense. Such parliamentary committees play a central role in developing and monitoring security policy frameworks.

For example, the Economic Community of West African States has regularly engaged with parliamentarians in training on security sector reform; it collaborated with a coordinating committee to address the role, authority, challenges, and prospects of parliaments in relation to various aspects of security governance. In 2022, it launched the first phase of the ECOWAS Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform and Governance (SSRG) and held training workshops for national representatives in Senegal and The Gambia. The African Union could also commission institutions with specialized training facilities to train and empower parliamentarians in overseeing and coordinating these processes. In 2014, the African Union, in partnership with the UN and the EU, trained representatives from North African countries. Training partnerships directed at national committees for security sector reform enhance the capacity of officials working in these institutions.

The Pan-African Parliament has drafted laws in collaboration with the African Police Civilian Oversight Forum (APCOF). Some experts have suggested that the African Union consider transforming the steering committee focused on security sector reform into a sustainable resource platform for national commitments regarding security sector reform. Currently, the committee meets once a year for two days, providing an opportunity for member states and multilateral actors to share experiences and lessons learned regarding security sector reform. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, the steering committee’s meetings have been held approximately once a year, reducing the length and scope of sessions. The proposals for the committee to meet once every two years have not yet been implemented.

The steering committee can be repurposed as a knowledge exchange platform by tracking security sector reform initiatives and ensuring that partners are informed about reform processes throughout the year. The African Union Centre for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, based in Cairo, can support the operations of the redirected steering committee in light of the limited capacities of the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Security Sector Reform Division. The African Union must enhance its engagement in national coordination mechanisms and be consistent in doing so. While it has supported the national coordination of security sector reform in the Central African Republic by hosting a series of workshops and awareness campaigns on security sector reform, it has failed to send a representative to The Gambia’s steering committee for security sector reform, which is coordinating strategic reforms.

Engagement in national coordination mechanisms for security sector reform can provide the continental body with a platform to leverage its political legitimacy to advocate for increased coordination between the host state and supporters of security sector reform. It will also ensure that the African Union is not marginalized by wealthier bodies, with the main issue becoming resource scarcity. Meanwhile, officials from AULOs and SSR advisors deployed by the African Union can participate in coordination mechanisms at the national level, which only occurs in member states where the AU does not have a liaison office or SSR advisor, as has been the case in Lesotho. This means that the African Union will need to increase its human resource capacity to implement this recommendation.

  • Enhancing Internal Coordination:
    The African Union should enhance internal coordination within the African Union Commission and among its institutions and agencies. This will strengthen policy consistency, enabling strategic alignment between security sector reform and other vital political objectives. Within the African Union Commission, administrative structures such as inter-departmental task forces focused on conflict prevention and operationalizing the partnership framework for reconstruction and development demonstrate a political will to coordinate responses to challenges of human security.

These structures, despite their limitations, facilitate coordination within the committee and between the African Union Commission, NGOs, regional economic communities, regional powers, and member states regarding peacebuilding operations, including security sector reform. Since 2020, the African Union Commission has been implementing reforms that include integrating the Peace and Security Directorate (PSD) and the Political Affairs Directorate (DPA) to create the Political Affairs, Peace, and Security Directorate (PAPS).

  • Deepening Engagement with Civil Society:
    The African Union should enhance its engagement with civil society. Current partnerships range from seconding staff to AUC, training partners, and supporting decision-making based on evidence through research. Expanding these partnerships can play a crucial role in enhancing local ownership.

The framework for security sector reform emphasizes the importance of African ownership and leadership in security sector reform operations and highlights the importance of local communities as a component of this ownership. Discussions are underway to deepen connections with civil society, with the African Union Economic, Social, and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) expected to lead the process. For example, in 2018, the Economic and Social Council, in collaboration with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Oxfam, launched a joint program entitled “Engaging Civil Society in Security Sector and Justice Reforms,” targeting civil society organizations in countries emerging from conflicts through a series of capacity-building workshops focused on security sector reform.

The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Security Sector Reform Division is already partnering with the Economic and Social Council to engage civil society in conducting a series of training sessions for several civil society organizations on the oversight mechanisms for the security sector. “William Karo,” Secretary of the Economic and Social Council, announced that this training represents the beginning of a series of new training workshops that the Council will conduct in partnership with the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Security Sector Reform Division.

There are two potential pathways to enhance civil society partnerships:

  • The first pathway: Involves engaging civil society in initiatives to raise local community awareness about security sector reform. Partnerships between the African Union and civil society aimed at raising awareness among local communities can enhance the legitimacy of security sector reform processes by ensuring broader participation. While the acceptance of political leadership is essential, the sustainability of security sector reform operations requires broader support from the populace.
  • The second pathway: Partnerships with civil society for sustainable monitoring and evaluation of security sector reform operations, which is crucial to ensure the sustainability of security sector reform and the responsiveness of reforms to the needs of the host country’s population. The African Union’s ability to conduct monitoring and evaluation of security sector reform is limited, and civil society can complement it by engaging with governments to bridge the gap. These monitoring and evaluation activities should be carried out in close cooperation with the host government to mitigate the risk of alienating member states, as civil society actors may adopt approaches and mechanisms that may not align with the host government’s stance.

In conclusion, since the launch of the security sector reform policy framework, the African Union has sought to enhance security sector reform partnerships driven by the principle of African ownership. A large number of actors in the security sector reform field operating at the same time on the continent highlight the need to strengthen partnership mechanisms to ensure that the African Union can utilize its resources effectively. Ongoing technical and financial constraints raise questions about what can be contributed to security sector reform partnerships.

The African Union can address these challenges by leveraging its political legitimacy to support reform processes in member states. This legitimacy would allow it to focus on strategic engagement by enhancing political involvement through high-level participation from the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, the Peace and Security Council, and special envoys and representatives collaborating with regional economic communities and regional powers.

Additionally, the African Union can strengthen coordination mechanisms by establishing partnerships with institutions that have specialized expertise in training and empowering parliamentarians in security oversight and coordination. Enhancing collaboration between the African Union Commission and various African Union bodies and agencies would increase the capacity of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Security Sector Reform Division by providing access to skills from other parts of the African Union. The African Union has made some progress in promoting internal coordination, highlighting the need to enhance coordination between the African Union Centre for Sustainable Development and the relevant AU Commission staff. The Centre can assist the reconfigured steering committee in supporting the Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Security Sector Reform Division in tracking and supporting ongoing security sector reform processes on the continent.

References

[1] African Union (AU), Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), www.peaceau.org/uploads/pcrd-policyframwowork-eng

[2] AU, Communiqué of the 990th PSC meeting on the theme Consideration of the Report of the PSC Field Mission to South Sudan.

[3] AU, AU Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (SSR), www.peaceau.org/en/topic/au-policy-framework-on-security-sectorreform-ssr

[4] Chido Mutangadura, Deadly cost of South Sudan’s delayed security reforms, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/deadly-cost-ofsouth-sudans-delayed-security-reforms

[5] Marina Caparini, DDR and SSR Challenges in Mali, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) Working Paper 853.

[6] African Union, Consultancy Services on Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the Kingdom of Lesotho, https://au.int/en/bids/20210428/consultancy-services-security-sector-reform-ssr-kingdom-lesotho

[7] The African Union Commission and Partners hold the 5th and final Steering Committee Meeting for the AU capacity project on Security Sector Reform (SSR).

[8] ISSAT, High-level sensitisation and training workshop on the National SSR process in Madagascar.

[9] Sarah Detzner, Modern post-conflict security sector reform in Africa: Patterns of success and failure, African Security Review.

[10] Sam Mednick, Old grudges and empty coffers: South Sudan’s precarious peace process, www.thenewhumanitarian.org/newsfeature/2021/01/21/south-sudan-peace-deal-violence-famine

[11] ASSN, ECOWAS SSRG Training Workshop Kicks off In The Gambia, www.africansecuritynetwork.org/assn/ecowas-ssrgtraining-workshop-kicks-off-in-the-gambia/

[12] AU, Conclusions of 2nd Africa Forum on Security Sector Reform – Promoting the Continental Agenda of Security, Justice and Development, www.peaceau.org/en/article/conclusions-of-2ndafrica-forum-on-security-sector-reform-promoting-the-continentalagenda-of-security-justice-and-development

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SAKHRI Mohamed
SAKHRI Mohamed

I hold a Bachelor's degree in Political Science and International Relations in addition to a Master's degree in International Security Studies. Alongside this, I have a passion for web development. During my studies, I acquired a strong understanding of fundamental political concepts and theories in international relations, security studies, and strategic studies.

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