How Tensions Escalated Between Nigeria and Niger

The relationship between Nigeria and Niger, located within the West African region, has recently witnessed escalating tensions. This can primarily be linked to accusations made by the President of the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland in Niger, “Abdou Rahmane Tiani,” on December 25, 2024, accusing Nigeria of collaborating with France to destabilize his country. He also accused Nigeria of providing support and refuge to a jihadist group that has been implicated in sabotaging a major oil pipeline. This situation coincided with Niger summoning the chargé d’affaires at the Nigerian embassy. In response, Nigerian officials have sought to deny these allegations and affirm their falsity, with Nigerian Information Minister “Mohammed Idris” labeling these claims as baseless. These developments highlight the growing distance and divergence in positions between the two sides since the military coup in Niger on July 26, 2023, which will likely affect the future trajectory of relations between the two countries.

Key Features

There are several distinguishing features indicating the escalation of tensions between Nigeria and Niger in recent times:

Worsening Diplomatic Tensions: The Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs “Bakari Yao Sangare” summoned the chargé d’affaires at the Nigerian embassy in late December 2024. In a statement broadcast on national television, he accused Nigeria of facilitating efforts to destabilize Niger. He expressed disappointment with Nigeria’s actions, stating that despite efforts to normalize relations, Nigeria has not ceased to serve as a rear base for destabilizing Niger in collusion with some foreign powers and officials from the previous political system led by President “Mohamed Bazoum,” who are granted asylum in Nigeria. These accusations follow a previous commitment made by Nigeria’s top military commander to the leader of Niger’s army not to intervene in the country’s affairs in August 2024.

Niger’s Accusations Against Nigeria of Collaborating with France: This emerged from accusations made by President Tiani of Niger’s transitional military council on December 25, 2024, claiming Nigeria was collaborating with France to destabilize his country, notably by allowing the establishment of a French military base. He also accused France of allying with armed groups in the Lake Chad region to undermine Niger’s security with Nigeria’s knowledge. Niger’s fears may be exacerbated by the growing closeness between Nigeria and France in recent times, exemplified by Nigerian President “Bola Tinubu’s” visit to France in late November 2024, where both sides discussed deepening economic relations, and France announced several projects and development aid. Despite the absence of statements regarding improvements in security relations, the French and Nigerian navies conducted joint naval exercises off the coast of Lagos, Nigeria in November 2024.

Nigeria’s Denial of Niger’s Allegations Regarding Its Internal Stability: This is evident from the efforts of Nigerian officials to deny the accusations coming from Niger. National Security Adviser “Nuhu Ribadu” pointed out that these accusations are “false” and “groundless,” reaffirming that Nigeria will never “destabilize Niger or allow any disaster to befall it.” This stance was echoed by Nigeria’s Chief of Defence Staff, General “Christopher Musa,” who stated that Nigeria has no plans to target Niger. Information Minister “Mohammed Idris” similarly described these allegations as false, denying Nigeria’s involvement in any public or secret coalition with France or any other nation to destabilize the Republic of Niger. He also rejected any Nigerian role in sabotaging oil pipelines and agriculture in Niger, suggesting that these accusations serve as a diversion by President Tiani to cover up his administration’s failures and represent an attempt to extort Nigeria regarding ECOWAS’s stance against the unconstitutional seizure of power in Niger following the military coup on July 26, 2023.

Niger’s Promotion of Nigeria’s Role in ECOWAS implementing Sanctions Against It: This forms a cornerstone for the recent tensions between the two sides, as Niger believes that Nigeria, under President “Tinubu,” pushed ECOWAS to support military intervention to restore constitutional order and enforce sanctions after the 2023 military coup that ousted former President “Mohamed Bazoum.” This claim was denied by ECOWAS in a joint statement on December 26, 2024, which refuted allegations of Nigeria being a state that sponsors terrorism, asserting instead that Nigeria supports peace and security in various countries, not only within West Africa but also across the African continent. The statement indicated that Niger’s withdrawal from ECOWAS—along with Mali and Burkina Faso—was recognized after its refusal to restore democratic governance.

Future Prospects

There are several potential impacts on the future of interactions between Nigeria and Niger in light of the ongoing tensions:

1. Niger’s Move to Garner Support from Local Communities in Northern Nigeria: This effort is reflected in Niger’s transitional leader “Tiani’s” attempts to appeal to local communities and public opinion in Northern Nigeria, which primarily represents areas of influence and popular support for Nigerian President “Tinubu.” Tiani made statements accusing Nigeria of intervening to destabilize Niger in late December 2024 using the Hausa language, which is prevalent in parts of Niger and Northern Nigeria. Notably, local communities in Northern Nigeria have deep social ties with Niger. Consequently, many religious and political leaders in the region have vehemently opposed President Tinubu’s efforts to mobilize an ECOWAS military coalition to intervene and overthrow Niger’s military council in 2023, fearing the economic and humanitarian consequences of such an intervention. These communities also strongly opposed the economic blockade imposed by ECOWAS on Niger, which has caused significant economic difficulties in parts of northern Nigeria.
2. Diminishing Efficiency and Effectiveness of Bilateral Security Arrangements: This is a priority in their bilateral relations, particularly in light of a security cooperation agreement concluded in late August 2024, signed by the Chiefs of Defense Staff of both countries in Niger’s capital, Niamey. This agreement represents the first military pact between the two nations since Niger’s military coup in late July 2023, wherein Niger expressed its willingness to resume active participation in the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to combat Boko Haram. This force was established by the Lake Chad Basin Commission along with Benin in October 2014 and commenced operations in January 2015.
3. Declining Economic Ties Between the Two Countries: This is supported by the instability of the border, which stretches approximately 1,600 km, significantly impacting trade between the two nations. International Trade Centre data from 2022 indicated that cross-border trade valued about 226million,withNigeriasupplyingNigerwithelectricity,tobacco,andconstructionmaterialslikecement,whileNigerprovidedNigeriawithagriculturalproducts,suchasdatesandlivestock.Moreover,NigerheavilyreliesonNigerianportsforitsexternalimports;however,tradehasbeennoticeablyaffectedbytheeconomicsanctionsimposedbyECOWASonNigerinAugust2023,leadingtoacompletedisruptionoftraditionaleconomicactivitiesinthebordercommunities.ThissituationhasalsoresultedinrisingpricesforgoodsandincreasingunemploymentratesinNiger,exacerbatingdifficultlivingconditions,asapproximately4.3millioncitizensrelyonhumanitarianaidaccordingtoUNestimates.Notably,thereisarailwayprojectdesignedtoconnectthecityofKano—Nigeria′slargestcityinthenorth—withMaradiinNiger,aimedatenhancingcross−bordertradeandtransport.Nigeriasecuredfundingofaround226million,withNigeriasupplyingNigerwithelectricity,tobacco,andconstructionmaterialslikecement,whileNigerprovidedNigeriawithagriculturalproducts,suchasdatesandlivestock.Moreover,NigerheavilyreliesonNigerianportsforitsexternalimports;however,tradehasbeennoticeablyaffectedbytheeconomicsanctionsimposedbyECOWASonNigerinAugust2023,leadingtoacompletedisruptionoftraditionaleconomicactivitiesinthebordercommunities.ThissituationhasalsoresultedinrisingpricesforgoodsandincreasingunemploymentratesinNiger,exacerbatingdifficultlivingconditions,asapproximately4.3millioncitizensrelyonhumanitarianaidaccordingtoUNestimates.Notably,thereisarailwayprojectdesignedtoconnectthecityofKano—Nigeria′slargestcityinthenorth—withMaradiinNiger,aimedatenhancingcross−bordertradeandtransport.Nigeriasecuredfundingofaround1.3 billion for its completion by March 2024, with a Chinese company financing about 85% of the project’s cost, while the Nigerian government will cover the remaining 15%.
4. Worsening Risks and Cross-Border Terrorism Threats: This is underscored by a new armed group called “Lakwara” that detonated an oil pipeline in Niger on December 17, 2024. This group has also attacked villages in remote areas in Northwest Nigeria and across the border in Niger. Reports indicate that members of this group control territories in several villages, where they also impose taxes on livestock. The group distributes financial aid, farming tools, fertilizers, seeds, and water pumping equipment to needy locals as a tactic to attract more followers and gain local support. They have sought to impose their version of Islamic law in the areas they govern. The Nigerian army acknowledged the existence of this group for the first time, stating its members operate from locations in the states of Sokoto and Kebbi in Nigeria as of November 2024. Originally, the fighters stemmed from Mali but had settled for years in communities along the Nigeria-Niger border. They were initially herders bearing arms for protection but organized as an armed group after being called upon by local leaders in rural communities in Sokoto State to help confront armed bandits attacking communities for money and livestock, as cited by various international reports. In addition to this, Boko Haram, operationally based in Nigeria, conducts some attacks and terror activities in Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, rendering it one of the primary transnational terrorist organizations in the West African region.
5. Niger’s Focus on Security Partnerships Through the Sahel Alliance: This is bolstered by the Niger government’s perception of Nigeria’s efforts to strengthen security ties with France recently, which contradicts the interests and self-goals of Niger and the Sahel Alliance as a whole. The alliance was formed by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in September 2023. These countries agreed at their first meeting to establish a “Sahel Confederation” in July 2024, following their decision to withdraw from ECOWAS membership in January 2024.

In conclusion, the recent escalation of tensions between Nigeria and Niger is fundamentally tied to the Niger government’s maneuvering under Tiani to exert pressure on Nigeria regarding its security relations with France. Niger has severed all military, security, and economic ties with France due to Nigeria’s support for military intervention under ECOWAS after the July 2023 coup. The future trajectory of relations between Nigeria and Niger suggests a continued decline, exacerbated by the existing divergence in coordinating joint positions, whether bilaterally or multilaterally in West Africa—this will likely cast shadows on the future dynamics of interactions between the two sides at various levels, especially in security and economic spheres.