As Turkish-Iranian relations warn of complicating dynamics, Turkish media revealed on January 15, 2025, that Iran is preparing to supply Syrian Kurds with drones while Turkey pressures to disarm Kurdish groups. According to the Turkish newspaper “Yeni Şafak,” Iran has agreed to provide the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria with 1,500 drones to counter the assault from Syrian factions loyal to Turkey. Despite the denial from the Kurdish self-administration, this suggests, according to observers, Iran’s efforts to reposition itself on the Syrian scene following the fall of the Assad regime and to maintain its influence by leveraging the Kurdish card through military support for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). In light of this, the potential increase in military cooperation between Tehran and the offshoots of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the region raises concerns for Turkey for numerous reasons and considerations, particularly considering the implications on Turkey’s efforts to dismantle the Kurdish project in the region.
Stimulating Policies
According to several estimates, there are encouraging contexts that could lead Tehran to exploit the Kurdish card to reinvigorate its effectiveness in the Syrian landscape. The most significant of these are:
Western Confusion Over Turkish-Faction Operations Against Syrian Kurds: The discussion about Iranian moves to support Syrian Kurds may be linked to the confusion among Western powers regarding military operations conducted by Turkish-backed factions against Syrian Kurds. This confusion was apparent in the Biden administration’s hesitance to address Turkish threats towards the Kurdish self-administration and its inability to curb Turkish interventions in northeastern Syria. Western stances on the Kurdish issue varied following Assad’s fall; while Germany urged Syrian Kurds to disarm, the French foreign minister called on Kurdish factions on January 3, 2025, to integrate into Syria’s political life.
Trump’s Concerns About Continued U.S. Military Presence in Syria: Iran is aware that Trump’s rise to power in the U.S. could lead to a renewed proposal to withdraw Washington’s forces from Syria, leaving the Kurds vulnerable to Turkish military strength, particularly since he expressed concerns about the prolonged U.S. military presence in the region. During his first term, he also sought to withdraw from northern Syria.
Expectations of Protracted Armed Conflicts in Northeastern Syria: Despite significant losses for SDF forces amid current confrontations with Turkish-affiliated factions, all indicators point towards prolonged conflicts in northeastern Syria. This is especially true following the SDF’s announcement to continue fighting against Turkey and its local affiliates to the end. Iran sees this as an opportunity for potential repositioning in the Syrian arena while simultaneously countering Turkey’s regional adversary.
Iran’s Discontent With Turkey’s Role in Overthrowing Assad: Despite extensive relations between Iran and Turkey, marked by historical ideological and political conflicts, recent signs of Iranian anger emerged over Turkey’s efforts to overthrow the Assad regime and support for anti-regime factions, resulting in Iran losing significant geopolitical influence in the region. In a message on December 11, 2024, Iran’s Supreme Leader indirectly accused Turkey of being involved in the collapse of the Assad regime, stating, “One of the neighboring governments of Syria played and continues to play a clear role in what happened in Syria.”
Diminishing Influence of Traditional Alliances Due to the Impacts of the Gaza War: Recent regional changes resulting from U.S.-supported Israeli military operations in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen, alongside the fall of the Syrian regime, have led Iran to lose its local proxies in its regional spheres of influence. This was evident in Hezbollah’s diminished capabilities, the weakening of Houthi strength in Yemen, and unprecedented pressures on its factions in Iraq, which could lead to their disintegration or at least incorporation into Iraq’s official military structure. Consequently, Iran might seek to engage with alternative local political forces to develop new alliances, especially in Syria, with the Kurdish movement being a key entry point for re-entry into the Syrian arena, particularly in light of its need to build defensive capabilities against Turkish military pressures.
Between Escalation and Containment
Given Ankara’s discomfort with potential Iranian support for Kurdish factions in Syria, this situation may place Iranian-Turkish relations on two potential paths. The first path involves increased latent tension between Ankara and Tehran; this scenario suggests a likelihood of tensions surfacing in the upcoming phase. Three significant considerations fuel this scenario: first, Turkish media confirmed recent Iranian military supplies to the SDF to assist in ongoing battles with Turkey-affiliated factions near the Al-Tabqa Dam in the Manbij area, east of Aleppo. Ankara is aware of the historical ties between the YPG and Iran, tracing back to the era of Qassem Soleimani, the former head of the Quds Force. Second, Turkey’s frustration with Iranian support for the PKK in northern Iraq over the past two years. Third, Turkey’s undeclared threats to Iran and some Kurdish-supporting parties, as evidenced by the Turkish president’s call on January 14, 2025, for everyone to “keep their hands off Syria,” stressing that those who wish to play any role should consider Turkey’s presence and interests.
The second potential path is to manage the differences between Turkey and Iran; despite the ongoing disputes between the two countries, which reached a peak after the fall of Assad—leading to Turkey’s rise on the Syrian stage against the backdrop of diminishing Iranian influence—it is likely that both countries will seek to manage tensions and avoid a complete rupture in relations, dealing pragmatically with reports indicating Iranian cooperation with Syrian Kurds. This scenario is linked to several factors, most importantly, both parties’ desire to maintain their shared economic interests, estimated to amount to around $11 billion of trade exchanges by the end of 2024. Iran is also keen to avoid heightening tensions with Ankara while seeking to prevent shifts in the regional balance of power or at least adjust Turkish influence. In this context, Tehran perceives Turkey as a potential economic lifeline, especially in light of Trump’s threats to revert to maximum pressure policies against Iran.
In conclusion, Turkish-Iranian relations are likely to face some tensions during the current phase, particularly following Ankara’s pivotal role in overthrowing Assad and the reports of Iranian support for Syrian Kurds. However, this does not indicate a complete severance of ties, as mutual interests may compel both countries to navigate these disputes or at least postpone confrontation at this time.
