The Horn of Africa region has been in a state of alert since the beginning of this year, following Ethiopia’s signing of an agreement with the “Somaliland” region. This agreement allows Ethiopia—a landlocked country—to gain direct commercial and military access to the Red Sea. This move has incited anger from Somalia, which refuses to recognize Somaliland’s claim for independence that was first declared in 1991. Amid these tensions, Beijing hosted the 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit in early September 2024, featuring Chinese President Xi Jinping and leaders from African nations. In this context, the article aims to highlight China’s response to the tensions in the Horn of Africa, specifically how China has interacted with the escalation between Ethiopia and Somalia, and what its vision is for resolving the crisis in the region.
Chinese Interests in the Horn of Africa
The Horn of Africa holds significant importance for China due to several strategic and economic considerations; it serves as a launchpad for achieving China’s economic vision in Africa, epitomized by the Belt and Road Initiative. This underscores the strategic weight the region occupies in the perceptions of Chinese foreign policymakers. China aims to interlink economic interests by enhancing trade and pouring investments into the countries of the region, improving infrastructure and constructing new ports and railways to facilitate the movement of people and goods and boost trade. This is clearly evident in the construction of railroads and ports in Djibouti, as well as the inauguration of a new railway line connecting Nairobi to Mombasa, linking the interior to the coast. China also launched a 750-kilometer railway in 2017 connecting Djibouti to Addis Ababa to facilitate the movement of Chinese goods, and constructed the Garissa photovoltaic power station in Kenya.
Furthermore, China has sought to bolster its military presence in the Horn of Africa by opening its military base in Djibouti in 2017, which houses ten thousand troops. This base contributes to enhancing military cooperation with countries in the region and helps maintain strategic maritime corridors, thus safeguarding Chinese economic interests.
China’s Response to the Escalation Between Somalia and Ethiopia
China’s response to the current crisis in the Horn of Africa can be viewed through several key points:
- Maintaining Distinct Relations with Both Parties of the Crisis: China has worked to deepen relations with both Ethiopia and Somalia (the parties of the crisis), which became evident during the ninth FOCAC summit. It was announced that the level of China-Somalia relations would be elevated to a strategic partnership, with China affirming its support for Somalia in protecting national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the peace and development process, while boosting cooperation in various fields such as economy, trade, fisheries, and human resource training. China also emphasized ongoing financial support for the international peacekeeping mission in Somalia, aiding the country in enhancing its capacity for independent development, combating terrorism, and maintaining stability. Regarding relations with Ethiopia, China has focused on consolidating cooperation with Addis Ababa across all sectors, clear during the FOCAC summit. The two countries share a strong foundation of mutual political trust, which reflects positively on economic cooperation between them and China’s commitment to enhancing infrastructure and industrial development in Ethiopia by building a shared transport network linking the sea and railways. China has also strengthened military cooperation with Ethiopia through a new agreement aimed at enhancing Ethiopia’s defense capabilities, transferring advanced weapon technology, building capacities, and joint production of military equipment. Additionally, Ethiopia will acquire the new CH-7 stealth drones from China.
- Emphasizing the Principle of Non-Recognition for Separatist Movements: China emphasizes the principle of “One Somalia,” meaning it refuses to recognize Somaliland as an independent state. It also rejects interactions between Somaliland and Taiwan, which seeks independence from China, as China considers Taiwan an integral part of its territory and opposes any official interactions between Taiwan and other countries. Therefore, China opposed Taiwan’s opening of a representative office in the Somaliland capital, Hargeisa, in 2020. In light of this, China and Somalia may cooperate to thwart any attempts to violate the territorial integrity of both nations.
- Chinese Support for Regional Initiatives: China supports Djibouti’s initiative to reduce tensions in the Horn of Africa. Djibouti introduced a proposal during the FOCAC to de-escalate tensions, offering Ethiopia “100% management” of a port in Tajura along Djibouti’s coast. If Ethiopia accepts this offer, it would achieve its ambitions for direct access to the sea, having become landlocked after Eritrea’s independence in 1991. Furthermore, Ethiopia’s acceptance of this proposal would resolve the diplomatic conflict that arose between Ethiopia and Somalia following the memorandum of understanding, which Ethiopia signed with Somaliland authorities to gain maritime access through the concession.
- Possibility of Direct Engagement: According to Chinese expectations, peace and security in the Horn of Africa are fundamental pillars for the stability of development and international trade. However, the current crisis in the region threatens its stability, negatively impacting Chinese interests there. The tense relations between Somalia and Ethiopia could lead to diminished security coordination between the two countries, providing opportunities for the terrorist group al-Shabaab to launch more attacks and destabilize the Horn of Africa. Given China’s strong relations with all countries in the region, there is a possibility of direct Chinese engagement in the ongoing crisis, potentially through mediation by the Chinese envoy for the Horn of Africa between the two parties to reach a compromise that would reduce tensions, benefitting China, which has significant economic interests in the region.
In conclusion, it can be said that China follows a non-interventionist policy in the internal affairs of other countries and aims to address conflicts diplomatically, which has been clearly evident in the current tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia amidst the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Somaliland. China’s response to this crisis has been characterized by pragmatism, aimed at protecting its vital economic interests in the Horn of Africa, especially in the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative, while emphasizing the principle of maintaining territorial integrity. China views Somaliland as part of Somalia’s territory and a domestic matter, suggesting that it opposes Ethiopia’s efforts to recognize Somaliland as an independent state, considering that such recognition would have direct implications for China regarding the recognition of Taiwan as a separate state.
