When established in 1975, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) aimed for economic integration and had already succeeded in achieving significant milestones in this regard. However, with the adoption of a democratic governance charter in 2001, it began to interfere in the internal politics of member states and imposed sanctions on those deviating from democratic rule through military coups, such as the sanctions imposed on Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, which failed to affect the military regimes and sparked widespread criticism. The sanctions harmed the civilian population and exacerbated frustrations towards the organization. Additionally, its slow response to certain political crises, such as constitutional amendments in Guinea and Ivory Coast, further eroded trust in ECOWAS.
Tensions between the Sahel States and the economic community escalated due to the military coups experienced by the three countries; in the past three years, the region witnessed six coups: in Mali in 2020 and 2021, in Guinea in 2021, and in Burkina Faso in January and September 2022, and finally in Niger in 2023.
ECOWAS imposed sanctions on these nations and demanded a return to constitutional order, but military leaders refused to comply. In Mali, ECOWAS decided in August 2020 to close air and land borders and impose a ban on financial and commercial exchanges, except for essential goods. In Burkina Faso, its membership in ECOWAS bodies was suspended. In Niger, the military leaders responsible for the coup were banned from travel, and economic sanctions isolated the country from many of its traditional trade partners, intensifying the food security crisis.
The military coups in Mali (2020 and 2021), Guinea (2021), and Burkina Faso (January and September 2022) angered ECOWAS, which had adopted a two-decade policy of zero tolerance towards military coups and unconstitutional power seizures. However, rather than forcing the Nigerien military to step back, the sanctions produced counterproductive results against ECOWAS, leading to severe shortages of food and medicine and an economic slowdown, sparking a wave of public outrage against ECOWAS on social media. Many Nigeriens blamed the organization for their suffering. Given that Mali and Burkina Faso were also under ECOWAS sanctions due to their coups, they joined Niger in its antagonism towards the organization.
In September 2023, the governments of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, all led by military officers, formed a new cooperative body in defense and security called the Sahel States Alliance. A senior official from the alliance explained to the Crisis Group that the alliance is inspired by the NATO model, establishing a non-aggression pact and mutual assistance in the event of an attack on any member state. This unity was a direct response to the threat of military intervention from ECOWAS following the military coup that ousted Niger’s democratically elected government in July 2023. This coup was the sixth in just three years in West Africa, adding a new link to the chain of political tensions that have plagued the region, which has already been suffering from severe jihadist violence for over a decade.
The Sahel States Alliance is pursuing a new approach to create a more integrated union that offers greater welfare to its populations. The core of this approach lies in unifying defense and security forces. In this context, General Silyv Moddy clarified: “In this common space, our forces can now intervene together,” indicating that this unified force is almost ready. He also confirmed that this military bloc will be equipped with human resources, air and ground means, intelligence apparatus, and an effective coordination system. This was stated during an interview on Niger’s state television, stressing that the joint force will be ready for action in a few weeks.
Thus, the tension between ECOWAS and the alliance states persisted until they announced their withdrawal from the community on January 28, 2024, and the formation of a confederation among themselves on July 6, 2024. Mediation and negotiations led by Senegalese President Macky Sall, alongside his Togolese counterpart, Faure Gnassingbé, aimed to bring the three nations back into ECOWAS, but to no avail. The community gave the three countries a full year to revise their stances, but they remained resolute, concluding the deadline on January 28, 2025, when the three countries officially withdrew from the organization on January 29, 2025.
Now, with the withdrawal in effect, it undoubtedly leaves serious repercussions in various individual, collective, and national areas. This is what we will attempt to address and explore in this modest research.
Consequences of Withdrawal from ECOWAS
The economic and financial sanctions imposed by ECOWAS on the three nations in response to the military coups in each added fuel to the fire; the populations of the region were already discontented with the actions of the economic community, which negatively impacted civilians, increasing feelings of injustice and frustration within the member states of the Sahel States Alliance. This fueled animosity and hatred towards ECOWAS.
Military leaders seized the opportunity to adopt populist rhetoric against the economic community, psychologically preparing the populace to accept decisions the leaders would take against the organization. Indeed, the citizens first called for their countries’ withdrawal from ECOWAS before the leaders announced their decision, and when the decision was made, it received widespread approval and welcome from the people up to this day.
Moreover, the absence of effective solidarity on the part of ECOWAS in combating the terrorism ravaging the coastal region deteriorated relations between the two sides. The Sahel countries criticized ECOWAS for failing to support them in the face of a significant security challenge threatening the stability of the entire region.
Feelings of foreign intervention, particularly from France, also played an important role in the decision of the alliance countries, accusing the organization of being used by external powers to defend their interests at the expense of the aspirations of African peoples.
Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger feel that their ambitions no longer align with the goals of ECOWAS and now seek greater independence from French colonial influence.
Political Impacts
The three countries encompass a geographical area of 2.7 million square kilometers, representing 52.84% of ECOWAS’s total area. They are home to roughly 70 million people, which is 17% of the total population of ECOWAS, yet they contribute only 7% of the gross domestic product (GDP) (50.65 billion dollars out of 723 billion dollars).
Burkina Faso’s President, Ibrahim Traoré, emphasized in a political statement that the formation of the Sahel States Alliance is the result of a need to extend and expand a structure in which members desire to deepen ties in areas beyond the military, particularly addressing economics, resources, and social and cultural development. This stems from the three nations’ desire to unify resources they consider critical in this closed area of the Sahel, as well as from their wish to rid themselves of old colonial influences, such as France. This separation primarily occurs by reducing diplomatic relations with France and the United States and promoting local languages in the media.
While the establishment of the alliance can be seen as a geostrategic tool aimed at stabilizing the region, the reasons for this union have deeper roots; the member states of the confederation advocate this approach to end what they describe as foreign intervention in their politics.
The alliance seeks to underscore the failure of Western military operations to combat jihadist groups in the “Liptako-Gourma” area, alongside the increased violence and insecurity resulting therefrom, and it strengthens its proximity to Russia, which is sending fighters to secure the region. The formation of the Sahel States Alliance and its exit from ECOWAS may shift the historical balance of influence in the region in favor of emergent powers free from Western influence.
Moreover, the withdrawal may lead to diplomatic isolation on the international stage, as these countries once garnered support for their positions within international organizations. They risk losing support from the regional bloc in international bodies like the African Union and the United Nations. Opportunities for their citizens to secure leadership positions within international organizations could diminish.
In light of the deteriorating security situation, the alliance nations are reevaluating their international partnerships. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have requested French troops to leave their territories, and recently Niger also asked for the withdrawal of American forces, which were replaced by Russian fighters, signaling a decline in Western influence at a time when Russian influence is on the rise.
Siddick Abba, head of the International Studies Center on the Sahel, believes this withdrawal does not necessarily spell the end for ECOWAS as a regional organization; certain gains, such as freedom of movement, will remain in place and will not simply disappear. However, ECOWAS will face immediate administrative and institutional repercussions, such as the departure of financial, Burkinabe, and Nigerien staff from its offices, along with the reevaluation of projects funded through it, which may be partially disrupted.
The withdrawal of the Sahel countries from ECOWAS also opens up new opportunities for the coastal region. The creation of a new, more independent regional organization capable of confronting the challenges specific to the area is a potential option.
Regarding ECOWAS, many observers agree that the withdrawal of these three countries represents a significant loss for the economic community, both politically and economically, and the organization will face a future legitimacy crisis, necessitating a reevaluation of its role and missions.
With the onset of the new phase beginning January 29, 2025, ECOWAS will encounter unprecedented challenges in restoring its regional balance.
Economic Impacts
Ibrahim Amadou Loushi, an economic analyst, states: “The consequences will be substantial and potentially catastrophic, given the interdependence among member states.” This could lead to an effective blockade preventing the movement of people and goods, resulting in severe shortages of essential goods and unprecedented price hikes.
Exiting the free trade area is expected to increase customs duties and transport fees, as Hama Hamidou Diallo, an independent economist, points out that 80% of the goods consumed by Niger come from abroad via the ports of Cotonou and Lomé. Thus, any changes in transport and trade costs will directly impact consumers.
In terms of trade, the alliance countries represent 10% of ECOWAS’s GDP; thus, quitting could reduce market size and disrupt trade among member states. It could impose restrictions on imports and exports, increasing economic challenges.
Regarding financial impacts, the cost of regional projects in these countries amounts to $321,634,253, meaning that their withdrawal will negatively affect the implementation of these projects.
The withdrawal could also lead to the closure of several regional agencies and negatively impact around 130 ECOWAS employees’ jobs.
Indeed, ECOWAS has started laying off employees of the three countries working in its institutions; on Friday, February 7, 2025, it was announced that 135 employees from these countries received notifications of the termination of their contracts effective at the end of September; this means they will be left unemployed, and they have complained about the fallout from decisions they became victims of without being consulted.
The exit of the Sahel States Alliance is expected to shrink ECOWAS’s population by about 70 million people, leading to a decrease in the organization’s GDP. Additionally, rising food prices may exacerbate the already difficult living conditions for the populations of the Sahel. Nevertheless, this severance does not necessarily indicate the end of economic relations; future cooperation agreements between the two sides are likely to be negotiated.
If customs taxes, visas, and other restrictions are reinstated, regional trade could be significantly affected. The Sahel Alliance countries heavily rely on ECOWAS for both imports and exports, and these exchanges are also a crucial source of income for ECOWAS.
When these countries were part of ECOWAS, they benefitted from joint economic advantages with 12 other countries in the community. However, following their announced withdrawal in January 2024, circumstances may change. Beyond joint economic projects and plans for launching a common currency, numerous economic sectors are exposed to risks due to this separation. Some economists warn that the exit of the alliance countries may have substantial economic repercussions extending to neighboring countries.
Omar Aliou Toure, the President of ECOWAS, warned that the Sahel’s exit from the union may cost them the loss of funding for economic projects exceeding $500 million from regional financial institutions, such as the ECOWAS Investment and Development Bank and the West African Development Bank, which could be suspended or entirely canceled.
Relationship with the West African Economic and Monetary Union
Despite their withdrawal from ECOWAS, the three countries will remain members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), allowing them to continue benefiting from freedom of movement and trade. However, there are investment concerns, as local and foreign investors may become more cautious due to the uncertainty and volatility arising from the unnegotiated withdrawal, affecting investments in the region.
The military regimes in the Sahel States Alliance continue to criticize what they consider exploitation by ECOWAS on behalf of the former colonial power (France). They are striving to free themselves from French control and are planning to establish a new common currency to replace the CFA franc, termed “Sahel,” continuously expressing their desire to sever all links with France, making a withdrawal from the CFA franc a potential step, yet it would also be more perilous as it would require exiting the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), thus abandoning the trade and humanitarian guarantees currently provided by this space.
It is essential to understand that withdrawing from the UEMOA would entail more serious consequences than leaving ECOWAS, as the union represents a framework for deep, long-standing monetary and economic integration, as well as strong human links formed over time, evident from the large communities of citizens from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger in Ivory Coast.
Security Impacts
The withdrawal will affect cooperation in security and intelligence sharing, potentially weakening joint counter-terrorism efforts; Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are key countries in West African integration, particularly in stabilization efforts in a region severely affected by terrorism. It is feared that this “hasty” withdrawal could threaten efforts to restore democracy and contribute to stabilizing a region that has become more fragile. Western leaders have warned of additional challenges that may confront efforts to combat transnational crime, illegal migration, and terrorism in the Sahel region.
The security situation presents a critical challenge amidst the ongoing crisis in the Sahel, especially regarding counter-terrorism. The Sahel States criticize ECOWAS for its marginal role in addressing this issue, as the organization has heavily relied on external funding or the deployment of foreign troops.
In November 2024, the Sahel States Alliance announced the establishment of its own joint military force. As regional divisions continue, analysts warn that this fragmentation could further destabilize the region, especially since 2023 was the deadliest year in the conflict’s history, according to the International Crisis Group.
Social Impacts
The major social consequences revolve around the freedom of movement for goods, people, and capital for the three countries, which lack access to the sea; ECOWAS guarantees citizens of member countries the ability to travel without visas and to remain within member states for work or residency. However, as the Sahel nations exit the organization, all sectors, including transportation, are threatened, particularly as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger are crucial transit points for overland transport in West Africa.
Given their status as landlocked countries, these nations heavily depend on goods from other countries. The situation may be more complicated for Niger, which is bordered by Nigeria and has an economy that relies significantly on exchanges with this neighbor.
In Mali, the populations in its southern border regions have become accustomed to seeing long lines of trucks loaded with sugar bananas, oil, and other goods. To the west with Senegal, trucks loaded with cement and iron pass through the country’s administrative region daily; from Guinea Conakry, Most of Mali’s goods arriving by port come from Conakry, as well as Abidjan, Dakar, and even Nouakchott. These countries were also negatively impacted by the sanctions ECOWAS imposed on Mali after the coup, indicating the difficulty or impossibility for any of these nations to disregard the others.
It is worth mentioning that ECOWAS citizens can currently travel freely using just their national identity cards, similar to the Schengen Area model in Europe. However, some barriers, such as corruption and illegal practices at borders, still persist.
Measures for ECOWAS Citizens
The leaders of the Sahel States Alliance have decided to take new measures to enhance the freedom of movement for ECOWAS citizens within their territories, including:
- Opening the borders of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to all ECOWAS citizens without visas.
- Granting ECOWAS citizens the right to travel and reside freely in the alliance’s states.
- Prohibiting any person deemed an “unacceptable migrant” from moving or residing within the union.
- Allowing the entry of private, commercial, and transport vehicles into the alliance’s territories, in accordance with the national laws of the three countries.
Passports
According to the statement from the rotating presidency of the Sahel States, General Assimi Goita, old ECOWAS passports remain valid until their expiration date. Holders of these passports can replace them with new ones from the “Sahel States Alliance.” ECOWAS passports for citizens from these countries remain valid, granting them the right to travel and reside without a visa in ECOWAS countries until further notice.
However, citizens in these countries may encounter travel and residency issues as they will lose their rights under ECOWAS agreements. Omar Aliou Toure, the President of the ECOWAS Commission, has stated that citizens of the three countries (Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso) may have to obtain visas to travel to ECOWAS countries, which will restrict their freedom of movement, residence, and work.
This change could particularly impact the large communities of Malians and Burkinabés residing in countries like Ivory Coast. Nonetheless, no official decisions regarding visa enforcement have been made yet, and agreements ensuring the continuation of freedom of movement may still be reached. It is known that when the freedom of movement for individuals and goods is hindered, it will complicate trade exchanges.
Such a withdrawal may lead these countries to lose the advantages of the shared ECOWAS market, which encompasses over 400 million people.
The experts of the Sahel States Alliance convened in Bamako on February 1 and 2, 2025, to discuss establishing a unified visa policy for member states. This initiative follows the recent launch of the biometric unified passport for the alliance, representing a significant step toward enhancing regional integration. The future community visa for the alliance, named “Liptako Visa,” aims to facilitate entry for citizens from non-member countries of ECOWAS into the three member countries: Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. This move is expected to promote tourism, trade exchanges, and investments in the region. Currently, the alliance experts are preparing a proposal for a secure visa sticker. This proposal, along with the outcomes of their discussions, will be submitted to the security ministers of the member countries for study and approval.
Russia’s Position
Russia welcomed the establishment of the Sahel Confederation and announced its intention to cooperate economically and militarily with it. ECOWAS fears that this could lead to a “dissolution” resulting from its creation. The concerns expressed by the economic community regarding fragmentation are based on worries about the emergence of a new division within it. In addition to divisions between English-speaking and French-speaking countries, ECOWAS faces an existential threat creating a new dividing line between pro-Russian and anti-Western countries, and those leaning towards the West; this might lead some nations to shift from ECOWAS to favor the confederation. Additionally, ECOWAS may experience diminished credibility on the international stage due to its inability to prevent this internal fragmentation. Until now, it has been the only internationally recognized regional organization capable of intervening swiftly and effectively in regional issues. This new situation (the Sahel nations’ withdrawal and the establishment of a confederation) is likely to lead to a loss of that recognition, contributing to a decline in Western influence on the continental level in favor of Russia, rather than the decline of ECOWAS associated with Western influence, reflecting a gradual retreat of Western hegemony over the continent towards affirming national identities.
Indeed, Russia has managed to replace Western powers that have become undesirable influences on African soil due to their colonial past and accusations of draining the continent’s mineral wealth and intentionally prolonging conflicts to benefit from them.
In the face of ongoing upheavals in the Sahel nations, Russia appears as an attractive security partner. Moscow aims to fill the void left by Western forces by providing military and diplomatic solutions, using influence operations, particularly through social media and the Wagner Group, a private military company, to strengthen its presence in the region. The latter serves as a tool to expand Russian influence and exploit local political crises, with Russia expressing support for military regimes that have taken power in these countries, asserting that their withdrawal from ECOWAS is a quest for new forms of cooperation. It has also warned against any interference against it, viewing such actions as potentially exacerbating the terrorist threat in the region. Agreements have been signed regarding training the armies in Sahel countries and the possibility of deploying more Russian paramilitary forces in the area, as well as collaborations in energy and even space initiatives. Russia positions itself as an alternative partner that does not condition its assistance on strict political demands, appealing to some Sahel nations weary of Western intervention.
These agreements have already begun to yield results; under these agreements, these nations have acquired arms they would not have been able to possess while aligned with French interests, where they would sign agreements to purchase weapons only with African countries, especially their former colonies. France would neither provide arms nor return funds; it would even intervene with other major arms-producing countries to thwart arms purchase deals, leaving these African nations at the mercy of terrorist groups, while France remained the only recourse for resolving such conflicts per its national interests.
Today, with Russia, these countries can purchase the arms they desire. Mali has acquired military aircraft, armored vehicles, trucks, tanks, advanced radar systems, drones, and highly sophisticated machine guns, enabling it to shift the balance of power and achieve successes in its war against jihadist and terrorist groups in the northern and central parts of the country. Cooperation with Russia differs from that with France in its realism and credibility, leading African nations to annul cooperation agreements with France, evacuate its forces, and close its bases even outside the alliance nations, such as Chad, Senegal, and Ivory Coast.
Conclusion
The withdrawal of the Sahel nations from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is now an established reality. The three countries are working on implementing union mechanisms across all political, military, economic, social, cultural, educational, health, media, and even sports spheres. Whether viewed as a break or a necessary evolution, this development reshapes the contours of regional cooperation in West Africa. For ECOWAS, this decision presents significant challenges regarding unity and effectiveness, while the Sahel nations see it as a step toward achieving an ambitious and bold project.
Through upcoming projects in preparation, the Sahel States Alliance aims to achieve political, economic, social, cultural, educational, and media unity, relying on cooperation with new partners in all these areas, characterized by realism and credibility.
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