The extraordinary summit of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), hosted by Abuja, the capital of Nigeria, on July 7, 2024, gained particular importance for several considerations, most notably its timing, just one day after the summit held by the leaders of the coups in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, during which they announced their intention to move forward in forming a confederation among them, known as the Sahel Countries Alliance.
Their decision, confirmed in January 2024, to withdraw immediately from ECOWAS posed a challenge to one of the most important regional organizations on the continent. ECOWAS had achieved significant successes on the economic level, especially with regard to the free movement of people and goods between the fifteen member states with a unified passport. It was also the first African organization to focus on the security dimension and its importance for achieving economic stability.
ECOWAS was a pioneer in formulating security protocols such as Non-Aggression in 1978 and Mutual Assistance on Defence in 1981, then establishing a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security in 1999. One of the most important provisions of this mechanism was the expansion of the basis for the intervention of the organization’s forces in internal conflicts in the event of a threat of a humanitarian catastrophe, the existence of acts of violence that violate human rights and the rule of law to a large extent, or in the event of the overthrow of an elected government. This withdrawal, or secession, so to speak, raises a key question that this study attempts to answer about the future of the political and security role of ECOWAS.
Therefore, this study will be divided into three main sections, from which sub-points emerge:
First: Political and security mechanisms in ECOWAS. Second: Assessing the political and security role of ECOWAS before and during the recent coups. Third: The future of ECOWAS after the formation of the new Sahel alliance “Scenarios”.
Section One: Political and Security Structures
ECOWAS was the first “sub-regional” organization on the continent concerned with linking the security and political aspects on the one hand, and the economic aspect on the other, on the grounds that the desired economic integration – according to the Lagos Agreement that established it in 1975 – would not be achieved in the shadow of inter- or intra-state wars with regional extensions. Therefore, achieving political and security stability is a prerequisite for economic integration in its various stages, starting from preferential treatment, a free trade area, through a customs union, a common market, and finally, comprehensive monetary union (“a single currency and a unified central bank”).
Therefore, ECOWAS has developed a set of “political and security” protocols and laws to govern its intervention in settling conflicts between or within member states, the most prominent of which are the following:
First: The Protocol on Non-Aggression, signed in 1978, which came as a declaration of principles regarding defensive aspects. It did not guarantee any institutional structures for intervention, and indicated in its first article the need for member states to refrain from the use of force or aggression, or the use of any means that is incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations or the Organization of African Unity, or that undermines the independence or sovereignty of any member state in their relations with each other.
Second: The Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence, known as the ECOWAS Defence Pact, was signed in 1981 and is considered the actual launch of its collective security system. It was more detailed and clarified many points that were not addressed in the 1978 Protocol, whether with regard to identifying conflicts that require collective intervention or the mechanisms entrusted with doing so.
The Charter specified the cases of intervention, including the case of an internal conflict being managed and supported from abroad in a way that threatens peace and security in the Community. In this case, the Authority of Heads of State and Government is the one that determines this position and decides how to deal with it (Article 4, paragraph 2). However, in the event of a purely internal conflict, the Community forces do not intervene (Article 18- paragraph 2). It also stipulated the need for special forces of the Community ready to intervene, these forces will be known as the Allied Armed Forces of The Community, which is known by the acronym (AAFC). They are formed through the commitment of member states to place special units of their armed forces at the disposal of the Community in the event of any military intervention (Article 13 – paragraph 1).
It is noted that the protocol did not provide for a specific system for voting on intervention decisions, which means that the voting process is subject to the rule of consensus that governs the decision-making process in the group, which may hinder the intervention process. This was confirmed by the Bamako Summit in November 1990, which was held to discuss the conflict in Liberia, which reaffirmed the rule of consensus.
Third: Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. Similar to the mechanism of the Organization of African Unity to prevent conflicts before they occur, which was launched in 1993. The protocol establishing the ECOWAS mechanism was signed at the Lomé Summit, the capital of Togo, on December 10, 1999, and one of its most important provisions was the expansion of the basis for the intervention of the group’s forces in the internal conflict in the event of a threat of a humanitarian catastrophe, the existence of acts of violence that violate human rights and the rule of law to a large extent, or in the event of the overthrow of an elected government. This is what is relied upon in cases of intervention to confront military coups.
The Protocol on the mechanism has identified the military forces affiliated with ECOWAS, which are:
ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) ceasefire monitoring forces
The Protocol on the Mechanism was keen on legalizing the status of the Community’s ceasefire monitoring forces (ECOMOG), which sparked widespread controversy regarding the extent of its legitimacy during its intervention in the Liberian War in 1990, as well as during the meetings that preceded its issuance. The end result of this was the issuance of the protocol that ECOMOG forces are one of the auxiliary bodies of the Mediation and Security Council (the security apparatus of the organization), similar to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.
It is noted that the group was a pioneer in forming and legalizing these forces, as it preceded the Organization of African Unity and its mechanisms for conflict resolution. It also preceded other sub-regional organizations such as SADC in the south and ECCAS in the center. The African Union, which replaced the OAU, worked to avoid this negativity by recognizing in Article Two of the protocol establishing it the existence of rapid intervention forces among the auxiliary (subsidiary) bodies of the Peace and Security Council.
Article (21) of the Protocol stipulated that ECOMOG forces are an ECOWAS entity, consisting of civilian and military forces, stationed in their home countries on alert, and ready for immediate deployment when needed. The same article also defined the tasks of ECOMOG missions as follows:
- Monitoring and observation.
- Peacekeeping and security restoration.
- Humanitarian intervention to support victims of humanitarian disasters.
- Imposing sanctions, including imposing economic blockades.
- Peacebuilding, disarmament and demobilization of warring factions.
- Activities of a political nature, including controlling organized crime and fraud and deception operations.
- Any operations that may be authorized or assigned to it by the Council.
Two things can be observed regarding ECOMOG’s mandate:
First: The protocol talked about the powers granted to ECOMOG in peacekeeping/peacebuilding/peacemaking operations, while it did not explicitly talk about peace enforcement (“the use of brute force to force a party to abandon war and sit down to negotiate”), as happened in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the nineties of the last century. The drafters of the protocol may have aimed to merge peacekeeping and peace enforcement, given that the tasks of the former may turn into the latter, but the distinction between them remains important because it will be reflected in the nature of the mandate granted on the one hand, and the level of armament on the other hand. Traditional peacekeeping operations may require the presence of light defensive weapons with the intervening forces, whose role is limited to supervising the peace agreements signed between the parties to the conflict, and these weapons are used in self-defense, while in the case of peace enforcement, the matter requires a high level of armament (heavy equipment); In order to carry out the basic task, which is to impose peace in the face of the parties to the conflict.
Second: The mandate operations and tasks assigned to the forces may be changed according to the dictates of the situation on the ground, and with the approval of the Council (Article 29), which gives ECOMOG great flexibility in dealing with these crises.
The seventh chapter of the mechanism was devoted to discussing the sources of financing for these intervening forces, identifying them in three main sources as follows:
- Allocating a share of the organization’s budget to finance the mechanism, where the Executive Secretariat – while preparing its annual budget – includes a section dedicated to financing the activities of the mechanism in it, and once the protocol enters into force, a percentage of these shares will be allocated to the activities of the mechanism (Article 36/1).
- Obtaining support from international organizations such as the United Nations, or regional organizations such as the Organization of African Unity at the time, or other organizations (Article 36/2).
- Voluntary contributions and grants that may come from bilateral or multilateral sources (Article 36/3).
In the event that the necessary funding for the intervention operation is not fully available, countries participating with forces may be called upon to bear the costs of their participating forces during the first three months of the intervention operation (Article 37/1), provided that the organization reimburses these expenses within a maximum period of six months, and the group then begins financing these operations (Article 37/2).
Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance in 2001 which addresses the causes and roots of conflicts, including corruption and instability, and deals with several issues, most notably the freedom and integrity of elections, civil society oversight over the military establishment, and reaffirming the rejection of unconstitutional changes in systems of governance. Perhaps this is the most important point on which ECOWAS relies in rejecting military coups and the possibility of intervention “in all its forms” to restore the democratic system.
If these are the legal and institutional structures of the organization, then what about the practical side? And why did its activity in intervention operations emerge during the nineties and early twenty-first century, then decline to a lesser extent during the second decade, to record a significant decline during the third and last decade?
Section Two: Evaluating the Performance of ECOWAS Intervention in Conflict Resolution
This part can be divided into two main stages: the first: the stage before the recent coups 1990-2020, and the second: the stage of the recent coups 2020-2024, and we will talk about them briefly:
First: The stage before the recent coups 1990-2020
Since the early 1990s, security aspects have become the most prominent activity of ECOWAS, compared to economic aspects, or in other words, economic aspects have declined at the expense of security aspects. This may be due to the large number of internal conflicts on the one hand, and the emergence of political differences between the member states on the other hand, which hinders economic integration and makes security aspects always a priority, in addition to the existence of a leading country seeking hegemony in the region, which is Nigeria during the era of the late President Ibrahim Babangida.
It is noted that until 2006, the group intervened to confront internal conflicts with regional extensions in four countries: Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea-Bissau.
It can be said that it has achieved reasonable results, especially in the cases of Liberia, where the civil war and the confrontation of President Charles Taylor, and in Sierra Leone to return the late President, Tejan Kabbah, who was overthrown in the 1996 coup, which were the result of using political and military settlement tools together. Among the most prominent of these successes were reaching several agreements on bringing peace to Liberia, which paved the way for holding parliamentary elections in 1997. The country witnessed a state of relative stability for three years, and the organization played the same role in the second phase of the conflict in 2000, even if the role was greater for international forces, which led to the holding of elections in 2005 that resulted in the victory of Ellen Sirleaf Johnson. As for the conflict in Sierra Leone, one of the organization’s most prominent efforts was the return of the democratic system headed by Kabbah to power in March 1998. It also participated – in cooperation with the United Nations – in conducting the 2002 elections, which resulted in Kabbah’s victory and the declaration of the end of the war in the country. As for Guinea-Bissau, its role was limited to means of political settlement, specifically through close cooperation with the United Nations and the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries, and supervising the 1999 parliamentary and presidential elections, and the same applies to the 2004 and 2005 parliamentary and presidential elections. In the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, ECOWAS – along with the United Nations and France – played a role in reaching the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, which is the basis of the peace process in the country, and the same applies to the Accra Agreement of July 3, 2004, which resolved the two most important problems facing the country: the problem of citizenship and candidacy for elections, and the inheritance of agricultural land lease contracts.
ECOWAS also intervened after these four cases, albeit to a lesser extent, in Côte d’Ivoire in 2010, Mali in 2013, and Gambia in 2017 to confront President Yahya Jammeh (no confrontations occurred), who refused to recognize the election results. By 2017, all member states of the organization had constitutional governments led by civilians.
The second stage: the recent coups (2022-2024)
It is noted that ECOWAS did not intervene militarily to confront seven coups witnessed by four countries during the past four years, which are: Mali witnessed coups in 2020 and 2021, Guinea in the coup of September 2021, Burkina Faso witnessed coups in 2022, and Niger in August 2023. It contented itself with suspending their membership, imposing economic and commercial sanctions, and giving the coup leaders a deadline to carry out the democratic transition process, although it has not been adhered to so far, and ECOWAS has not taken escalatory measures represented in military intervention against them as a result of several problems, whether they are political problems (the consensus of the political will to intervene among the member states of the organization) or financial (providing the necessary funding for the intervention), or even problems related to the acceptance of public opinion in the target country of this intervention, or the absence of the role of Nigeria, which was preoccupied with its internal files, especially those related to development and confronting armed movements such as Boko Haram and others.
ECOWAS and the Niger Coup 2023
As for the coup in Niger in July 2023, in which ECOWAS threatened military intervention to return the ousted president, Mohamed Bazoum, to power, a number of considerations prompted it:
First: Political considerations related to the extent of support of ECOWAS countries for this intervention: It can be said that there is a state of division within the member states, between countries that support the intervention, led by Nigeria and Senegal, and others that reject the intervention, namely Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea. Of course, the reason for the rejection is that the ruling regimes in them came to power through coups. And there is a third team that has not determined its position precisely on the intervention, although it tends towards a political settlement.
Second: A set of challenges are also associated with this, related to Nigeria, the largest country in the region and the one with previous interventions, in addition to having the longest border with Niger. The newly elected Nigerian president at the time, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, faces several challenges, including the existence of enormous economic and security problems, most notably the fight against Boko Haram, which is spread in many states. Therefore, withdrawing some of his country’s forces to Niger may affect the efficiency of the internal confrontation process. The occurrence of a state of security fluidity in Niger as a result of instability may contribute to the flow of elements from the Islamic State and others from Libya through Niger to Nigeria and other neighboring countries, in addition to the economic bill that is difficult for Nigeria to pay alone. Last but not least, the country’s Senate rejected the president’s request for intervention. It is true that the president may take a decision contrary to the council under the constitution when it comes to a threat to peace and security in the country, but he may not take this step unilaterally with this speed, especially since the main opposition forces also reject the intervention and tend towards political solutions.
Third: Financial considerations related to financing military intervention in general, which emerged clearly during ECOMOG’s intervention operations in the cases of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau in the nineties of the last century. In the Liberian crisis, the initial agreement was that each participating country would finance its participating forces during the first month, provided that the responsibility would then fall on the organization. However, some countries did not pay their share because they refused to send forces to Liberia. The same thing happened in Sierra Leone; Where Nigeria – as well – bore most of the expenses of the ECOMOG mission. Although the Protocol on the Mechanism for Preventing Conflict stipulated the methods of financing, including contributions from member states and the possibility of obtaining foreign aid, its former Executive Secretary, Lansana Kouyate, warned of the danger of external financing, saying: “If we rely 100% on donors, then all the good ideas that the group seeks to achieve will not be achieved.”
Fourth: Considerations related to the nature of the tasks of the intervening forces, and whether they will be peacekeeping or peace enforcement, with the big differences between them. Peace enforcement requires combat missions, heavy weapons and equipment, in addition to the high cost, not to mention the expected human and material losses. Thus, removing the putschists in Niger requires a direct military confrontation, and a force of no less than 10,000 to confront a regular army, and these are things that are difficult to provide in a short period of time, especially since the coup leaders have prepared for this, and have closed the borders, redeployed forces, in addition to The coup leader was at one time the commander of the ECOWAS forces that intervened in Côte d’Ivoire; Thus, he knows very well the nature of the intervening forces, their strengths and weaknesses, and so on, not to mention the declaration by Mali, Burkina Faso and their forces to stand by the putschists; This means that the intervening forces will not face a single regular army, but rather the armies of other countries allied with it; This means prolonging the duration of the war on the one hand, and increasing the bill of material and human losses on the other hand.
Fifth: Considerations related to the possibility of the collapse and weakening of the effectiveness of ECOWAS, which has been witnessing, since the first intervention in Liberia, a state of division between the Anglophone countries led by Nigeria, and the Francophone countries led by Côte d’Ivoire at the time, the crisis of mistrust between the two blocs, and its impact on its effectiveness in the intervention process. In the recent Niger crisis, we find this division not only between countries that support and countries that oppose, but it is noted that the latter threatens to withdraw from the organization, but this has already happened, which may affect its strength and effectiveness.
Therefore, and in light of these obstacles, ECOWAS initially decided to impose strict economic sanctions on the putschists in Niger, but with the latter’s intransigence, and their refusal to return President Bazoum to power, or even release him, in addition to the solidarity of the regimes of Burkina Faso and Mali with them, and the announcement of the formation of a defensive alliance To confront any intervention, then the announcement of withdrawal after that from ECOWAS, the latter was forced to show flexibility in dealing with these troika countries, especially with Niger, as the organization made every effort to meet the needs of these countries, including lifting the sanctions imposed on travel, trade and economy (10) Even when there were no guarantees that the military leaderships in these countries would take any positive steps towards resolving the matter.
Section Three: The Future of ECOWAS After the Announcement of the Sahel Countries Alliance “Scenarios”
There is no doubt that the announcement of the establishment of the new confederation between the three countries poses a number of challenges and raises many questions about future scenarios regarding ECOWAS.
First: Challenges
It can be said that the withdrawal process of the three countries from ECOWAS puts the organization in front of three basic challenges: security, economic and social. This was clearly expressed by the President of its Commission, Omar Touray, at the Abuja Summit in July 2024, saying about the economic challenge: “Freedom of movement and the common market, which includes 400 million people, are at risk if the three countries withdraw; and the financing of economic projects worth more than 500 million dollars in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger may stop.”
This withdrawal would abolish the free trade agreement, the movement of goods and services, working without a visa, and the restoration of customs barriers between the organization’s countries and the Sahel countries; It will also affect the economies of the Sahel countries, which rely heavily on imports; In addition to being landlocked countries; It will also hinder ECOWAS’ efforts as an organization to search for a currency different from the CFA franc, which is used by 8 countries in the organization (“Francophone countries”), while the rest of the organization’s countries deal with their national currencies. Therefore, there were discussions within the organization to establish an integrated monetary zone using the single currency (Eco) by 2027. But it is clear that there are a number of challenges and disparities regarding it within the organization, most notably the extent to which Nigeria and Ghana, which are two Anglophone countries, are ready to abandon their national currencies, especially in light of the link of the new currency to the euro as well, and some questioning that it will be a new tool for Western European dependence. On the other hand, there is another trend represented by the new Senegalese president, Bassirou Diomaye Faye, calling for the need to carry out some reforms regarding the franc before moving to the new currency.
There is no doubt that the withdrawal of the three countries (which are Francophone), and their search for an alternative unified currency, puts us in front of 3 monetary zones within the one organization; This may hinder the process of economic integration. It should be noted here that more than half of the member states of the organization, including the three countries, are classified – according to World Bank data last year – among the low-income countries; The rest of the countries are classified as lower-middle-income countries.
Regarding the security challenge, the President of the Commission indicated that the withdrawal of the three countries would constitute a severe blow to security cooperation, especially the exchange of intelligence information and participation in the war on terrorism.
It is known that the West African region, especially these three countries, is facing an escalation in the operations of armed groups in it after the recent coups, and their unstable conditions threaten neighboring countries that are members of ECOWAS; The region in general has become ranked first in the world in terms of armed operations; According to the Global Terrorism Index 2023, Burkina Faso ranks first in the world (8.5 out of 10), then Mali ranks third (8 out of 10), while Niger ranks eighth (7.5 out of 10).
Therefore, if the issue of terrorism was one of the reasons for the exit of these countries from the Sahel grouping established by France about 10 years ago, it has become a challenge for it and for the countries of the organization, after the vacuum created by its recent withdrawal.
As for the social challenge, the President of the Commission explained that there may also be new procedures to impose visas on citizens of these three countries to enter other countries in the region. This will pose a social and not just economic challenge, in light of the presence of many ethnicities spread across more than one country, which may hinder their movement and increase the cost of their movement.
Second: Scenarios
These challenges raise questions about the alternatives and scenarios available to the organization to deal with the issue of withdrawal.
The first scenario: Seeking the return of these three countries to the organization again: This can be done through mediation efforts; The organization assigned the presidents of Senegal and Togo to do so within the framework of their close relations with the military councils in the coalition countries to persuade them to return to the organization again. In this regard, the organization, through mediators, can do two things:
First: Reconsidering the conditions set by the organization for the military councils in the coalition countries, including the short transitional period, and not nominating the leaders of the coups in the upcoming elections, because these conditions may harden the position of those in charge of these coups, as it entails postponing the elections that were supposed to be held in Mali and Burkina Faso in March and July of this year, according to ECOWAS arrangements; The same applies to the transitional period; Where it was extended in Burkina Faso for another five years, ending in 2029; With the text on the right of the interim military president, Ibrahim Traoré, to run; The same applies to the National Dialogue Conference (“Ideological”) in Mali, which called for extending the transitional period for another three years (ending in 2027); With the eligibility of the head of the military council, Assimi Goïta, to run in the elections; While the leaders of the coup in Niger have not yet set a date for the transitional period and therefore the elections.
But there are fears that this will lead to the military’s encroachment on the rules of democracy in the rest of the member states, just as happened in Niger; When ECOWAS backed down from the condition of returning the ousted president, Mohamed Bazoum, to power; Where the military have not released him so far. Here, a middle ground can be reached by extending the current timelines for the transition, including in Niger, with a clear definition of the next steps, with ECOWAS committing to assisting in achieving the objectives of the transitional phase according to the new timeframe.
Or in other words, not severing relations with the countries of the new alliance, or imposing more sanctions on them, but in return adhering to the necessity of ending the transitional phase and starting the process of democratic transition, so that the ECOWAS system does not disintegrate, or the wave of military coups spreads in other countries at the expense of the group, which will be unable in this case to deal with it, as it will lose the most important foundations that were the reason for the existence of these security and political structures: the inadmissibility of reaching power through coups.
Second: The organization should intensify its efforts in the field of combating terrorism by activating the initiative that was approved at the end of 2022, where ECOWAS announced last May that it had provided the necessary arrangements for these forces in the city of Lungi in Sierra Leone; Agreeing on plans to mobilize a 5,000-strong regional counter-terrorism standby force; with an allocation of $2.4 billion for it; Member States will provide one billion dollars initially. Thus, through this mechanism, counter-terrorism efforts can be enhanced in an attempt to win over these countries again, especially since these criticisms (“the ineffectiveness of confronting terrorism”) were directed at ECOWAS and France together; It was one of the foundations upon which the military junta in the three countries relied to justify their exit from ECOWAS.
The second scenario: The organization escalating against these three countries, fearing that military leaders in other countries would take similar measures; This may lead to the collapse of the organization and the disintegration of its system. It is based on the fact that the new tripartite alliance may collapse quickly due to the weak foundations on which it is based, in addition to the security challenges facing its countries, which have not succeeded under the alliance of these countries with France and Europe and in light of the existence of an umbrella from the Security Council in stopping terrorist operations; As well as the economic challenges (“landlocked countries with low incomes; and need to deal with the outside world in terms of exports and imports; not to mention the social challenges related to the movement of citizens to neighboring countries”).
Under this scenario, the organization can take several steps:
The first: Continuing the economic sanctions imposed on the three countries, with the possibility of re-imposing the sanctions that were partially lifted on Niger; This may greatly affect the economies of these already crisis-stricken countries, and the fact that it is a landlocked country exacerbates its economic suffering and the possibility of economically suffocating this system; Which may cause – with the continuation of armed attacks – further deterioration of the situation in it; For example, Nigeria’s halt to supplying Niger with electricity after the coup led to the country entering into darkness in light of its 70% dependence on Nigerian electricity.
Second: The possibility of imposing visa restrictions on the entry of citizens of these countries into the organization’s countries; This means depriving them of the reasons for living on the one hand; In addition to the possibility of severing the ethnic ties of these three countries with neighboring countries.
But it seems that the organization has ruled out this scenario, and preferred not to escalate and continue the policy of containment. This was clearly evident in its summit held in Abuja on December 15, 2024, which affirmed the open door policy with these three countries and gave them a transitional period starting from the date of their official withdrawal on January 29, 2025, and ending on July 29, 2025, to discuss the possibility of their return to the organization, with the continuation of mediation by the presidents of Senegal and Togo with them to dissuade them from their position. The Ministerial Council also requested that an extraordinary session be held during the second quarter of 2025 to consider adopting all measures arising from this withdrawal, and to develop a contingency plan that covers political and economic relations between ECOWAS and these three countries. Then this matter was confirmed in the Commission’s statement issued on January 29, 2025, with the start of the official withdrawal of these countries, as it stated:
- Despite the official withdrawal of these countries, ECOWAS will continue its approach based on regional solidarity and the interests of the peoples of the region, stressing that its doors remain open to these countries.
- ECOWAS clarified that passports and national identity cards of citizens of these countries bearing the organization’s logo will remain valid.
- Continuing commercial and investment dealings with goods and services coming from these countries in accordance with the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS) and approved investment policies, as well as citizens of these countries continuing to benefit from freedom of movement and residence without a visa in accordance with the organization’s protocols until further notice.
- Providing support to ECOWAS officials from the three countries while carrying out their duties for the benefit of the organization.
- These arrangements will remain in effect until all forms of future cooperation with these three countries are determined, which will be determined by the leaders of the organization. The ECOWAS Commission has established a structure to facilitate discussions with the three countries, and so that there is no disruption during this transitional phase (“ending on July 29, 2025).
Third: Activating the institutional framework of ECOWAS, especially with regard to revising its protocol on democracy and good governance, which was signed in December 2001; Which prohibits the overthrow of elected regimes; It is also necessary to conduct a comprehensive review of it, after the failure of attempts to review it in 2015 and 2021, especially with regard to the process of institutional or constitutional coups. Perhaps the most important of these proposals that should be discussed are related to strengthening the mechanisms of democracy and good governance, providing the organization with additional means to act in the event of manipulation of the constitution, and explicitly stating that it is not permissible to assume power for more than two consecutive terms.
Related to this part is the need for the organization to abandon double standards in implementing the provisions of the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. In recent times, the organization has taken strict measures against military coups, but it has turned a blind eye to “institutional or constitutional coups” carried out by elected governments by changing the constitution in a way that allows them to run for more than two terms, as happened in Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea; This has undermined the credibility of the organization to the member states.
Therefore, it should oblige member states to ensure that the presidential term does not exceed two consecutive terms, with the need to hold free and fair elections, reject the idea that these matters are subject to internal sovereignty, and impose sanctions on opponents. Although it is difficult to implement this proposal in light of the desire of many heads of state to extend their rule through constitutional amendments, the organization’s taking of any punitive measures against them requires a unanimous decision, and this is one of the drawbacks that prevent it from taking vital and important decisions. Perhaps this issue and others will be at the forefront of the agenda of the upcoming extraordinary summit meeting (2025) on the future of regional integration in West Africa, which was announced by the heads of state of the organization at their extraordinary summit last July, which aims to restore the momentum of ECOWAS and reactivate its role again on both the political and security levels. Which, from our point of view, requires the convergence of political will on the need to abandon both unconstitutional coups and constitutional institutional coups alike. This seems like a distant prospect from our humble point of view so far. This is what is causing the loss of popular confidence in the organization, which is now seen as a “union of heads of state”; This gives the opportunity for more military coups that may find popular support after the disappointment of the peoples in their rulers, and in the main institution in the region, whose collapse or even weakening may lead to the spread of this contagion in other organizations and regions on the continent, which is a matter that needs further study or even studies on the future of regional institutions in Africa.
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