On May 6, 2024, Chadians voted in the presidential elections, marking the end of the transition period that began three years prior after the assassination of President Idriss Deby Itno. Interim President Mahamat Deby (the son) won the election with over 61% of the votes. General Deby Jr. seized power and established a Transitional Military Council immediately following the official announcement of his father’s death on April 21, 2021, disregarding the constitutional provision that mandated the president of the National Assembly, Haroun Kabadi, to lead the country; thus, the Deby clan has maintained control since 1996.
During the transitional phase, which saw violent protests from the Chadian opposition coalition “Wakit Tamma”, some of which escalated into violent clashes with security forces, parliamentary elections were held in December 2024. The National Salvation Movement (the party of President Mahamat Deby) secured a majority of seats amid a boycott by many opposition parties. This was followed by tensions that led to armed attackers storming the presidential palace in the capital N’Djamena in January 2025; however, the Chadian government killed the attackers and managed to regain control over the country’s security situation.
In this context, the French Institute of International Relations published a research paper in October 2024 assessing the power transition in Chad from father to son during the transitional period between 2021 and 2024, aiming to understand the factors and dynamics behind the establishment of Deby Jr.’s authority from the perspective of Transitology, a new term for the study of political transitions.
Limited Concessions:
To contain popular demands for change, the transitional authority in Chad offered some limited formal concessions. In 2021, the first concession from the authority was to accept the classic model of democratic transitions, adopted in Africa since the wave of democratic transitions in the 1990s up until the first decade of the current century. This model consists of four stages: organizing a national dialogue; forming a national unity government; holding a referendum on a new constitution; and organizing presidential and legislative elections.
In this framework, Interim President Mahamat Deby announced the formation of a national unity government and a three-phase transitional roadmap (national dialogue, constitutional referendum, and national elections). He seemed to implement policies different from those of his late father by re-establishing the national charter, reconciling with the opposition and rebel movements, and paying full salaries to civil service employees. The key features of this transitional period included:
- Redefining the National Charter: The national dialogue announced by the Chadian authorities in 2021 lasted for a year and aimed to rebuild the national charter. Intellectuals were invited to contribute to preparatory texts, and representatives from provinces flocked to the capital for the occasion to discuss previously taboo subjects such as federalism, corruption, electoral systems, interfaith and community relations, and human rights violations. However, this initiative was met with some skepticism. The government labeled this event as a “comprehensive and sovereign national dialogue” in an attempt to demonstrate its respect and commitment to the outcomes of this dialogue. Yet, as time passed after the dialogue ended, it became clear that the government had no intention of actual change.
- From Inclusion to Opponent Selection: As part of managing the transitional period, Deby Jr. adopted an inclusive policy, inviting all political forces to join him. The three successive transitional governments from 2021 to 2024 embodied this tactical openness. Deby Jr. chose opposition leaders to head the transitional governments, most notably the third Prime Minister, Succès Masra, who was among the opposition leaders that led a rebellion against Deby Jr.’s regime in October 2022 and was forced to flee abroad. After signing a reconciliation agreement, Mahamat Deby not only allowed Masra to return to Chad in November 2023 but went so far as to appoint him Prime Minister in January 2024. Deby Jr. also selected other figures from political forces that opposed his father and appointed them to the National Assembly and other public bodies.
- Negotiating with Armed Opposition: Despite the “Front for Change and Concord” (FACT) rebel group killing former President Idriss Deby in April 2021, Deby Jr. began the transitional period with peace talks with armed opposition groups in the same year, culminating in an agreement in Doha in August 2022 allowing the return of key leaders of the armed groups, except for FACT. However, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration have yet to commence due to a lack of funding.
- Social Peace Charter: To appease labor unions (a major center of protests), the transitional government signed a three-year charter with unions starting October 4, 2021. The charter stipulated the payment of arrears and gradual salary increases, but like many similar initiatives in the past, it was not implemented.
- Allowing Opposition to Run in Presidential Elections: Deby Jr. allowed opposition forces to run in the presidential elections held in May 2024, including opposition leader Succès Masra, contrasting with his father’s policy of excluding opponents from the electoral competition.
Consolidating the Regime:
The death of Idriss Deby did not weaken the Deby family’s regime, which consists of a group of trusted generals, an extended presidential family, and his clan (the Zaghawa) as well as the Zaghawa/Goran partnership. The regime has been solidified through several means:
- The Military: The military has always held a central position in Chadian politics. As a result, one of Mahamat Deby’s priorities during the transitional period was to ensure its support; thus, he adopted a very generous policy toward the military. His strategy involved expanding his supporting network within the military through a series of appointments within the General Directorate of Security, and he made changes at the head of some units relying on the Zaghawa and Goran clans.
- The National Salvation Movement: Established in Chad in 1990, this movement has remained the political party cornerstone of the regime even after the death of its founder, Deby Sr. It supported Interim President Mahamat Deby and worked to achieve smooth political progress in the transitional process through active participation in national dialogue and preparation for the referendum and presidential elections.
- Civil Society: In the past, Idriss Deby’s regime selected some civil society executives and supported its own associations called “GONGOs” (Government Operated NGOs) to compete with and weaken other civil society entities. Notable GONGOs included the Coalition of Civil Society Organizations (CASAC) and the Coordination of Civil Society Organizations and Human Rights Defenders (CASCIDHO).
Opposition Divisions:
With a few exceptions, opposition parties and civil society organizations opposing Idriss Deby’s regime have taken a stance against the transitional process organized by Deby Jr. In July 2021, opposition movements published a roadmap for peaceful transition with a series of recommendations and steps to organize an inclusive and sovereign national conference with strong participation from the African Union. By the end of October 2021, protest movements formulated their vision for the transitional period during a meeting in Geneva, then established an alternative transitional charter and proposed holding a comprehensive and sovereign national congress and creating a transitional council, followed by several pivotal events, including:
- Strategic Disagreement: Despite a consensus among the opposition about the need for a different transitional phase, sharp divisions arose regarding the strategy for achieving this goal. The opposition split into two main factions: those who rejected Deby’s constitutional coup; consequently, they opposed adhering to the transitional phase; and another faction that accepted and participated in the transitional phase. Due to these different visions, some opposition movements and parties experienced internal divisions.
- Emergence of a New Opposition Force: The “Wakit Tamma” coalition was established in March 2021 against Idriss Deby’s candidacy for a sixth presidential term and demanded change. During the transitional period, this coalition began to lead the opposition against the transitional authority. Initially, the main components of “Wakit Tamma” were the “Transformers” party and the Union of Labor Unions in Chad (UST). The “Transformers” party, led by Succès Masra and established in 2018, is a relatively new player in the Chadian political scene. For young Chadians, this party represents the only viable alternative between hereditary power and the aging opposition that has lost credibility. Masra’s appointment as Prime Minister after his forced exile immediately raised doubts within the opposition about the regime’s attempts to co-opt him. Despite this strategic concession, Masra’s party campaigned as an opposition party during the presidential elections. In contrast, the role of the Union of Labor Unions (UST), Chad’s largest union center representing about 70% of civil service employees, gradually diminished during the transitional period. After participating in “Wakit Tamma” protests, it signed the social charter and became less prominent.
- Intimidation of the Opposition: National dialogue meetings were held in N’Djamena from August 20 to October 8, 2022. Nonetheless, it became apparent that the agenda and direction of discussions in the national dialogue were under the control of the transitional authorities. These meetings were directed by members of the Idriss Deby regime and selected opposition figures. Following the conclusion of the dialogue, opposition figure Saleh Kebzabo was appointed Prime Minister, and a new “Transitional National Unity Government” was formed on October 14, 2022, prompting the “Transformers” party to lead widespread protests in N’Djamena and some towns in the south, resulting in escalating violence between the transitional authorities and the opposition. Masra and some of the party’s leaders fled abroad, further intimidating opposition forces, especially after the assassination of a prominent opposition figure, Yahya Dillo.
- Conducting Parliamentary Elections: On December 29, 2024, Chad held parliamentary elections, the first since 2011, with initial results showing the ruling party, the National Salvation Movement (MPS), winning a majority of seats in the National Assembly. It is noteworthy that most opposition parties boycotted these elections, questioning the integrity of the electoral process.
- Attempted Coup of the Presidential Palace: On January 8, 2025, the presidential palace in the capital N’Djamena was attacked by an armed group, resulting in clashes between security forces and attackers, which led to the deaths of 19 individuals, including 18 attackers and one Chadian soldier. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack as of now.
Transitional Control:
The government imposed its views on the transitional phase and disregarded its previous commitments, particularly regarding respecting the recommendations of the national dialogue. It abandoned the commitment to hold a double-question referendum (Unified State or Federalism?); a constitution was drafted that allows Deby Jr. to serve two consecutive terms, with the ability to amend the constitution to extend the number of presidential terms; an electoral law was specifically designed to support his candidacy and victory. This phase resulted in several outcomes, most notably:
- Control of Electoral Bodies: The government monopolized the bodies responsible for organizing the transitional phase. Drafting the referendum law and the constitution was entrusted to a small group of constitutionalists close to the regime. Federalists and the representative body of political parties were excluded, and the National Commission responsible for organizing the constitutional referendum (CONOREC) and the National Agency for Election Management (ANGE) were appointed, along with pro-Deby regime elements.
- Control Over Foundational Texts: Thanks to the government’s control over the bodies responsible for organizing the transitional phase, the foundational texts of the new regime (the constitution and electoral law) favored the government. The new constitution was adopted in a referendum in December 2023, inspired by the 1996 constitution. It elevated the presidency and allowed its extension beyond the stipulated two terms while also preserving the president’s control over the judiciary, along with the ability to influence the legislative authority since he appoints one-third of future Senate members.
- Absence of International Guarantees: The transitional process in Chad saw a marginal role for international guarantors; Chadian authorities viewed the African Union with suspicion due to its chairman, Moussa Faki, who served as Chad’s Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2008 to 2017. The United Nations and the International Organization of La Francophonie limited their roles to technical assistance in the transitional process without any political influence. Meanwhile, the European Union implemented a conditional financing policy for the transitional phase without gaining any influence. Western countries did not form a unified front and preferred to defend their interests individually against the transitional authority. In a regional geopolitical context anti-Western, the Chadian transitional authority began to ally with two new anti-Western countries, Hungary and Russia, and Chad requested that the U.S. military withdraw some of its forces from N’Djamena.
Conclusion: The dynamics of the transitional period in Chad reveal how President Mahamat Deby consolidated his authority after his father’s assassination through a flexible strategy, oscillating between restrictive measures and gestures of openness; ultimately leading to the containment and division of the opposition. Although these are classic and predictable approaches in African contexts, they have been relatively successful in Chad, albeit creating local and international tensions that the country continues to grapple with.
Source: Thierry Vircoulon, Tchad: de Déby à Déby .. Les recettes d’une succession dynastique réussie (2021-2024), Ifri, October 2024.
