In a move that might seem somewhat surprising, in his end-of-year speech for 2024, Alassane Ouattara, the President of Côte d’Ivoire and an ally of France, announced that French troops would withdraw from the country. He described this withdrawal as coordinated and organized, implying that it had been discussed with Paris. He justified this move by citing the existence of a modern national army, while also confirming that the 43rd Marine Infantry Battalion (BIMA), a French military base located in Port-Bouet in the economic capital, Abidjan, would be “handed over” to the national army starting in January 2025.
Despite aligning with the French strategy aimed at reducing military presence in West African and Sahel countries, and in light of discussions about a French desire to scale down its deployed forces in Côte d’Ivoire since November 2024, this decision raises questions regarding the reasons behind it in a country of significant strategic importance to Paris in West Africa, along with a political system that maintains close relations with it. Additionally, the timing of this announcement follows the declaration by Chad, which is also crucial to France in the region, that it would end its military cooperation agreement with Paris and demand the withdrawal of its troops by the end of January 2025. Similarly, Senegal’s President, Ousmane Sonko, announced on the same day as Ouattara’s speech that the country would end all foreign military presence starting in 2025.
A second question arises: does this Ivorian decision imply a lack of security and intelligence coordination, or will there still be other forms of cooperation between the two sides? Furthermore, it raises inquiries about France’s alternatives in Côte d’Ivoire. Will the alternative be Russia, akin to other countries in the region like Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, or this time will it be American, given Washington’s search for an African base for AFRICOM, with reports suggesting that Côte d’Ivoire could be one of the potential alternatives in this regard?
Reasons for the Withdrawal Decision
This decision has sparked numerous questions about the underlying reasons for it and whether it was made unilaterally by the Ivorian regime or in coordination with Paris, given their close relationship. France played a pivotal role in supporting Ouattara following his victory in the 2010 presidential elections, especially after former President Laurent Gbagbo refused to cede power to him. French forces intervened as part of Operation Licorne, coordinating with UN forces to force Gbagbo to step down.
This support strengthened the relationship between Ouattara and Paris, establishing France as a key political partner for Ouattara in the post-crisis phase. France is Côte d’Ivoire’s largest trading partner, and French companies dominate critical sectors such as energy, transportation, and infrastructure.
Consequently, Ouattara has remained committed to enhancing economic ties with France, which has stabilized the Ivorian economy. However, he has faced internal criticism for excessive reliance on Paris concerning various economic and security issues.
Economically, there are accusations of French companies monopolizing key economic sectors in the country to serve their interests at the expense of Ivorian citizens, particularly in cocoa farming, Côte d’Ivoire being one of the world’s largest suppliers. Furthermore, the CFA franc, used in 13 countries in Central and West Africa including Côte d’Ivoire, is viewed as a tool of French control over African economies, being printed in the French central bank and linking the monetary policy of these countries to Paris and the Eurozone; these nations place approximately 70% of their foreign currency reserves in the French Treasury.
Culturally and educationally, the French language and curricula largely reflect a French identity at the expense of an Ivorian counterpart, hindering the emergence of a clear independent African national identity.
In terms of security, security agreements are seen as further binding the national army in favor of France in the region, starting with the agreement of 1961 signed immediately after independence, one of its key provisions permitting the presence of French forces in the country. This continued through the 2011 agreement established shortly after Ouattara assumed power with French support, which included modernizing the armed forces and training officers and soldiers by French troops, as well as cooperation between the two sides to support Operation Barkhane in the five Sahel countries: Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mauritania.
Although Côte d’Ivoire isn’t part of this operation’s domain, it has been a significant partner in its success, allowing its territory as a launch point for Barkhane operations and offering logistical support for French forces deployed in the Sahel, along with limited participation in regional operations. Finally, there exists an agreement regarding the French military presence at the Port-Bouet base, which is used to support stability in West Africa and execute French military operations in the region. Hence, the country has periodically witnessed protests against the French presence, particularly during times of political crises.
Therefore, Ouattara’s decision could be interpreted as a desire to coordinate with France by following the path of other West African nations aiming to end this military presence, amidst growing domestic public opinion opposing the French presence, and possibly to preemptively undermine his opponent in the upcoming elections, scheduled for October 2025, given that his rival will be former President Laurent Gbagbo, who has focused on rejecting dependency on France since his loss to Ouattara in the 2010 elections. Additionally, this aims to counter accusations from his adversaries that he is merely a “puppet” of the West.
This trend is supported by two aspects of coordination between both sides concerning the withdrawal:
Firstly, relations between him and Paris have not soured recently, unlike situations between France and the coup regimes in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. For instance, Ouattara visited Paris in August 2024, being warmly welcomed by President Macron, and a special dinner was held for him at the Élysée Palace.
Secondly, in the same speech where he announced the French withdrawal, Ouattara praised the role of French troops in supporting the country’s stability and assisting its army in fighting armed groups active in the Sahel region, which are expanding into countries along the Gulf of Guinea, including Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. He also acknowledged France’s role as part of the UN peacekeeping mission during the long civil war in the country from 2002 to 2011.
This sentiment and these statements are not new for Ouattara; he mentioned in a previous interview with France 24 in February 2022, coinciding with the start of the French troop withdrawal from Mali, that France was not withdrawing entirely from the Sahel but was adapting its military presence to current changes. He emphasized that there was no issue for his country in welcoming French forces to address security needs alongside national armies.
This suggests that Ouattara may have intended with this decision to quell internal public opposition to France while also preparing the ground to position himself as a presidential candidate for a fourth term amidst ongoing political and legal debates surrounding his eligibility for this. The 2016 Constitution allows the president to run for two consecutive five-year terms, raising questions about whether this amendment applied to Ouattara’s prior terms. The Constitutional Court resolved the matter by interpreting the constitutional amendment as starting from the upcoming elections held in 2020, meaning President Alassane Ouattara, who had served two terms prior to 2016, could run for a third term in 2020, and subsequently in the next elections in 2025, which he affirmed in statements to Reuters in 2018.
Conversely, the withdrawal of French troops aligns with Paris’ new strategy in the region. Following the withdrawals from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, France also plans to significantly reduce its military presence in its bases in Chad in Central Africa and Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire in West Africa, except for Djibouti in the East of the continent. In July, Jean-Marie, Macron’s personal envoy to Africa, submitted recommendations regarding this matter to the president. On February 28, 2023, just before his African tour encompassing four countries—Gabon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo, and Angola—Macron outlined the new French strategy for the continent, which includes:
First: Reducing military presence on the continent to a minimum, indicating a French intention even before the Niger coup in August 2023 to reduce military presence and end French military bases, reshaping them into academies co-managed by France, European, and African nations, reflecting a cooperative investment from France and its African partners to cut down on financial expenditures and human and material losses, as well as easing domestic public opinion, especially during a wave of discontent met during his recent visits to several states including Gabon and Central Africa. According to Le Monde, there are currently about 15 national academies in Africa training African armies spread across Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Cameroon, Niger, Togo, and Benin, providing all necessary training in defense and security.
Secondly: The new security approach also involves supporting African armies through intelligence, logistic services, arms exports, or fire support for specific operations, while increasing reliance on non-military soft power tools, such as diplomatic measures. This tactic expands the scope of partners in Africa, framed as a vital challenge for all of Europe, allowing France to involve EU countries in Africa, positioning it as Europe’s leader, while also splitting costs of interventions and developmental operations needed on the continent.
Thirdly: Economic tools constitute one of the pillars of this new strategy by focusing on development projects, akin to China’s role as Africa’s largest infrastructure financier.
Fourthly: The humanitarian approach involves providing humanitarian needs and a traditional cultural entry point exemplified through facilitating visas for students, which continues the “Francophonization of Africans” policy via educational curricula, allocating a significant part of the development budget for this aspect. This might distinguish France from other former colonial powers by emphasizing the cultural aspect as a tool for continued dominance, possibly tied to the direct administrative model Paris has pursued from the beginning in managing these “colonies,” in contrast to Britain’s indirect administration which led to its waning influence in the continent.
Fifthly: The sports approach through “supporting sports” was notably seen in the recent 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar, where most of the French national team’s players had African roots.
This implies that while French troops may be leaving Côte d’Ivoire militarily, other French interests will remain unaffected by this withdrawal, given the presence of an ally in power.
The Russian and American Alternatives and Côte d’Ivoire
If there is a semblance of agreement between Ouattara and France regarding troop withdrawal, does this suggest the presence of another alternative to fill this void, namely Russian and American alternatives?
Regarding the Russian alternative: It is noted that the Russian troops currently engaged in the Sahel have not achieved better results, along with Russia’s position on Bashar al-Assad’s abandonment, which negatively affected its credibility in two aspects: first, regarding the loss of trust in Russia and its potential to easily withdraw support from allied regimes, and second, the effectiveness of this role and concern about the potential impact of the closure of the naval base in Tartus on the Mediterranean and the Hmeimim air base on Moscow’s anti-terrorism efforts in North, Central, and West Africa. Both bases were heavily relied upon for logistical support in Africa, especially given the weakness of African alternatives, such as Benghazi in Eastern Africa controlled by Haftar, which is not as efficient as the Syrian bases. Moreover, a military base in Sudan on the Red Sea has yet to be negotiated. Hence, Russia may not be a preferred alternative for Côte d’Ivoire at this time.
On the other hand, the United States may be a possible alternative, especially after Le Monde revealed in early July 2024 that President Ouattara had agreed to establish an American military base in the northwest of the country near the Odienne area, without disclosing further details regarding this agreement—its conditions, the number of troops deployed, levels of armament, duration, and so on.
Ouattara may aim to ensure that the United States does not oppose his candidacy for a fourth term in the upcoming elections scheduled for October 2025, an election that will allow Ouattara to remain in power since 2010, potentially having served three terms by that point.
However, his decision to run for the presidency in 2020 after the sudden death of his successor and Prime Minister Amadou Gon Coulibaly provoked widespread outrage among the Ivorian opposition. He has not hidden his intention to run for re-election; he explicitly hinted at this in a speech to the diplomatic corps in Abidjan on January 9, 2025, just about two weeks after his announcement regarding the French troop withdrawal. He indicated his desire to continue serving his country as president, adding that he is in good health and eager to keep serving, marking the strongest signal yet of his plans to run again.
Conversely, there is a strong American interest in establishing alternatives in the region, especially after the withdrawal from Niger, affirmed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General C.Q. Brown, in June 2024, stating that Washington is exploring enhanced military cooperation with several countries on the continent. One American official confirmed this to the media, mentioning that these countries include either Ghana, Benin, or Côte d’Ivoire.
Similarly, General Michael Langley, head of AFRICOM, indicated that losing American bases in the Sahel would reduce our ability to monitor and provide warning, including conducting defense missions from these bases, crucial for countering the prevalent jihadist and Salafist groups in these areas and supporting ECOWAS efforts against terrorism.
Even with a possible American presence in Côte d’Ivoire, it may not significantly affect the entrenched French presence across various facets of life. Coordination could occur between the French and American sides on this matter, akin to the arrangement in Djibouti, which houses the largest French base in Africa adjacent to the American base at Camp Lemonnier.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it can be stated that the Ivorian step may have been taken in coordination with France and that the military withdrawal does not imply a complete and final exit from Côte d’Ivoire in all its aspects. Alassane Ouattara remains the preferred partner for France and is keen to avoid any diplomatic rifts between the two countries, ensuring that his country remains an important ally of France in West Africa.
President Ouattara did not express anger or even discontent with Macron’s recent comments on January 7, 2025, during the annual conference of French diplomats in Paris, where he sharply criticized the leaders of several African countries. These statements contained an air of arrogance and condescension toward these countries, which owe their gratitude to Paris, yet they did not act accordingly. Macron reminded unnamed African leaders that none of those countries would have gained independence without French intervention. Furthermore, he asserted that no one could manage a sovereign country without interconnected involvement. These comments sparked irritation among French partners like Chad and Senegal, as well as the military council in Burkina Faso, while Ouattara merely remained silent.
References
Glez. Damien, French military withdrawal from Côte d’Ivoire: Alassane Ouattara and the temptation of sovereignty, Jeune Afrique, January 2, 2025 (Visited 14 Jan 2025) https://2cm.es/QlMB
Vincent, Elise, France will further cut back military presence in Africa, le monde, August 1, 2023(Visited 14 Jan 2025) https://2cm.es/NTTO
Phillips, Michael M, U.S. Seeks Drone Bases in Coastal West Africa to Stem Islamist Advance, The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 3, 2024, (Visited 14 Jan 2025) https://2cm.es/NTYD
