The Turkish opposition is undergoing significant political transformations that have led to a relative decline in its presence on the Turkish political stage in recent times. This was evident in a poll conducted by the Aksoy Research Company in late September 2024, the results of which were published on October 7, 2024. The poll revealed a decline in support for the Republican People’s Party (CHP) to about 32 percent, down from 34 percent, while the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has regained some of the supporters it lost during the local elections in March 2024. Despite the opposition’s victory in the recent municipal elections, it still lacks the vision necessary to govern the country, alongside certain Turkish parties aligning themselves with their ideological agendas.
Various Motivations
The decline in the role and influence of the opposition within Turkey can be interpreted in light of several considerations, the most prominent of which are as follows:
Public Unresponsiveness to Opposition Calls for Early Elections: The opposition has struggled to mobilize the public for early elections, despite growing dissatisfaction among citizens regarding political polarization. The populace has become more focused on core issues intersecting with living conditions. This discontent led the Turkish president to announce a refusal to hold early elections, stating, “These demands do not concern us; they are merely an internal struggle among opposition parties, and we have nothing to do with them.” He added, “We have four years without elections, and we will not allow the country to enter an electoral atmosphere amid the crises we currently face.”
Potential Imprisonment of Opposition Figure Ekrem İmamoğlu: The anticipated decline of the Turkish opposition is linked to the potential affirmation by the Court of Appeals in the coming days of the December 2022 verdict that sentenced Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu to two years, seven months, and fifteen days in prison, as well as barring him from political activity for five years, due to insults directed at members of the Supreme Elections Council, referring to them as “fools.” Should İmamoğlu be convicted, he would be excluded from the 2028 elections, casting substantial doubt on the opposition’s wisdom and ability to handle the political matters that require more careful consideration than heated statements.
Division Within the CHP: Many estimates suggest that the decline in momentum for the Turkish opposition is due to notable divisions within the Republican People’s Party (the largest opposition party). There is a covert struggle between Istanbul Mayor İmamoğlu and Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavaş, each aiming to run for the upcoming presidential elections in Turkey. The disagreements peaked during the CHP’s conference held in September 2024, exposing profound divides within its leadership. Yavaş sparked considerable debate by stating that he was only given the opportunity to speak at the party’s annual conference at the last minute, indicating his desire to deliver a speech similar to that of İmamoğlu. There is also unprecedented division among the party’s traditional bases, with supporters of İmamoğlu and current party leader Özgür Özel on one side, while supporters of former leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and Mayor Yavaş are on the other.
Fracturing of the Good Party: The Good Party (İYI) faced a significant setback and internal strife following the party’s disappointing performance in the municipal elections at the end of March 2024. This led some party officials in April 2024 to call on party leader Meral Akşener to take responsibility for these results, prompting her to resign from the party leadership on April 27, 2024, just before the party’s extraordinary general conference.
Dissolution of the Six-Party Table Alliance: The opposition alliance known as the Six-Party Table, established during the presidential elections in May 2023 and comprising major opposition parties, has come to an end. The opposition also ran separately in the recent local elections, leading to a decline in the presence of smaller parties.
Weakness of New Opposition Parties: The trajectory of Turkish domestic politics displays the weakened influence of smaller opposition parties, particularly the Welfare Party, alongside those that emerged from the Justice and Development Party, such as the Future Party led by Ahmet Davutoğlu and the Democracy and Progress Party led by Ali Babacan. Efforts by the two parties to merge and form a united political entity through a single parliamentary group, involving other parties as well, have not yielded tangible results due to multiple contentious issues, including party leadership and presidential nominations.
Decline in Erdoğan and His Nationalist Ally’s Aggression Towards the Opposition: Recently, President Erdoğan has managed to reduce tensions with the political opposition, as highlighted by his meeting with CHP leader Özgür Özel in May 2024, the first such meeting in nearly eight years. Moreover, Erdoğan visited the CHP headquarters in Ankara on June 11, 2024, for the first time in 18 years. He also met with former Good Party leader Meral Akşener on June 5, 2024. Many analyses suggest that these meetings have contributed to alleviating political polarization domestically and have enhanced the popularity of the Justice and Development Party at the expense of local adversaries. Additionally, Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Erdoğan’s coalition partner, adopted a different rhetorical stance towards the opposition by softening his harsh comments against them, which helped improve the image of the People’s Alliance in the Turkish collective consciousness. This was evident in Bahçeli’s “Handshake Campaign” ahead of the new legislative year opening in early October 2024, where he greeted the leader of the CHP, the leader of the Future Party, and even members of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), the political wing of the Kurds.
Erdoğan’s Ability to Secure Political Alliances: He has bolstered his relations with the Nationalist Movement Party, the Great Union Party, and the Kurdish Huda Par, while also attracting more conservative and traditional political forces. Erdoğan has maintained support among the nationalist segment, thanks to his ties with the MHP.
Qualitative Improvement in the Turkish Economy: Recently, the Turkish economy has witnessed qualitative advances, particularly concerning curbing inflation and increasing foreign investment. According to Fitch, Turkey has made significant strides in boosting its foreign currency reserves, with the Central Bank’s net foreign currency reserves rising from a deficit of $75 billion in April 2024 to a surplus of $6 billion by the end of August 2024. Consequently, Fitch predicts the reserves could rise to $158 billion by the end of 2024 and approximately $165 billion by the end of 2025. Additionally, Turkey’s image in international financial circles has improved after the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) removed Turkey from its grey list of countries under special scrutiny for money laundering and terrorist financing.
Political Utilization of Regional Conflicts by the Government: The Justice and Development Party has adeptly leveraged the Israeli war on Gaza and southern Lebanon to strengthen its popular standing, critiquing Israeli actions in Gaza and joining a lawsuit filed by South Africa to the International Criminal Court against Israeli crimes of genocide. Moreover, Erdoğan’s government suspended certain Turkish exports to Israel and condemned the assassination of Hezbollah’s secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, while rejecting the Israeli ground incursion into southern Lebanon. Many analyses suggest that Turkey’s policies and the populist rhetoric of the Justice and Development Party against Israel have boosted President Erdoğan’s and his party’s popularity.
A Qualitative Decline
In conclusion, it is likely that the Turkish opposition will experience a qualitative decline in its popularity in the upcoming phase, due to intensifying divisions within its parties, as well as the developments in the performance of the Justice and Development Party as it seeks to address internal polarization and capitalize on regional crises, especially the war in Gaza, to bolster Erdoğan’s popularity and fortify the position of the Justice and Development Party.
