Wars Are Not the Only Reason… Climate Change Aggravates the Suffering of Displaced Persons in Syria and Yemen

Mohamed SAKHRI November 13, 2024

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Wars Are Not the Only Reason… Climate Change Aggravates the Suffering of Displaced Persons in Syria and Yemen

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is the second-largest region for internally displaced persons (IDPs), accounting for 23% of global internal displacement. By the end of 2023, there were 16.2 million IDPs, with Yemen and Syria recording the highest numbers in the region (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2024). These two countries face a complex interplay of climate change and conflict, making it challenging to identify specific causes of internal displacement.

Climate change has emerged as a significant driver of internal displacement, compounding the initial displacement crises triggered by conflicts in Yemen and Syria. Climate change (1) increases risks to rural livelihoods, complicating efforts to implement lasting solutions to the displacement crisis. As a result, citizens are often forced to migrate to urban areas, where their skills may not align with local job market demands, adversely affecting food security. In a region considered one of the most climate-vulnerable, Syria and Yemen experience extreme heat, desertification, water scarcity, coastal and marine ecosystem degradation, and high levels of air pollution (World Bank, 2022, para. 1).

Recognizing the wide-ranging impacts of climate change, this article examines its relationship with livelihoods and food security among displaced populations, as well as those at risk of future displacement.

Climate-Induced Displacement in Syria and Yemen

The Global Report on Internal Displacement (2024) states that “all 45 countries and regions reporting conflict-induced displacement last year, apart from three, also reported displacement due to disasters” (p.13). This highlights the undeniable correlation between disasters and conflicts. While the root causes of displacement may sometimes be unclear, climate change acts as a “threat multiplier” (Mixed Migration Center, 2024). Due to prolonged displacement, IDPs face climate-related disasters that often lead to secondary displacement, with Syrian IDPs experiencing secondary displacement for an average of five years and being displaced multiple times (Danish Refugee Council, 2024).

In Yemen, climate-induced displacement in 2023 was three times higher than displacement caused by the ongoing war. Approximately 240,000 IDPs were displaced due to climate, compared to 80,000 displaced by conflict (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2024). Flooding is the primary climate risk faced by Yemenis, displacing 174,000 people in 2023 alone. This is a stark increase from 2013 when 10,000 individuals were displaced by flooding. Between January and May 2024, the largest displacements (over 1,000 people each) were due to climate, while conflict-induced displacements affected hundreds in separate events. The average displacement count for Yemenis is 1.3, with 20.6% of IDPs experiencing multiple displacements ranging from two to seven times (Cash Consortium of Yemen, 2024).

In a needs assessment by the Danish Refugee Council, 83% of respondents in Syria reported being forced to displace, while 48% indicated plans to leave their current area due to inadequate housing, and 17% due to lack of livelihood opportunities (Danish Refugee Council, 2024). Although none cited climate risks as a direct driver, climate change affects their livelihoods, with Syria approximately twice as vulnerable to drought as the global average (Economist Impact, n.d). This risk exacerbates the challenge of securing livelihoods in regions where humanitarian field teams report displacements due to drought, water stress, and competition for natural resources (4).

Impact of Climate Change on Food Security and Livelihoods

Recent floods in Yemen highlighted that displaced people are highly vulnerable to climate risks. While displacement is the immediate impact of severe climate changes, these events also lead to the destruction of physical assets, housing, productive infrastructure, and sometimes injuries or loss of life. Additionally, access to supply chains and aid may be disrupted, and personal documents may be lost. Displacement often leads to psychological trauma that can hinder recovery efforts. Long-term climate impacts can also create social tensions between displaced people and host communities over vital resources like water and land.

For instance, in Yemen, women and children frequently walk long distances to fetch water or firewood, exposing them to gender-based violence and limiting their access to education or work. Climate risks impacting Yemen and Syria affect agriculture, livelihoods, and food security. Agriculture is a critical sector in both countries, comprising 28.7% of Yemen’s GDP and 27.8% of Syria’s, and employing 29% and 15% of the workforce, respectively (Mixed Migration Center, 2024). However, climate change threatens smallholder farmers, who make up 85% of the region’s agricultural workforce, by intensifying risks to natural resources and jeopardizing livelihoods.

Food insecurity is more severe in Yemen and Syria than in other MENA countries. The World Bank’s Global Food Security Outlook reported that in 2023, severe food insecurity affected 88.9% of Yemen’s population and 41.7% of Syria’s, with further increases anticipated until 2028 (World Bank, 2023). With agricultural sectors highly vulnerable to climate impacts, food supplies fall short of demand, raising costs and worsening poverty. This decline in agricultural output also affects job availability, pushing more people toward displacement.

Practical Recommendations for Supporting Livelihoods Impacted by Climate Change

Addressing climate change as a root cause of internal displacement is essential to prevent new and secondary displacements, support livelihoods, and improve food security in Yemen and Syria. This requires solutions aligned with local conflict conditions, enhanced data collection, and supportive public policies. Measures should include supporting IDPs and at-risk communities in rural areas to diversify their livelihoods, adapt to climate change through climate-smart agriculture, improve product processing, introduce resilient seed varieties, improve water management, use greywater, and strengthen community-based natural resource management.

Humanitarian organizations, governments, and decision-makers can also implement proactive measures to mitigate natural disasters and provide financial support for green energy (such as solar or biogas). Ensuring food security for affected populations through social protection programs during climate shocks is essential. For displaced populations migrating to urban areas, authorities should integrate IDPs into the urban ecosystem by establishing alternative green and sustainable job opportunities that align with the urban labor market’s needs in Yemen and Syria, where unemployment rates are high.

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