The State Crisis in the African Sahel Region: A Study of Causes and Challenges in State Building

The post-independence states in Africa rushed to adopt the Western model of the nation-state, a move that clashed with local particularities (tribe, linguistic, ethnic, and religious diversity) incompatible with the imported Western model. This dissonance fueled a series of conflicts, leading several African countries into civil wars, compounded by the emergence of new security threats such as international terrorism and organized crime.

This complex security environment has increasingly imposed new roles on the state, both as a guarantor of security and as a responsible actor for its realization. In this context, the African Sahel region emerges as a crisis-producing area. Thus, this study addresses the following issues: To what extent has the colonial legacy contributed to deepening the state crisis in the African Sahel? What are the main challenges facing state building in the region?

The Formation of the State in Africa: A Theoretical Introduction

The crisis of building a national state reflects one of the major dilemmas of the security problem facing African countries. This arises from the historical residue of geographical borders inherited from colonialism, which did not take into account the ethnic, tribal diversity, and the specificity of African societies. Additionally, political ties and dependencies still connect African political regimes with those of colonial powers.

The issue of state formation in Africa has been widely debated in African literature due to its importance and the peculiar nature of modern state formation in Africa as a “post-colonial state.”

The modern African state is essentially a distorted version of the Western state, primarily due to its disregard for the African environment and local peculiarities. The years following the post-colonial era have demonstrated the failure of all forms of imitation in building a state model along Western lines, particularly in the constitutional domain.

In the same vein, it can be said that the problems facing the post-colonial state and the difficulties it encountered in localizing the Western model of the state stem mainly from the absence of state traditions (foundations of state building) in African history. This explains the community’s rejection of the concept of “state,” as confirmed by Goren Hyden, who argues that—except for Ethiopia—sub-Saharan African societies have been unable to develop state systems on their own.

John Wiseman distinguishes between three stages in the political and social development in Africa:

The Early Stage: This period, marked by the decolonization process and the beginning of achieving national independence, was characterized by several major issues including the problem of building a national state, the nature of political systems, and the pursuit of political development.

The Second Stage: Spanning from the mid-1960s to the late 1980s, this phase was marked by three main characteristics: the abandonment of liberal pluralism in favor of a one-party system, direct military intervention in political life, and the existence of competitive electoral systems, both in countries that maintained a multiparty system and those adopting a single-party system.

The Third Stage: Beginning in 1989, this phase witnessed a notable transformation in African political systems, as one-party regimes were legally and constitutionally abolished in the guise of formal democracy—an insincere form or what Richard Joseph terms “virtual democracy.” The reality of practice proved unequivocally that this transformation did not reflect the theoretical frameworks established by charters, texts, and various constitutions, in what was described as the wave of democratization, dubbed Africa’s “second liberation.”

According to African affairs expert Hamdi Abdel Rahman Hassan, this transformation was not institutional or genuine; rather, the ruling elites sought to adapt and respond to the conditions imposed by the complex transformations accompanying the post-Cold War era.

In this context, proponents of the new liberal political economy assert that the post-colonial African state bears responsibility for the political and economic crises characterizing Africa, having failed miserably in its developmental function.

Fundamental questions have revolved around the contextual and substantive determinants of the phenomenon of “state crisis” in Africa in general and the Sahel region in particular. A group of researchers has considered the ethnic-identity factor and the arbitrary division of African borders without regard to community specificities as a primary variable, akin to studies by Tual François.

Others trace it back to the nature of leadership within clientelistic and patrimonial systems—characterized by politicization and personalization serving private interests, as seen in the studies of René Lemarchand and Samuel Eisenstadt.

Another group emphasized the role of economic factors and weak development, while others focused on the dependency approach, and some highlighted what is currently termed “war economy,” with its stimulating consequences for conflicts, showcasing the emergence of new actors such as terrorism and organized crime.

Structural Crises in the African Sahel Region

A critical observation when deconstructing the failures and weaknesses seen in the national state in Africa generally, and specifically in the Sahel region, is the conflation of the concept of state with various incompatible forces. The notion of state has been embodied in (the leader’s persona, the party, and the tribal affiliations), along with (tribal, royal, regional, and ethnic identities), leading to the characterization of the African state as what is known as the “military-civilian nexus.”

Thus, the researcher will attempt to rely on political modernization theory regarding the transition from traditional societies to modern ones, described by some researchers as “agricultural societies” in contrast to “industrial societies.”

We will attempt to identify the crises faced by political systems and the state in the African Sahel, based on the analysis provided by Lucian Pye and Joseph LaPalombara regarding political system crises, including (identity crisis, political participation crisis, legitimacy crisis, penetration crisis, and distribution crisis), which we aim to use as a theoretical framework to analyze the political development crises facing the state in the African Sahel.

A – Identity Crisis and National Integration

One of the challenges faced by national leaders in building states in Africa and the Sahel region is how to transform multi-ethnic and culturally diverse societies into a “unified nation.” The belief of a cultural group in its non-belonging to the state, or claiming that another group does not belong, despite the fact that this latter group resides within the same state, leads us to conclude that we are witnessing an identity crisis. Educational, military, and bureaucratic institutions, as well as intermediary institutions such as parties and unions, are all based on allegiance to the dominant identity in the center, whether tribal, sectarian, or ethnic. Consequently, state institutions become mere tools serving tribal loyalty and the deepening of the integration crisis.

Political life in this region fundamentally relies on the prevailing tribal loyalties that often eclipse loyalty to the nation, especially since some tribes native to the region have transnational extensions, such as the Tuareg minority spread across five countries: Mali, Niger, Libya, Algeria, and Burkina Faso. This directly impacts national unity and consequently the state’s survival.

Thus, the identity and integration crisis in Sahelian countries manifests in three primary forms:

1. Ethnic variation and linguistic, religious, and cultural diversity.
2. The issue of artificial borders left by colonialism without consideration of these diversities.
3. Weak allegiance, with loyalty shifting towards external entities.

B – Crisis of Political Participation

The political process in all Sahelian countries is characterized by deep structural imbalances, as well as the nature of closed political systems, weak political participation, and restrained freedom of expression and the press—features that define the reality in Sahelian states, alongside the continuing influence of the military as a decisive factor in managing the political transition, despite these states adopting a democratic facade.

Furthermore, this is linked to the degree of institutionalization, a characteristic notably absent in all Sahelian countries. Samuel Huntington links institutionalization to political participation and stability, asserting that the latter depends on the extent to which political institutions are established to organize political participation and prevent instability.

C – Crisis of Legitimacy

The legitimacy of the political regime represents one of the most crucial components of a state’s persistence, yet in the Sahel region, power is often attained through undemocratic means, reflecting the dominance of a particular minority over the political scene and monopolization of power or through military coups that conflict with democratic principles. The legacy of authoritarianism in Africa has led to political considerations overshadowing election management, which often assumes a symbolic nature in many cases to legitimize the ruling regime.

It can also be said that the state in the Global South, including Sahelian countries, is both alien and traditional simultaneously. It has drawn from Western experiences in its administrative, security, and military structures, while also deriving from its cultural heritage the notion of power being exclusive to the ruler and his entourage, thereby voiding any genuine modernization.

D – Penetration Crisis

The state in the African Sahel continues to face challenges in its internal geopolitical landscape due to its inability to control and secure its vast lands and monitor its borders. The governments of the five Sahel countries theoretically exercise sovereignty over their expansive territories.

This is primarily attributed to the lack of available resources and the failures they experience. Most countries in this region are either collapsed states or on the verge of failure, a condition fueling instability and insecurity as non-state actors share power with central authority, such as tribes and various ethnic groups throughout the Sahel, exemplified by the Tuareg minority, in conjunction with networks of organized crime and terrorist groups operating in the region. In some cases, this includes alliances between Tuareg rebels and al-Qaeda, along with organized crime networks.

E – Distribution Crisis and Economic Failure

Joseph LaPalombara states that governance problems are fundamentally issues of distribution, as the political system is responsible for extracting, mobilizing, and distributing resources, services, values, and opportunities.

In Sahelian countries, resource distribution signifies a prevalent phenomenon, where a few monopolize available resources while the majority bears the burden of deprivation. This distribution crisis underscores severe class disparities, leading to class conflict, which may incite instability, starkly evident in Mali and Niger through the ongoing insurrections and rebellions by the Tuareg and various minority groups.

The exacerbation of this crisis can be attributed to the phenomenon of political corruption, characterized by the misuse of power to achieve personal objectives and treating public properties as personal assets.

In this context, the 2023 International Transparency Index highlights the low rankings of several Sahelian countries. Under such circumstances, it is unsurprising that class and social inequalities deepen, economic rights suffer, and poverty prevails, distanced from the concept of human development.

Challenges of Building the State in the African Sahel Region

Many experts and researchers agree that the political and economic weakness of the national state in the Sahel region plays a fundamental role in destabilizing the security and stability of the area. The state crisis results from the accumulation of what are termed “crisis-inducing factors.”

Additionally, the process of state building in the Sahel faces various challenges that hinder the path toward stability and development, exacerbated by foreign projects exploiting this precarious reality, which will be elaborated upon in the following points:

A – Historical Challenges

Colonial policy sought to create a fragmented African citizen divided along regional, ethnic, and religious lines, balancing traditional societal affiliations with modern social and political realities.

Furthermore, colonial policy disrupted ethnic borders and destabilized traditional ways of life, including the free movement of people and goods, imposed by artificial boundaries inherited from African states. In this context, which combines state control and the presence of nomadic populations, many coastal conflicts should be analyzed, often seeing nomads as key players, and frequently these conflicts are border-related, as is the case for the Tuaregs in Mali and Niger.

B – Political Challenges

The end of the colonial era, marked by various distortions, led to the emergence of the modern African state, sometimes referred to as the “post-colonial state.” Most newly independent African states adopted the one-party system during this period as a means for state building.

One of the prominent intellectual frameworks characterizing African political systems in the post-independence period has been described by Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle in 1997 as “new patrimonialism.”

The absence of “institutionalization” is a common feature in many state institutions in Sahelian countries, tied to ethnic, tribal, and sectarian tendencies, alongside administrative failures, without downplaying the continuing influence of tribal power over state institutions, where individuals’ collective memories are tied to ethnic belonging rather than state identity—one of the fundamental reasons these new states have failed to form modern societies capable of offering equal guarantees to all.

When one delves into the geopolitical space of the Sahel, there are always central forces possessing political power and controlling the country’s resources, while peripheral forces seek to redefine the status quo. Colonial powers have significantly entrenched this dynamic, effectively reversing traditional power relations in the region, evident in Mali, Niger, and Chad. This situation produces a political crisis due to the absence of normal power transition mechanisms, with leadership positions monopolized by elites often lacking the necessary integrity and professionalism, compounded by missing public freedoms, worsening human rights violations, and the confusion between state and tribe as the central features of society and state.

Moreover, the economic system prevailing in these countries following the discovery of oil is rentier, a blend of theocratic and autocratic structures, sidelining legislative and constitutional institutions and modern state frameworks. The idea of institutionalization and political participation has been overshadowed by a specific minority through politicization and personalization, characterizing the military and neo-patrimonial regimes that have dominated political life in this region since independence.

In this context, military coups emerge prominently, with the military institution occupying a significant role in political life, an indication that some researchers have termed “embedding the military in civilian life,” which significantly contravenes democratic mechanisms.

C – Economic and Social Challenges

Among the challenges impeding state building in the Sahel are poverty, rising unemployment, famine, economic decline, health deterioration, weak economic growth, high debt levels, dependency on external aid, poor educational and social infrastructure, agricultural resource instability, as well as illiteracy and ignorance.

These factors serve to fuel sources of despair, escalate feelings of frustration, and create fertile ground for rebellion, insurgency, and extremism, stemming from the security-development nexus. Notably, in the 2014 Human Development Index, all Sahelian countries ranked at the bottom, with Niger at 187th, Chad at 184th, Mali at 176th, Sudan at 166th, and Mauritania at 161st.

Regarding food security, which directly correlates with health security, estimates from December 2014 indicated that 19.8 million people in the Sahel were suffering from food insecurity, with 2.6 million in critical condition needing urgent food assistance.

In 2015, there was deterioration in food security for an even larger number than in previous years.

The Sahel faces high and persistent levels of acute malnutrition, which were highlighted by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) indicating that in 2015, 5.8 million children under five suffered from global acute malnutrition (GAM), including 1.7 million children experiencing severe acute malnutrition (SAM), and 4.4 million children with moderate acute malnutrition (MAM). On average, one in three children in the Sahel suffers from stunting due to halted growth, with approximately 571,000 children under five dying annually from malnutrition.

This multifaceted weakness can be traced back to several factors:

• Poor management and corruption (both petty and grand).
• External environmental factors related to external debt, as Sahelian countries largely rely on humanitarian aid and loans that significantly obstruct growth and development, effectively compromising their political and economic independence.
• Geographical factors attributed to the desert characteristics of the region, marked by low rainfall, desertification, and drought problems which impede achieving food security and leading development.
• The abandonment of social functions by the state concerning social justice in light of rapid demographic growth, which does not align with the pace of economic growth in the region, weakening loyalty and redirecting it towards alternative affiliations (minority groups, ethnicities, regions, clans), sometimes extending to alliances with organized crime gangs to secure livelihoods, as evidenced during the recent crisis in the Sahel since 2012.

D – Security Challenges (Terrorism Issues and Organized Crime Activities)

Among the security challenges in the Sahel are cross-border organized crime activities of various kinds and the phenomenon of international terrorism, both of which play a significant role in obstructing the state-building process, particularly since any form of development must accompany stability and security.

This region witnesses thriving illegal arms trafficking, particularly after the collapse of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in Libya, leading to the opening of arms depots and the return of Tuareg associated with his plans to establish a “Tuareg Republic” in the Sahara, a viewpoint echoed by Mano Dayak, a Tuareg from Niger, in his work on the “suffering of the Tuaregs.”

Additionally, illegal activities such as smuggling of Moroccan hashish resin, cocaine trafficking from Latin America, and kidnapping for ransom—often linked to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb—are prevalent, alongside trading in smuggled goods circumventing legal processes. Mauritania has emerged as one of the top three hubs for cigarette smuggling in the Sahel and West Africa, and illegal immigration accompanied by extortion and human trafficking remains significant.

The close relationship between terrorist activities in the region and organized crime, and their links to certain individuals within official bodies in these countries, should not be overlooked.

E – Challenge of Foreign Projects

Among the challenges facing state building in the Sahel is the security threat posed by foreign interests attempting to enhance the strategic value of this region or adjacent areas. In this context, several foreign projects are emerging as attempts to position themselves in order to gain influence and protect their economic interests primarily.

Prominent among these are French interests in Niger and Mali, where the largest French investments in uranium (companies such as Areva and Total) exist, motivated by a perception of traditional influence.

Terrorist organizations are exploited to create an existential threat justifying intervention, whereby the “terrorist threat” is exaggerated, allowing competing states to seize control of resources and establish military and economic footholds in the strategic corridor linking the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea, thus impacting geopolitical and energy balances in the Maghreb and West Africa. This has been notably evident in the French military intervention in Mali in 2013 and in the Central African Republic in 2014, purportedly for the purpose of combating “terrorist groups.”

Furthermore, American projects in the African Sahel have emerged prominently following the September 2001 attacks, in the context of the global campaign against terrorism and a renewed focus on this strategic region, affirmed by the US government in the National Security documents of 2002 and 2006, along with security programs such as the Sahel Initiative (2002), the anti-terrorism Initiative for the Sahara (2005), and the African Command military initiative (AFRICOM). Efforts to combat terrorism often involve exaggerating the terrorist threats in the Sahel to dominate oil sources in the oil-rich West African region, seen as a strategic energy alternative, thereby diversifying energy sourcing and achieving American energy security amid political and security upheavals in the Middle East.

In this competitive landscape, Chinese economic competition must not be overlooked.

These diverse projects undermine these countries’ efforts towards building security, achieving stability, and promoting development.

Conclusion

This current reality can only be rectified by addressing the structural crises related to the need to build a state based on its environmental context and local peculiarities, taking into account diversity and multiplicity, and utilizing these factors as a source of strength rather than weakness for the state, transcending all historical resentments to build cohesive societies that respect this diversity. Additionally, it is crucial to rectify structural imbalances in the political process by establishing democratic systems founded on free and fair elections, fostering peaceful power transitions, achieving distributive justice, and preventing exclusion and marginalization under the banner of citizenry—ensuring human dignity and protecting individual identity, as well as liberating them from fear and want.

In our view, the majority of security challenges in the African Sahel relate to economic failure and distribution crises. Any stabilization must be a pathway to economic development concerned primarily with human needs, achieving human development in its broadest sense in this region.

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