The Iranian Response: A Wall of Silence, Hesitation, and Complex Calculations
The world is closely watching Iran’s reaction to the repeated violations of state sovereignty committed by what is known as the “Resistance Axis,” with its reach extending like a crescent around the Arab and Middle Eastern regions, including Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. This anticipation follows the assassination of “Presidential Guest” Mr. Ismail Haniyeh, the head of the political bureau of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), inside an Iranian Revolutionary Guard guesthouse during Haniyeh’s visit to participate in the inauguration ceremony of new Iranian President Massoud Bezkishan. The Iranian response is also awaited in light of a series of attacks from Israel and the United States targeting Iranian Revolutionary Guard Commander Qassem Soleimani, numerous Iranian nuclear scientists, and extending to the assassination of President Ibrahim Raisi, who was preparing to succeed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The presidential plane, carrying Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, was downed, with all signs and evidence indicating it was an assassination rather than an accidental incident, despite investigation results insisting it was merely an accident to preserve the remaining prestige of the Persian state and its institutions.
These attacks, along with various clashes and assaults on facilities, camps, and assassinations targeting Iranian proxies in the region, have put the Mullahs’ regime in a position where it must respond. Silence or avoidance of reality is no longer an option, despite the serious threats and unprecedented military deterrents on the ground and in the surrounding waters of the Arabian Gulf, the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean. Tehran faces two difficult choices, both of which will come at a high cost, affecting its prestige, status, and possibly its long-term project invested in over decades. The first option is to respond forcefully to all Israeli violations to maintain its prestige and position among the supporters of the Resistance Axis and its proxies, and to restore lost deterrence against future violations. The second option is to yield to the threats, sacrificing its project through silence and avoidance of direct confrontation, leading to isolation, ridicule, increased pressure, and loss of negotiating leverage. Matters would worsen if Donald Trump wins the upcoming November 5 election, bringing with him his challenging legacy with Iran and his tough policies towards it.
This silence and avoidance could result in a loss of control over its proxies, which seek to retaliate against the direct and public Israeli attacks. For instance, the Houthis might retaliate for the shelling of the Hodeidah port, and Hezbollah might respond to the assassination of its deputy leader and senior military commander, Fouad Shukr. These proxies, which span east, west, north, and south, could potentially rebel and deviate from Persian control, as they inherently belong to different cultural and Arab origins and are facing significant internal pressures.
The injured and deterrence-lacking Iran has received threats to destroy all its nuclear facilities and infrastructure. Additionally, threats have been made to target all oil export ports and facilities, potentially leading to a severe economic crisis that would exacerbate internal instability and threaten to topple the Iranian regime. This would sever its reach to all its regional proxies and subject them to military strikes. Some leaks even suggest that threats to assassinate the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution have reached Tehran through various channels, given that the hand that has targeted all the assassinated leaders, guests, and objectives is capable of reaching any individual or facility within Iran, even those under the protection of the Revolutionary Guard. This is a price Tehran, with all its pragmatic and functional history, finds itself unable to pay, sacrificing its project, credibility, entity, and proxies except what is required to save face. This explains the delay in the response and may prompt it to seek a reaction similar to that of April 13, with responses from Israel and its allies engineered by Western and Arab intermediaries.
Tehran might find a compromise that preserves some dignity through responses and attacks conducted by its proxies in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. This would involve involving the peoples, governments, resources, and fortunes of these countries, which Tehran sought to protect its interests, facilities, project, and sovereignty with, making these countries pay the price for Israeli-Iranian extremism and calculations in the region. Some view this scenario as preserving the Supreme Leader’s prestige and credibility while keeping the fires away from his residence. However, the Supreme Leader had previously demanded the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to respond and seek revenge for the assassination of “Presidential Guest” Haniyeh on Iranian soil. This scenario aligns with President Bezkishan’s efforts to protect his country from devastating strikes that could ruin his presidency before it even begins.
We can analyze Hezbollah’s actions, such as targeting some Israeli military bases and facilities, within this context. For instance, on the morning of last Sunday, Hezbollah announced it had attacked several military targets inside Israel. The party’s statement and leader Hassan Nasrallah emphasized linking the attack to revenge for the assassinated leader Fouad Shukr, without connecting it to the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh or any of the declared Iranian targets justifying a potential Iranian strike on Israel.
Consulate Attack and Response: April 13 Exception
In general, for Iranian leaders, the Israeli airstrike on April 1 against the Iranian consulate adjacent to the Iranian embassy in Damascus was seen as an excessive violation of the rules of engagement and the agreed-upon game plan, even if implicitly. It was not merely an April Fool’s joke but a new reality imposed on the mullahs and their proxies beyond their borders. The failure to respond could show weakness, undermining the deterrent position at the core of Tehran’s forward defense strategy. Despite Iran launching unprecedented attacks on Israel, it continued to move with extreme caution, aiming to prevent further escalation rather than encourage it. Details of the attack were exchanged with neighboring countries before the strikes—undoubtedly with the Iranian knowledge that these details would subsequently be passed on to the United States and Israel, allowing enough time to prepare and prevent significant injuries or damage in Israel. It took no more than 12 days.
Tehran was also quick to publicly call for an end to the escalation, tweeting this desire from its mission at the United Nations in New York while drones were still in the air heading toward Israel. Iran continuously sent a very clear message that it did not want a war with Israel or the United States. Instead, Iranian leaders claimed their primary goal was to reaffirm previous rules of engagement with Israel—mutual deterrence where confrontation is contained in the “gray area” and does not involve direct attacks. Similarly, even as Hezbollah now escalates its response to Israeli strikes, the ongoing intention seems to be to establish new rules of mutual deterrence rather than provoke a full-scale war.
This approach reflects Iran’s clear and persistent desire to avoid being dragged into a wider war, a point publicly emphasized by both Khamenei and Nasrallah. This is due to the recognition that such a conflict would cause devastating damage to Hezbollah’s military infrastructure, significantly reducing Hezbollah’s and Iran’s ability to deter Israel, which remains far more important to Tehran than the fate of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza. Reports indicate that Tehran is deeply concerned about a direct conflict with Israel or the United States and is working with its allies in Lebanon to find ways to avoid it.
Information Overload Tactic
Following the assassination of Haniyeh, what has been known in media and intelligence circles as “information overload” occurred regarding the nature of the operation, its details, and its execution. Each party emerged with a completely different narrative. Israel, the executor of the operation, put forward one story and leaked another. Iran, which received the strike, produced an official narrative accusing nearby countries and another contradictory narrative from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which was hosting the victim. The United States and its intelligence agencies, which knew the details in one way or another, leaked several narratives to the media and newspapers. Numerous regional intelligence agencies, which knew or were aware of the operation before or after its occurrence, provided their own narratives and stories. The scene became saturated with narratives and stories, creating a state of uncertainty for the message’s recipient, which in itself is a goal for those engaged in political and media communication. Each party built its narrative based on a plausible scenario it wished to follow, as is common in crisis management, using narratives and stories in a way that allows it to dominate the rest of the narratives.
To achieve this, Tehran’s explanations about how Haniyeh was assassinated in the IRGC guesthouse evolved continuously. This was to select a form of response that would ensure Iran inflicts significant damage on Israel without becoming involved in a regional war that would affect its borders, territories, and resources. Due to persistent efforts among various Iranian security agencies to avoid accusations of negligence and failure, and the blame for the lack of security oversight that allowed the assassination, officials and Iranian media sought to devise a strategy for effectively deterring Israel. It was clear that the “Promised Attack” with missiles and drones did not succeed in this regard. The attack was initially promoted as a shift in Iran’s response policy towards Israel—from using proxies to direct attacks—and senior Iranian officials claimed that from now on, Iran would respond to Israeli attacks with direct attacks on Israel.
Initially, the regime claimed that Haniyeh’s assassination was carried out by a missile launched from outside the country from a nearby state, and then by a missile launched near the assassination site. Thus, the regime said Israel would face missile and explosive drone attacks from all directions, posing a comprehensive threat. However, such a step was expected to push Israel to strike Iran hard. Consequently, the regime later claimed the assassination was carried out using an explosive device smuggled into Haniyeh’s wing in the guesthouse under the nose of the IRGC, with the help of IRGC members. This raised the possibility of a response involving parallel Iranian attacks on sites in Israel against Israeli officials inside and outside the country, whom Iran claimed were responsible for the assassination. This option allowed Tehran to seek assistance from non-Iranian elements and boast of executing a smart, focused attack while simultaneously thwarting any Israeli military strike against it or its assets in the region.
To achieve this, President Bezhikian made an effort to “persuade” the Supreme Leader to target specific objectives only, preferably agreed upon with an intermediary, to avoid a regional war and protect Iran’s security and interests. This was in response to demands from senior IRGC officials for an immediate missile attack on Israel, regardless of the cost to Iran. Some even suggested that Bezhikian did not want any military escalation that might cut off communication channels with Washington.
According to leaked reports amidst the information and media overload, discussions within Iranian security leadership about the nature of the Iranian response raised additional possibilities. These included targeting Israeli and Jewish interests worldwide; delegating the response to the resistance axis, especially Hezbollah and the Houthis; leveraging the threat of direct Iranian attacks on Israel to lead to a regional war in negotiations with the United States, aiming for Iranian nuclear achievements, securing the lifting of economic sanctions, and obtaining the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region, among other demands that Bezhikian and his team pushed to the crisis table.
For instance, the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Jarida reported on August 9 that a source in the Iranian Supreme National Security Council said the issue of responding to Israel is still under discussion in Tehran, and officials are waiting for specific orders from Supreme Leader Khamenei before making any decision on the attack. The source indicated that the United States proposed lifting a significant portion of the U.S. sanctions on Iran and returning to the nuclear agreement in exchange for Iran backing away from its intention to attack Israel. In response, Iranian President Bezhikian said that Iran is prepared to delay the response until further notice based on the U.S. proposal, provided it also includes a comprehensive ceasefire in Gaza and American guarantees to halt any Israeli aggression against Iran and its allies. Bezhikian mentioned in a Supreme National Security Council meeting that he coordinated this response with Khamenei, and if the United States accepted these conditions, he would persuade Khamenei to delay the military response and proceed with individual retaliatory actions—such as assassinating Israeli officials in response to Israel’s assassination of Iranian-linked individuals.
It seems that Tehran, which always seeks to maximize political gains through military threat diplomacy, continues to warn of its right to “appropriate response” to Israel and pay only a calculated price for political and economic gains while enhancing its image against the Biden administration and Europe to support its forces in the Middle East. At the same time, isolated terrorist attacks on specific targets cannot be ruled out.
Observers of Israeli policy during this crisis and other crises repeatedly confirm that the information overload tactic is a distinctive feature accompanying all its moves in crises. It is used intensively to pressure and escalate by repeatedly attempting to dominate the Israeli narrative of events, statements, and behind-the-scenes information over other narratives. This approach succeeds in infiltrating its narratives into Arab satellite channels and websites that translate and rebroadcast opinions, analyses, and perspectives from Israeli Channel 12, 13, and 14. Consequently, it occupies extended broadcasting and attention space on Arab channels and, by extension, the audience (Arab citizens).
Forward Defense Strategy
On a strategic level, Iran’s “Forward Defense” strategy complements its ideological foundation by translating ambition into action. This involves expanding Iran’s influence and establishing proxy forces throughout the Middle East, with the aim of deterring potential threats before they reach Iranian borders. The concept of forward defense, known in Iranian military circles as “offensive defense,” is a military strategy that integrates offensive elements within a broader framework of deterrence. From this perspective, Iranian military strategists view their country’s approach in the Middle East as an effort to enhance Iran’s “strategic depth” rather than as merely an ambitious expansionist project. Their goal is to increase Iran’s ability to absorb enemy strikes and carry out counterattacks, all while safeguarding domestic security and territorial integrity.
Given that decades of arms embargoes have limited Iran’s ability to develop conventional military capabilities, while its Middle Eastern competitors—especially Saudi Arabia—have made significant advancements in this area, Iran has focused on asymmetric tools. These include its allies in the Axis of Resistance, domestically produced drones, medium- to long-range missiles, and asymmetric naval capabilities, such as fast boats, drones, and sea mines (like those Iran has deployed in the Strait of Hormuz in recent years). This strategy reflects Iran’s acknowledgment of the limitations on its conventional military capabilities when facing superior adversaries.
Over the past decade, Tehran has intensified this strategy as tensions with the United States and Israel have escalated. The deterioration in relations has led to crippling economic sanctions aimed at curbing Iran’s nuclear and regional ambitions, as well as targeted assassinations and cyberattacks on Iranian nuclear infrastructure. This has significantly heightened Iranian leaders’ perceptions of threat, reinforcing their belief in the strategic importance of bolstering the country’s deterrent capabilities.
Lebanon and Syria are central theaters for this strategy. Over recent decades, Tehran has built significant political and military influence across both countries, with senior Iranian officials now claiming that Iran’s “natural strategic depth” extends to the Mediterranean Sea. Geographical priorities serve as a guiding force for Iran’s strategic focus. Iranian presence in southern Lebanon makes Hezbollah the most significant challenge to Israel in the event of a multi-front war with the Axis of Resistance. Similarly, the Syrian Golan Heights—bordering Israel—hold immense strategic value as an additional layer of deterrence.
At the same time, eastern Syria serves a somewhat different but related purpose for Tehran, acting as a land bridge connecting Iran through Iraq to Syria and Lebanon. Control over this area facilitates the free movement of Iranian and Iranian-supported personnel, supplies, and weapons across borders, enabling rapid deployment and resupply for proxy groups.
Moreover, Iran’s presence in eastern Syria allows it to monitor and increase pressure on American activities. As part of the U.S.-led mission against ISIS, America maintains a small military presence in that part of the country to support its allies in the Syrian Democratic Forces in retaining control of the northeast. The U.S. also maintains a garrison in Tanf in eastern Syria, which—although part of the mission against ISIS—simultaneously aims to challenge Iran’s influence in the region. Despite this objective, U.S. bases in eastern Syria (as in Iraq) have increasingly become targets for attacks by Iran-backed militias, while Iran seeks to force their withdrawal from the region.
The war in Gaza has underscored, from the perspective of Iranian leaders, the value of this strategic posture in the thinking of both political and military leaders. As the threat of war with Israel and the United States grows, the importance of Syria and Lebanon as core Iranian strategic interests has increased. Tehran now views its alliances in both countries as the cornerstone of Iran’s security and as a unified deterrence front against Israel. This front, built over many years of Iranian support and local engagement, needs to be absorbed by Europe as it considers an effective response to escalating regional dynamics. Following in importance are the Houthis, who have a unique relationship with al-Qaeda in Yemen in coordination with Tehran, as well as al-Shabab in Somalia across the sea, serving as investments that benefit Iranian Houthi objectives as sources of threat and deterrence in the region. These are of equal importance to the Shia militias in Iraq, which secure the rear of the mullahs’ regime and pose a threat to U.S. forces in the Mesopotamian basin. Hamas and Islamic Jihad, though, rank lower on the priority and investment scale, even if the events in Gaza since October 7, 2023, have placed them in the spotlight and prioritized them.
In conclusion, the situation appears dominated by complex calculations and hesitation, with both Iran and the United States wary of their respective projects in the region. Iran will not sacrifice Hezbollah, its investment and major arm. The United States will not sacrifice Israel or leave it without deterrence and protection in a region that harbors at least public hostility. Whether responses come or not, the rounds and battles will continue according to established rules of engagement, fulfilling the functional roles of both Israel and Iran and their negative impact on neighboring countries. This perpetuates polarization and attrition regardless of conspiracy theories, as reality has surpassed all theories and fruitless debates about the existence of conspiracy.
