Although many scholars of international relations believe that geography has lost its weight in shaping foreign policies due to technological development and the encroachment of geoeconomics on geopolitics, it is still difficult to understand some foreign policy shifts without acknowledging the persistence of geography. This is clearly reflected in the changes taking place in European diplomacy toward Middle Eastern issues in general, and the Palestinian cause in particular.
The succession of European verbal condemnations (which we rarely heard before) of Israeli settlement policies and Zionist excesses in committing genocide against Palestinians, the cautious moves toward recognizing a Palestinian state, the repeated summoning of Israeli ambassadors in some European countries, and even the occasional sharp exchanges between Israeli and European officials—alongside the growing European media space critical of Israel, supported by demonstrations and civil society movements against Israel, as well as less tense voting behavior at the UN—are all developments that call for explanation. Is this the beginning of a trend in European foreign policy? And more importantly, why is this happening?
It is important to stress that we are not speaking of a “revolution” in European diplomacy, but rather of a “revision” of traditional European positions. Arab governments—this is where my doubts lie—should seize this opportunity through practical initiatives (and not just through the broken record of condemnations).
Causes of the Emerging European Shift
Several indicators push Europe to “reconsider” its positions:
a. Geography and proximity
European research institutes constantly highlight that the major global powers (the U.S., East Asia—China and Japan, and Russia) are geographically distant from the Middle East, whereas Europe is its immediate neighbor, sharing the Mediterranean, with Arab coastlines stretching over more than 6,500 km. This means that Middle Eastern conflicts directly impact Europe, making it the first to suffer from regional instability.
b. Mediterranean trade routes
About 30% of global maritime trade passes through the Mediterranean. Any disturbance—such as the current crisis in the Red Sea—significantly disrupts this trade. The Yemeni actions limiting commercial movement in the Red Sea, which is the most convenient passage for Euro-Asian trade (over $1 trillion in 2024), highlight this vulnerability. This may encourage Europe to support alternative land corridors, especially the Belt and Road Initiative, which could align with Iran’s interests. But restoring stability in the region would again boost the Mediterranean’s centrality.
c. NATO spending pressure
A stable Middle East weakens former President Trump’s calls to raise European defense spending within NATO from 2% to 5% of GDP.
d. Migration
Unstable regions produce migration flows. The Arab region ranks highest in political instability (by most measurement models), fueling migration toward Europe—the nearest and most attractive destination. This creates social, economic, and political challenges. The Palestinian issue, if resolved, would significantly contribute to regional stability. France, Germany, Britain, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands host the largest Arab migrant populations. Since 2010, Europe has received about 900,000 asylum applications annually, most of them Arabs.
e. Oil dependency
Europe is the world’s second-largest oil importer, consuming around 9.3 million barrels per day. Israel’s recent attack on Iran raised oil prices by 7% within hours. Every $1 increase per barrel costs Europe $9.3 million daily, excluding higher shipping and insurance costs, which escalate with instability.
f. Iran–Israel conflict scenario
If war erupts between Israel and Iran and Tehran closes the Strait of Hormuz, Europe will face severe energy vulnerabilities, especially since it has drastically reduced imports of Russian oil and gas—weakening its stance on the Ukraine conflict.
g. European public opinion
Most polls show only 13–21% support for Israel’s policy toward Gaza across European countries, while opposition ranges from 63–70%. This pushes governments and parties to adjust positions. Pro-Palestinian demonstrations have erupted in 18 European countries, worrying Israel—especially as most protesters are youth, a fact with long-term implications.
Europe’s Ability to Apply Pressure
Historically, Europe has shaped Israel’s existence—Britain’s role in its creation, and the joint Franco-British-Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956. Today, however, if European interests are harmed, the continent may reconsider its relationship with Israel. One-third of Israel’s trade is with Europe, Germany alone supplies about 32% of Israel’s defense needs, Britain 1%, and Italy—by late 2024—halted all defense sales to Israel.
Europe’s voting bloc (44 countries, including 28 in the EU) is highly influential, especially with Britain and France’s UN veto power. Spain, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Slovenia are at the forefront of Israeli critics. To date, 7 European countries have recognized Palestine (6 in 1988), followed by 5 more after the “Al-Aqsa Flood” (3 in 2024, 2 in 2025), with the number expected to grow.
The “two-state solution” deeply troubles Netanyahu, since it would entail dismantling settlements, raising the specter of civil war among Israelis. Hence, Netanyahu, with U.S. and Arab normalization allies, works toward:
- Limiting the Palestinian state to Gaza alone.
- Concentrating Palestinians in small West Bank enclaves and annexing them to Jordan.
- Orchestrating events leading to voluntary or forced displacement.
- Blocking or indefinitely delaying UN deliberations.
- Offering Palestinians in 1967 territories self-rule without sovereignty.
Decisive Factor: The Arab Position
The key determinant of Europe’s stance is the Arab role. If Arabs remain stuck in “poetry of condemnation,” Israel will mitigate European backlash through U.S. support, expanding Arab normalization, and fueling Arab internal conflicts. In that case, Arabs—not Israel—will be blamed for the instability harming Europe.
Currently, the Arab scene appears chaotic: groups like HTS engage in “political intimacy” with Israel in Europe; some Arab actors from Libya and Sudan accept Palestinian resettlement; others support Israel’s economy through secret multibillion-dollar deals. Some may even cooperate with Israel to ease Europe’s burden from the Arab–Israeli conflict—why not? Gulf media outlets are already normalizing such contacts, covering for HTS’s meetings with Israeli ministers, while Al Jazeera retreats behind RAND Corporation’s agendas. The rest of Gulf media follows in sowing doubt over any alternative narratives.
And the worst may yet be to come.
