After India’s independence in 1947, South Asia witnessed a hidden intelligence struggle among Western powers, each seeking to strengthen its influence and interests in the region. The causes of this conflict were diverse, including competition over natural resources, political influence, ideology, and the lingering legacy of colonialism.
In this context comes Paul McGarr’s book “Spying in South Asia”, considered the first comprehensive study of the history of the “secret Cold War” in India. It focuses on British and American intelligence interventions in Indian politics and culture from independence in 1947 until the end of the Cold War. McGarr narrates how Indian politicians, human rights activists, and journalists either resisted or collaborated with British and American intelligence operatives, and how these interventions left a significant and lasting imprint on the political and social fabric of South Asia.
The book also explores the relationship between intelligence and state governance in South Asia, and between agencies and governments that claimed to promote democracy, while revealing a fifty-year battle that shaped the subcontinent.
Historical Context and Orientations
The book begins with a historical and conceptual background of the role played by Western intelligence—especially British and American—in South Asia during the Cold War, particularly in India and Pakistan. It shows that the region was not “peripheral” to the global struggle between East and West but rather at the center of a silent and complex espionage war.
The author questions the nature of the relationships established between foreign intelligence agencies and South Asian governments. Initially framed as support for democracy, these relationships often turned into justifications for repression. The book challenges prevailing assumptions about the post–World War II era, asserting that the real impact of Western intelligence was not limited to Europe but also had deep political, social, and cultural consequences across the developing world.
He highlights how the period from the early 1950s to the mid-1970s saw covert British and American interventions in countries such as Iran, Guatemala, British Guiana, Indonesia, Congo, and Chile—interventions condemned by Indian policymakers as unacceptable manifestations of neo-colonialism. Yet, quietly, New Delhi was also reinforcing its intelligence ties with the West.
Britain’s Not-So-Silent Withdrawal
In 1947, as the world entered a new phase, Britain was preparing to leave its ancient empire in South Asia—but not silently. Even as it relinquished political control, Britain sought to maintain a presence in India through the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which it helped train, supplied with information, and covertly supported even after independence. Britain also created the Information Research Department (IRD), a secret propaganda unit designed to influence the media and public opinion.
Britain relied on Indian officers who had served under colonial rule as “intermediaries” or “secret agents” within the bureaucracy, ensuring channels of information and networks of dual loyalty. Thus, independence was not viewed as a total loss, but rather as an opportunity to reshape relations in ways that safeguarded strategic interests.
The book notes that the inherited intelligence infrastructure was weak. Unlike the gradual—though turbulent—transfer of political power in India, the handover of intelligence and security responsibilities was abrupt and problematic. Britain had not left behind a proper intelligence apparatus for an independent state. This was unsurprising, since British intelligence efforts during colonial rule were largely focused on monitoring and neutralizing nationalist leaders, especially those in transitional governments before independence.
Unlike Britain’s intense interest, the United States and Soviet Union showed little concern for post-independence India, allowing Britain a golden opportunity to reinforce its intelligence footprint in the new state. Thus, while official independence ceremonies took place in public, another transfer of power was unfolding in secret. In 1947, British agencies—MI5 and MI6 (SIS)—implemented plans to retain a foothold in independent India through clandestine networks.
Washington’s Communist Anxiety
The CIA began monitoring India in the 1940s, but its activity intensified with the rise of the Indian Communist Party. It cultivated secret links with Indian intelligence (particularly during Nehru’s leadership) and launched joint projects such as monitoring China’s nuclear program from the Indian Himalayas (the Nanda Devi project).
By the early 1950s, the United States—initially hesitant—recognized India’s strategic value in the Cold War. The CIA and NSA gradually engaged New Delhi, but cautiously, given India’s non-aligned stance.
Both the British and Americans feared India might tilt toward the Soviet Union, which led to intensified intelligence operations in New Delhi, Calcutta, and other cities. Some U.S. sources claimed that between 1946 and 1959, the CIA had access to nearly every document passing through Nehru’s personal secretariat. Despite his public criticism of U.S. policies, Nehru quietly permitted limited cooperation, though he resisted subordination to Washington and criticized it over colonialism, racism, and China.
Relations were further strained by rogue CIA operatives who exceeded their authority, sparking diplomatic incidents. Journalistic investigations and exposés—such as those in The Ugly American—fueled Indian suspicions that the U.S. conspired to undermine its democracy. Leftist and communist media amplified the image of the CIA as a hidden enemy.
Thus, while India officially pursued non-alignment, covert cooperation with U.S. intelligence existed—though marred by mistrust, U.S. support for Pakistan, and India’s vocal criticism of Western policies, particularly under Eisenhower and Nixon. The CIA’s failure to grasp India’s political culture often backfired, fueling elite mistrust, widening rifts with Nehru, and reinforcing the perception of America as a neo-colonial power.
Moscow Exploits Anti-Western Sentiment
The book analyzes the activities of the Soviet KGB in India during the Cold War, showing how it became a powerful force in politics, media, economics, culture, and even daily life. Unlike the cautious CIA, the KGB saw India as a vital arena to counter American and Chinese influence. Moscow employed networks of agents, diplomats, and journalists to expand its reach.
Information warfare was central: the Soviets poured resources into leftist newspapers, planted pro-Soviet propaganda, and spread disinformation about the CIA. They even forged documents to implicate the CIA in assassinations and conspiracies, many of which reached Indian media and shaped public opinion. The Soviet embassy in India effectively became a massive intelligence hub, hosting KGB officers under diplomatic, cultural, and commercial cover. Some of the USSR’s most important spies worked out of India.
Despite this deep engagement, the India–Soviet relationship remained one of cautious closeness: New Delhi preserved its independence, while Moscow sought to mold India into a “flexible strategic partner” against the West.
Indira Gandhi and the “Foreign Hand”
The book explores how Prime Minister Indira Gandhi weaponized the rhetoric of the “Foreign Hand” as a political tool to consolidate power, justify extraordinary measures, attack opponents, and create public suspicion toward Western influence, especially the CIA.
By the 1970s, Britain had largely scaled back its intelligence presence after the IRD’s failure. During the Emergency (1975–1977), Indira Gandhi arrested opponents under the pretext of foreign-backed threats. The “Foreign Hand” narrative legitimized repression. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) became politicized, focusing less on genuine security threats and more on monitoring politicians, activists, and unions.
Accusations against the CIA multiplied, alleging election interference, support for separatists, and surveillance of politicians. U.S. backing of Pakistan during the 1971 war, rising Indo-Soviet ties, and Western criticism of Gandhi heightened tensions. The Soviets quietly encouraged this framing, reinforcing the image of the CIA as an internal enemy.
Even after the Emergency ended, the “Foreign Hand” narrative persisted in Indian politics, where opponents were frequently accused of serving foreign agendas. Political dissent became closely linked to questions of loyalty.
Indian Intelligence and the End of the Cold War
The book analyzes how Indian intelligence adapted to global shifts after the Soviet Union’s collapse. With the loss of its old partner, India redefined its global role, and its intelligence agencies—the IB and RAW—entered a new era.
Despite decades of suspicion, India cautiously moved closer to the U.S., with intelligence cooperation becoming more open, especially around terrorism and nuclear issues. Economic liberalization in the 1990s reinforced this.
Yet the “Foreign Hand” mentality did not vanish. It resurfaced in new forms—accusations against human rights groups, claims that protests and student movements were foreign-influenced, and securitized approaches to internal conflicts like Kashmir and the northeast.
Ultimately, India transformed from merely being a site of great-power rivalry into an active intelligence player in its own right, adept at leveraging support, balancing powers, and managing information.
Conclusion
McGarr concludes that Western intelligence interventions in India often backfired: London and Washington failed to gain New Delhi’s trust and sometimes strengthened anti-Western sentiment. He argues that lessons from India are key to understanding later Western failures in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Source:
Paul M. McGarr, “Spying in South Asia: Britain, the United States, and India’s Secret Cold War”, Cambridge University Press, 2024.
