The Sudanese Army recaptured the city of Wad Madani, the capital of Al-Jazira State, at the beginning of January 2025, then broke the siege on the headquarters of the Sudanese Army’s General Command and the Signal Corps and recaptured a refinery at the end of the same month. The recapture of Wad Madani is a central turning point that may give the Sudanese Army operational momentum to push forward with every position it recaptures.
The Sudanese Army paved the way for the recapture of Wad Madni with battle preparations and arrangements that preceded it, concerning the general battlefield across various parts of Sudan. In terms of operational arrangements for the battle of Wad Madani, the army surrounded it from three sides: the south, west, and east, to close in on the Rapid Support Forces, and used a combination of weapons, primarily airstrikes, to target Rapid Support Forces positions, its infrastructure, and supply depots, weakening its morale, preventing it from regrouping, and paving the way for the Sudanese Army to launch the final ground operations.
Prior to that, the Sudanese Army succeeded in convincing the commander, Abu Aqila Kikl, and his forces to abandon Hamidti, the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, and join the army in October 2024. This provided valuable intelligence information that the army forces benefited from in building and executing their plan, and also provided the army with reinforcements in personnel and equipment.
The recapture of Wad Madani relieved pressure on the Sudanese Army in the capital, Khartoum; the Rapid Support Forces were using their proximity to the capital, about 200 km away, to send supplies to their forces still entrenched in several locations in Khartoum, and the recapture of the city by the Sudanese Army will increase the pressure on the Rapid Support Forces in the capital. Additionally, the Rapid Support Forces were using Wad Madani as a connection hub between the southern and eastern regions, particularly Sennar, Gedaref, and White Nile states. Wad Madani is also known for its abundance of agricultural products, so during the period of Rapid Support Forces control, it served as a gathering center for energy, weapons, personnel, and food supplies, and directed them to various fronts. All of this will have future repercussions on the Rapid Support Forces, as they will not be able to replace this location with its connections between eastern, southern, and central Sudan, but will suffer from the pressure exerted by the Sudanese Army relying on the good capabilities provided by the Wad Madani location.
Dismantling the Rapid Support Forces’ Pillars
The failure of the Rapid Support Forces to maintain control of Wad Madani was not a random event, but a development reached through several consecutive strikes carried out by the Sudanese Army, not all of which were evident in the media, that exhausted the Rapid Support Forces; because they hit many of its sources of strength and cohesion in general, but weakened its capabilities most in Wad Madani.
First: The Sudanese Army’s control of the bridges of Khartoum at the end of September 2024 enabled it to connect the capital with Omdurman and South Khartoum, cutting off the Rapid Support Forces’ supply lines to the capital and restricting their movement there, so the Sudanese Army forces no longer feared attacks from the rear if they intended to engage in battles in the cities adjacent to Khartoum. This paved the way for the encirclement of the Rapid Support Forces in Wad Madani from the northwestern side of the city.
Second: The Sudanese Army took advantage of its positioning in the city of Sennar, the capital of Sennar State, on November 23, 2024, and thereby gained control of the roads connecting southern and eastern Sudan. Additionally, Sennar is located 150 km south of Wad Madani, so it was a means for the Sudanese Army forces to encircle the Rapid Support Forces from the south.
Third: The Sudanese armed factions in Darfur announced their joining of the Sudanese Army to fight the Rapid Support Forces in November 2024, and they were part of the joint forces of the armed struggle movements, and decided to fight the Rapid Support Forces in response to what they considered to be the atrocities of the Rapid Support Forces. This joint force launched an attack on the Zurug base in North Darfur in December 2024, which is a supply center for the operations of the Rapid Support Forces. The attack resulted in the destruction of military equipment and inflicted heavy losses on the Rapid Support Forces.
This joint force also announced the seizure of drones and the destruction of Rapid Support Forces convoys coming from some neighboring countries, further disrupting the Rapid Support Forces’ supply lines and operational capabilities.
This joint force, supported by the Sudanese Army, managed to thwart the Rapid Support Forces’ efforts to take control of Al-Fashir, the capital of Darfur, which numbered about 170 attempts, the last of which was in January 2025, and the Sudanese Army had eliminated Ali Yaqoub, one of the most important Rapid Support Forces commanders in Darfur, in June 2024, and managed to crush the Rapid Support Forces and inflict significant losses on them in September 2024. The joint force also managed to take control of strategic areas in Kutum in North Darfur, disrupting their supply lines and hampering their operational capabilities.
This deprived the Rapid Support Forces of achieving a symbolic victory, which would be a basis for claiming control of Al-Fashir, the capital of the Greater Darfur region, and they might use it to announce a parallel government to the Khartoum government, and demand recognition from world countries, as Haftar is trying to do in Libya to gain recognition for the Benghazi government in eastern Libya. Additionally, the Rapid Support Forces’ control of Al-Fashir, the capital of Darfur, deprives opposing forces of the most important city in the region logistically, and they will find it difficult to replace it, so the Rapid Support Forces’ control over the Darfur region will intensify, ensuring that supply lines with Chad, Central Africa, and Libya remain open.
As the balance of power has shifted internally in favor of the Sudanese Army, the regional and international environment has also tilted slightly in its favor. The Sudanese government welcomed the peace mediation with Abu Dhabi offered by Turkey, and Abu Dhabi welcomed Turkey’s efforts to resolve the Sudanese crisis. The Sudanese government accused the United Arab Emirates of supporting Hamidti’s forces, but the Emirates denies this.
There was also a shift in the position of the Kenyan government, which refused, at the beginning of January 2025, to allow Hamidti to hold a press conference because he did not provide official authorization from the Sudanese government led by Burhan, and this was followed by the reception of the Sudanese Foreign Minister, Ali Youssef. At the beginning of the war in 2023, Kenya was attacking the Burhan government and seeking to convince countries from East Africa to send forces to control the situation in Sudan. This shift in Kenya’s position will increase Hamidti’s isolation in East Africa and enhance the African legitimacy of the Burhan government, and other countries may follow suit.
The potential presidency of Trump in the United States may tip the scales in favor of the Sudanese Army; because Trump is not interested in the ideological aspects of conflicts, which are the aspects on which Hamidti and the political forces surrounding him rely, and he wants to end wars as he said, and his team may seek to limit the influence of international powers competing with the United States in Africa, such as Russia and China, and this weakens Hamidti’s forces, which rely on the Wagner forces currently integrated into the African Corps controlling the situation in Central Africa and exerting significant control over the oil sector in Libya in cooperation with Haftar’s forces. He may also seek to ensure stability in the Red Sea, cooperating with the Burhan government, which controls the Sudanese areas overlooking the Red Sea.
Saudi Arabia also showed additional support for Burhan through the visit of the Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister, Waleed bin Abdulhakim Al-Khuraiji, to Port Sudan, the temporary headquarters of the Sudanese government, and confirmed the Kingdom’s desire to strengthen bilateral cooperation and stabilize Sudan.
Gradual Strangulation
All these developments indicate that the recapture of Wad Madani by the army and the loss of the Rapid Support Forces, followed by the breaking of the siege on the headquarters of the Armed Forces and the Signal Corps in Khartoum, are part of significant shifts in the balance of power, similar cases may appear in the future, especially in the fragile areas controlled by the Rapid Support Forces, and Wad Madani may be a means of pressure used by the army to exacerbate the fragility of these areas, paving the way for their recapture.
The first positions of the Rapid Support Forces to be affected may be those in Khartoum and its suburbs, as its forces in the capital will face increasing difficulties in obtaining support in personnel, equipment, or supplies, and its control may collapse soon, losing its fortifications in the institutions and the center where it has been entrenched since the beginning of the war. The Sudanese forces may then press on the presence of the Rapid Support Forces in the area between northern Madani and Khartoum, to secure the capital and hinder the Rapid Support Forces’ maneuvers to encircle and strangle it. The Sudanese Army may prioritize this until the government regains its official headquarters, returns to them from Port Sudan, and strengthens its political legitimacy as the only force controlling the capital, Khartoum.
The army may rely on Wad Madani to intensify pressure on the Rapid Support Forces’ positions, weakening their control and forcing them to withdraw from these areas, to prevent the Rapid Support Forces’ attempts to be present on the Ethiopian border, which the Rapid Support Forces commander was counting on, whether for supplies or for obtaining recognition from the Ethiopian leadership. The Sudanese Army will also rely on its positions in Wad Madani to pressure the Rapid Support Forces in the White Nile in the city of Al-Qatina, tightening the stranglehold on them and disrupting their supply lines, forcing them to retreat.
All of this may weaken the Rapid Support Forces’ control in its main center in Darfur; because it will put pressure on the reinforcements and supplies that used to reach it from central Sudan, and at the same time, the Sudanese Army’s positioning in these important locations in central, southern, and eastern Sudan will enable it to advance towards eastern Darfur to tighten the stranglehold on the Rapid Support Forces in its most important strongholds.
Darfur: The Main Battle
These partial pressures may form a large current of pressure that weakens the cohesion of Hamidti’s forces in Darfur, his main base, causing limited cracks in its structure to widen, and may cause new cracks to appear. One of these limited cracks is the simmering dispute between Hamidti and the President of Chad, Mohamed Deby. A report by UN experts states that the Rapid Support Forces use Chadian territory near the Sudanese border as rear bases to receive supplies coming from allied foreign countries. However, the relationship between the Rapid Support Forces and the Chadian government is not based on a stable foundation, as most of the Chadian leadership belongs to the Zaghawa tribe, the same tribe to which the Sudanese armed factions in Darfur belong, which fought Hamidti in the past and have started fighting him now, and on the other hand, Hamidti does not belong to this tribe but to other tribes that the Sudanese government relied on during the rule of Omar al-Bashir to fight the armed movements in Darfur. Therefore, the Chadian regime is based on a volatile situation, so if it continues to cooperate with the Rapid Support Forces, it may spark an internal rebellion against its rule because Chadian army leaders may resent continuing to support the Rapid Support Forces, which, according to the United Nations, commit atrocities against their relatives in Darfur. Additionally, the Sudanese government has gradually escalated its dispute with the Chadian government. Initially, it publicly accused the Chadian government of providing the Amdjarass airport in northeastern Chad to receive equipment directed to the Rapid Support Forces, which was confirmed by a report by experts to the UN Security Council, and also facilitating the movement of the Rapid Support Forces through Chadian territory. The Sudanese government recalled its ambassador from Chad in June 2024 and filed a complaint with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on November 5, 2024. The escalation between the two countries may develop into the Sudanese Army forces or the affiliated armed factions carrying out raids on the Rapid Support Forces’ positions in Chadian territory.
The Sudanese Army forces and the affiliated armed factions will also seek to cut off the Rapid Support Forces’ supply lines in Central Africa, which rely on the Russian-backed African Corps (including Wagner forces) to maintain the existing rule. An investigation conducted by CNN revealed that the African Corps supplies the Rapid Support Forces with equipment through Libya, and this cooperation may extend to Central Africa. The Sudanese government may gather to achieve its goals by offering Russia incentives in gold mines or facilities in the Red Sea to accept breaking the link between the African Corps and the Rapid Support Forces, and Turkey may mediate in this. At the same time, the Sudanese Army forces may intensify strikes on the supply lines connected to Central Africa, after consolidating its control over the Sudanese areas adjacent to Darfur. It is also likely that Trump will pressure the Rapid Support Forces and their foreign allies to stop cooperating with the African Corps, Russia’s arm for influence in Africa.
Predicting the Future
The potential developments in the armed conflict between the Sudanese Army and its affiliated factions with the Rapid Support Forces are divided between short-term developments that are likely to occur, such as regaining full control of the capital, and long-term developments that are difficult to predict, such as crushing the Rapid Support Forces in Darfur; because the proportion of unknown variables varies in the two cases. Chad may intensify its cooperation with the Rapid Support Forces, and influential regional countries may succeed in alleviating international pressure on the Rapid Support Forces and achieving equivalence in external legitimacy between Hamidti and Burhan, as the United States did at the beginning of January 2025, when the American State Department imposed strict sanctions on Hamidti, followed by the Treasury Department imposing less severe and detailed sanctions on Burhan, and this discrepancy indicates the weakness of the wing of the American administration that is trying to equate the delegitimization of Hamidti and Burhan, but this wing may strengthen its grip in a Trump administration, entrenching a state of exhaustion, and the scenario of two competing Sudanese governments seeking external recognition may resurface, and Hamidti may consolidate his control over the Darfur region, and exhaustion may force both sides and the concerned foreign powers to accept a state of stagnation similar to the Libyan situation.
Sudan witnessed a similar scenario in the case of the war with the southern forces that led to the emergence of the state of South Sudan in 2011, and the Sudanese Army has historically not ended civil wars with a decisive military victory but with political settlements, such as the one it reached with the factions of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front, an alliance of armed factions from Darfur, Kordofan, and Blue Nile, which were fighting the Sudanese Army and then signed a peace treaty with it in Juba, the capital of South Sudan, in October 2020.
The end of the ongoing war may differ from this general pattern; because it has unique characteristics:
First: The Rapid Support Forces rely on the leadership of Hamidti and his relatives, making it a fragile organization; because it may disintegrate if the Sudanese Army succeeds in overthrowing the leadership, leaving no political project to unite the components of the Rapid Support Forces.
Second: UN experts’ reports and US condemnation confirm that the Rapid Support Forces have committed massive atrocities, which may make the army reluctant to reach any settlement with Hamidti’s forces because that may face strong opposition from the army, the Sudanese people, and the armed factions affiliated with the army.
Third: The length of the war has led several countries supporting the Rapid Support Forces to reassess their positions; because they may have calculated that it was capable of winning and rewarding them with material and political benefits, but the length of the war, the increase in atrocities, the army’s regaining of the military initiative, and the widespread popular and diplomatic rallying around it have lowered the bets on the Rapid Support Forces, and may push its foreign supporters to abandon it as Kenya did.
Fourth: The Rapid Support Forces do not enjoy a large base in Sudan, but its base is limited to some areas in Darfur, thus losing the most important pillar that enables armed factions relying on guerrilla warfare to win battles.
The Sudanese Army may exploit these vulnerabilities and succeed in eliminating the leadership of the Rapid Support Forces and tearing apart its network.
If this scenario is realized, the Sudanese Army will face numerous challenges, as some sections of the Rapid Support Forces may turn to organized crime, spreading terror in Sudanese regions. Additionally, the Sudanese Army suffers from the fragmentation of its internal political base, as the political forces currently rallying around the Sudanese Army have set aside their differences to confront the threat of the Rapid Support Forces, so if this threat disappears, these differences may resurface, and they may fail to agree on establishing a political system to take over from the army.
