Tactical Analysis of the Military Scene in Gaza

The military operations in the Gaza Strip have been marked by intense clashes, initially centered around the Israeli settlements surrounding the area, and have now progressed into the heart of the strip. From the outset until now, the battles have been largely irregular in nature, evolving from “infiltration operations” at the beginning to modern “urban warfare.”

The defensive plans of the Israeli army failed to prevent Hamas fighters from breaching the separation fence at the start of the battle, despite the lessons learned from previous conflicts and the training Israeli ground units received in urban warfare. Even with advancements in technological capabilities, these measures did little to reduce losses.

Initial Military Tactics of Both Sides

The “Al-Qassam Brigades” (the military wing of Hamas) employed a specific strategy aimed at disrupting Israeli surveillance methods, breaking the decision-making chain, and scattering Israeli units in the field, isolating them. To execute this strategy, a multi-directional initial assault was launched using various means—land, sea, and air—followed by attacks designed to thwart Israeli reinforcements from behind the front lines.

The initial steps of Hamas’s attack included:

• A naval raid using speedboats on the “Zikim” naval base north of the strip.
• Electronic jamming of Israeli radars, communications, and satellite signals.
• Missile attacks using three types of long-range “surface-to-surface” missiles, launched at different angles and ranges to confuse and overwhelm the “Iron Dome” system.
• Aerial infiltration by motorized gliders, which typically fly between 3 meters and 5 kilometers at speeds between 24-50 km/h. By flying at low altitudes and under 100 km/h, they are difficult to detect by radar, and with minimal thermal signatures, they are hard to track. Their objective was to isolate frontline Israeli forces by attacking them from behind while targeting command and control centers.
• The main attack involved a full military-sized group divided into small, fast-moving units capable of maneuvering with motorcycles, small transport vehicles, and bulldozers. According to Eitan Shamir, Director of the Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University in Israel, in his interview on November 4, 2023, with The New Statement, the barrier was designed to withstand multi-directional attacks by a maximum of fifty individuals. However, the attack was executed by 1,500 fighters simultaneously. On that day, surveillance balloons were not present due to maintenance, which was scheduled to be completed after the holiday. Additionally, at least half or two-thirds of the soldiers were on leave, and only two Apache helicopters were operational.

The shock of Hamas’s initial assault had a detrimental effect on the Israeli soldiers in their defensive positions on the front line, leading them to retreat haphazardly. This situation exemplifies the Israeli military doctrine, which assumes inevitable victory due to technological, intelligence, and air superiority. However, these factors alone cannot substitute for soldiers physically holding their ground.

The Israeli army had no choice but to engage in close combat without prior intelligence or information about the battlefield, as they could not bomb their own settlements with air power. The defensive plan thus comprised five tactical steps:

1. Rapid deployment of attack helicopters aimed at disrupting the flow of infiltrating elements, especially transport vehicles, but they were met with shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles, forcing them to adopt a sniping approach from safe distances while securing landing zones for special forces.
2. Swift aerial deployment of special units like “Shaldag” and “Yamam” via heavy transport helicopters, which were attacked due to inadequate security from attack helicopters, and the troops landed were often surrounded due to their small numbers.
3. The involvement of counterterrorism units, which arrived by car and were ambushed by defenders.
4. Deployment of drones and electronic surveillance aircraft to locate Hamas command centers, field leaders, fighter gatherings, and missile depots in Gaza, followed by airstrikes to disrupt the offensive operation.
5. The arrival of army units, particularly infantry brigades with fast wheeled armored vehicles like the “Nahal” brigade, followed by armored brigades and tanks, which were attacked by Hamas drones, both kamikaze and armed, modified from standard civilian models.

Military Tactics Inside the Gaza Strip

From past experiences in urban warfare, it is evident that operations against irregular forces require a smart and flexible approach, with equipment specifically designed for this purpose. More importantly, it requires specialized training to prepare soldiers mentally and physically to fight a lightly equipped enemy with high maneuverability in the field. Special forces units trained for urban warfare, typically lightly armed with rapid transport means, should pave the way for heavier army units advancing from behind, preferably with armored vehicles fighting alongside infantry.

In the Israeli model, the invasion of the Gaza Strip began on October 27, after reservists were fully mobilized, with the stated strategic goal of besieging and crushing Hamas. The operation was preceded by:

• Intensive reconnaissance efforts using all available Israeli means, as well as support from allies, particularly various American and British reconnaissance aircraft, to gain a complete understanding of the field situation.
• Ground raids involving troops advancing and withdrawing before the main attack.
• Fire support from ground and naval artillery while continuing to locate Hamas operations rooms and field commanders, targeting them with heavy bombardment, potentially attacking 200-400 targets in a single night.
• Advancing on three different axes from the north, east, and center of the Gaza Strip.
• Complete communication jamming, cutting off internet services.
• Identifying and attempting to destroy anti-tank defensive positions to secure paths for advancing ground forces.

The primary force tasked with the invasion consisted of armored and paratrooper brigades, covered by attack helicopters and supported from the rear by infantry brigades. Typically, an Israeli armored brigade consists of three armored battalions, a signal platoon, an engineering battalion, each battalion containing a “support company,” command and services units, two “tank companies,” and a “support armor company,” along with a reserve “tank company.”

The incursion was carried out with two specific versions of the Merkava tanks: the upgraded “Merkava-4” known as “Ruach,” and the “Merkava-5” known as “Barak,” considered the latest versions equipped with the “Trophy” system for 360-degree detection and active protection against threats, along with the “Ofek” system for communications with other air and ground systems.

The armored units have two tactical formations for combat maneuvering:

1. Supporting directed firepower with a full company strength.
2. Supporting maneuverability with half a company, which is currently being employed inside the strip.

The attack helicopters, specifically the “Apache,” use a sniping approach with Hellfire and Spike missiles from a distance, coordinated with reconnaissance drones like “Eitan TP” and “Searcher” from the “Hatzor” base, which continuously pass targets to the reconnaissance aircraft for subsequent targeting, a method similar to the American approach used with air units attached to ground forces.

Hamas’s Combat Tactics Inside the Strip

Hamas has adopted a “guerrilla warfare” style, relying entirely on tunnels to maneuver easily within the battlefield, with well-camouflaged openings for quick attacks and withdrawals to achieve key objectives:

1. Surprising Israeli ground forces from behind and potentially encircling and isolating them.
2. Getting as close as possible to Israeli forces to deprive them of artillery or air support.
3. Gaining the best opportunity to launch unguided missiles with high accuracy, as these weapons are difficult to detect and offer limited guarantee of significant impact.

Hamas has exploited the Israeli forces’ failure to operate based on the “combined arms maneuver” concept, which requires integration between infantry and armored units. This allowed Hamas fighters to approach Israeli vehicles and armor easily without any interception by Israeli infantry, enabling them to fire their projectiles or even place explosive charges on the vehicles’ bodies and quickly retreat into tunnels. Additionally, they have managed to fire large-caliber, locally manufactured armor-piercing projectiles, known as “Yassin-105.”

Hamas’s advantage is not only in the use of tunnels but also in its ability to camouflage and hide rocket artillery, mortars, and drones in crevices and openings, providing fire support to combat units engaged with Israeli forces or disrupting Israeli reinforcements from the rear using rocket artillery, which delivers high firepower and is difficult to intercept, along with small mortar shells that are launched sequentially. Hamas also employs small-sized kamikaze drones like “Shahab” and “Zouari” as tactical solutions to target armored vehicles or command units, exploiting electronic warfare tools to intercept communications and identify locations. Lastly, quadcopter drones are used to infiltrate Israeli lines undetected, attacking troop concentrations with free-fall bombs.

Conclusion

The battles in the Gaza Strip have demonstrated that the Israeli army relies heavily on brute offensive force, disregarding the losses on both sides to achieve field success. This approach has mirrored the significant failure in defensive operations, leading to the depletion of Israeli ammunition and ground forces, with a heavy reliance on American support. Hamas, on the other hand, hinges its success in the battles within the strip on sustaining its armament supply and compensating for material and human losses over time, while applying pressure on Israeli forces from the north and south, tightening the siege. The lack of strong engagement from supportive militias in neighboring countries in military operations also eases the pressure on Hamas.