Japan After Ishiba’s Resignation… Leadership Crisis or Structural Transformations Ahead?
On the morning of September 7, 2025, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba announced his resignation less than a year after assuming office—an event that could herald a prolonged period of political paralysis in the world’s fourth-largest economy.
This resignation came amid growing voices within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) calling for a change in both the prime minister and party leader, following an electoral setback that left the coalition without a majority in both houses of parliament. In this context, Japan’s public broadcaster NHK reported that Ishiba made his decision to avoid internal party divisions, while the newspaper Asahi Shimbun noted that he was unable to withstand mounting calls for his resignation.
Ishiba, who became prime minister after a period of political turbulence following the assassination of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, had been regarded as an “honest” politician and more independent from traditional party factions. However, his popularity could not withstand the wave of public anger over inflation, rising living costs, an economic slowdown exacerbated by unstable trade policies, and the government’s inability to provide tangible solutions.
The Liberal Democratic Party’s Structural Crisis
To understand Ishiba’s resignation, one must consider the nature of the Liberal Democratic Party itself. Since its founding in 1955, the LDP has functioned as a “dominant party,” maintaining long-term political stability through alliances with the bureaucracy, private sector, and local administration. Today, however, these pillars show clear signs of “fracture” and “erosion.”
The party’s traditional electoral base in rural areas is shrinking as the population ages and young people move to the cities. Corruption scandals are undermining the party’s image, as several of its leaders and figures have been implicated. Moreover, since Abe’s assassination, the party has suffered from weak leadership, as Abe was the last strong leader able to unite competing factions. On top of this, the party’s popularity has declined as its economic policies seem disconnected from voters’ daily concerns, especially amid persistent inflation and rising prices.
This structural crisis, combined with the declining popularity of its coalition partner, the Komeito Party—backed by the religious movement Soka Gakkai, but losing appeal among younger generations—led to major losses in recent elections for both houses of the Japanese parliament.
In the House of Councillors election held on July 20, 2025, the combined seats of the LDP and its junior coalition partner Komeito fell from 146 to 122—below the minimum of 125 required for a simple majority.
In proportional representation, LDP support dropped from 18.3 million votes in the 2022 upper house elections to 12.8 million in 2025—the lowest since July 1995. Komeito also lost support, falling from 6.2 million votes to 5.2 million. Nevertheless, the LDP still secured five million more votes than the strongest opposition party.
In the House of Representatives election held in October 2024, the LDP-Komeito coalition’s seats dropped from 291 to 215—well below the 233 needed for an outright majority. LDP support fell from 19.9 million votes in October 2021 to 14.4 million in 2024—the lowest in any lower house election since its founding in 1955. Komeito also declined from 7.1 million votes to 6 million. Yet again, the LDP outperformed the best opposition party by four million votes.
In contrast, political parties from both left-wing and nationalist camps stepped into the vacuum. In the July 2025 upper house election, 57–61% of Japanese voters aged 18–39 supported various populist parties such as the leftist Reiwa Shinsengumi, the centrist-right Democratic Party for the People, the Japan Conservative Party, and the nationalist Sanseito. Fewer than 4% of these younger voters supported Komeito.
These figures show that new political forces are moving to occupy the vacuum left by the ruling coalition—whether leftist parties like Reiwa Shinsengumi or nationalist ones like Sanseito. While these parties are not yet capable of governing the country, they are changing the rules of the game by imposing more radical agendas and pushing the LDP toward risky populist policies in the long run.
This phenomenon is not unique to Japan. Across advanced democracies—from the United States to Europe—marginal forces are rising to the mainstream. Their common denominator is economic anxiety, demographic fears, and declining trust in traditional elites.
The LDP’s Options
Following Ishiba’s resignation—a rare event—the ruling LDP now faces two main options to remain in power, each carrying risks.
The first option is to broaden alliances with centrist forces such as the Democratic Party for the People. But this would likely erode internal cohesion and require significant political concessions.
The second option is to adopt more populist policies, such as tax cuts and increased social spending. While this might quickly appease the public, it would likely exacerbate Japan’s already massive public debt, which exceeds 250% of GDP.
Thus, the party faces an existential dilemma: how to maintain its role as a responsible and stable party while also responding to mounting popular demands.
International and Regional Implications
Ishiba’s resignation is not purely a domestic matter. As the world’s fourth-largest economy and a key U.S. ally, Japan occupies a critical position in the international system. Political vacuum or instability in Tokyo will likely have repercussions beyond the Japanese archipelago.
One of Ishiba’s key achievements last year was reaching a trade agreement with Washington to ease tariffs on Japan’s auto sector. But this outcome may not last if his successor takes different positions, especially with a U.S. administration demanding greater burden-sharing from allies.
Regionally, the rise of nationalist currents within the ruling party—or among its opponents—could lead to tougher policies toward China and North Korea, potentially escalating tensions in East Asia. In other words, Japan’s domestic political crisis following Ishiba’s resignation is expected to reshape the regional balance of power, albeit indirectly.
Stability Amid the Storm
Despite the political turmoil caused by the prime minister’s resignation, it is important to note that Japan’s institutions serve as “safety valves.”
The emperor—though his role is symbolic under the constitution—remains a symbol of national unity and continuity, especially in moments of political uncertainty.
Meanwhile, Japan’s bureaucracy, historically known for its discipline and efficiency, plays a central role in ensuring policy continuity regardless of changes in government. Unlike in some other countries, this “deep state” is not a source of controversy in Japan but part of a social contract that views the administration as neutral and effective. Thus, even when governments fall and prime ministers change, Japan’s system does not collapse, nor does its performance decline dramatically.
Japan After Ishiba!
Ishiba’s resignation is not the end of the story but the beginning of a new chapter in Japan’s political crisis. This crisis is not merely the result of the outgoing prime minister’s decisions but of broader voter discontent over rising inflation, burdensome living costs, and a general perception that the ruling party is unable to renew itself or address the needs of Japanese society.
Ishiba himself tried to cling to power, citing the danger of a “political vacuum” amid external challenges such as U.S. tariffs and regional tensions. But ultimately, he found his resignation was not a choice but an inevitable outcome of his party’s decline.
Looking ahead, Japan’s political scene is likely to face further party fragmentation, parliamentary instability, economic policy swings between fiscal discipline and populist pressures, and foreign policy challenges balancing U.S. alliance commitments with the realities of managing ties with China and South Korea.
Japan—long seen as the “most stable” of advanced democracies—must now confront an existential question: Can the LDP renew itself and retain its role as the dominant party, or is the country on the verge of a new party system ushering in wider, and perhaps more volatile, pluralism?
Whatever the answer, post-Ishiba Tokyo faces a tough test: how to reform the political system to reflect new demographic and economic realities. The LDP may adapt successfully, or it may lose its historical role as the dominant party. Either way, one thing is certain: “Stable Japan” is no longer what it once was. The country has entered a new era of politics—more open to change, but also more vulnerable to turbulence.
