On May 30, 2022, Foreign Policy published an article by Alexander Wooley titled “The Navy Made America a Superpower Once. Can It Again?” This piece offers a critical commentary on classical works, particularly highlighting Paul Kennedy’s book “Victory at Sea,” which is less controversial than his more renowned work, “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.” Kennedy, a professor of history at Richardson Delworth and the director of international security studies at Yale University, provides an essential lens through which to examine the dynamics of naval power.
The article explores key foundations of Kennedy’s classic analysis, focusing on the close relationship between maritime superiority, economic strength, and industrial capability. It emphasizes the significant evolution of the U.S. Navy during World War II, comparing it to the current state of American naval military power, especially in light of China’s dominance in terms of commercial shipping, which plays a crucial role in supporting naval operations during wartimes. This analysis can be summarized across several critical points.
First, the article posits a strong link between naval superiority and economic and industrial strength. Wooley notes the remarkable growth of American naval capabilities during World War II; for instance, the U.S. Navy expanded from 380 operational ships in 1938 to 6,084 by the end of 1944.
Secondly, it discusses Washington’s reliance on allied nations for enhancing its naval arsenal. Wooley argues that “Victory at Sea” not only chronicles the robust rise of the U.S. as a superpower but also examines the roles of five other major naval powers—Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan—starting from 1936 and leading into the prelude of World War II. Kennedy’s work integrates economic capacity, technology, and strategic choices to explain the trajectory of naval warfare, particularly highlighting the collaboration between Britain and the United States during the war when the Royal Navy assisted the U.S. in protecting Atlantic convoys.
Thirdly, the article elaborates on the pivotal role that aircraft carriers played in shifting the balance of power favorably for the United States. According to Wooley, Kennedy asserts that until 1943, the war was a back-and-forth struggle among contending powers. The turning point came with the arrival of a flood of new, large Essex-class aircraft carriers in mid-1943, when Congress ordered the construction of 32 of these carriers, 24 of which were completed. In contrast, Japan managed to build or convert only six aircraft carriers during the war, most of which joined the fleet too late to influence the outcome.
Fourth, Kennedy points out that the advancements in naval power were not solely derived from military experience. His book chronicles how the major naval powers retained a significant number of domestic shipyards, capable of producing commercial vessels even during the restrictive treaty periods of the 1920s and 1930s. Retaining these shipyards and their skilled workforce became the nucleus for expansive warship construction programs, helping to produce over 2,700 ships.
Fifth, Wooley draws a parallel between the current situation and the end of World War II. He observes that echoes of the naval battles from World War II are still relevant today, suggesting that the naval dynamics of 1945 closely resemble those of 2022. Kennedy argues that aircraft carriers remain the primary vessels in naval confrontations, followed by destroyers and cruisers. While the U.S. still possesses the most formidable naval force, the operational theaters for the Navy today—the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and the western Pacific—parallel those during World War II.
Finally, the article highlights a concerning trend in how China is surpassing the United States in shipbuilding capacities. While emphasizing the existing American naval superiority, Kennedy also points out the critical impact of shipbuilding capabilities, which previously enabled victorious powers during World War II to bolster their military strengths swiftly. Presently, China boasts the largest commercial shipping fleet globally, driven by an extensive civil shipbuilding program, with about 90% of the world’s commercial ships constructed in China, Japan, and South Korea.
In conclusion, the article indicates that unlike China’s growth in shipbuilding, the number of shipbuilding companies in the United States is indeed declining. This decrease, coupled with a capacity shortfall in American shipyards, could have significant implications for U.S. naval power in the future.
Source: Alexander Wooley, “The Navy Made America a Superpower Once. Can It Again?” Foreign Policy, May 30, 2022. Accessible at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/30/us-navy-victory-at-sea-review-paul-kennedy-history/
