Following the assassination of Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, and the subsequent confirmations from Israeli sources regarding the death of his potential successor, Hashim Safi al-Din, the situation has reached a critical turning point in the party’s history. The implications of this event are significant for Hezbollah’s future, its military confrontations with Israel, and possibly its relationship with Iran and the Shiite axis it leads.
This assassination is regarded as the most notable event in a series of “successful operations” carried out by the Israeli army, resulting in a major disruption of Hezbollah’s command and control structure and the dismantling of several of its political and military leaders. These operations greatly diminished a key part of Hezbollah’s strategic capabilities within less than a week after the start of Israel’s intensive aerial campaign against the party. This prompted French President Emmanuel Macron to call for an immediate halt to arms exports to Israel, citing grave violations of international law and human rights associated with Israeli attacks on Gaza and Lebanon. What then is the fate of Hezbollah in the post-Nasrallah and post-assassination of his potential successor?
Implications of Nasrallah’s Assassination on Hezbollah’s Future and Lebanon
The assassination of Hassan Nasrallah is a pivotal event, not only due to his effective role within the party but also because of his significance on both the Lebanese and Iranian political scenes. Nasrallah is considered one of the most influential figures in Iranian regional politics both within and outside Lebanon.
First: Hezbollah and the Possibility of Fragmentation Replacing Nasrallah poses an unprecedented challenge for Hezbollah, especially given the military successes achieved by Israel that have resulted in the erosion of the party’s leadership structure. The new leadership will encounter significant difficulties; Nasrallah’s leadership role and his prolonged tenure were sources of strength for the party’s cohesion. His successor will need to navigate cautiously among various factions within Lebanon and determine the optimal means to quickly cement his authority amidst these changes while also engaging regional partners, all while facing ongoing military threats from Israel.
The assumption that the party would collapse or fragment following the loss of its leadership cannot be realized solely through the assassination of its political and military leadership for several reasons:
Diverse Role of the Party: The multifaceted roles Hezbollah plays, including its political presence and oversight of social welfare networks in Lebanon, provide a buffer against collapse. Unlike smaller organizations that disband when their leaders are absent, Hezbollah has deep roots within Lebanese society, making its continued existence more plausible even after the loss of leaders. This resilience is largely attributed to its solid ideology, robust structure, and the extensive support it receives from Iran.
Organizational Structure: Hezbollah’s experience over more than forty years demonstrates that it is not solely dependent on individual leaders but operates as an organized entity with high discipline and strong internal mechanisms that enable it to adapt amidst leadership transitions. Thus, while the loss of top leadership is serious, it may not necessarily represent an existential threat.
Security Leadership Strength: As per available information up to now, Hezbollah’s security leadership remains intact, managing the organization’s internal ranks and coordinating field operations both domestically and internationally. If reports confirming the survival of Nasrallah’s expected successor, Hashim Safi al-Din, are verified, the party is likely to continue launching intense and violent campaigns against Israeli targets and cities.
However, despite these factors, reorganizing the internal ranks of the party in the short term will be a major challenge; this process might take five years or more to fully complete. Additionally, the restructuring of the party will depend on Israel’s actions; if Tel Aviv positions itself to intervene in Lebanon at will, Hezbollah’s ability to respond effectively to such a situation will be uncertain.
Second: The Lebanese Interior
It is certain that Nasrallah’s death will have substantial repercussions for Lebanon, especially given that Hezbollah plays a central role in the country’s political and military dynamics. Disarray within the ranks of the party could lead to a form of political chaos in the Lebanese landscape. One of the significant challenges confronting Lebanon is how Iran will manage the situation following the loss of one of its most significant instruments of influence; Hassan Nasrallah played a prominent part in coordinating Iranian alliances with other internal power players. This vacuum may drive Tehran to seek to form new alliances, either by strengthening ties with Shiite factions or expanding cooperation with non-Shiite groups.
However, these challenges also present positive opportunities. The weakened state of Hezbollah represents a significant chance for the Lebanese national state to extricate itself from its grip and elect a president operating independently of the party’s agenda. Additionally, the Lebanese army can regain security control and enhance its presence based on UN Resolution 1701, particularly after caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati announced earlier in October the state’s readiness to fulfill the resolution’s requirements, including deploying the army south of the Litani River. This situation has also become an opportunity for national political forces to regain initiative and attempt to curb Hezbollah’s influence in the Lebanese arena, given that the party’s position has become untenable and increasingly questioned after being a cornerstone of Lebanon’s political landscape.
Options and Future Challenges for Hezbollah
The upcoming phase following the assassination of Nasrallah and his potential successor will depend on the party’s strategies, as well as on Iran’s responses. Up to this point, a series of covert and overt operations executed by Israel against Hezbollah, along with relatively measured responses from the party itself, have fostered a widespread belief that Hezbollah is no longer capable of protecting its members or deterring Israeli strikes. It continues to suffer losses due to Israel’s extensive campaign and covert operations. With the assassination of its most influential figure, who was also regarded as a leading religious and political leader among many Lebanese Shiites, it has become imperative for Hezbollah to continue launching strikes against Israel, seeking to execute a costly retaliatory operation against the enemy and deter further Israeli attacks on the remnants of its leadership.
While Hezbollah is still recuperating from the disruption of its command structure due to targeted strikes and recent assassinations, unofficial American assessments indicate that it still possesses the capacity to launch a significant number of medium-range ballistic missiles at major Israeli cities and military sites. As it intensifies its operations to target Israel more broadly, it is likely that Hezbollah will also resort to longer-range, more advanced ballistic missiles, as well as other heavier types that cause greater damage in its operations against major cities such as Haifa and Tel Aviv.
Furthermore, the party will continue targeting the upper, middle, and lower Galilee within Israel; these attacks are expected to increase to create confusion in Israeli air defenses and inflict substantial casualties as a response to Nasrallah’s assassination. However, the feasibility of a broader campaign by Hezbollah against Israel also relies on having a strong leadership that enjoys wide acceptance within the organization, such as the Executive Council head, Hashim Safi al-Din, who has been appointed as Nasrallah’s successor. The continuity of the security leadership’s ability to organize its ranks and enhance communication with various entities inside and outside Lebanon hinges on two key figures: Talal Hamiyeh, who is responsible for planning and overseeing military operations outside Lebanon and international recruitment, and Wafiq Safa, who heads the liaison and coordination unit and coordinates with the security apparatuses in Beirut.
The Crisis of Succession for Hassan Nasrallah and Key Candidates
Hezbollah faces a severe crisis following the official announcement of Hassan Nasrallah’s death in the Israeli airstrike, centered on identifying a suitable successor. This dilemma stems from several factors, including Israel’s containment of most of Hezbollah’s prominent leaders, such as Fuad Shukr, Ibrahim Aqil, and Ali Karky, with the most recent confirmations regarding the death of Hashim Safi al-Din, the figure most likely to succeed Nasrallah. Israeli sources have leaked information suggesting he had already assumed the position and begun making decisions within the party.
Additionally, the very criteria for leadership play a crucial role; while there are no clear constitutional requirements, certain conventions cannot be ignored. Historically, figures like Sheikh Abbas al-Mousawi, Sobhi al-Tufayli, and Hassan Nasrallah were clerics educated in Shiite seminaries, implying that leadership requires similar backgrounds. This differs from the military leadership in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, as Tehran seeks to ensure that leaders of its affiliated factions have religious credentials or close ties to the clerical establishment, enabling them to serve as a link between the leader and the broader Shiite community.
Consequently, the pool of candidates narrows to highlight the following names:
Sheikh Naim Qassem: The party’s deputy secretary-general. While competent, his political and religious standing does not match the stature of Nasrallah or Safi al-Din. Reports suggest he may temporarily assume leadership until the party’s Shura Council convenes to select a new secretary-general. Currently, there is an actual competition between two prominent figures within the party: Naim Qassem and Hashim Safi al-Din. For now, Qassem appears to lead Hezbollah temporarily as he prepares for the council’s upcoming meeting.
Sheikh Sobhi al-Tufayli: A former founder and secretary-general of Hezbollah, he split from the party in 1998 and opposed the idea of Velayat-e Faqih, which he deemed a Shiite innovation. Nonetheless, he enjoys some acceptance and followers among Shiite bases due to his foundational role in the party, and his tenure witnessed a surge in military operations against Israel. While taking over from Nasrallah seems unlikely given that the selection process occurs solely within the party, factoring in the importance of loyalty and the organization of Islamic institutions and Iran’s significant role, he remains a potential option if the party opts to reevaluate itself away from Iranian influence.
In conclusion, Hezbollah’s future appears shrouded in considerable uncertainty, significantly influenced by the rapid developments that may unfold in the coming weeks and months. Following the complete loss of leadership, the party finds itself back at square one, presenting a dramatic scene characterized by unexpected changes and openness to complex scenarios. This is compounded by the unprecedented escalation in the region under a far-right government in Israel, where it is now certain that the ball remains in Israel’s court, responsible for the decision to continue escalating tensions. The resistance axis, confined to a revolutionary rhetoric filled with threats without effective movements to restore its standing, faces an increasingly volatile environment. Within this heated context, it becomes evident that the anticipated Israeli escalation will be determined by reference points and changes in the region, heralding an unstable future that may reshape the conflict landscape.
