There is a growing global consensus that the UN Security Council, tasked with maintaining international peace and security, requires reform or reconfiguration to reflect the current balance of power. There is also increasing agreement among many countries, organizations, and blocs that Africa deserves a permanent and expanded presence in the council.
The Security Council is the central body of the United Nations, responsible under Article 24 of the Charter for the primary duty of maintaining international peace and security, with significant authority over any other body, including the General Assembly, which comprises 193 member states, as outlined in Article 12. The council includes permanent representatives from all continents except Africa, a continent made up of 54 countries and home to 1.4 billion people, which lacks representation as a permanent member. Thus, after military colonization, political trusteeship, and economic and strategic dominance, Africa continues to suffer discrimination that keeps it out of global negotiations and strategic decisions within the most important international body.
For years, the UN General Assembly has discussed reforming the Security Council, but momentum has increased in recent years as geopolitical rivalries have led to deadlocks in the council on numerous issues, particularly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a permanent member with veto power.
The debate has also taken a new turn with the United States announcing its support for the establishment of two new permanent seats for African countries.
The current composition of the Security Council does not reflect today’s geopolitical realities. For Africa, in particular, obtaining full permanent membership in the Security Council is not only about correcting historical injustices but also about the legitimacy and credibility of the council.
This paper discusses questions relating, first, to the motivations behind the repeated and renewed calls for granting Africa expanded permanent membership in the UN Security Council; second, to the challenges standing in the way of implementing this step in practice; and third, to its future prospects.
Motivations: Attempts to Correct Unfair Representation
The desire to expand Africa’s membership in the UN decision-making bodies, particularly in the Security Council, is based on four main motivations:
First: Reforming the Security Council
Reforming the Security Council has consistently been a topic of discussion in the General Assembly since the post-Cold War period, with reform initiatives arising every time an international crisis reveals the council’s structural weaknesses. The push for change gained momentum with the establishment of the Security Council Reform Team in the early 1990s, which produced a series of reports, yet no real change has occurred. The term “Security Council reform” refers to five key issues: the categories of council membership, the veto power, regional representation, the size of an expanded council, and the relationship between the council and the General Assembly.
Most often, attention focuses on expanding the 15-member council, including both permanent and elected members, and addressing the use of the veto. These contentious issues have led to a variety of reform initiatives over the past decades, none of which have succeeded since 1965 when the council expanded from 11 to 15 members.
There have long been calls for a more representative council, and there seems to be some consensus among member states that reform would make the council, if not more effective, at least more representative in a way that enhances its legitimacy. However, there is still no agreement on what shape this reform should take.
There are differing opinions about the balance between permanent and non-permanent members. However, it is widely accepted that there should be new permanent seats for Africa, South America, and Asia, as well as Germany and Japan.
Proposals for new categories of seats, for instance, those to be rotated among countries within a region or occupied by regional organizations, are also controversial.
The structure of the Security Council has changed only once in its 80-year history, in 1965, when General Assembly Resolution XVIII of 1963 was amended to expand the number of its non-permanent members from 6 to 10.
Today, Africa is significantly overrepresented in the problems the council addresses: in 2018, over 50% of the council’s meetings and 70% of its resolutions were related to peace and security in Africa, yet the council’s composition remains unchanged since 1945. The council consists of 5 “permanent” members with veto power and 10 members elected by the General Assembly on a rotating basis for two-year terms without veto power, with only 3 African seats that are rotated every two years without veto rights.
In 2005, the African Union adopted two documents to serve as a framework for its common position on UN reforms: the “Ezulwini Consensus” and the “Sirte Declaration.” They called for “full representation for Africa in all decision-making bodies of the UN, especially in the Security Council,” where the continent should have at least two permanent seats “with all the privileges of permanent membership, including veto power.”
Second: Correcting a Historical Injustice
UN Secretary-General António Guterres acknowledged that “the greatest injustice in the Security Council is the lack of an African state as a permanent member.” Interestingly, Africa played a significant role in the 1971 change of the seat of the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China. The increasing presence of Africa in the Security Council makes sense given its demographic rise; one in four humans is expected to be African by 2050, and by the end of the century, Africa is projected to be the most populous continent. African countries hold 28% of the votes within the General Assembly, surpassing Asia (27%), the Americas (17%), and Western Europe (15%). Additionally, the numerous conflicts on the continent, from Sudan to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sahel region, certainly call for greater African involvement in finding solutions.
The goal of Africa’s common stance is to rectify the “historical injustice” stemming from underrepresentation, lack of recognition, and the numerous grievances the continent has faced for centuries at all levels. Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, African conflicts have dominated the Security Council’s agenda; Africa is continuously on the list but Africans have no (permanent) seat at the table.
In 1945, when world leaders gathered to establish the United Nations, four African countries were among the 51 founding members: Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and the Union of South Africa.
The media, academics, and global political actors still regard the continent as a collection of underdeveloped societies that eternally receive aid, a source of crises, wars, clandestine migration, and pandemics, instead of being seen as the cradle of humanity and contributors to peace, progress, and prosperity.
Third: Ensuring the Legitimacy of the Organization
One of the most damning criticisms aimed at the Security Council continuously concerns its lack of legitimacy, and its composition is increasingly viewed as unrepresentative of the international community. In particular, the identity of the permanent members with veto power is often seen as contradictory to current global political realities.
African nations have long felt neglected by the leading powers within the body. The failure to resolve major conflicts and crises, ranging from climate and poverty to terrorism, pandemics, and civil wars, has undermined the institution’s credibility. If institutions are unjust, members stop cooperating with them because they “undermine principles of fairness, inclusivity, and equality of sovereignty among states.” It is not merely a matter of ethics and justice; it is also a strategic necessity that can enhance public acceptance of the council’s decisions, benefiting both Africa and the world.
Fourth: Recognizing African Contributions
A glance at the past decade reveals that a significant portion of the council’s agenda was dedicated to Sudan, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, all sites of ongoing peacekeeping operations.
Africa has been an active contributor to the success of these missions, with two African secretaries-general having served in the organization’s leadership.
As more African countries gained independence, they vigorously pushed for reform in 1965, while practices and legal frameworks within the UN evolved through the activism of African nations.
The African Union has also undertaken several of its own peacekeeping operations, and Africans have contributed to peacekeeping missions worldwide, overseeing 10 peace operations involving over 70,000 personnel deployed across 17 African nations. Notably, four countries—Rwanda, Ghana, Morocco, and Ethiopia—are among the top 10 contributors to peacekeeping missions globally. Furthermore, successive African members within the Security Council have led other informal reforms.
Ambitions Amid Real Challenges
The issue of reforming the Security Council today raises real questions, considering the differing positions regarding the future composition and procedural considerations of various parties. While Africa’s moment in the Security Council may have arrived, significant obstacles and challenges remain to create the objective conditions needed to overcome them:
First: Amending the Organization’s Charter
It is essential to remember that any reform of the Security Council first requires an amendment to the organization’s Charter, which stipulates two procedures: the first is an amendment through the General Assembly under Article 108, requiring a positive vote and ratification by two-thirds of member states, including the five permanent members; the second is reform through an international conference under Article 109, again requiring two-thirds approval from member states, followed by ratification from two-thirds. This legal difficulty explains the extremely rare nature of reforms conducted within the UN. Given that reform through an international conference is highly unlikely, it is the General Assembly that those wishing to expand African membership, including the Africans themselves, must engage in meeting the two-thirds requirement.
Second: Exemption from Veto Power
No permanent member wants to give up its veto or is willing to propose a systemic reform that would upend the geopolitical order by granting additional states veto power.
Africans, who have long sought two permanent members, want those members to be on equal footing with the other five. Africa demands the abolition of the veto; however, if member states wish to retain this power, it should be expanded to include the new permanent members or abolished altogether for everyone, implementing the principle of fairness among members.
Denying African countries this right reflects the incomplete nature of the process of freeing Western thought from discriminatory perceptions against Africa. However, this should not pose an obstacle to the African continent achieving permanent membership; the African principle to uphold should be the abolition of the veto, not its proliferation. It may be more fitting for Africa to adopt a strategy based on accumulation, starting with obtaining a permanent seat and subsequently seeking veto power, rather than rejecting the whole deal outright.
Third: Geopolitical Calculations
The announcement of granting Africa two permanent seats comes in response to setbacks faced by the West in Africa amid diplomatic and strategic offensives by Russia and China.
A Gallup poll from April 2024 confirmed that Russia is gaining popularity in the continent, and China has now surpassed the United States in popularity across Africa.
Russia’s repeated calls for “creating a fairer global system,” while aimed at appealing to Southern nations, are fundamentally directed against the Western community with which it is waging war in Ukraine. It has urged Africans to “stay vigilant to prevent new Western countries from joining the Security Council.” By advocating for a permanent seat for Africa, Russia is waging an international mobilization campaign against the West within the BRICS bloc, which recently endorsed the “Ezulwini Consensus” and “Sirte Declaration” in the joint statement of foreign ministers following their meeting in Russia in June 2024, which recently included two other African members, Egypt and Ethiopia, alongside South Africa.
While China supports Africa’s demands, it welcomed the inclusion of this position in the recent document from the China-Africa summit, “For the Future.” To counter this offensive, Washington must respond to Russia and China and take serious steps for Africa, such as resuming US-Africa summits, launching new projects and investments, and advocating for a permanent seat for the African Union in the G20, along with two additional seats in the Security Council. Neither Russia nor China, despite their postures as the best defenders of Africa, have gone this far.
For years, these two countries have defended the “Global South” but without taking similar actions within the most powerful body of the UN system. Therefore, Washington’s offer to Africa should not be viewed as a charitable act. Integrating Africa into the Western sphere of influence is a strategic calculation to counter the increasing influence of Russia and China on global affairs, achieved by attracting prominent members of the Global South or enticing them to engage in this or that alliance, evidenced by the unprecedented division and alignment left in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine within the halls of the Security Council.
The emergence of a new global system will produce new pressures and tensions in both the African and international arenas. While the West, led by the United States, continues to exert its power in all its forms, its influence is waning, whereas the coalition among Global South countries, led by Russia and China, is determined to eventually amend the existing international order. Africa is being courted specifically due to its significant number of voters (54 countries can make a difference in multilateral meetings) and more so from a geo-economic perspective as it is set to become the world’s economic powerhouse in the future.
Fourth: The Representation Dilemma
One of the excuses put forward for indefinitely postponing Security Council reform is the lack of consensus among the countries and regions seeking permanent membership.
The unfortunate reality is that Africa remains divided along geographic, linguistic, cultural lines, and self-interests, struggling to speak with a united voice on critical issues like peace, security, and development as priorities in the UN’s security agenda. Clearly, there is still no consensus on which countries could represent Africa, as this question was largely evaded in the recent African Union summit.
Thus, one could speculate that South Africa might not accept Nigeria’s nomination, Algeria for Morocco, or Egypt for Ethiopia. The clearer and more consensual the continent can perceive a strategic offer for its representation, the better its chances of rallying the international community to its cause. In this environment, selecting two members from the African Union is likely to be challenging, if not unsuccessful.
Should countries be nominated based on population size, large economies, diplomatic and financial capabilities, defense expenditures, participation in peace operations, or should the two seats rotate based on regional representation or the geopolitical weight of influential powers? Should one seat be reserved for a state and the other for a continental body?
Although the “Ezulwini Consensus” states that the African Union should be responsible for selecting Africa’s representatives in the council, the continent has so far failed to establish criteria for selecting candidates from among its member states.
It will be important to consider factors such as capability, geopolitical significance, diplomatic experience, regional representation, commitment to upholding international law and human rights, resilience, and effective presence within this changing and complex global system.
If all challenges are overcome, the selected countries will face a daunting task; despite having greatly benefited from UN participation in their quest to end colonialism, and working closely with the UN to tackle challenges of poverty, underdevelopment, inequality, and the exploitation of their human and natural resources, serving the Security Council agenda will be a full-time arduous task.
These countries will need to dedicate substantial human and financial resources, diplomatic leadership skills, and the capacity to innovate solutions that enable achieving peace, security, and development on the continent; they also must be prepared to confront various pressures that may be exerted by the powers that allowed them to gain permanent membership in alignment with their interests within the council.
A Future That May Not Go Beyond “Statements of Intent”
On September 22, 2024, the United Nations adopted the Charter of the Future, which calls, among other declared reform priorities, for plans “to enhance the effectiveness and representation of the Security Council, including by addressing the historically inadequate representation of Africa as a priority.” Reforming the Security Council has become an aspiration shared between Africa and many countries around the world, but skepticism prevails among Africans concerning whether these declarations will be followed by actual steps and tangible actions towards achieving that, as has been the tradition, Western countries and others believe that such declarations of intent will satisfy African nations.
Technically, for reform to see the light, it must be proposed in a vote within the General Assembly and then ratified by the permanent members. This process has so far been met with reluctance and hesitation from the five major members. Not to mention that countries like Brazil, India, and Japan are also calling for the reform and expansion of the Security Council in their favor.
Despite broad support for the establishment of African permanent seats, it cannot practically be done in isolation; it must be regarded as part of a broader reform package, including: permanent seats for other regions, the size of the council, increasing the number of non-permanent members, and new membership categories. Thus, it is unlikely that a single reform will occur on its own while leaving other issues pending.
There are several other reasons that could make the endeavor to grant Africa permanent membership likely result in failure, due to:
First: The five permanent members with veto power are hesitant to share it, fearing for their interests and influence.
Second: If there is agreement on expansion, who will deserve to occupy the new seats? How will they be selected? Many are nominating themselves, from Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa.
Third: How will Africa select its representatives in the council?
Fourth: What could guarantee that the steps to expand membership will not be subjected to geopolitical calculations among the five permanent members; as new African members may find themselves caught in a tug-of-war and a series of attempts at coercion, seduction, or persuasion to adopt, support, or help implement specific geopolitical agendas at the expense of African and global peace and security agendas? Recent history reminds us that in 2011, the three non-permanent African members of the Security Council (Gabon, Nigeria, and South Africa) supported Security Council Resolution 1973, put forth by France and the UK, which authorized NATO military action in Libya, despite ongoing efforts by the African Union to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis.
Conclusion
By 2045, the United Nations will celebrate its 100th anniversary. By then, Africa’s population will reach 2.3 billion, constituting 25% of the global population. Will Africa’s membership in the Security Council remain the same as it is today? Will strategic decisions in multilateral bodies that organize global affairs remain monopolized by a few countries?
Since 1945, the nature of global threats and the definition of international security have changed drastically, and these threats can only be resolved by an organization and a Security Council that represents the interests and perspectives of all humanity, especially the countries of the Global South.
Africa has long been the subject of discussion among permanent members of the Security Council but has never been an active party in it. This historical injustice and moral, legal, and political deviation must be rectified as soon as possible. The credibility, effectiveness, and legitimacy of the entire UN edifice are at stake. The challenge is immense: reform the UN to adapt to today’s world, a world not devoid of crises and geopolitical upheavals and uncertainties that could lead to strategic sliding at any moment.
Conversely, African nations must collectively prepare to fully capitalize on the opportunities presented by the current global geopolitical landscape, which provides significant potential for gaining advantages for Africa and work towards speaking with one voice and presenting a unified African offer on how to represent the African continent and its interests in global forums, particularly the UN Security Council, Bretton Woods institutions, and with major partners such as China, Russia, the United States, and the European Union.
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“What would it mean for Africa to have two permanent UN Security Council seats?” Ibid.
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“Africa on the UN security council: why the continent should have two permanent seats”, Ibid.
