Over recent months, Turkey has witnessed significant transformations, centered around two major events. The first occurred on July 11, 2025, when members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) began laying down their arms in northern Iraq, responding to a historic call by the party’s imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan. The second event is the intensifying pressure by Turkish authorities on the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), ongoing since late October 2024, culminating on July 16 with the sentencing of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu—detained since March—to one year and eight months in prison for allegedly insulting and threatening Istanbul’s public prosecutor.
These two developments are deeply interconnected, forming part of what can be described as the Turkish government’s attempt to “re-engineer” the political landscape that emerged from the presidential and parliamentary elections of May 2023 and the municipal elections of March 2024.
Peace with the Kurds
On July 11, a symbolic ceremony was held in Sulaymaniyah, in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, marking the beginning of the PKK’s disarmament. Around 30 men and women from the group laid down their weapons at the entrance of a cave and set them ablaze—signaling the start of an end to the armed conflict with the Turkish state that has raged since the 1980s and caused tens of thousands of deaths.
This step came in response to a historic call issued by PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in February from his prison on İmralı Island, urging the PKK to disarm and dissolve. Öcalan reiterated this call on July 9 in his first recorded message since 1999, declaring that the “armed struggle has voluntarily ended” and that the party would now pursue a “legal and democratic political path.” He emphasized the need to establish a mechanism for disarmament to facilitate a broader resolution.
This historic development followed an initiative launched in October 2024 by Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and ally of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), proposing reconciliation with the Kurds. Bahçeli invited Öcalan to speak in Parliament and declare the end of the outlawed PKK. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan supported the initiative, calling it a “historic opportunity” to end the conflict that reignited after the 2015 collapse of the previous peace process.
Pressure on the Opposition
Coinciding with the Kurdish reconciliation initiative, the Turkish government escalated its crackdown on the CHP in late October 2024. By early July 2025, over 500 CHP members and municipal employees had been arrested on corruption charges, including 14 mayors. These arrests targeted large municipalities governed by the CHP, such as Istanbul, Izmir, Adana, Adiyaman, and Antalya.
One of the most prominent cases was the March 19, 2025, arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, Erdoğan’s main political rival. His detention sparked the largest wave of protests Turkey has seen in a decade.
İmamoğlu was arrested a day after Istanbul University revoked his degree over alleged academic violations. This came just days before he was expected to be nominated as the CHP’s presidential candidate for the 2028 elections—where a university degree is a legal requirement. In defiance of the government, the CHP organized a symbolic election on March 24, in which about 15 million people participated, including 13 million non-CHP voters in a show of solidarity. The party officially announced İmamoğlu’s candidacy for 2028, despite his imprisonment.
Erdogan’s Objectives
These actions appear to reflect a broader goal by the Erdoğan-led government to “re-engineer” Turkey’s political scene, which was reshaped by the 2023 elections—where Erdoğan won a second-round victory, but the AKP saw a decline in parliamentary seats. This trend continued in the 2024 municipal elections, where the AKP suffered its first major defeat since coming to power in 2002, while the CHP reached its highest vote share since 1977.
The re-engineering strategy may aim to solidify Erdoğan’s and the AKP’s grip on power through several objectives:
1. Securing Parliamentary Majority for a New Constitution
Since 2021, Erdoğan has repeatedly expressed his desire to replace the current constitution—drafted after the 1980 military coup and amended 18 times, including 10 under AKP rule—with a “civilian” one. On May 19, 2025, speaking to youth in Ankara on Atatürk Youth and Sports Day, Erdoğan reiterated this goal: “All our colleagues are working on a new constitution, and we will continue this work because the current one no longer meets the challenges of the modern era.”
One key proposed change is altering the method of electing the president: removing the requirement for an absolute majority (50%+1) and allowing victory by simple plurality. This is meant to prevent future opposition coalitions from uniting behind a single candidate, as they did in 2023, which could jeopardize AKP control of the presidency—the most powerful office since Turkey adopted a presidential system.
However, passing a new constitution in Parliament for a referendum is a challenge. Article 175 requires support from at least three-fifths of MPs (360 seats). The ruling People’s Alliance (AKP, MHP, and HÜDA PAR) holds only 318 seats, necessitating opposition support. Opposition parties demand a return to the parliamentary system, preservation of secularism, and rejection of changes to presidential election rules.
This is where reviving the Kurdish peace process becomes crucial. Erdoğan seeks the support of the pro-Kurdish Equality and Peoples’ Democracy Party, which holds 61 seats. Their backing would give Erdoğan 379 seats—enough to put constitutional changes to a public vote.
2. Creating Legal Grounds for a Fourth Term
Under the current constitution, Erdoğan is serving his final term, with the presidency limited to two terms. He is expected to step down by 2028. However, in January 2025, during a party meeting in Şanlıurfa, when Turkish singer İbrahim Tatlıses asked if he would run again, Erdoğan replied, “If you support it, so do I.” Days later, AKP spokesperson Ömer Çelik confirmed the issue was “on the agenda,” saying, “We are working on a formula to allow the president to run again.”
There are two possible paths for Erdoğan’s fourth-term candidacy:
- First, passing a new constitution would “reset” presidential terms—just as Erdoğan was allowed to run in 2018 and 2023 after the 2017 constitutional changes, despite serving from 2014–2018.
- Second, Parliament could call early elections under Article 116. If elections are renewed during a president’s second term, he is permitted to run again.
3. Blocking the CHP from Contesting the 2028 Presidential Election
This may be the motive behind the current crackdown on the opposition—by sidelining its key leaders, especially in major municipalities like Istanbul, the country’s largest city and economic capital. Weakening the CHP’s local power base could enable the AKP to advance its political agenda and improve its chances in future elections.
İmamoğlu’s imprisonment may be intended to reduce the CHP’s chances in 2028. He rose to prominence after defeating the AKP in Istanbul’s 2019 mayoral race, and his popularity surged after a larger-margin victory in 2024. Many saw him as Erdoğan’s most likely successor, and his political trajectory is often compared to Erdoğan’s own, which also began in Istanbul. İmamoğlu was even considered a top contender for the 2023 presidential race, but CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu insisted on running himself.
4. Denying the Opposition the Kurdish Vote
Since the 2015 collapse of the peace process, Kurds have informally aligned with the opposition, especially the CHP, in national and local elections. This coordination allowed the CHP to score unprecedented victories, defeating the AKP in Ankara and Istanbul in 2019 and again in 2024. The pro-Kurdish Equality and Peoples’ Democracy Party withdrew its candidates and urged its base to support the CHP—a move that earned the party the nickname “kingmaker.”
The AKP now seeks to flip the Kurdish vote in its favor and deny this strategic bloc to the opposition.
Conclusion
The success of the AKP’s and Erdoğan’s efforts to “re-engineer” Turkey’s political scene may hinge on the Kurdish peace process—an initiative fraught with challenges, including deep mistrust between the parties and uncertainty over the full compliance of PKK factions with Öcalan’s call.
Securing Kurdish backing is crucial for advancing the AKP’s political agenda. However, Turkish public opinion remains a decisive factor. Further protests could erupt amid continued pressure on the CHP and ongoing legal battles involving İmamoğlu.
