Spying or Praying: The Russian Orthodox Church and How Ukraine Fights Against This Kremlin Tool

• By Daryna Patiuk ( Revue Défense Nationale 2024/8 n° 873)
• Translate by Mohamed SAKHRI

On August 20, 2024, the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) adopted a historic law, law number #8371, aimed at regulating and subsequently banning the activities of religious organizations linked to Russia. This decision marks a new phase in diminishing Russian influence in Ukraine. It is firmly supported by the Ukrainian populace: according to a survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, more than 50% of Ukrainians today support the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine (UOC), which is based in Kyiv and has between 8,000 and 9,000 parishes. Moreover, 83% of Ukrainians believe that the state should intervene in the activities of the UOC-MP (the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate). Only 5% of Ukrainians support the UOC-MP, which had nearly 9,000 parishes in Ukraine before the invasion but has been losing adherents since. Indeed, since the beginning of the Russian invasion, the links between the UOC-MP and the Kremlin have come increasingly to light. Accused of pro-Russian propaganda and collaboration with Russian intelligence services, the UOC-MP has been placed under heightened surveillance.

Why and how did the Ukrainian authorities achieve the legislative ban on the UOC-MP? What will happen to the Church, when and by whom might it be banned, and how might this precedent assist other countries?

This article analyzes the instrumentalization of the Church by Russia for political purposes, its current strategies, and Ukraine’s effective resistance methods.

Navigating Political Realities: Understanding the Agenda of the “Russian World”

The concept of the “Russian World” transcends clichés of vodka, bears, and caviar. It is a complex ideology rooted in Soviet political culture, while also incorporating the excesses of 1990s market economy, marked by the rise of oligarchs. This concept is also fueled by heightened nationalism and neocolonial ambitions, where the Church plays a central role.

As philosopher Michel Foucault noted in his work The Archaeology of Knowledge, historical narratives and discourses construct specific forms of knowledge and claims to truth. Drawing from Soviet methods of discourse creation and dissemination, Russia has aimed to develop this narrative by presenting itself as the center of the Slavic world, the defender of neighboring countries, the custodian of Russian traditions, and the core of culture and religion. This combination gives rise to the concept of “Russian World” or “Russkyi Mir”. According to Wilfried Jilge, an expert on Ukraine at DGAP, this concept has always been influenced by Orthodox and Slavophile inclinations, distinguishing it from the purely geopolitical notion of “neo-Eurasianism”. The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has notably played a central role in this narrative. By closely aligning itself with the state, it has established itself as one of the main defenders of the Russkiy Mir ideology, emphasizing the “sacred” connection between Eastern Slavic Orthodox communities, while reviving the notion of “Holy Russia”.

This discourse serves as a framework for Russia’s deeply rooted colonial origins in post-Soviet societies and its effective propaganda efforts to position itself as a global power. The main purveyors of the “Russian World” in Western societies are “Russian family” institutions abroad, such as the Russian Orthodox Church, cultural centers, and embassies. Key political groups likely to project the Russian conservative agenda are extreme right-wing parties in Europe. Common points between them and the Kremlin include the restoration of traditional state-based policies, regulation of migration (hygienic discourse advocating for a “clean” and authentic national body), and strong resistance to liberal and emancipatory mass culture. For instance, in France, political stances of Marine Le Pen sometimes echo the “official language of Putin’s regime”, and various other extreme-right groups, ranging from the radical anti-Zionist group Égalité et Réconciliation led by writer Alain Soral to deputies from the National Rally (RN), are also sponsored by Russia.

The Russian Orthodox Church: An Incubator for Spies

KGB archives have shed light on the close collaboration between the Russian Orthodox Church and Soviet intelligence services, particularly regarding Patriarchs Alexei II and Kirill I. This historical relationship has manifested in the instrumentalization of religion for political purposes, namely:

• The Militarization of the Church: Since 2010, the ROC has played an active role in the Russian armed forces, helping to reinforce the link between the state and the Church.
• Propaganda and Influence: The ROC has become a tool of Soft Power for Russia, disseminating Kremlin-friendly propaganda and participating in influence operations abroad.
• Espionage: The ROC serves as a cover for espionage activities, infiltrating Russian communities abroad and accusing local governments of religious persecution.

This instrumentalization is part of a long history of state interference in religious affairs in Russia, characterized by the deification of leaders – a tradition dating back to Byzantine times and reinforced by Mongol khans; direct state control – instituted by Peter the Great and strengthened under Soviet rule; and infiltration by special services – appointing NKVD/KGB agents to key positions within the ecclesiastical hierarchy.

Today, the Russian Orthodox Church is a key player in Russian foreign policy, serving state interests while enjoying significant privileges. This situation raises critical questions about the separation of Church and State and the use of religion for political purposes.

Functioning of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine

Since the invasion of Ukraine, Patriarch Kirill has transformed into a genuine war propagandist, using social media to justify Russian aggression. He has blessed soldiers, claiming their actions are acts of redemption, while demonizing the West and Ukraine. Russian Orthodox priests, far from their pastoral role, have actively collaborated with the military, providing intelligence, participating in repression operations, and blessing troops. Some have even been promoted in recognition of their services. The ROC has thus instrumentalized its faith to legitimize an imperialist war and divide the Ukrainian people.

Kyiv’s Response

The issue of the Russian Church in Ukraine has intensified since the onset of the war. The number of instances of hostile propaganda being disseminated in UOC-MP churches and priests cooperating with Russian special services has increased. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) has conducted inspections of UOC-MP premises, explaining these measures as counter-espionage. In December 2022, Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) imposed sanctions on UOC-MP clergy who collaborated with the aggressor and began banning organizations linked to Russia, reacting to the hostile institution. According to its decision, religious organizations will have nine months to sever ties with Russia.

The main provisions of the law banning the activities of religious organizations with their central direction in Russia stipulate that organizations suspected of collaborating with the Russian Orthodox Church will be inspected by a commission of experts established by the Ukrainian State Service for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience. If violations are found, the state service will issue an order to rectify the situation.

Conclusion

Ukraine’s experience with the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in the context of the current war offers several important lessons for other countries. Ukraine’s resistance against the “Russian World” from 2014 to 2024 illustrates a multifaceted confrontation at both the state and societal levels. Ukraine’s efforts to combat Russian influence within its borders began relatively late, amidst the onslaught of Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics since 2014. Consequently, Ukraine today possesses unique experience in fighting Russian influence, both domestically and abroad, with a particular emphasis on the role of religion as an aspect of resistance.

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