Balancing Acts of Bzeshkian: Limits of Change in Iran’s Policies Following the Formation of the New Government
On August 21, 2024, the Iranian Parliament granted confidence to the complete ministerial formation proposed by President Masoud Bzeshkian, consisting of 19 ministers. This achievement was notable as it had not been accomplished in over two decades. No Iranian president had managed to pass all their ministerial appointments through Parliament since the era of former President Mohammad Khatami.
Bzeshkian’s government formation sparked controversy, with significant dissatisfaction and criticism from the reformist camp and some of the new president’s allies, particularly from the conservatives. Despite these criticisms, they ultimately did not affect the eligibility of any minister before the Parliament, which is under the control of the conservative faction. This is largely due to the support of the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, for the government. In this context, it is essential to highlight the implications of the new ministerial formation and its potential impact on Bzeshkian’s government policies on both domestic and international issues in the coming period.
Parliamentary Confidence
The Iranian Parliament granted confidence to the government proposed by President Bzeshkian after intense discussions on the qualifications of each minister during a session held on August 21. In his address, Bzeshkian emphasized the necessity for parliamentary members to agree on the new government formation, which already had Khamenei’s backing.
Out of 290 members, 285 participated in the vote. Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh received the highest number of votes, with 281 members supporting him. Health Minister Mohammad Reza Zafarghandi received the fewest votes, with 163. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi garnered 247 votes, Intelligence Minister Ismail Khatib received 261 votes, Interior Minister Iskandar Momeni secured 259 votes, and Culture Minister Abbas Salehi obtained 272 votes. It is worth noting that any proposed minister needs to secure the confidence of at least half of the Parliament members (145).
The vote of confidence came after Bzeshkian made several defenses amid speculations about the potential failure of four ministers to gain approval, including those for Health, Labor and Welfare, Economy, and Cultural Heritage and Tourism. During these defenses, Bzeshkian asserted that the proposed ministers had the consensus of security institutions and the Revolutionary Guards. However, Bzeshkian’s repeated need to defend his government formation before Parliament led him to express frustration over the delay, stating, “Why are you forcing me to say things I shouldn’t have to say?” He indicated that he had received direct confidence from Khamenei regarding the government members and revealed that Foreign Minister was among the first names to gain Khamenei’s approval, and that Khamenei had insisted that Farzaneh Sadeghi, the nominee for the Ministry of Roads, join the government. Bzeshkian also disclosed that Culture Minister nominee Abbas Salehi initially declined the position but was instructed by Khamenei to accept it.
Criticisms of the Government
The announcement of President Bzeshkian’s new government formation was met with several criticisms from the reformist camp, notably from one of the president’s key allies, former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. Zarif resigned from his position as Vice President for Strategic Affairs—a role created by Bzeshkian to leverage Zarif’s expertise and reward him for his unwavering support during the campaign. Zarif expressed disappointment with the government formation proposed to Parliament. Conservatives also criticized the formation and attempted to obstruct the confidence vote for some ministers.
Overall, the main criticisms of Bzeshkian’s fourteenth government include:
Pressure in the Name of the Supreme Leader: Bzeshkian frequently invoked the name of Khamenei in his speeches to assert the Supreme Leader’s approval of all government members, which some deputies saw as undue pressure to grant confidence to the government. Conservative deputy Malik Shariati criticized this approach, arguing that leveraging Khamenei’s support to gain parliamentary approval was a grave mistake as it placed Parliament in opposition to Khamenei’s choices, thus diminishing the government members’ sense of responsibility.
A Government Without Change: Despite Bzeshkian’s campaign promises to form a government capable of meeting the demands of Iran’s challenging period, the most significant criticism of the new ministerial formation is the lack of any apparent change. The formation retained three ministers from former President Ebrahim Raisi’s government, including those of Intelligence and Media, as well as five ministers from former President Hassan Rouhani’s government. The formation also included eight conservatives, leading reformist and moderate newspapers to criticize Bzeshkian. For example, the moderate newspaper “Jomhuri Islami” noted in its August 12 editorial that Bzeshkian’s cabinet could not be considered a “new formation” and bore clear marks of Khamenei’s influence, aiming to maintain the status quo and continue Raisi’s administration without implementing promised changes. The reformist newspaper “Etemad” criticized the method of selecting ministers and presenting names to security and intelligence agencies, which Bzeshkian himself confirmed, arguing that this procedure did not indicate a change in the approach to ministerial appointments.
Absence of Youth and Minorities: Bzeshkian had promised that his new government would be a “national consensus government” representing youth, women, and minorities. Zarif, before his resignation, had stated that the council tasked with nominating ministers and advising the president had agreed that no minister would be over 60 years old and that the government would include new faces from youth and women, as well as representation from minorities.
However, this promise was not fulfilled. The new government formation lacked youth representation, with most members over 60 years old, and included only one woman, Farzaneh Sadeghi, the Minister of Roads. She is the second female minister in successive Iranian governments since the success of the Islamic Revolution, following Marziyeh Vahid-Dastjerdi, who was appointed Health Minister in September 2009 during President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s second term.
Moreover, the new government formation did not include any Sunni representatives, contrary to Bzeshkian’s promise. Although a Sunni name, Emad Hosseini, was proposed for the Ministry of Oil, reformist media have demanded clarification from the president on the absence of a Sunni minister. The absence of Sunnis in the government has raised questions about Bzeshkian’s perception of their importance, especially as Tehran threatens retaliation for the killing of Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’s political bureau. The newspaper “Etemad” noted that while the new government could partially address the rift within the ruling system, it could not resolve the gap between the people and the authorities.
Limits of Impact
Given that the new ministerial formation did not achieve consensus from both the conservative and reformist camps—since neither fully controls the government—the debate over its members will continue, even with full parliamentary approval. This highlights a clear paradox: the last Iranian president whose government received full parliamentary approval was also a reformist, Mohammad Khatami. In contrast, Parliament had previously refused to grant confidence to four nominees in President Ahmadinejad’s government, three in President Rouhani’s government, and one in President Raisi’s government. This indicates that reformist presidents typically anticipate potential confrontations with the conservative faction within state institutions and seek to gain a consensus to preemptively manage obstacles.
In this context, Bzeshkian affirmed in his parliamentary speeches that he was willing to make concessions for the sake of consensus, stating: “I had ideal candidates in mind, but when I saw there was no agreement on them, I backed down,” adding: “Agreement is more important to me than ideal candidates,” and pledging to “move forward in unity.”
Bzeshkian’s retreat from insisting on Zarif’s proposed names led to Zarif’s resignation, which he announced to the Iranian public via his “X” account just ten days after being appointed Vice President for Strategic Affairs. Zarif indicated that he could not fulfill his promises and therefore could not continue in his role. Despite this, Bzeshkian’s loss of his key ally Zarif was in exchange for gaining parliamentary consensus to proceed with his government amidst numerous internal and external challenges facing the Iranian system and the new president, particularly as much of his authority remains restricted by other influential entities.
An analysis published by the American newspaper “Wall Street Journal” on July 6, titled “Iranian Voters Elect First Reformist President in Two Decades,” suggested that Khamenei’s allowance of a reformist candidate’s victory after two decades reflects the Iranian system’s resort to a safer option following the exclusion of reformists and the consolidation of conservative power, leading to major political and social crises highlighted by protests in Iran in September 2022.
Overall, the current reformist president will not be able to escape the grip of the conservative system or step out of the Supreme Leader’s shadow, who initially allowed a reformist candidate for the presidency and pre-approved all government members, participating in its formation, as acknowledged by Bzeshkian on several occasions. The selection of key ministries, such as Intelligence, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Defense, and Oil, traditionally falls under the Supreme Leader’s authority.
Conversely, with positive indications in the government formation, such as Abbas Araghchi taking the Foreign Ministry and the appointment of reformist Zahra Behrouz Azar as Vice President for Women and Family Affairs—who has criticized the morality police and its practices—there are possibilities for easing external and internal pressures on the Iranian system through more flexible policies. Araghchi’s appointment as Foreign Minister is seen as a potential move towards resuming negotiations with the United States and the West, given his role in the 2015
nuclear agreement and his commitment to the Supreme Leader’s foreign policy directives. Success in improving the economic situation is contingent on resolving the conflict with Washington and lifting sanctions on Tehran.
The role of Vice President for Women and Family Affairs, Zahra Behrouz, will depend on her ability to address the grievances of women and families affected by the morality police’s policies, especially with renewed violent practices and recent videos showing severe beatings and arrests, including of a 14-year-old girl, despite Bzeshkian’s promise to halt this unit’s operations and find alternative ways to persuade girls to wear the hijab.
Major issues like the conflict with Israel will likely see the government’s influence as weaker compared to the Supreme Leader and Revolutionary Guards leadership. According to a report by the British newspaper “Telegraph” on August 9, the new Iranian president is in a battle with the Revolutionary Guards to prevent a full-scale war with Israel. While the Guards push for a broad and direct missile attack on Tel Aviv and other cities, as well as targeting military facilities, Bzeshkian prefers to strike at Israeli bases in the region. However, the final decision on how and when Iran will respond will rest with Khamenei.
In conclusion, the enduring truth in the structure of the Iranian system is that the Supreme Leader sets policies and makes strategic decisions, both domestic and foreign. Having a reformist president at the head of the executive branch does not signify a change in the ruling system’s approach but may lead to adopting more flexible policies in implementing its largely fixed orientations.
