On January 23, 2025, during an online address at the World Economic Forum in Davos, U.S. President Donald Trump urged China to reduce its nuclear arsenal. In response, China countered by calling on both Russia and the United States to first cut their nuclear stockpiles, while Russia expressed its readiness to engage in such discussions. In fact, these positions may have been reiterated verbatim in past years.
Indicators of the Arms Race:
The indicators of the arms race are numerous, suggesting a staggered approach and policies among major nuclear powers. Some of the most significant indicators are as follows:
Signs of Unraveling: For the first time since the Cold War, nuclear disarmament seems to be unraveling, beginning with the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war in February 2022, followed by the suspension of the New START treaty between Moscow and Washington in February 2023. The most serious concern is that the treaty is nearing its expiration, and the U.S. and Russia should have initiated discussions on a new framework. This step followed the U.S. withdrawal in 2019 from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a move anticipated due to developments in delivery mechanisms and the inability to comply with range limitations. The outcome of this has been a deterioration of deterrence leading up to the Russian-Ukrainian war, an increase in missile proliferation, and the deployment of weapons in the Pacific. President Trump’s stance on controlling Greenland may fall within this context.
Surge in Nuclear Arms Spending: Spending on nuclear armaments and the modernization of capabilities and infrastructure has surged to record levels. According to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), this spending increased by $10.8 billion in 2023, with the U.S. accounting for $51.5 billion and a projected budget of approximately $1.5 trillion for modernization until 2040. Despite China ranking third globally in nuclear capability, it has risen to second in terms of spending, estimated at $11.9 billion, followed by Russia in third place with $8.3 billion. The UK ranks fourth, nearing Russia’s spending levels at approximately $8.1 billion, while France comes in fifth with about $6.1 billion. France has announced a modernization plan (around €60 billion from 2023 to 2030 to develop its nuclear triad) as part of its pursuit of independent nuclear decision-making.
Redistribution Operations: In terms of nuclear proliferation, a related indicator connected to geopolitical factors is that all nuclear powers are in a state of redistribution. For instance, Russia has deployed nuclear weapons in Belarus, while NATO is operationally moving in response. In China’s case, there is expansion rather than redistribution. U.S. intelligence estimates indicate that China is building new silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), increasing the number of nuclear warheads, and enhancing the capability of its nuclear triad. The U.S. has various manifestations of deployment through NATO’s redistribution plan in Europe and the AUKUS alliance, which focuses on developing advanced nuclear submarines. Regarding geopolitical factors, it is crucial to discuss hot spots relevant to Ukraine. In this context, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) proposed in January 2025 a contingency plan for deployment in a detailed vision titled “Deterring Russia: The U.S. Military Posture in Europe.” Similarly, China’s position on Taiwan represents a critical point in U.S.-China relations, having been brought to the table in formal and informal negotiations, with both sides agreeing on the principles of “no first use,” meaning no preemptive strikes. However, some argue that in the event of war, these guarantees may be disregarded due to changing circumstances, especially in light of the AUKUS alliance.
Modernizing Nuclear Capabilities and Infrastructure, Integrating Artificial Intelligence: As previously mentioned, nuclear modernization programs may pose tremendous challenges to the prospects of returning to disarmament. Current modernization processes are structural, meaning they will ultimately yield a new generation of nuclear capabilities and delivery systems. For instance, the U.S. has modernized its B61-12 gravity bombs in Europe, with approximately 100 B61-3 and B61-4 bombs stored there. Nonetheless, the deployment plan set for 2022 was not executed due to the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war. In Europe, there are also ongoing modernization and maintenance efforts for nuclear stockpiles, likely to include new inventories of gravity bombs. A common theme in the nuclear modernization programs of various nations is the integration of artificial intelligence (AI), which they argue enhances the effectiveness, safety, and flexibility of nuclear weapons, making them more precise and capable of maneuvering to avoid air defenses, as well as improving nuclear command and control systems without granting them the authority for final decision-making—an essential point given concerns about losing control. The U.S. is evolving systems like Aegis and THAAD, relying on AI to enhance missile interception capabilities. Priority trials for deployment may be underway in Israel amid confrontations between Israel and Iran. Meanwhile, China and Russia are developing smart nuclear warheads that can change directions in flight, making interception nearly impossible.
On the Russian side, AI-dependent missile defense systems like the S-500 Prometheus are being developed, theoretically capable of intercepting hypersonic missiles. Machine learning systems can analyze threat patterns and provide strategic recommendations on how to respond to potential nuclear attacks. AI also assists in simulating nuclear war scenarios to determine the best deterrent approaches and reduce escalation risks. AI is utilized in systems of nuclear drones and submarines, with Russia developing the Poseidon nuclear torpedo, an autonomous submarine that can operate independently using AI to target the U.S. coast. Similarly, China is working on drones capable of carrying nuclear weapons, which could change the landscape of conventional nuclear warfare. Reports indicate that North Korea may be attempting to mimic China’s advancements.
Opportunities and Constraints:
In this context, opportunities and constraints for initiating a multilateral nuclear disarmament process can be discussed. On one hand, the indicators of the development of major powers’ nuclear programs do not reflect a serious commitment to addressing disarmament. Rather, it is expected that as calls for nuclear disarmament increase, the reaction will be to accelerate the pace of nuclear arms races within what is referred to as “a new nuclear cold war.”
Regarding opportunities, the main challenge lies in the difficulty of returning to the arms control frameworks that existed since the Cold War until the onset of the Russian-Ukrainian war, a pivotal moment in the decline of arms control. Therefore, a ceasefire in Ukraine could represent a starting point for disarmament discussions, but it will likely remain at the bilateral level (U.S.-Russia/NATO). However, it is essential to open avenues to encourage China through a flexible agenda that does not begin with bans or disarmament, as that may not be logical for Beijing.
Another aspect to consider concerning opportunities and constraints is the perspective of international relations and the global order. One hypothesis is that nuclear disarmament could serve as one of the entry points for stabilizing the reshaping multipolar international system. There are delicate stations in this reconfiguration of the international system; for instance, China may view that disarmament efforts during the Cold War ultimately favored the U.S.
Regarding constraints, it can be said that initiating any discussions, even at the bilateral U.S.-Russia level, will not be easy, as the technical vocabulary surrounding the nuclear race has completely changed from previous arms control eras—this is a crucial matter as it could complicate any potential nuclear talks among international powers. Foremost, one cannot assume that “quantitative reduction” could serve as the ideal starting point; in the current nuclear age (the third nuclear age), reducing the number of warheads does not necessarily halt arms races.
Addressing this issue will also require reconsideration of the formation of technical multilateral teams and committees, mechanisms that did not exist before, as well as arrangements for early warning processes, and addressing geopolitical considerations reflecting policies of redistribution and structural expansion of the nuclear triad, in addition to addressing the files of regional actors seeking nuclear weapons, such as North Korea and Iran.
Returning to Nuclear Disarmament:
Now may not be the perfect time to return to nuclear disarmament amid a multilateral arms race. Based on the indicators reviewed, the expectation is a continuation of arms races in the coming phase, despite increasing calls for and initiatives toward disarmament politically and diplomatically, irrespective of the ability to translate these calls into action amidst the highlighted challenges. Perhaps most notable here is China’s desire for “nuclear parity,” which observers consider an “impossible condition” that others will not accept; neither Washington nor Moscow are expected to reduce their nuclear arsenals.
However, it may be conceivable to envision a starting point for returning to arms control policies. In the medium term, it may need to begin from different stations that do not involve disarmament or reduction, while agreeing that disarmament remains the goal. This differs from the Cold War context and was logical in the past when there were over 70,000 warheads in the world, capable of turning any conflict into a “doomsday” scenario.
Optimal points of departure may be indirect, such as settling or reducing geopolitical conflicts among the three major powers (the U.S., Russia, and China), whether regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war or preemptively calming tensions around Taiwan—both viable under Trump’s policies during his second term. But this do not depend solely on the U.S. side.
Another option could involve technical aspects subjected to stricter controls, especially since structural developments amid geopolitical proliferation—and the potential for future expansion into other realms—cannot endanger humanity, yet the acquisition of weapons, particularly nuclear ones, does not inherently suggest a reasoned logic. Still, there may be those who can seize a moment of wisdom and enter history through the doorway of saving humanity.
