Withdrawal and Expulsion Strategy in the Sahel Countries: Sovereignty Suspended Between Liberation and Dependence

The concepts of withdrawal and expulsion form a duality that governs a significant part of the strategy employed by the military leaders ruling Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Most of the major measures they have taken since coming to power in these three countries are based on this duality, under the banner of “sovereignty.”

These military leaders have proposed alternatives to most processes of withdrawal from regional and international bodies and have replaced partners in expulsion operations, but there is hardly a noticeable difference between what existed and what has become the new reality.

In fact, true sovereignty necessitates the abandonment of both the original and the alternative, as the same criticisms leveled by military rulers against the partnerships of their countries prior to their rise to power through military coups are now directed at the partnerships they have established. Thus, their countries drift further from the desired “sovereignty,” or may, at best, remain stagnated.

If we consider that these “transitional” leaders possess foresight based on which they establish their partnerships and strategic visions, leading ultimately to the achievement of the goals they justified by overthrowing elected civilian presidents—namely, “liberation from neo-colonialism” and “utilizing their countries’ resources for construction and development”—then the path ahead is long and may require a significantly longer time than has already passed. This is something that may not be tolerated by their military comrades, as indicated by the coup attempts that sometimes surface in these countries.

Moreover, linking the organization of elections in their countries to establishing security in all their regions may also imply an extended stay in power, as the security issue is tied to many other structural factors, progressing now toward completing a decade and a half of entrenchment in these countries.

In this reality, it is important for the ruling systems in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey to pay more attention to domestic fronts, working to strengthen and reconcile with them in their military, political, and developmental dimensions, while reducing the blame for any setbacks on external parties. This involves expulsion here, withdrawal there, or creating a crisis with this party or that, to make the path easier toward the desired objectives.

Withdrawal Strategy

This strategy consists of withdrawing from regional and international organizations, claiming that they do not align with the path of sovereignty that Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger aspire to achieve. This strategy can be divided into three main sections: joint triple withdrawal, asymmetric triple withdrawal, and individual withdrawal.

1. Joint Triple Withdrawal

There are essentially three major withdrawals announced jointly by the three countries: withdrawal from the International Criminal Court, withdrawal from the International Organization of La Francophonie, and withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

• Withdrawal from the International Criminal Court

A statement issued by the Sahel States Confederation on September 22, 2025, announced that the three countries—Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—were withdrawing from the International Criminal Court, accusing it of failing to prosecute war criminals and perpetrators of crimes against humanity.

The statement, signed by the rotating president of the Sahel States Confederation, transitional Malian President General Assimi Goita, described the ICC as a “tool of new colonial oppression,” confirming the confederation’s desire to “establish local mechanisms to cement peace and justice.”

Following this announcement, Amnesty International quickly deemed it “a concerning regression in the fight against impunity in the Sahel region and the world.” The organization’s regional director for West and Central Africa stated that the announcement “is an insult to the victims and survivors of the most heinous crimes and to all those fighting against impunity in these countries and across the globe.”

Regardless of the nature of the justifications provided by the Sahel States Confederation and the concern expressed by Amnesty International, the focus of the ICC on crimes occurring in Africa more than elsewhere raises much criticism and controversy, having previously been a direct cause for multiple African countries withdrawing from it.

• Withdrawal from the International Organization of La Francophonie

In March 2025, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso jointly announced through a statement from the foreign ministers of the three countries their withdrawal from the International Organization of La Francophonie, established roughly 55 years ago to promote the French language and cultural diversity.

The statement accused the organization of being “a politically controlled tool” and of “selectively applying sanctions based on geopolitical considerations and disregarding the sovereignty” of the withdrawing countries, referring to the suspension of membership that the organization had imposed following the military coups that took place.

• Withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

On January 28, 2024, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso jointly announced their withdrawal from ECOWAS, accusing it of “subordination to foreign powers,” “betraying its principles,” and constituting a “threat” to the three countries, referring to the economic sanctions imposed on them after the military coups.

The withdrawal became effective immediately following the announcement, but the withdrawing countries and ECOWAS maintained some level of communication to prevent the exit from the organization from leading to a complete rupture, considering the significant repercussions for both parties; the three landlocked countries rely heavily on the West African space for the movement of goods and people, while ECOWAS cannot overlook these countries that have substantial mineral resources and are destinations for many of its member countries’ citizens.

2. Asymmetric Triple Withdrawal

In addition to their joint withdrawal from the ICC, the International Organization of La Francophonie, and ECOWAS, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso also withdrew jointly but unequally from the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel).

• Withdrawal from the G5 Sahel

In mid-May 2022, Mali announced its withdrawal from the G5 Sahel, which included Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mauritania.

Mali justified this withdrawal by stating that it was denied the opportunity to assume the rotating presidency of the organization, which was supposed to be hosted in Bamako in February 2022, following a conference of the leaders of these countries, where Mali was to take over the presidency as was customary.

However, the group states refrained from doing so “on the pretext of internal instability in Mali, which had witnessed a military coup that brought the military council to power.”

More than a year after this decision, Niger and Burkina Faso jointly announced in early December 2023 their withdrawal from the G5 Sahel and its joint force, justifying their decision by stating that “the path to independence and dignity (…) contradicts participation in the group in its current form.”

The G5 Sahel was established at a summit held in Nouakchott in February 2014, defining itself as “an institutional framework for coordinating and monitoring regional cooperation in the fields of security, development, and governance.”

3. Individual Withdrawal

Among the most notable examples of individual withdrawals are Mali’s exit from the peace agreement with Algeria, the withdrawal from the common operational staff committee, as well as Niger’s withdrawal from the multinational force to combat armed groups.

• Mali’s Withdrawal from the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement

In the midst of tensions between Mali and neighboring Algeria, the transitional military council ruling in Bamako announced in late January 2024 its withdrawal from the peace and reconciliation agreement signed between the Malian authorities and Azawad movements in 2015 under Algeria’s sponsorship.

The Malian government justified the withdrawal decision by citing “hostile actions” allegedly taken by Algeria, as well as the resumption of attacks by armed Azawad groups against the Malian army.

• Withdrawal from the Joint Operations Staff Committee

As another reflection of the deteriorating financial relations with Algeria, Bamako announced on April 6, 2025, its exit from the joint operational staff committee, which also included Algeria, Mauritania, and Niger. This committee was established in 2010 “to coordinate security efforts in the Sahel.”

The new withdrawal followed the Algerian army’s downing of a drone belonging to the Malian army, which Bamako authorities claimed was shot down within Malian territory, while Algerian authorities contended that the downing took place after the drone breached its territory.

• Niger’s Withdrawal from the Multinational Force

At the end of March 2025, Niger announced its withdrawal from a regional multinational military force established in 1994, which Niamey had revitalized in cooperation with Abuja, N’Djamena, and Yaoundé in 2015 to enhance efforts against Boko Haram operating in the Lake Chad Basin.

Niger justified this withdrawal by citing its desire to enhance security at its oil sites, which faced attacks from armed groups active near its borders with Mali and Burkina Faso.

Expulsion of Foreign Forces and Diplomats and Crises with Neighboring Countries

From the very first moments after the military took power in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, the three countries adopted an escalating option under the banner of defending sovereignty against the West in general, and France in particular, claiming it follows a new colonial policy in these countries.

This escalation option for military regimes extended to include some neighboring countries under the pretext of threatening security and stability and pursuing an antagonistic course against them on behalf of France.

1. Expelling Foreign Forces

The spark of anti-French sentiments in the Sahel ignited in Mali, being the first country in the Sahel alliance to witness a military coup that ousted the late civilian president Ibrahim Boubacar Keita in August 2020.

However, the first phase following Keita’s coup did not witness significant tensions between Mali and France, as the military were seeking recognition for their takeover, particularly from Western powers. Thus, the transitional president chosen by the military, retired Colonel Bah Ndaw, frequented France until he was ousted in May 2021.

After the removal of Colonel Bah Ndaw and the assumption of his deputy Colonel Assimi Goita, who was later promoted to general, tensions began to dominate the relationship between Bamako and Paris due to the latter’s open and explicit opposition to the coup.

On February 18, 2022, the Malian government—through a statement—called for the immediate withdrawal of French “Barkhane” forces and the European Takuba force it leads, citing “repeated violations of defense agreements” signed between the two countries long ago.

Initially, France did not respond promptly to Mali’s military request, initially refusing and declaring the “illegitimacy” of the military demanding its forces’ departure. However, the ruling military council in Bamako insisted on the withdrawal request, later pushing through street protests which strongly demanded the expulsion of foreign troops. Consequently, Paris acquiesced to the decision, and by mid-August 2022, it announced the completion of its forces’ withdrawal from the country.

Before announcing the completion of the withdrawal of the “Barkhane” force from Mali, on July 1, 2022, France had declared the end of the “Takuba” force’s mission in Bamako, a military force that France, along with 12 allied European and African countries, had formed in late March 2020 to counter armed groups. In November 2024, the UN handed over the last camp of its peacekeeping mission in Mali, based on a decision from Malian authorities in late 2023 ordering UN forces to leave the country.

Similarly, Burkina Faso issued a one-month ultimatum in January 2023 for French forces to withdraw from its territory, having also experienced two military coups, the first of which ousted civilian president Roch Marc Christian Kaboré in January 2022, followed by a second coup at the end of September of the same year which deposed transitional president Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba.

France withdrew its troops from Burkina Faso within the specified timeline, consequently ending a military presence that had lasted 15 years.

In December 2023, Niger announced the completion of the withdrawal of French forces from its territory, five months after the army overthrew civilian president Mohamed Bazoum, thereby putting an end to a military presence that had lasted nearly ten years. Less than a year after this withdrawal, the American military also announced the completion of its withdrawal from the country.

The decisions of the military regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to expel French forces opened the door for several other countries to take similar actions, such as Chad, Senegal, and Ivory Coast, albeit without creating a definitive rupture with France.

2. Expelling French and UN Diplomats

In addition to expelling foreign troops from their territories, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have also adopted the expulsion of ambassadors and UN representatives as a complementary strategy under the broad “sovereignty” banner. This entitlement, in the eyes of the new military rulers, requires a rupture with everything related to “new colonialism,” which France represents as its prominent face.

In this context, the three countries expelled their French ambassadors to varying degrees, and in September 2025, there was a reciprocal expulsion of diplomats between France and Mali, leading Paris to suspend its cooperation in “counter-terrorism” efforts with Bamako, in the latest wave of diplomatic tension between the two parties.

However, the situation was not limited to France alone; Mali had previously declared the Swedish ambassador as persona non grata in August 2024, justifying the expulsion by a statement described as hostile from Sweden’s Minister for International Cooperation and Trade against Bamako.

In February 2023, Malian authorities also expelled the Head of Human Rights within the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) over a UN report accusing the army and its Russian allies of committing human rights violations.

Prior to that, Malian authorities had expelled in October 2021 the special representative of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which Bamako asserts is controlled by France in its decisions and orientations.

In Burkina Faso, the transitional military authorities expelled the UN Coordinator in August 2025 following a report concerning children and armed conflict in the country, which was submitted by the UN Secretary-General to the UN Security Council.

The country had previously expelled its former UN Coordinator in December 2023, and in February 2024, it expelled French diplomats.

Niger closed the offices of the International Committee of the Red Cross in February 2025 and expelled foreign staff working there after they distributed humanitarian aid without notifying or involving the authorities in the distribution process.

Niger had previously expelled its UN Coordinator in 2023, with the Nigerien Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that the reason was the UN Secretary-General preventing the country from participating in meetings of the UN General Assembly.

Numerous cases of expelling diplomats and representatives from UN and international organizations have occurred in the three countries, and those mentioned above are merely examples.

3. Crises with Neighboring Countries

For various reasons, relations between Mali and Algeria as well as Ivory Coast have become tense, while tensions have risen between Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast, and between Niger and Benin since the military came to power in the Sahel coalition countries.

a) Tension in Relations between Mali and Algeria and Ivory Coast

Generally speaking, three main reasons led to the deterioration of relations between Mali and neighboring Algeria, which shares a border exceeding 1300 km with it. The first is Algeria’s hosting of Mali’s influential cleric Mahmoud Dicko, who was an ally of the military before becoming an outspoken critic, in addition to sheltering some leaders of Azawad groups to coordinate regarding the peace agreement sponsored by the country.

The second reason is the Tin Zaouatine battles that took place at the end of July 2024, in which the Malian army and Russian Wagner forces suffered significant losses at the hands of Azawad forces, prompting Bamako authorities to accuse Algeria of supporting the Azawadis in that conflict.

The third reason is the incident involving the downing of a Malian military aircraft on the night of April 1, 2025, amid ongoing controversy about it. Mali contends that the aircraft was shot down within its borders by the Algerian army, while Algeria claims that its army only downed the craft after it had entered its territory. This issue reached the International Court of Justice.

As for the tension between Mali and Ivory Coast, the basic background is Abidjan’s opposition to the military coup in Bamako. However, the immediate cause was the capture of 49 Ivorian soldiers by Malian authorities on July 10, 2022, when their plane landed on Malian territory, accusing them of being “mercenaries” sent to destabilize the country, a claim denied by the Ivorian authorities, who maintained that their soldiers came as part of a UN peacekeeping mission and informed the Malians of this.

Although the Ivorian soldiers were released in January 2023 through a pardon from transitional Malian President Assimi Goita after being tried and sentenced to terms ranging from death to 20 years in prison, relations between Bamako and Abidjan did not improve.

b) Tension in Relations between Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast

Since Colonel Ibrahim Traoré came to power in Burkina Faso following a military coup that ousted Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba on September 30, 2022, relations between Ouagadougou and Abidjan have soured regarding the stance on the military coup.

Traoré has repeatedly accused Ivory Coast of harboring opponents of his regime and serving as a rear military base for France to oust him. Ivorian authorities have consistently denied the accusation of exploiting their territory by France to undermine Traoré’s regime, without denying harboring opposition figures to his rule.

In one of the latest allegations made by Traoré against Ivory Coast, he announced in a television interview in late September 2025 that his country had arrested six Ivorian officials for illegally crossing the border and engaging in espionage activities, a claim Abidjan denied, stating that its personnel entered the country on a humanitarian mission.

c) Tension in Relations between Niger and Benin

Niger, since the military overthrew civilian President Mohamed Bazoum in late July 2023, and General Abdourahamane Tiani assumed the transitional presidency, has viewed its neighbor Benin cautiously due to its close relations with France. Thus, when Nigerien authorities reopened borders with neighboring countries after closing them during the military coup, they maintained closure with Benin.

Tiani confirmed in an interview with Niger’s state television several months ago that the border with Benin would remain closed for security reasons, accusing the Beninese government of “colluding with France and Western countries aimed at destabilizing Niger.”

Benin has denied the accusations leveled against it by Niger, previously inviting Nigerien authorities to visit the country to verify the validity of their claims and calling for dialogue. However, Niamey is determined not to reopen the border despite the significant economic costs this entails for both countries.

d) Severing Relations with Ukraine

The deterioration of relations among the Sahel coalition countries has not been limited to neighboring nations but has extended to countries outside the African continent, notably Ukraine. Mali announced in August 2024 the severance of relations with Kyiv following a statement by a Ukrainian official regarding their country’s involvement in the battle of Tinzouatine that resulted in the deaths and captures of several Malian soldiers and fighters from the Russian Wagner group at the hands of Azawadi forces. Just two days after the Malian authorities’ decision, Niger also announced the severance of its relations with Ukraine “in solidarity with Mali,” accusing Kyiv of “supporting terrorist groups” in the Sahel. Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry denied all allegations made by both countries.

Regardless of the veracity of these allegations, there is another noteworthy background to the strained relations between Mali and Niger with Ukraine, namely the aspect regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war and the competition between the two parties for influence in Africa considering its significant voting bloc at the United Nations and its resources that are now subject to unprecedented international competition.

Russia has become an important ally for Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso since the military regimes came to power in these countries, intensifying the strain with their traditional partner, France.

Alternatives to the Withdrawal, Expulsion, and Tension Strategy

Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have implemented several measures as alternatives to their withdrawal from organizations and expulsion of foreign forces, as well as diplomatic tensions with Western countries or certain neighboring countries. These measures can be summarized as follows:

• Formation of a Joint Triangular Alliance

In July 2024, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso established the “Sahel States Alliance” as a new framework to unite the three countries governed by a similar approach towards the former colonial power and the West in general, pursuing a shared “sovereign” path aimed at ensuring their benefit from their resources and independent decision-making while also facing common challenges.

This alliance stemmed from the “Liptako-Gourma” charter, which these countries signed in September 2023 as a framework for trilateral cooperation within the “Sahel States Confederation.”

Thus, the three countries integrated into a unified framework, despite previously making joint decisions before its establishment, but the formation of this framework solidified their unified vision regarding the reality and its challenges and ways to overcome it.

The formation of this triangular alliance primarily served as an alternative to the G5 Sahel and as a consolidated bloc against ECOWAS during the period of tensions with it.

• Establishing a Joint Force and Deploying Russian Troops

As an alternative to the joint force of the G5 Sahel, and in light of the absence of deployments from the African Union and ECOWAS forces that had earlier sought to mobilize in the Sahel, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso announced, within the framework of their new alliance in March, the formation of a joint force to combat the armed groups that have been carrying out attacks on their territories for an extended period, as well as along their common borders.

Niger’s President General Abdourahamane Tiani announced during a visit to Bamako in October 2025 that the joint force had entered an operational phase, stating that the Burkinabe Colonel Eric Dapéré was appointed to lead it and that Niamey would serve as the command center for this military force.

As for the alternative to the French forces expelled from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, the Takuba force, the expelled UN forces from Bamako, and the US military that left Niamey, it has been Russia, either through initially contracting the Wagner group and later replacing it with the “African Legion,” as seen in the Malian situation, or through deploying training troops as is the case in Niger and Burkina Faso. The three countries have also purchased military weapons from Moscow on several occasions.

• Towards Establishing a Criminal Court

Before Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso withdrew from the ICC, the justice ministers of the three countries agreed at the end of a meeting in Bamako in late May 2025 to establish an independent criminal court tasked with “judging the most serious crimes affecting the (trilateral) alliance.” Its jurisdiction also includes “acts of terrorism, transnational organized crimes, in addition to grave human rights violations.”

While the justice ministers have not settled on the court’s location or structure, they agreed to create a shared regional prison and to expedite the process of unifying legislation on several issues including “terrorism,” “money laundering,” “human trafficking,” and “attacks on state sovereignty,” reflecting a trend towards establishing a common judicial system.

• New Map of International and Regional Partnerships

This new map has manifested on the international level through the three Sahel alliance countries enhancing their relations with Russia to encompass military cooperation, be it in terms of deploying forces or acquiring weapons, but also economically, with several Russian companies in the three countries obtaining licenses for mineral exploration or exploitation, and investments in establishing factories and nuclear energy power plants.

Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have strengthened their ties with Turkey, Iran, and China, manifested in the exchange of visits by officials and signing numerous partnership agreements covering various fields, notably military and economic ones.

Thus, these countries supplanted France and other traditional Western partners with new allies, some of whom maintain a somewhat persistent tension in their relations with the West.

At the regional level, these countries have woven important relationships with Morocco in North Africa, and with Togo, Ghana, Senegal, Guinea, and Chad in West Africa.

For Morocco, relations with these countries have significantly strengthened through the Atlantic initiative proposed by King Mohammed VI in 2023, aimed at enabling the three countries—along with Chad—to access the Atlantic Ocean.

Regarding Togo and Guinea, they provide a lifeline for these landlocked countries, as through the ports of Lomé and Conakry, these countries meet many of their maritime shipping needs, a situation that also applies to Mauritania, which has strongly sided with Mali during the imposition of sanctions by ECOWAS and opened the independent port of Nouakchott to it.

In addition to the aforementioned countries, relations among the Sahel coalition countries and Senegal have strengthened under President Bassey Djoumaï Faye, as well as with Ghana under John Mahama, encompassing diplomatic, trade, and sometimes security dimensions.

As for Chad, these nations have enhanced their relations primarily through security cooperation, with the armies of the four countries conducting joint security operations.

• Strengthening Local Cultures and Languages at the Expense of La Francophonie

In a notable shift, just weeks prior to the announcement of their withdrawal from the International Organization of La Francophonie, culture ministers from Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso signed a memorandum of understanding during a forum in Segou, Mali, regarding the adoption of a “common cultural policy and a unified strategy for crafts,” aimed at “promoting the shared cultural heritage and organizing major cultural events among the three countries, contributing to the social and economic development of the region.”

Prior to this, these three countries had individually taken steps at the level of their new constitutions to reduce the prominence of the French language and to give greater attention to local languages, through the official recognition of several of them.

In Mali, the 2023 constitution stipulated that the French language became a working language only, whereas it had been an official language for over 60 years. Conversely, 13 national languages were codified, reflecting a marked shift towards enhancing linguistic sovereignty.

Following Mali’s example, Burkina Faso adopted a draft law in December 2023 that revisions the constitution, establishing national languages as the official languages instead of French. The “Reconstruction Charter” in Niger, established in March 2025, proposed that Hausa would become a national language, with French downgraded to a working language, alongside English.

Conclusion

From the above, it is evident that the military leaders governing Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have anchored their vision of leadership from the beginning by linking the causes of security instability to the presence of foreign troops in their countries, and the reasons for their deteriorating economic and developmental conditions to traditional partners, especially France, the former colonizer of these countries.

The practical implementation of this vision has resulted in a complete rupture between these countries and France through the expulsion of its military forces and ambassadors and the annulment of contracts with its companies. The rupture has also included several Western countries, some regional organizations, and neighboring countries.

Most of these confrontational steps enjoy a significant level of popular acceptance, which has provided a strong incentive for the military to move forward with their agenda, solidifying in the minds of many citizens in these countries that the military regimes ruling them aspire for “sovereignty” and “independence,” and that there is no path to achieving that other than a comprehensive overhaul.

In reality, the alternatives proposed by these transitional military regimes do not significantly differ in some aspects from what existed previously. Regarding international external partnerships, traditional partners have been replaced by new allies, and foreign forces have been substituted with others; perhaps the only difference in this aspect is that the alternative partners were not the former colonizers of the Sahel coalition countries.

As to some internal alternatives, limited to the three countries, such as establishing a joint military force, and moving towards creating a joint bank, a common criminal court, and other trilateral mechanisms, they may face challenges related to resources and means, which could limit their effectiveness.

Nonetheless, some measures implemented by the three Sahel nations have yielded tangible results, particularly regarding renegotiating with certain companies for enhanced shares of profits from extracted minerals, and there has also been notable development in military armament. Economically and developmentally, efforts have been made to establish various factories in these countries.

Conversely, the security threat remains present, with achievements on this front marked by fluctuation, leading to periods of military advancement for these nations’ armies as well as setbacks, and ongoing criticisms from international organizations regarding human rights and freedoms in these countries, alongside considerable ambiguity concerning the future of democracy there.

References:

Forced Withdrawal: The Case of France in the Sahel Region (Tánczos & Fejérdy, 2024) — Explores France’s retreat from the Sahel, analysing how a former colonial power’s withdrawal reshapes security architectures and sovereignty. Link: https://jceeas.bdi.uni-obuda.hu/index.php/jceeas/article/view/242/272

Counterterrorism Shortcomings in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger (FPRI, 2025) — Analyses the counter-terrorism policies of the Sahel juntas and how reduced foreign support interacts with increased repression and sovereignty claims. Link: https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/03/counterterrorism-shortcomings-in-mali-burkina-faso-and-niger/

The Sahel’s Shifting Sands: How Security Landscape is Redrawing Regional Alliances (Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 2025) — Examines how the Sahel’s regional security alliances are being re-configured, with the trio exiting old frameworks in favour of new ones. Link: https://studies.aljazeera.net/sites/default/files/articles/documents/2025-03/The%20Sahel%27s%20Shifting%20Sands_0.pdf

Sahel: Moving Beyond Military Containment – Policy Report (Atlantic Council/Africa Centre, 2022) — Focuses on the limits of purely military approaches in the Sahel and points to governance, sovereignty, and external dependence as core issues. Link: https://sahelresearch.africa.ufl.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/170/Sahel-Policy-Report-2022-1.pdf

Contemporary Civil‑Military Relations in the Sahel (OECD, 2019) — Provides a foundational overview of civil–military structures in Sahel states, useful for roots of sovereignty and external linkages. Link: https://doi.org/10.1787/f17713c9-en

The Presence of the French Military in the Sahel: A Lasting Commitment or a Distant Fantasy? (Global Affairs, 2025) — Reflects on France’s long-standing military role and how its departure signals a new phase in sovereignty and dependence.

Algeria and the French Withdrawal from the African Sahel Region (Maouche Hassiba, 2025) — Looks at how neighbouring Algeria reacts to the French withdrawal and implications for border-state sovereignty and security. Link: https://asjp.cerist.dz/en/article/276535 ASJP

Wars Without Beginning or End: Violent Political Organizations and Irregular Warfare in the Sahel‑Sahara (Walther, Leuprecht & Skillicorn, 2016) — Historical/structural background on the insurgency environment; helpful for roots of sovereignty crisis. Link: https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.02705

Terrorism & Democracy in Burkina‑Faso (Zagre, 2025) — While focusing on Burkina, this article illustrates how insecurity and withdrawal of external presence affect the domestic political contract and sovereignty. Link: https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.23046

The Golden City on the Edge: Economic Geography and Jihad over Centuries (Kubo & Tsuda, 2022) — Less directly about withdrawal but useful for roots: links geography, jihad, and state weaknesses in Sahel, relevant to sovereignty/dependence theme. Link: https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.04763

External Threats, Political Turnover and Fiscal Capacity (Galindo-Silva, 2020) — Theoretical paper on how external threats affect state capacity—helpful to frame how withdrawal of outside actors impacts sovereignty. Link: https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.02322

Distance, Borders, and Time: The Diffusion and Permeability of Political Violence in North and West Africa (Skillicorn et al., 2016) — Underpins the cross-border nature of insurgency in the Sahel, tying to how states negotiate sovereignty amidst external dependencies. Link: https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.02700

Withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger from ECOWAS Takes Effect After Notice — While from reddit (so less “academic”), it gives timeline/data for the withdrawal movement. (Use cautiously, follow primary sources). Reddit

Chad Ends Defence Pact with France (Financial Times/2024) — Example of a neighbouring country signalling assertion of sovereignty via termination of defence pact, benefiting comparative angle. Link: https://www.ft.com/content/aa2e3ee9-a500-471f-b8e7-601b91eab186

Les pays du Sahel, sous influence de la Russie, annoncent quitter la CPI (Le Monde, Sept. 2025) — News article but revealing for future dependence: Sahel states leaving the International Criminal Court, positioning sovereignty but also aligning with Russia. Link: https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2025/09/24/les-pays-du-sahel-sous-influence-de-la-russie-annoncent-leur-retrait-de-la-cour-penale-internationale_6642837_3212.html