This article discusses the expected or potential impacts on U.S. policy toward the Middle East, should former President Donald Trump, now a Republican candidate, succeed in the upcoming presidential elections in November 2024. Thus, it is a forward-looking piece on what is referred to as the second version of Trump, “Trump 0.2.”
Trump’s View of the World:
Firstly, we do not assume that Trump’s policies, if he wins the elections, will be a mere repetition of his previous presidency (2017-2021). The international and regional contexts have changed; the United States today is not the same as when Trump took office seven years ago, and the Middle East is also different. Moreover, Trump himself may not necessarily be the same person, as his ideas might have evolved. Additionally, the president’s character and inclinations are not the sole factors in shaping American policy; ongoing national interests are protected and managed by deep state institutions. Often, the difference between one president and another lies in the mechanisms and means used to achieve the same goals.
The positions of any U.S. president stem from their view of the global order, Washington’s role within it, and the vital American national interests that need safeguarding and defending. When reflecting on Trump’s perspective on the world, we find it characterized by two main features:
First Feature: Trump adopts an “offensive realism” approach in international relations, which posits that the objective of any state is to maximize its overall power in various material and non-material aspects. It views the essence of relations between states as competition and conflict. Moreover, it asserts that a state’s power is defined by its actual capabilities under its direct control, rather than through agreements and alliances with friendly states. This approach is proactive, seeking to take the initiative; hence, the state’s goal becomes continually and independently increasing its capabilities instead of relying on international balance policies.
Second Feature: The management of international relations is conducted through a “deal-making” logic, which Trump excels at as a businessman focused on “transactions” among the deal parties. According to this approach, state management resembles company management, with a focus on “profit and loss” considerations and the objective of increasing profits. This perspective prioritizes bilateral relations between states and the immediate short-term gains from each deal, often at the expense of engaging in international organizations and collective frameworks that involve commitments, objectives, long-term mutual interests, and values.
Middle Eastern Policies:
During his campaign, Trump addressed Middle Eastern issues in brief and scattered terms, mostly not reading from a scripted text but rather expressing phrases in speeches to his supporters or in responses to questions in media interviews.
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: If Trump wins the next elections, he will have to deal with the ongoing issue in the region: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which ignited with the “Flood of Al-Aqsa” operation on October 7, 2023, and had entered its tenth month by July 2024. It is uncertain what the situation will be on January 20, 2025, when Trump takes office if he succeeds.
Trump is a strong ally of Israel and shares a unique relationship with its Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. During his previous presidency, Trump decided in December 2017 to move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and recognized the Golan Heights as “part of Israel” in March 2019. His administration did not consider Israeli settlements in occupied Palestinian territories to be in violation of international law, contrasting with traditional U.S. positions and international legality.
Trump never recognized the national and political rights of the Palestinian people and believed that the Palestinian issue could be resolved through “economic peace” and improving the living conditions of Palestinians. This was encapsulated in what was called the “Deal of the Century,” announced in January 2020 under the title “Peace to Prosperity,” where the maximum Palestinians could attain in this plan was “self-rule for the residents” in parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Trump actively encouraged Arab states to establish diplomatic relations with Israel.
Trump’s statements during his campaign did not introduce anything new; they were characterized by support for Israel and he never called for a halt to the ongoing war on the Gaza Strip, nor for refraining from targeting civilian facilities or easing the entry of humanitarian aid to the territory. On the contrary, one of his early statements was that this war would go on for a long time, framing it as part of a long-standing conflict. He stated, “We have an ongoing war, and it’s better to let it go forward.” As the war dragged on without a clear Israeli victory, Trump advised the Israelis in March that they must conclude the war, as its continuation was eroding much of Tel Aviv’s support worldwide. In April, he reiterated this sentiment, urging, “Finish it up and let’s get back to peace and stop killing people… finish it quickly,” arguing that Israel was “losing the public relations war completely.”
Trump criticized pro-Palestinian demonstrations, particularly those organized by Columbia University students in New York City, claiming the city was “under siege.” He praised police forces for raiding the building where protesting students had gathered and arresting them last May, adding, “It was fun to watch New York police raid the building.” To scare Americans about the consequences of pro-Palestinian stances, he claimed that “residents of Gaza will come to live in American towns and villages,” referring to misleading media reports suggesting that Biden’s administration was considering welcoming some Palestinians.
Among Trump’s notable remarks reflecting his stance was his use of the term “Palestinian” as an accusation or an indictment. During the debate with Biden on June 27, he insisted that Biden allow Israelis to “finish the job” and accused him of acting “like a Palestinian,” stating, “He has become like a Palestinian, but they don’t like him because he’s a very bad Palestinian. He is a weak Palestinian.” The following day, he repeated this description, referring to Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, calling him “a Palestinian” as well, despite the irony that Schumer is of the Jewish faith. When asked in the earlier debate if he supported a Palestinian state, Trump dodged the question, saying, “I need to see…,” and then shifted to another topic. This evasion is not coincidental; perhaps Trump, in his blunt way, did not wish to commit to a position on an evolving issue.
Thus, it can be said that Trump is a pragmatic figure who deals with international issues through a “deal-making” approach and considerations of “profit and loss.” If he returns to power, he will manage his country’s policies accordingly. It is likely that foreign ministries in Arab and Middle Eastern countries are preparing scenarios and forecasts regarding Trump’s stance should he win. Starting with Israel, despite Israeli caution in preferring between Trump and Biden, it is likely that the ruling far-right coalition in Tel Aviv would feel more comfortable with Trump’s success, who they believe would better understand their policies, especially concerning settlement and the establishment of a Palestinian state.
On the other hand, most Arab governments have previous interactions with Trump. They remember that his first overseas trip after taking office was to Saudi Arabia in May 2017, where he held three summits: “Saudi-American, Gulf-American, and Arab-Islamic-American.” With the exception of the Palestinian issue, cooperative relations between these governments and Washington have developed during his presidency.
Iran Issue: Another matter Trump must address if he wins is the relationship with Iran, from which he decided to withdraw on May 8, 2018, from the nuclear deal, reinstating a policy of “maximum sanctions,” claiming that the agreement had not prevented Tehran from pursuing nuclear weapons or curtailing its efforts to develop ballistic missile systems.
During the current Biden administration, negotiations between the United States and Iran have resumed, leading to certain understandings that have reinstated the role of diplomacy in softening relations between the two nations. This included the announcement in August 2023 regarding the release of several American prisoners in Iran in exchange for South Korea ending the freeze on Iranian financial assets there. Iran seized this opportunity to increase uranium enrichment levels and ceased its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s additional protocol.
During this time, relations between Iran and GCC countries improved, notably marked by Riyadh and Tehran’s announcement of a return to diplomatic relations in March 2023, brokered by China, with the announcement coming from Beijing.
There have not been many statements regarding the Iran relationship during Trump’s presidential campaign. In commentary on the U.S. involvement in intercepting Iranian drones en route to Israel in the early hours of April 14, he stated: “I would never have allowed this to happen if I were president,” implying that the Biden administration’s weakness encouraged Iran to take such actions.
Thus, should Trump win the U.S. presidential election, he would face a different situation than during his previous tenure. Previously, his main goals were twofold: to prevent Iran from achieving uranium enrichment levels that would enable it to produce nuclear weapons and to halt its ballistic missile program. It appears that both objectives may now be outdated. The goal of stopping Iranian interventions in Arab countries’ affairs might also have lost its significance following improved relations between the two sides.
It is likely that tensions between Washington and Tehran would increase, and that Trump would intensify sanctions imposed on Iran, citing its support for anti-Israel organizations, as well as its provision of drones to Russia in the war against Ukraine. Trump might also exert pressure on Arab countries to prevent them from strengthening ties with Tehran. Iraq is likely to become particularly significant in this regard, given its relationship with Iran and the role of certain armed Iraqi factions against Israel.
Trump’s efforts will be met with Israeli denial of Palestinian rights and its refusal to establish a Palestinian state, making it difficult for Arab countries to align with such pressures, especially while Iran positions itself as a supporter of Palestinian rights. Ironically, at the same time Iranians voted for a new reformist president, Masoud Pezeshkian, Americans might vote for Trump.
In conclusion, Trump recognizes that the United States is no longer the sole player in the Middle East and that China and Russia have successfully built and developed close relations with many U.S. ally and friendly nations, with Beijing becoming the primary trade partner for several countries in the region. Trump may put pressure on Arab nations to distance themselves from China and Russia, but such attempts are likely to fail, as Arab states understand the transformations occurring in the international system and realize that having a single pole dominating the world does not serve their interests.
All these previous possibilities are valid, yet one cannot assert any of them with certainty. In the realm of politics, the decision-making process hinges significantly on the balance of power and interests at the time.
