Why the Ukrainian Crisis is the West’s Fault

In an article published in 2014 in Foreign Affairs by John Mearsheimer, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago, titled “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault,” the author argues that blaming the crisis that arose when Russia annexed Crimea solely on Putin is misguided, asserting that the West bears a significant portion of the responsibility for this crisis. He explains certain events and reasons from the perspective of “realist theory,” concluding with a logical solution to the crisis based on realism.

Mearsheimer begins by attributing the blame for the aggression towards Ukraine to the West, specifically the European Union and NATO. He refutes the argument of Putin’s imperial ambitions and his long-standing desire to restore the greatness of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, he points out that the roots of the problem trace back to NATO’s eastward expansion and its desire to pull Ukraine out of Russia’s sphere and integrate it into its own. On the other hand, the EU’s ambition to incorporate Ukraine and support democratic movements began with the Orange Revolution in 2004. The Russian presidents have consistently opposed NATO’s expansion and have rejected the idea of passively watching the transformation of significant neighboring countries into Western-aligned nations. He also discusses the disconnect among European elites who observe events through Western media, believing that realism has no role in the twenty-first century and presuming that Europe can remain free on the basis of liberal democracy.

In the first chapter titled “The Insult to the West,” Mearsheimer discusses several key points that he considers to be the reasons behind the crisis. First, Russia’s grievances about NATO’s eastward expansion. Second, the encouragement of Ukraine and Georgia’s NATO membership by George W. Bush, despite the concerns of France and Germany regarding potential Russian backlash. Third, Russia’s strong opposition to this decision, highlighted by statements from then-Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko and President Vladimir Putin, labeling this step as a direct threat to Russia, and insinuating during a phone call with President Bush that Ukraine’s NATO membership would mark its end.

To demonstrate the seriousness of his intentions, Putin aided separatists in South Ossetia and Abkhazia to secede from Georgia, yet NATO persisted in its goal to incorporate Georgia and Ukraine. Another crucial trigger for Russia’s provocation was the EU’s eastward expansion under the Eastern Partnership initiative, which escalated tensions by supporting and funding democracy in Ukraine during the Ukrainian Revolution of 2014.

Under the title “Creating the Crisis” in the second chapter, Mearsheimer explains that the main reason for the revolution was the Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to cancel an economic agreement with the EU in favor of a $15 billion offer from Russia. The opposition and the government negotiated to keep Yanukovych in power until elections, but he quickly collapsed and fled to Moscow. As a result, a new pro-Western, anti-Russian government took power in Ukraine, revealing U.S. complicity in supporting the revolution and overthrowing Yanukovych. For Putin, this seemed to be the opportune moment to seize Crimea.

In the third chapter titled “Diagnosis,” the author indicates that understanding Putin’s actions is straightforward, referencing Crimea’s historical significance in the Napoleonic and Nazi wars as attempts to invade Russia through Crimea. Great powers are justified in fearing potential threats near their borders. The author then discusses the West’s attempts to reassure Russia and minimize tensions by claiming they had no ambitions against it. In 2002, the NATO-Russia Council was established to foster cooperation.

Views on NATO policy varied; some realists believed that Russia needed containment. Others voiced concerns that NATO had provided Russia with opportunities to engage in aggression and destruction in Europe. Mearsheimer then highlights the promotion of the liberal order in the West and deeper European ties to this system, believing it to be the true path to peace. Some liberal American officials viewed the events in Crimea as an “old-fashioned” crisis that had lost its relevance. However, Putin and his allies relied on realist perspectives, while their Western counterparts leaned towards liberalism, which ultimately exacerbated tensions and led to the 2014 Ukrainian crisis.

In the penultimate chapter titled “The Blame Game,” Mearsheimer debunks Western narratives that labeled Putin as mentally unstable and seeking to re-establish the Soviet Union, describing the annexation of Crimea as a sort of “test” to confirm that the time was right to implement his plans. Contrarily, he argues that Putin must be respected by anyone who challenges him in foreign policy. He has no expansionist ambitions, as there has been no evidence of such intentions, and he was opposed to Crimea’s separation before the crisis.

Next, the author discusses the factors preventing Russia from expansion; it lacks the capability to easily occupy and annex Ukraine, facing over 15 million Ukrainians living along the Dnieper River who wish to retain their Ukrainian citizenship. Furthermore, the Russian military is unable to conquer and occupy, and the Russian economy also restricts such actions.

In the final chapter, the author presents reasons why the crisis remains unresolved and potential solutions that could benefit all parties under the title “The Exit.” He notes that the sanctions imposed on Russia to end its support for separatists in Donbas exacerbate the crisis. Germany also fears tightening sanctions due to concerns about Russian retaliation. Another reason is the West’s insistence on the original causes that led to the crisis.

He argues that alleviating the crisis involves not insisting on Ukraine’s alignment and making it a neutral state, supported economically by both Russia and the West. This compromise would not damage U.S. reputation and would be a significant step towards achieving peace in the region. It is dangerous for Ukraine to think it can align with whomever it pleases, even if they are adversaries of Russia, and it should contemplate its moves carefully against a nearby great power.

Some statistics indicate that NATO handled the Ukrainian issue ineptly. Mearsheimer concludes by mentioning that Russia will lose its strength over time and that NATO does not consider Ukraine a core strategic area, making its annexation futile. Therefore, granting Ukraine NATO membership serves as a collision point between Russia and the West, and maintaining the status quo will complicate Western-Russian relations, as the West will need Russia in certain Middle Eastern issues such as Syria and Iran, and for help in containing China.

In conclusion, the policies followed at the time are likely to drive Russia and China closer together, and persisting with the same strategy will lead to a loss for all. Altering this policy and reaching out to Russia would make everyone a winner.