In exchange for sending troops to assist Russia on the Ukrainian front, North Korea aims to strengthen its alliance with Moscow, much like that between South Korea and the United States. In light of this situation, Seoul’s reaction may be counterproductive, argues this commentary from the newspaper “Kyunghyang Shinmun.”
The effect is immediate: by sending its soldiers to Russia, North Korea positions itself as an important player on the global stage. Kim Jong-un is reminding the international community of his presence by being seen alongside Putin, following a series of challenges including American economic sanctions, failed summits with Donald Trump [in 2018 and 2019], the arrival of a conservative government in Seoul, and North Korea’s diplomatic isolation.
For its own survival, the regime has chosen to create the conditions for a potential world war that could involve major powers. The United States and NATO will have to react sooner or later. As for South Korea, the war in Ukraine is no longer a “war of others.”
“About 3,000 soldiers from special units of the North Korean army have been sent to Russia, with a total of around 10,000 expected by December,” stated Jo Tae-yong, head of South Korea’s intelligence services, on October 23.
The Significance of the Chosen Moment
Du Jin-ho from the National Defense Research Institute in Seoul specifies that foreign contingents can play several roles: “There are, of course, combatants, but also those who ensure security and reconstruction in the rear.” Prior to this deployment, a number of North Korean soldiers were already present in Russia, including engineers familiar with the weapons, such as the short-range KN-23 missiles, that Pyongyang has supplied to Russia.
Various South Korean specialists on North Korea agree that the soldiers sent to Russia are not immediate combatants deployed to the Ukrainian front. Winter is approaching, and fighting will likely continue through airstrikes. What is most noteworthy is the timing of Pyongyang’s decision to launch this expedition just days before the U.S. presidential election.
Since the beginning of the year, North Korea has defied the predictions of the South Korean government and experts, who had for example anticipated significant constitutional reforms during the Supreme People’s Assembly held on October 7 and 8, aimed at solidifying the regime’s desire to sever ties with its southern neighbor.
Alliance Against Alliance
Nothing of the sort occurred. Kim Jong-un opted for concrete actions, such as destroying road and rail connections and reinforcing barriers between the two countries. After accusing Seoul on October 11 of sending drones into the North’s airspace to drop leaflets, Pyongyang authorities issued only threats of retaliation should such acts occur again.
Rather than attacking the South, North Korea chose to send soldiers to Russia. Thus, the opposition between Pyongyang and the Seoul-Washington alliance has widened with Moscow’s involvement. Hong Min, a researcher at the Institute for Unification Studies in Seoul, states categorically: “What North Korea wants from Russia in exchange for military aid is a strong alliance equivalent to the defense ties that unite South Korea and the United States. The latter will now have to deal not only with North Korea but also with Russia.”
Du Jin-ho elaborates:
“Despite its nuclear capabilities, North Korea still faces American pressure. Kim Jong-un is taking short-term risks by parting with part of his military elite to strengthen his regime’s security in the long run.”
Trump, the Winning Bet of Pyongyang
It is hard to see Pyongyang’s choice as just a simple “bet”—since it was made just days before the U.S. presidential election. Russia and North Korea had every reason to want Donald Trump to return. The Republican candidate has argued, regarding the war in Ukraine, for prioritizing an end to hostilities—which means signing a ceasefire without returning occupied territories to Ukraine.
Moreover, North Korea’s participation in this war has been largely seen as a failure of Joe Biden’s government. This likely explains why other powers remain cautious, fearing involvement in a conflict that does not directly concern them, which could further divide the international community. Only Ukraine and South Korea have clearly spoken out.
Seoul’s Hasty Reaction
“It is understandable that the North Korean initiative worries Kyiv,” comments Yang Mu-jin, president of the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul. “But it is less clear why Seoul is mentioning the possibility of supplying arms to Ukraine when the U.S. and NATO are opting for caution while awaiting clarification regarding the scale and objectives of North Korean troops in Russia.” He adds:
“I do not understand why our government wants to involve itself in this war on its own initiative.” Yang Mu-jin refers to the announcement on October 22 of the South Korean National Security Council meeting urgently discussing “measures [that] will be taken step by step depending on the progress of military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang,” including the possibility of providing lethal weapons to Kyiv.
The question arises regarding the relevance and effectiveness of Seoul’s reactions. The direct link between North Korean action and the supply of arms to Ukrainians is not evident. Such a measure would make Russia an enemy of South Korea; however, it is unclear how this would deter North Korea.
Yoon Suk-yeol and the “Flag Effect”
Furthermore, it could be seen as a de facto participation in the war. The government might not be able to undertake such a measure without approval from the National Assembly, not to mention the numerous questions it raises, such as those regarding the budget or the risk of undermining national security. Lee Jun-han, a professor at Incheon University, mentions a “flag effect”:
“In the face of an external threat, a solidarity naturally forms around the leader.”
“South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and his government need to display firmness toward North Korea to consolidate their voter base,” explains the academic. He adds that it is also an opportunity to “silence criticisms in a tense context due to the various scandals involving First Lady Kim Keon-hee, as well as the president’s disagreements with his own party and, notably, with its leader.”
Since taking office in 2022, President Yoon Suk-yeol has always hinted that it is possible to control North Korea by force. It is evident today that not only has he failed to achieve this, but moreover, this policy has even pushed North Korea to choose its side, to the extent that inter-Korean relations are now experiencing an unprecedented international extension.
