Amid the military and political developments in the Syrian arena, Turkey is working to bring the issue of rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus back into focus. This effort comes after a stagnation in recent months due to the difficulty of overcoming the contentious issues between the two countries. Turkey is attempting to revive the initiative of Iraqi Prime Minister “Mohammad Shi’a al-Sudani” for mediation with Syria and facilitate a meeting between Presidents “Recep Tayyip Erdoğan” and “Bashar al-Assad.”
Turkish Foreign Minister “Hakan Fidan” revealed on November 23, 2024, during statements to Turkish media representatives, Turkey’s appreciation for Baghdad’s mediation efforts between Ankara and Damascus. He stated, “We value Baghdad’s efforts, which have shown willingness in this regard, and Turkey is open to such an initiative if Iraq wishes to host it on its territory.” He added, “Turkey, Syria, and Iraq are neighboring countries sharing a land border, and the three countries should meet as in the past to discuss important issues in a more structured and methodical manner.”
Stimulating Factors
Turkey’s attempts to accelerate the normalization of relations with Damascus are linked to several motivations, the most prominent of which are:
The battlefield superiority of the SDF over Turkey-aligned factions: The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have managed to deplete the resources of Turkey-aligned armed factions in northeastern Syria through tactical invisible nighttime infiltration. Recently, at least 15 fighters from the Turkey-aligned “Liberation and Construction” Movement were killed on November 24, 2024, in the “Dughlabash” axis in the Aleppo countryside. Over the past months, the SDF has intensified its nighttime infiltration operations, resulting in casualties for Turkey-aligned fighters, thereby decreasing their ability to launch attacks or secure their areas of influence. Recent victories of the SDF have strengthened the confidence of their fighters in achieving battlefield objectives.
Increasing burdens on Turkish forces in Northern Iraq: The military operations in Northern Iraq against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) have turned into a burden for Turkey, with the timeline for resolving the conflict having extended, giving the PKK greater opportunities to regain balance and enhance its combat capabilities by drawing the Turkish army into an attrition war that it was unprepared for. This concern has heightened especially after Turkey expanded the scope of its operations into rugged mountainous areas, which the PKK fighters are skilled in. Turkey’s fears have increased following three surprise drone attacks on its military positions in Iraqi Kurdistan since the beginning of November 2024, alongside the PKK’s expansion of guerrilla warfare against Turkish forces.
Russia’s retreat from supporting Turkish-Syrian rapprochement: Russia has reduced its support for Turkish-Syrian rapprochement, demonstrating backing for Damascus’s stance that insists on the withdrawal of Turkish military forces from Northern Syria before discussing any negotiations. On November 14, 2024, the Russian envoy to Syria, “Alexander Lavrentiev,” stated that Turkey is acting “as an occupying state” in Syria.
Notably, Russia has shown diminished interest in advancing this issue, as evidenced by its opposition to Ankara’s threats of launching a new military operation in Northern Syria, alongside support for the Syrian army’s capabilities in countering Turkey-affiliated armed factions. Many assessments suggest that Moscow’s notable shift stems from its displeasure with Turkish support for Ukraine, as well as Moscow’s concern over Turkey’s intentions to bolster its military presence in Syria, especially following the announcement of “Trump’s” electoral victory.
Increasing tensions between Turkey and Israel: Turkey’s foreign minister’s statements on November 23, 2024, regarding the importance of restoring Iraqi mediation to approach Damascus cannot be separated from Turkey’s growing fears of the backlash from the current Israeli war in the region. Recently, Turkish-Israeli relations have entered a new phase of tension following Turkey’s announcement to cut trade ties with Israel and its blocking of Israeli President “Isaac Herzog’s” flight over Turkish airspace on November 17, 2024.
Additionally, Israeli Foreign Minister “Gideon Sa’ar” stated on November 10, 2024, the importance of strengthening ties between Israel and Kurdish communities. In this context, Turkey recognizes that securing its border with Syria and supporting relations with Damascus provides a fertile environment for leveraging against Israeli threats to Turkey.
Stalled initiatives to resolve the conflict with the PKK: Turkey’s attempts to revive Iraqi mediation efforts are tied to dwindling prospects for resolving the Kurdish issue and the failure of the initiative by “Devlet Bahçeli,” leader of the “Nationalist Movement Party,” to address Kurdish matters. This was reflected in the Turkish government’s decision on November 20, 2024, to ban visits to PKK leader “Abdullah Öcalan” for six months. Moreover, on November 4, 2024, the Turkish Interior Ministry dismissed three elected mayors in southeastern Turkey over allegations of supporting terrorist organizations.
Preempting movements from domestic opponents in Turkey: Ankara seeks to leverage Iraqi mediation for rapprochement with Damascus to thwart local opposition in Turkey that aims to take the initiative in resolving normalization with Syria. This has caused concern within the ruling party, especially after “Republican People’s Party” Deputy “Ilhan Özkal” announced on October 12, 2024, that he sent an official message to the Syrian leadership expressing the party’s desire to visit Damascus and hold talks with Syrian officials, emphasizing that the Syrian government’s response was “not negative.”
Potential Pathways
Given the previous variables, potential pathways for Turkey in revitalizing Iraqi mediation for rapprochement with Damascus are evident:
Baghdad’s swift support for rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus: The first pathway involves Iraq supporting rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus and hastening mediation efforts. Various indicators suggest Iraqi support for Turkey’s aspirations to finalize normalization with Damascus and reach a resolution for pending issues between the two countries, considering that this remains a strategic priority amidst increasing Israeli threats to Iraq. Israel has accused the “Mohammad Shia al-Sudani” government of being responsible for attacks by Iran-aligned militias on Israeli targets within Iraq.
Moreover, there is an Iraqi conviction that supporting the Turkish vision for relations with Syria provides fertile ground for pushing Turkey to take further steps in resolving pending issues with Iraq, particularly the water file and Iraqi oil exports via the Turkish port of “Ceyhan.” In this framework, it appears that the recent shift in Turkey’s position toward normalization with Damascus aligns fundamentally with Iraq’s stance on this file, as Iraq is eager to develop Syrian-Turkish relations, believing that it would achieve various Iraqi benefits, including enhancing Iraq’s role as a regional mediator, in addition to the conviction that this rapprochement contributes to addressing security challenges along the Iraqi-Syrian border, especially with the resurgence of operational activities by the “ISIS” organization.
Delayed Iraqi response to mediation between Turkey and Syria: The second pathway pertains to Iraq’s potential delay in responding to the role of mediator. Despite Iraq’s desire to normalize relations between Ankara and Damascus, there are indications that Iraq might postpone returning to a mediating role, particularly due to Baghdad’s distraction with confronting Israeli threats and the pressures of Iran-aligned Shiite elites to disrupt the “Sudani” government’s efforts toward mediation between Ankara and Damascus. Iran does not favor normalization between the two nations at this current time and seeks to limit Turkish influence in the Syrian arena.
The “Sudani” government has recently faced internal political pressures from rival parties and factions opposed to Turkish influence in Iraq, especially with the prolongation of Turkey’s military operations in Northern Iraq, resulting in negative ramifications for Iraq’s interests and sovereignty.
Failure of Baghdad to restore its role as mediator between Ankara and Damascus: The third pathway involves the failure to regain the role of mediator, as Iraq believes that the current regional and international competition in the Syrian arena may hinder mediation and diminish its momentum, particularly after Moscow’s call for the necessity of Turkey’s withdrawal from Syria, deeming it an “occupying state.” Additionally, Syria may not respond favorably to Iraq’s mediation efforts at present due to renewed conflicts between Turkey-aligned factions and Syrian army forces.
Different Challenges
In conclusion, Turkey’s call to revive the role of the Iraqi mediator to advance normalization with Syria comes at a time of pressure on Ankara; however, various challenges may prompt Iraq not to respond to the Turkish invitation or at least defer it to a later time. Among these challenges is the “Sudani” government’s engagement with potential Israeli threats. Furthermore, Iraq’s close ties with Iran, which is a key ally of Syria, may result in Baghdad facing tensions in this strategic relationship if it is pushed toward accelerated normalization between Damascus and Ankara. Lastly, international and regional pressures could lead Iraq to adopt a more cautious stance regarding this issue.
