Why is there a push within Iran to engage in the war against Israel?

Iran continues to send mixed signals regarding its stance on the war Israel is waging in Lebanon, following its actions in Gaza. This has been particularly evident after the assassination of Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, on September 27, 2024. These signals suggest that Iran may be more inclined to avoid escalation or direct involvement in the war, attempting to sidestep what Iranian officials see as a “trap” set by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Despite this caution, there is a faction within Iran pressing for involvement in the ongoing war, even while recognizing the high cost such engagement could impose on Iran’s security, stability, and interests. This faction is also aware of the extent of security breaches Iran is currently suffering, similar to the situation faced by its militia proxies.

Various Motivations

This push for involvement in the war against Israel, even if Iran is not fully prepared for it, is driven by several key considerations:

1. Preventing the war from reaching Iran’s borders:
This faction believes that engaging in the war against Israel in Lebanon is far preferable to being forced into the war within Iran itself. In other words, they see it as crucial for Iran to choose to engage in the current conflict rather than being compelled to do so later.

According to this view, Iran could become Israel’s next target, especially given the significant successes Israel has achieved in its military confrontations with Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Additionally, Israel’s substantial security penetrations inside Iran and among most, if not all, of its proxies may tempt it to expand the current war to include Iran itself, alongside its proxies. Hence, this faction believes it would be better for Iran if the battlefield remained distant from its borders, even if it meant the war was fought through proxies on foreign soil.

2. Commitment to Supreme Leader Khamenei’s war strategy:
This approach is rooted in the traditional stance declared by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in 2014, when he said, “Iran fights its enemies in Aleppo, Homs, Damascus, Beirut, and Gaza instead of having to fight them in Tehran and Isfahan.” This implies, according to this faction, that Iran follows an advanced strategy committed to a core principle: avoiding a direct attack from outside forces, whether from Israel, the United States, or any other party. Iran seeks to reduce the likelihood of such an attack by signaling its capacity to increase the cost of aggression through its loyal proxies in the region, who manage the escalation on Iran’s behalf.

3. Maintaining Iran’s influence over its proxies:
This faction believes that Iran’s current reluctance to intervene and support its proxies in their escalating confrontation with Israel could have serious negative consequences for the relationship between Iran and these groups. Reports have already indicated that after the cyberattacks named “Pager Attacks” and “Walkie-Talkie Attacks” carried out by Israel against Hezbollah on September 17 and 18, 2024, Hezbollah requested Iran’s direct intervention to relieve the pressure imposed by these attacks. However, Iran refused, citing its desire not to fall into “Netanyahu’s trap.”

While Iran knows that its proxies may have few alternatives in managing their relationship with it—given its leadership of the so-called “Axis of Resistance”—the realization that Iran is withdrawing from its ability to support them could encourage these groups to act more independently in dealing with conflicts and developments. This would likely lead to a decline in Iranian influence over its proxies, which has consumed a portion of Iran’s resources over the past four decades.

4. Disrupting President Bezeshkian’s foreign agenda:
This faction expresses clear concerns over the new foreign policy pursued by President Masoud Bezeshkian and his government, especially his strategic adviser Mohammad Javad Zarif and Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi. The faction believes that Bezeshkian’s government is seeking to exploit Iran’s current non-involvement in the escalating regional conflict to strengthen its ability to open communication channels with Western countries, potentially even achieving a new deal on the nuclear issue.

From their perspective, the upcoming visit of President Bezeshkian to Qatar on September 30 and October 1, 2024—although officially focused on the Asian Cooperation Dialogue Forum—may also be an opportunity to exchange messages between Iran and the United States, with Qatar acting as a mediator, a role that the president has sought to enhance during his participation in the United Nations General Assembly.

This faction views the president’s agenda as unlikely to have a positive impact on Iran’s interests, particularly concerning the nuclear deal. With President Joe Biden’s term nearing its end, and the increasing possibility of Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025 (should he defeat Vice President Kamala Harris in the November 5, 2024, elections), this faction believes military escalation with Israel would constrain Bezeshkian’s ability to pursue his foreign policy objectives. They argue that Iran engaging in military escalation against Israel would reduce the chances of any new negotiations with the U.S., especially as Washington would likely intervene against Iranian missile or drone strikes on Israel, as happened on April 13, 2024. Recently, the U.S. has sent direct warnings to Iran about this.

Ongoing Debate

In conclusion, the internal debate within Iran over its role in the current military escalation between Israel and its proxies in the region will likely continue. This is particularly so as Israel remains determined to carry out military operations in most countries where these proxies operate, including Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and the Palestinian territories. Additionally, the threats directed at Iran, the most recent being from Prime Minister Netanyahu on September 30, 2024, remain a key concern. In his message to the Iranian people, Netanyahu accused Iran’s regime of “plunging the region into darkness and war” and emphasized that “there is no place on earth where Israel cannot reach.”

Please subscribe to our page on Google News
SAKHRI Mohamed
SAKHRI Mohamed

I hold a Bachelor's degree in Political Science and International Relations in addition to a Master's degree in International Security Studies. Alongside this, I have a passion for web development. During my studies, I acquired a strong understanding of fundamental political concepts and theories in international relations, security studies, and strategic studies.

Articles: 15176

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *