The relationship between Orthodox Christianity and Russia is characterized by a historical interconnection between the Russian state and religion that has evolved over centuries and continues to shape their dynamics. Although religion is officially separated from the state in Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church remains a significantly influential institution, both domestically and internationally, among other Orthodox churches and in the general perception of the Russian state.
Historically, since the establishment of the monarchy in Russia, the Russian state and Orthodoxy have functioned as a unified entity. The Orthodox monarchy was founded as a result of the war against paganism following the Baptism of Rus in Kyiv, which played a crucial role in the formation of the Russian state. Tsar Ivan IV was crowned with Byzantine Orthodox rites, and the establishment of the Tsarist system was closely linked to religion and the fulfillment of God’s will, with the monarch serving as His representative. All Russian emperors were crowned through an Orthodox coronation ceremony, and adherence to Orthodoxy was a prerequisite for ascending to the imperial throne. During the reign of Peter the Great, the Russian Empire was proclaimed, and the head of state began to be referred to as “Emperor,” simultaneously taking on the title of “Defender of the Church.” The emperor led or controlled the Russian Orthodox Church, and according to doctrine and law, held the right to do so. This arrangement positioned the head of state as a dominant figure in both religious and political affairs. During Peter the Great’s reign, the patriarchate was abolished, with the emperor assuming leadership of the church, which was only reinstated during the Soviet era through a personal initiative by Joseph Stalin. Meanwhile, throughout the Soviet years, the role of the church, and religion in general, was severely restricted and tightly regulated. Following 1991, efforts began to restore the lost church institutions.
It is important to note that the Russian Orthodox Church was not the oldest among Orthodox churches; at its founding, it immediately ranked fifth in the ecclesiastical hierarchy among world churches. Today, it stands as the largest and most influential Orthodox church globally.
Following the Great Schism of 1054, which led to the emergence of the Western Catholic Church, characterized by Latin culture and led by the Pope in Rome, and the Eastern Orthodox Church, defined by Greek culture, the number of major Orthodox churches worldwide increased to 15. These include: (Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, Russian, Georgian, Serbian, Romanian, Bulgarian, Cypriot, Hellenic (Greek), Albanian, Polish, Czech and Slovak, and American churches).
The Poles achieved independence of their church leadership from the Russians in 1948, the Czechs and Slovaks in 1951, and the Americans in 1970. The Bulgarians, Greeks, and Albanians, as well as the Russians, gained independence from the Church of Constantinople at different times. However, in terms of the number of congregants and leaders (bishops and metropolitans), the churches are not equal. Although the Church of Constantinople, along with the Churches of Antioch, Jerusalem, and Alexandria, has maintained its patriarchate since 451, it is relatively small in terms of economy and organizational structure. Despite its claims of being a patriarchate, the authority of its patriarch in resolving ecclesiastical disputes is often seen as disproportionate to its size. The issuance of a decree by Bartholomew I, the current patriarch of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, in 2019, which granted official status to the newly established “Orthodox Church in Ukraine,” allowing it independence from the Moscow Patriarchate, has led to conflicts among Orthodox churches globally.
The decision made by the patriarch of Constantinople was supported by the Churches of Jerusalem and Alexandria for the Orthodox Christians, while the Albanian, Antiochian, Georgian, Hellenic, and Romanian churches abstained from voting. The remaining six churches expressed their support for the Russian Orthodox Church, forming a bloc of seven churches.
It is evident that the United States and Western countries have politicized this issue to exacerbate tensions for Moscow. This factor suggests that the majority, including the American Orthodox Church, have chosen to side with Russia.
In response to the actions of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, the Moscow Patriarchate began establishing its own exarchates (representative offices) in Western Europe, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Specifically, priests from the Alexandrian Church of the Orthodox Greeks fall under the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church, as they deemed their patriarch’s actions (Patriarch Theodoros II) unacceptable and in violation of Orthodox canons.
Naturally, among other factors, the Russian Orthodox Church is an active player in global politics. The Russian Church views relationships outside its followers in a manner similar to them and considers the potential for interaction with governmental, public, and other religious structures. This distinction sets the Russian Church apart from governmental actors in global political processes, traditionally divided into external and internal realms connected to national borders; thus, the domain in which the Russian Church manifests as an active element is often linked to its foreign activities.
The Russian Orthodox Church participates in various summits of leaders, religious organizations, and United Nations structures. In the past, it actively engaged with EU institutions and the Council of Europe. Moreover, according to the doctrinal document “Fundamentals of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church,” its interests encompass areas such as the nation, state, ethics, secular law, issues of war and peace, politics, bioethics, environmental concerns, international relations, globalization, and secularism. Therefore, the nature of the Russian Orthodox Church’s work is truly global in scope.
Focusing exclusively on the economic aspect, the Russian Orthodox Church boasts impressive assets. Income from various church activities—such as revenue from the sale of religious literature and other services—is estimated to be around 6 billion rubles annually (with 1 US dollar equivalent to 87.85 rubles at today’s rates). This income is tax-exempt. Additionally, the church’s revenue also stems from business ventures, accounting for approximately 55 percent of its budget, along with donations contributing to about 40 percent.
Finally, the most significant asset of the Russian Orthodox Church is its people. Within Russia, both the church and the government are invested in mutually beneficial cooperation. With the declaration of “conservative transformation,” traditional circles have received unprecedented support for their initiatives, creating a favorable environment for the rise of Russian electoral politics in regions traditionally referred to as the “Orthodox belt.” While this can be justified by various public initiatives on behalf of the Russian Orthodox Church and the establishment of new institutions, it is also essential to consider the deep-rooted nature of popular traditions, such as the synergy between state ideology and Orthodoxy, the ideology of “Moscow as the Third Rome,” the comparison of the West to the Antichrist, and other eschatological narratives that grant the Russian Orthodox Church a uniquely qualitative dimension.
