Tensions between Iran and Western countries have escalated following a decision made at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting on November 21, 2024, initiated by Germany, France, and Britain, with support from the United States. This decision harshly criticized Iran for its reduced cooperation with the agency, which demanded a comprehensive and updated assessment regarding the potential existence or use of undeclared nuclear materials related to past and current issues concerning the Iranian nuclear program by next spring, ahead of the next Board of Governors meeting.
However, notably amid this escalation—which intensified after Iran announced it would install more advanced centrifuges in its nuclear facilities in response to the agency’s decision—Tehran began sending direct messages to the United States and Western nations expressing its readiness to reach a new nuclear agreement. On November 22, 2024, the official website of Supreme Leader “Ali Khamenei” published an interview with his advisor “Ali Larijani,” in which he stated that Iran is ready to pursue a new nuclear deal. He addressed the newly elected U.S. President “Donald Trump” directly, indicating that Iran is prepared to commit to not seeking nuclear weapons, despite its ability to enrich uranium to 60%, should the U.S. accept the new conditions.
Multiple Motivations
Iran’s eagerness to present an offer to Western nations signaling its readiness to reach a new nuclear deal at this time can be interpreted through several key motivations:
Mitigating the Impact of Threats to Change “Nuclear Doctrine”: Recently, some Iranian officials reiterated threats to reconsider Iran’s nuclear doctrine if faced with an existential threat. This doctrine refers to the fatwa issued by Supreme Leader “Ali Khamenei” in 2003, which prohibits the production and storage of nuclear weapons. On November 1, 2024, ex-Foreign Minister and current head of the Strategic Center for Foreign Relations “Kamali Kharrazi” stated that Iran could alter its defensive and nuclear doctrine if it faced existential danger. These threats have elicited harsh reactions from Western nations, which may have contributed to the decision by the IAEA Board of Governors, prompting many in Iran to warn against repeating threats that could adversely affect Iran’s interests and its ability to withstand Western pressure. Thus, Larijani’s remarks aim, in part, to defuse this hardline Western stance against Iran.
Preempting the “Maximum Pressure” Policy of the Trump Administration: Iran anticipates that the reinstatement of the “maximum pressure” policy will be among the first decisions made by the new U.S. President “Donald Trump” upon returning to the White House on January 20, 2025. Trump aims to reduce Iran’s oil exports—currently averaging around 1.7 million barrels per day, mostly to China—to zero. Such pressure could exacerbate the domestic economic crisis, as current oil exports are one of the resources Iran relies on to cope with U.S. sanctions and mitigate their negative impacts. Iran appears to be preparing for a potential escalation of the economic crisis, as evidenced by remarks made by President “Masoud Bezhkian” during a meeting with members of the “Basij” militia at the “Khomeini” shrine on November 22, 2024, where he indicated that some service sectors in Iran, like electricity, gas, water, and the environment, are on the brink of collapse due to U.S. sanctions and the inability of state-owned enterprises or those affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard to fill the vacuum left by foreign companies withdrawing from the Iranian market.
Avoiding the Transfer of the Iranian Nuclear File to the UN Security Council: Iran no longer dismisses the possibility that Western nations, in the next IAEA Board of Governors meeting scheduled for March 2025, might transfer the Iranian file back to the UN Security Council. This is especially relevant after the IAEA called for a comprehensive assessment of the Iranian nuclear program. Tehran believes this could pave the way for the reactivation of international sanctions that were suspended under the nuclear deal reached between Iran and the “5+1” group on July 14, 2015, particularly since Western nations are currently leaning toward using what’s known as the “snapback” mechanism to trigger those sanctions without facing a veto from Russia or China in this case. The likelihood of this scenario increases, bearing in mind that these nations will aim to preempt the so-called “expiration day” on October 18, 2025, which signifies the end of the aforementioned international sanctions.
Averting Direct War Between Iran and Israel: Iran believes that the likelihood of a direct war with Israel is no longer improbable given the new realities imposed by the ongoing conflict instigated by Israel in Gaza and Lebanon since October 7, 2023. This reflects a shift in Iran’s strategy, calculating the outcomes of recent military attacks by Israel on October 26, 2024, against some of its missile production facilities and “S-300” air defense systems, as well as a research reactor at the Parchin military facility. Iran may now view these Israeli attacks not just as retaliation for previous Iranian strikes on October 1, 2024, but also as a means to lay the groundwork for possible future military options following the current conflict in Gaza and Lebanon.
Undoubtedly, the potential for renewed military action in this context would aim to target Iran’s nuclear program, which has reached unprecedented levels of advancement, as confirmed by a recent IAEA report on November 19, 2024, indicating that Iran has enriched uranium in varying amounts, totaling 6,604.4 kg—32 times the limit specified in the nuclear deal (202.8 kg). Additionally, the amount of uranium enriched to 60% reached 185 kg.
Managing Escalation
In conclusion, Iran expects to face unprecedented pressures from Western countries and Israel in the coming period, not only due to its support for allied militias in the region and Russia but also due to the intensification of its nuclear program crisis, which opens the door to multiple scenarios— all of which could impose negative repercussions on Iran unless it is able to secure a new deal with the administration of the newly elected U.S. President “Donald Trump.”
