A heated debate is currently unfolding in Iran regarding the possible paths that negotiations between Iran and the United States might take, which are scheduled to be held in the Sultanate of Oman on April 12, 2025. These negotiations will be led by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and U.S. Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff. Although the talks have received clear support from various forces and institutions in Iran—believing they could, first, save the country from the severe American sanctions imposed on it, and second, prevent direct war with the United States or Israel, both of which are poised to resolve the crisis with Iran over its nuclear program either through diplomacy or military means—other forces, particularly those aligned with the hardline conservative current, continue to view these negotiations, and the potential deal they may yield, as a threat to their interests. This has prompted them to attempt to obstruct the talks and launch strong campaigns against them.
These campaigns became evident in the “Dialogue” column published by Kayhan newspaper on April 5, 2025, which predicted the assassination of U.S. President Donald Trump—the “killer of Soleimani”—with a shot to the head. This prompted the Press Supervisory Board to issue a warning to the newspaper for publishing content deemed contrary to national interests. It also led reformist-aligned newspapers to criticize fundamentalist attempts to derail the negotiations. For instance, in its April 8, 2025 edition, Arman Emrooz argued that fundamentalist media outlets and figures like hardline parliamentarian Hamid Rasaei consistently oppose the talks because they fear the negative impact a successful outcome might have on their interests.
Multiple Reasons
The fundamentalist conservative bloc’s efforts to hinder U.S.–Iran negotiations can be explained by several key considerations, the most prominent of which include:
1 – Fears of Reformist Success in Reaching a Deal:
Conservatives believe that if President Masoud Pezeshkian’s government succeeds in securing a deal with the United States, it will be portrayed as a win for the reformist camp as a whole. This could significantly strengthen their popular support base, particularly since the deal would likely have a positive impact on the country’s living conditions. Most notably, it may include lifting parts of the U.S. sanctions on Iran—especially in the areas of oil exports, access to the SWIFT banking system, and the release of frozen Iranian funds held in foreign banks.
Notably, the fundamentalist conservatives have seemingly tried to insert conservative figures into the negotiations. Reports published on April 5, 2025, indicated that the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, met with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who approved direct negotiations with the United States and the formation of a delegation including Ali Larijani (Khamenei’s advisor), IRGC commander Mohammad Forouzandeh, and former Vice President for Strategic Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif. However, the Pezeshkian government was keen to affirm its leadership in managing the negotiations with Washington. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that these reports were incorrect and that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would lead the talks.
2 – Potential Shift in Iran’s Internal Power Dynamics:
A successful reformist-led deal with the United States could alter the balance of power within Iran’s political system. Although the reformists managed to win the presidency from the fundamentalists in the early elections held in two rounds on June 28 and July 5, 2024, conservatives still control key decision-making institutions such as the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the Expediency Discernment Council, the Guardian Council, and the Assembly of Experts.
Thus, fundamentalists fear that if the reformists succeed in reaching a deal with President Donald Trump, it may mirror the events of the early 2016 elections for the Assembly of Experts and the Islamic Consultative Assembly—held after the July 14, 2015 nuclear agreement and the suspension of international sanctions on January 16, 2016—where reformists won a sweeping victory over conservatives. They secured all 30 parliamentary seats in Tehran, and former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, regarded as the spiritual leader of the reformist camp, came in first place in the Tehran district for the Assembly of Experts.
3 – Boosting Pezeshkian’s Ability to Pass New Laws:
Fundamentalists are deeply concerned about President Masoud Pezeshkian’s efforts to pass new laws, either by securing support from institutions still dominated by conservatives—often with the backing of Supreme Leader Khamenei—or by delaying the implementation of laws that heavily restrict social freedoms. Pezeshkian has already succeeded in lifting the house arrest of former Speaker of Parliament Mehdi Karroubi on March 17, 2025, which had been in place since February 2011. He also postponed the enforcement of the “Hijab and Chastity” law, which imposes strict dress codes on women, and applied pressure to abolish the so-called “morality police,” which had sparked widespread protests across Iran in mid-September 2022.
From the conservative perspective, a successful deal with the United States would empower Pezeshkian’s government to push through even more such reforms and legislation with Khamenei’s support—developments that are seen as contrary to their political calculations and interests.
4 – Blocking Reformist Influence Over Khamenei’s Successor:
Fundamentalists—backed by the IRGC—are working to exclude the reformist camp from the process of selecting the next Supreme Leader, should the current leader, Ali Khamenei, leave the political scene. They view this exclusion as a safeguard to ensure the appointment of a hardline conservative leader who would uphold their policies and strengthen their grip on power within the regime. However, a successful reformist-led deal with the United States could increase reformist influence in the succession process, potentially leading to pressure for selecting a more moderate figure to assume the most powerful position in the country.
A Key Variable
In conclusion, the fundamentalist conservative current is expected to continue exerting strong pressure to derail the potential deal with the United States. A crucial factor that will determine their success in doing so is the nature of the upcoming negotiations—specifically, whether they will focus solely on the nuclear program or if the United States will push to broaden the scope to include Iran’s regional influence and ballistic missile program. If the negotiations are limited to the nuclear file, the chances of success may improve, thereby reducing the conservatives’ ability to obstruct the deal. However, if there is pressure to expand the agenda, it could serve as a golden opportunity for the conservatives to launch a new campaign to sabotage the potential agreement.
