Ukraine is looking to China to play a mediation role in its crisis with Russia, considering Beijing as a major power capable of taking on this role, despite certain limitations that might hinder China from fully assuming it. In this context, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba visited Beijing, marking the first visit since the Russian-Ukrainian war in February 2022. The visit, which began on July 23, lasted three days, focusing on exploring the “potential Chinese role” in ending the war with Russia.
Kuleba stated that a just peace in Ukraine is a strategic interest for Beijing. He also emphasized that Kyiv included in its discussions with China the conditions under which it would enter negotiations with Moscow.
The visit to Beijing was preceded by hints from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky about his willingness to negotiate with Russia, mentioned in a speech to the nation during the first half of July 2024. Zelensky also proposed that Moscow send a delegation to attend a conference scheduled for November.
Declining Western Support:
Several reasons have led Ukraine to request China to mediate in its crisis with Moscow, with the most prominent being:
Uncertainty Over Continued Western Support:
Ukraine’s attempts to reach a Chinese-mediated resolution coincide with the uncertainty of continued Western support, particularly from the U.S. and Germany. Although Kyiv received the first batch of the much-anticipated American F-16 fighter jets—10 out of a total of 79—on August 5, 2024, the battlefield has shown the ineffectiveness of military aid in the face of Russian advances, although the pace of these advances has slowed compared to earlier periods. Ukrainian President Zelensky affirmed that Western military support remains weak against the Russian war machine. He also noted that Ukrainians are ready to sacrifice their lives to liberate their lands but need financial, military, and economic support to continue resisting Russian advances. This was evident when Zelensky stated that Western support is sufficient to repel Russian attacks “only” but not to achieve victory by reclaiming territories seized by Russia since February 2022. Additionally, Germany plans to reduce its military support for Ukraine next year. If Western support stops and Ukraine fails to secure funds from frozen Russian assets in Europe, as approved by the European Union in May 2024, this will impact its ability to achieve any significant military progress.
Leveraging China’s Relatively Neutral Role:
Ukrainian Foreign Minister expressed his desire to explore ways to achieve a comprehensive and just peace with Russia in discussions with his Chinese counterparts. Kyiv aims to build constructive relations with Beijing to encourage China to push Russia toward peace. The visit comes after China’s earlier efforts to distance itself from direct engagement with Ukrainian officials since the war began. The visit marks a significant shift in China’s foreign policy toward the crisis. China abstained from attending the peace conference held in Switzerland in June 2024, with Zelensky accusing Beijing of trying to dissuade some countries from participating in the summit.
Attempt to Halt Russian Advancements:
Kyiv views Western support as unreliable, especially amid ongoing elections in several European countries and the U.S. Ukraine also realizes the difficulty of sustaining its gains against continuous Russian advances. Recent Western aid has helped Ukraine repel attacks, but some circles, particularly in Russia, believe Kyiv may have a strategic goal of delaying peace to gather and store as much Western military aid as possible for a counteroffensive similar to the one in 2023. Russia seems aware of this and is thus pushing forward on all fronts since Putin’s re-election and even after opening a new front around Kharkiv.
Timing Implications:
Several implications arise from Ukraine’s request for China to mediate, with the most notable being:
Proximity to U.S. Elections: The potential political changes in Washington, with the presidential elections scheduled for November 2024, serve as a major incentive for Ukraine’s actions. The U.S. is the largest financial and military supporter of Kyiv. Zelensky seems to be hoping for a Democratic administration in the White House, given concerns over the possible victory of Republican candidate and former President Donald Trump, who announced he would reduce U.S. support for Kyiv. However, Trump had a “good” phone call with Zelensky on July 19, 2024, during which he confirmed his intention to end the war and establish peace in the region. Zelensky stated that the call discussed ways to establish a just and lasting peace.
Kyiv’s Shift in Rhetoric on Peace: During the phone call with Trump, the Ukrainian president emphasized the importance of ending the war and preserving lives. In another context, he stressed the need for peace and protecting civilians’ lives—a shift from his previous focus on “territory” and sacrifice, in contrast to preserving Ukraine as a unified state with sovereignty over the same territory it gained after the Soviet Union’s collapse. It’s noteworthy that Ukraine’s diplomatic move to end the war is unusual, given the presidential decree issued by Zelensky that legally prohibits negotiations with Russia regarding ending the war. The decree is practically nullified following Kuleba’s trip to Beijing to discuss peace prospects.
European Reluctance for Peace: Some circles believe that Europeans are not genuinely seeking peace; they may even play a negative role in Ukrainian peace negotiations, as they do not want Putin to emerge victorious or achieve part of his goals. This is evidenced by British pressure that encouraged Ukraine to withdraw from peace talks brokered by Turkey at the beginning of the crisis in 2022.
Western Accusations of China’s Support for Russia: Unlike Europe, China’s cooperation with Russia is ongoing; Russia has allies it can rely on, and their foreign policies are not controlled by political mechanisms as they are in Europe and the U.S., focusing directly on interests according to Kyiv’s view. Ukraine and its Western supporters consider China the largest supporter of Russia by supplying technology and materials for sustaining Russian military industries and military support through large purchases of oil and gas, significantly compensating for the embargo on Russian fuel. Former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg considered China a key player in the war due to its significant role in supporting and aiding Moscow, while Beijing asserts that its relations with Moscow are not targeted at any other parties. Moreover, China-Russia trade relations continue despite Western sanctions on Russia. Bilateral trade between China and Russia increased by 26% in 2023 compared to 2022. Chinese exports to Russia have risen by 60% since the war began. China has exported approximately $300 million worth of dual-use products (which can be used in military production) to Russia. For example, Russian imports of electrical devices, navigation tools, and digital cameras increased from $170 million in January 2022 to $305 million in December 2023. This is in addition to the “no limits partnership” principle that China has followed in its relations with Moscow since February 2022.
Leveraging China’s Desire to Resolve the Crisis: Ukraine seeks to capitalize on China’s desire to resolve the crisis. China, in cooperation with Brazil, announced a six-point document before the Switzerland Peace Conference on Ukraine in June 2024 and called for an international peace conference with representatives from Moscow and Kyiv. Additionally, Beijing announced a 12-point peace plan in February 2023. It’s worth noting that the group of Western countries did not take China’s plan seriously, considering it a means of supporting Russia to gain new territories from Ukraine. However, China’s potential role as a mediator in the crisis may be strengthened by its lack of direct military support for Russia since the war began, avoiding the export of weapons, ammunition, or spare parts. This has likely caused Ukraine to hesitate in criticizing Beijing directly since the crisis began.
Conversely, Ukraine has attempted to strengthen its economic ties with China but was surprised that the West opposed such steps. Beijing has a golden opportunity for mediation, especially since Chinese President Xi Jinping has a strong friendship with Putin, with the two leaders meeting frequently as heads of state. China also holds economic leverage over Moscow, especially with Russia’s growing reliance on dual-use equipment and as a major importer of Russian energy exports, alongside India.
In conclusion, China’s potential role as a mediator in the Russia-Ukraine crisis could present an opportunity for China to affirm its status as a major power capable of mediating significant international crises. It could also serve as a form of countering U.S. influence in this conflict, given that Washington cannot mediate due to its direct and explicit support for Ukraine, whereas China’s stance on the crisis is relatively neutral. However, this is still subject to several considerations, including Western acceptance of this mediation, especially in light of ongoing disputes with Beijing, as well as the conditions and concessions that the conflicting parties (Russia and Ukraine) may agree to when conducting negotiations.
