Although President “Masoud Bezhkian” expressed reservations about the restrictions on public freedoms, including the Modesty and Hijab law, prior to the elections, the fall of Syrian President “Bashar al-Assad” on December 8, 2024, provided a new opportunity for the president to seek amendments to the law. This law was supposed to take effect on December 15, 2024, imposing penalties on women who wear the hijab “inappropriately” according to authorities or who do not wear it at all.
In this context, on December 15, 2024, President “Masoud Bezhkian” requested the postponement of the announcement of the Modesty and Hijab law by the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Iranian media reports noted that he held a meeting with the Supreme Leader of the Republic “Ali Khamenei” specifically to discuss this matter; he indicated that the law could have “negative social impacts,” which prompted the Supreme Leader to agree to place the law on the agenda of the Supreme National Security Council. This move could help strengthen the president’s ability to push for amendments to the law, which was passed by the predominantly hardline assembly.
Interestingly, this debate coincided with the uproar caused by young Iranian singer “Barastu Ahmadi,” who recorded songs in a historic site in Mazandaran province on December 12, 2024, without a hijab, and posted them on her YouTube channel. This led to her arrest alongside her music team, although they were released a few hours later, with a lawsuit filed against her concerning the incident.
Multiple Motivations
The step taken by President “Masoud Bezhkian” to request a postponement on the implementation of the Modesty and Hijab law can be explained through various motivations, the most prominent of which are:
Weakening the likelihood of replicating the Syrian model: Bezhkian believes that the timing of the implementation of the Modesty and Hijab law could serve as a “recipe for extensive protests in Iran,” possibly escalating to a “revolution” against the Iranian regime, similar to the situation in Syria. In his view, the triggers that could instigate a repeat of what happened in Syria within Iran are numerous, starting with a worsening economic crisis, evident in the devaluation of the national currency—where the dollar reached about 75,000 tomans in the black market—as well as increasing restrictions imposed by authorities on social freedoms, alongside ongoing tensions in relations with various ethnic groups along the borders.
Concerns about threats and messages from the Israeli Prime Minister: The Iranian regime appears to be closely monitoring the statements and messages directed at the Iranian people by Israeli Prime Minister “Benjamin Netanyahu.” Most recently, on December 13, 2024, he addressed the Iranians stating, “The future of Iran without the Islamic Republic is approaching,” adding, “Women, life, freedom… this is the future of Iran, and this is the future of peace.” This marked the second message Netanyahu conveyed to the Iranian populace in under a month.
Here, Iranian decision-making circles may now see Israel as having initiated a plan to undermine the foundations of the Iranian regime from within by fueling social protests and possibly providing support to armed groups from ethnic minorities facing marginalization and exclusionary policies from the regime. Therefore, Bezhkian might have concluded that amending the Modesty and Hijab law could help authorities contain the likelihood of new waves of protests that the Iranian authorities might struggle to control.
Increasing pressure from moderates on the president: The moderate faction—comprised of figures from both the reformist and traditional conservative camps—seems to have exerted strong pressure on the president to hinder measures taken by the hardline conservatives within the Islamic Consultative Assembly, which they dominate. Recently, some moderate figures have criticized the president, arguing that he has failed to translate his electoral promises into actionable steps and that he is avoiding confrontation with hardline conservatives. Some reformists have actively participated in a campaign against the president a hundred days after his government was formed, underlining failures to tackle the worsening crises in Iran.
Some reformists have suggested that the president’s stance on the Modesty and Hijab law will impact his political future and the future of his faction overall. In this context, Iranian academic “Sadegh Zibakalam” stated, “The hijab law is the revenge of the minority against the people, and if Mr. Bezhkian succumbs to the pressure from the hardliners, his credibility will diminish, and the left (reformists) will lose their standing.”
Hence, Bezhkian may have sought to express his reservations about the Modesty and Hijab law and request its reconsideration by the Supreme National Security Council to enhance his ability to demand amendments, thereby mitigating increasing pressures from moderates and preventing hardline conservatives from enacting new laws that restrict public freedoms and diminish the moderates’ ability to secure high-ranking positions in the state.
Responding to attempts to marginalize “Javad Zarif”: This step taken by Bezhkian cannot be separated from the intense pressure faced by his strategic affairs assistant “Mohammad Javad Zarif” from the hardline conservatives, who previously compelled him to announce his resignation on August 12, 2024, before he returned to his post about two weeks later. The hardline faction has launched a significant campaign against “Zarif,” viewing him not only as a key figure behind the nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 in July 2015, but also due to his occasional criticisms of the hardline faction, particularly prominent members of the Consultative Assembly.
In this context, the majority belonging to this faction has sought to amend citizenship laws—under the heading “appointments in sensitive positions”—to facilitate the ousting of “Zarif.” The Speaker of the Consultative Assembly “Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf” claimed his position was illegal, citing various reports that indicate that Zarif’s children—”Mahdi” and “Mahsa”—obtained U.S. citizenship during his time in the United States when he served as Iran’s permanent representative to the UN.
Counter Moves
Nonetheless, it does not seem that the hardline conservatives will easily retreat from their rigid stance on this particular issue, which enjoys clear support from high-ranking institutions within the regime, such as the Revolutionary Guard. This could lead to escalating political tensions between President “Masoud Bezhkian’s” government and the hardline conservatives in the upcoming period. Ultimately, the stance that Supreme Leader “Ali Khamenei” will take will determine the trajectory of this dispute between moderates and conservatives amidst the current challenging internal and external circumstances in Iran.
