As the American presidential elections approach, the United States faces several economic, social, and political challenges that will play a crucial role in determining whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump will be the next American president. Domestic political issues typically dominate the interests of American voters, with topics such as illegal immigration, rising living costs, and economic growth at the forefront of current electoral concerns. Although foreign policy issues usually garner limited attention, except in specific cases that have a direct impact on American interests, the Israeli wars on Gaza and Lebanon, along with the possibility of escalating into a broader regional conflict, elevate the Middle East’s status as a significant influencer in the electoral scene and as a primary stakeholder in the outcomes. In this context, this paper discusses how the developments in the Middle East might affect the election results and the potential policies of both candidates concerning regional issues.
Implications of the Middle East on American Elections
Strategic interests have traditionally made the Middle East a vital area for American foreign policy, including safeguarding the secure flow of energy supplies through maritime routes, ensuring the security of Israel (Washington’s foremost strategic ally in the region), combating terrorist organizations and Iranian proxies, undermining the Iranian nuclear program, limiting the growing Chinese-Russian influence, and supporting regional allies. Despite their significance to American interests, these issues have not conventionally acted as strong drivers of voter behavior. However, the rise in tensions related to the Gaza and Lebanon wars has made these issues central in the campaign strategies of candidates from both the Democratic and Republican parties and a priority for voters.
The central importance of the Middle East in the American political discussion concerning the upcoming presidential elections relates to the impact of regional events on attracting specific local electorates that play a pivotal role, even if they are numerically small. This includes the Jewish community, estimated to number between 5.5 and 8 million, who possess the power to sway certain “swing states” in favor of one candidate, particularly Pennsylvania and Nevada, where they constitute a higher-than-average percentage of the electorate. Additionally, some Jews living in Israel hold American citizenship, allowing them to vote in the elections.
Moreover, Arab and Muslim Americans form an active voting bloc of more than 2.5 million registered voters, with some concentrated in swing states like Michigan and Georgia. Michigan’s 15 electoral votes play a crucial role in tipping the scales in favor of one candidate, being home to the largest Arab American population (211,405) and one of the highest concentrations of Muslims in the entire United States. Historically, American Muslims and Arab Americans have voted for Democrats since 2004. Despite their relatively small numbers, their significant presence in Michigan makes them pivotal in influencing presidential election outcomes in the state. Polls show that their voting tendencies towards Trump and Harris are closely aligned, with 42% and 41%, respectively. This gives their votes dual importance, related to their role in providing one candidate with a narrow margin for electoral victory.
Such electoral calculations have led to an overshadowing of Middle Eastern events in electoral discussions, causing the Biden administration to cautiously monitor developments in the region, fearing that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s appetite for wars and seizing the current moment’s opportunity to reshape the geopolitical maps of the region and create a regional system that grants supremacy to Israel while sidelining Iran could lead to igniting a comprehensive war with Iran. This possibility complicates the calculations of the American administration, compelling it to deviate from its current course and take uncertain decisions, pushing it towards getting embroiled in a new Middle Eastern war that it has long sought to avoid.
This war would have significant repercussions on American domestic affairs, causing a heavy price in rising energy costs, inflation rates, and declining job markets. Notably, rising energy prices always become a central issue in American election campaigns, prompting Biden to avoid an oil crisis weeks before the elections. There is a concern that voters—and challenger Donald Trump—might hold the Democrats accountable for failure in managing Middle Eastern crises and accuse them of adopting faulty policies, subsequently turning away from supporting Kamala Harris—particularly independents—in favor of re-electing Trump, a scenario favored by Netanyahu. Nonetheless, the indirect effects of war in the Middle East may not significantly influence voters’ choices as they focus on issues such as the economy, abortion, immigration, climate change, and concerns about democracy.
The Biden administration has strongly pressured Netanyahu to limit the scope of the Israeli response to the Iranian ballistic attacks on October 1, 2023, due to their potential impact on reshaping the presidential race. Netanyahu seems to have responded to Biden’s wishes; The Washington Post quoted sources stating that Netanyahu informed the American administration that retaliatory measures would target military infrastructure while refraining from hitting nuclear facilities and energy installations to avoid perceiving political interference in the American elections. Any Israeli attack on Iranian oil facilities could lead to soaring global energy prices, while attacking the nuclear program might erase any remaining red lines governing the Israeli-Iranian conflict, exposing the United States to the risk of taking on a more substantial military role in the Middle East.
Conversely, Trump is gearing up to capitalize on any opportunity to criticize the failures of Biden’s foreign policy by accusing the Democrats of being responsible for global chaos, claiming that the peace and stability achieved during his administration in the Middle East are collapsing under Biden’s rule. He might accuse Biden and Harris of allowing tensions in the region to spiral out of control and dragging the United States into a new foreign war, an issue that resonates with American voters. This enables him to bolster his image among voters as a leader who managed to bring peace to the Middle East by undermining Iran and applying a “maximum pressure” policy against it while attempting to establish a regional security system that includes Israel through the Abraham Accords. Thus, he positions himself as a “strong and decisive leader” compared to a “weak and soothing administration,” appealing to undecided voters who prioritize national security.
In any case, the Middle Eastern crisis works to enhance Trump’s standing among pro-Israel voters, especially given his previous stances, such as moving the American embassy to Jerusalem and supporting Netanyahu’s hardline policies. Meanwhile, Trump appears less concerned about Arab and Muslim voters due to his hardline stances on immigration from Muslim-majority countries and his unwavering support for Israel at the expense of achieving a fair resolution to the Palestinian issue. In contrast, Harris is compelled to walk a tightrope between supporting Israel and addressing the concerns of American Muslims, many of whom have been severely affected by the Gaza war and the broader regional conflict, seeking to win over the votes of Arabs and Muslims, especially in certain swing states like Michigan and Florida, where their voting could be decisive. However, this balancing act carries the risk of not convincing both sides; Muslim voters may not consider the policies of either Trump or Harris adequate for supporting Palestinians and Lebanese and halting Israeli aggression, whereas pro-Israel voters may view the Biden administration as hesitant and still insufficient in its support.
Some Arabs in Michigan have shifted their support away from Harris, choosing to endorse Trump or vote for third parties—not out of conviction and satisfaction with Trump’s policies, as his anti-Muslim and pro-Israeli stances make him an unattractive option—but rather out of spite towards Harris and as a punishment for the Democratic administration, which they blame for allowing the genocide in Gaza to continue. They wish to affirm their political weight and capability to influence the outcomes of future American elections, making them a significant variable in partisan calculations. The American Arab Political Action Committee has declared that it will not endorse Harris or Trump, marking a notable shift for a committee that has usually supported Democrats since its establishment in 1998.
Potential Policies Toward the Middle East
Just as the Middle East can partially influence the current American electoral landscape, the countries in the region are closely watching the electoral race and the new occupant of the White House. The United States’ dominant position—so far—in the structure of the international system makes the presidential elections not merely an internal affair due to the global implications of American foreign policy and its ability to guide events in the Middle East and contribute to reshaping regional equations.
Therefore, it is beneficial to study the inclinations of Trump and Harris toward the region; while Trump has a record during his previous presidency (2017-2021), Harris has had little opportunity to engage with Middle Eastern affairs as her role as Vice President has primarily focused on domestic issues. This encourages observers to anticipate that a potential second Trump presidency would likely continue the outlines of his previous policy, albeit with some modifications based on new regional developments or Trump’s acquired political experience. Meanwhile, Harris is expected to inherit much of Biden’s framework regarding the Middle East. This section discusses the positions of both Trump and Harris on key regional issues.
The Palestinian Issue and the Wars in Gaza and Lebanon:
Drawing on his previous presidential experience and his economic background, as well as his “America First” isolationist policy, Trump is expected to provide unequivocal support for the Israeli agenda aimed at liquidating and ending the Palestinian issue. He is likely to pressure Netanyahu to conclude the extended wars that he favors and sees as the optimal means to shape a new Middle East according to Israeli vision. This may accompany assurances regarding Netanyahu’s political future and shielding him from legal issues once the war ends, alongside supporting the Israeli plan to evacuate Gaza’s population and expand control over Palestinian territories in the West Bank and Gaza.
There could also be a revival of the “economic peace” vision through a revised version of what was once termed the “Deal of the Century,” aiming to decisively eliminate the idea of an independent Palestinian state, as Trump ideologically aligns with Netanyahu’s far-right government, which utterly rejects the concept of a two-state solution. The same applies to the Lebanon war; Trump may encourage Netanyahu to achieve Israeli objectives through targeted, decisive strikes of limited duration, and might support carrying out focused Israeli military or intelligence operations against Iranian targets or assassination attempts on political and military leaders without slipping into a comprehensive confrontation that would require deploying American ground forces or draining military capacities.
In addition to the political objectives of avoiding entanglement in a regional war and reducing American military engagement in the area while enhancing his image as a strong leader capable of controlling Middle Eastern interactions and establishing regional peace, where the continuation and expansion of war would portray him in the public eye as a weak American leader, Trump’s anticipated approach stems in part from his desire to stop the depletion of American economic capacities by channeling resources to Israel to support its war effort.
Harris is expected to continue Biden’s approach of strong support for Israel and persistent flows of American military aid while calling for the end of wars in the Middle East; however, she will not be able to rein in Israel’s ambitious desire to expand confrontation arenas while maintaining the Democratic Party’s verbally supportive stance for the Palestinian people’s right to establish their state and end their humanitarian suffering. This would ultimately aim towards a political settlement of the Palestinian issue based on a two-state solution. While this proposal often disregards existing political and field realities, it serves to establish the status quo and mask the absence of a comprehensive and implementable American project concerning the final resolution of the Palestinian issue.
The Iranian Nuclear Program:
Both Democrats and Republicans agree on the goal of preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear state. However, Trump’s return to the White House would reactivate the “maximum pressure” policy against Iran through several options, including stricter enforcement of American sanctions and ensuring that Iran has no room to maintain any oil sales using a combination of political, economic, and possibly military pressures to weaken it. In this context, the activation of the “snapback” mechanism post “sunset” day—October 18, 2025—could also occur. This is when the Security Council’s guardianship over the nuclear deal will expire, international sanctions on Iran, which were suspended under the agreement, will be lifted, and it would exit Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, thereby allowing the “snapback” mechanism to automatically reimpose international sanctions without a Russian or Chinese veto.
In addition to pursuing and weakening its regional proxies and pressuring Arab states to avoid normalizing relations with Tehran, executing assassinations of political and military figures, and affiliated militia members could be part of his administration’s approach. He could cite Iranian missile attacks against Israel and their provision of missiles and drones to Russia in its war against Ukraine as justification, alongside the disruptive actions of its proxies against the safety of global maritime operations, which would undermine the chances for reviving the nuclear agreement.
However, Harris’s election coinciding with the coming to power of reformist president Masoud Bezhikian in Tehran hints at a potential return to negotiation paths, especially since the latter has shown openness to reviving nuclear talks with the West after receiving a green light from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei under a “tactical withdrawal” strategy designed to charm the American administration and divert it from supporting Israeli strikes against Iran, although Netanyahu will likely do everything he can to undermine such a scenario.
Crises in the Middle East such as Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Iraq:
These crises seem to hold a lower priority on the American foreign policy agenda towards the region compared to the security of Israel, the Iranian nuclear program, and the security of maritime corridors. Neither Democratic nor Republican administrations have a comprehensive, cohesive, and practical project to address these crises; their engagement is limited to certain aspects. For instance, Washington lacks a vision for resolving the Yemeni political crisis, but is concerned about Houthi activities threatening navigation in the Red Sea.
The Harris administration is expected to maintain the current American approach towards Yemen, which seeks to avoid escalating military confrontation in the region while keeping the United States as uninvolved as possible in any battlefield and reinforcing a degree of deterrence against the Houthis through targeted airstrikes while keeping them on the specially designated global terrorist organizations list (SDGT). In contrast, Trump, if reelected, is likely to resume his previous approach of preventing the depletion of military resources through airstrikes while reinforcing destabilizing measures such as reclassifying the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization and cutting humanitarian operation assistance in Yemen, possibly supporting targeted Israeli strikes against Houthi infrastructure.
Concerning Syria and Iraq, while the Harris administration is expected to sustain the current level of American troops in Syria and achieve a repositioning and redeployment of forces in Iraq to support American military operations in Eastern Syria, a Trump-led administration may expedite reducing the number of American troops in both countries, particularly Syria. The second issue related to Iraq involves sanctions waivers; should Harris consider granting new waivers to support Iranian energy imports to supply Iraqi electricity, the forthcoming Trump administration would be less inclined to grant such waivers for Iranian energy imports, focusing instead on weakening Iran as much and as quickly as possible. Both administrations’ roles in Libya would be limited to attempts at undermining Russian influence and supporting the policies of European allies there.
American military presence in the Middle East: The United States will remain militarily engaged in the Middle East regardless of who the next president is, but Trump may gradually seek to reduce the American military presence. However, this would require the conclusion of the Gaza and Lebanon wars, a decrease in Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, and alleviation of the threat facing American assets in Iraq and Syria, necessitating an expedited resolution to the ongoing wars in the region. Efforts may be made to mediate the establishment of closer relations between Israel and its neighbors, alongside adopting a tough stance against the Iranian regime. This would enable a reframing of efforts on perceived threats to American interests in the region, particularly regarding the erosion of growing Chinese and Russian influence, while refocusing military resources towards the Indian and Pacific Ocean areas to counter China’s military strength there.
Relations with Regional Allies:
Issues like democracy and human rights are expected to recede as driving forces of Trump’s foreign policy toward Washington’s key regional allies in favor of a deal-making mentality and “America First” approach, prioritizing strategic bilateral arrangements such as signing lucrative military and economic deals and activating personal relationships with regional leaders to yield potential gains for his investment entities, specifically the “Trump Organization.”
In contrast, a Harris-led administration would maintain the current pragmatic approach in dealings with the region, flexibly presenting or delaying issues of democracy and human rights on the relationship agenda in accordance with American political and security interests. When the necessities call for extensive cooperation, those issues would be deprioritized; conversely, if pressure is needed to induce certain countries to adopt policies and stances that serve Washington’s interests, those issues become useful leverage for pressure and coercion. The next administration, whether Democratic or Republican, is also expected to continue negotiating a security deal with Saudi Arabia initiated by Biden’s team, involving Saudi access to advanced American weapons and civilian nuclear technology in exchange for security guarantees concerning the defense of the kingdom in the event of threats. However, Trump may be more hesitant to offer explicit security guarantees but will seek to increase arms sales to Riyadh.
Saudi-Israeli Normalization: Both Republicans and Democrats share a consensus that normalizing diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia would contribute to achieving greater stability in the Middle East, aiding in containing the threat posed by Iran and mitigating Chinese and Russian influence in the region. There’s no doubt that the incoming administration will embark on completing Biden’s efforts to integrate the kingdom into the Abraham Accords, though this will depend on the conclusion of the Gaza war and progress concerning the Palestinian issue, or on Washington’s ability to persuade the kingdom to decouple these two paths—a prospect that remains weak. Nevertheless, a second Trump administration will likely intensify pressure and encouragement for Saudi-Israeli normalization to enhance his legacy, which he initiated during his first term by completing connections between Arab and Israeli rapprochements.
In conclusion, the actual foreign policy of the forthcoming American administration will be subject to political changes and developments in the Middle East, meaning it may not necessarily align with the candidates’ statements during their campaigns. For example, the campaign remarks of George W. Bush and Joe Biden contradicted their actual policies toward the region. Bush criticized U.S. interventions under the pretext of state-building and promoting democracy, only to lead one of the largest foreign intervention operations in Afghanistan and Iraq after taking office. Likewise, Biden pledged to make Saudi Arabia a pariah while relations progressed smoothly, culminating in a visit to the kingdom amidst efforts to sign a security deal between the two countries.
Therefore, there remains room for variance and maneuvering beyond expectations, underscoring that American foreign policy toward the Middle East is governed by stable principles, determinants, and interests, regardless of whether the administration is Republican or Democratic.
Consequently, the policies exhibit relative continuity, albeit with changes in tools corresponding to differing perceptions, visions, and conceptualizations of American presidents. Additionally, American policy is of an institutional nature rather than personal, except in some cases like Trump’s, making his actions somewhat unpredictable, and thus precluding any certainty in forecasting his political behavior toward the region.
