On October 21, 2024, the Gülen Movement and Turkish media announced the death of Turkish preacher Fethullah Gülen, the founder of the “Gülen Movement,” in Pennsylvania, USA, where he had lived since 1999. He was accused of orchestrating the 2016 coup attempt. Gülen’s death, classified as a terrorist by Turkey, could have significant repercussions on Turkish policies both domestically and internationally. Notably, the end of Gülen represents a major turning point in the confrontation with the movement and in Turkey’s relations with regional and international powers where the Gülen Movement is active. It is also expected that Gülen’s death will have direct implications for the cohesion of the movement internally, its presence, and its interactions with the new realities that will arise in the post-Gülen era.
Local Effects
Gülen’s death is likely to bring about a range of political and social consequences for the Turkish system in the upcoming period, which can be outlined as follows:
Diminished Ability of Erdoğan to Justify Domestic Crises: Many tendencies do not exclude the possibility that Gülen’s death, as the central figure of the Gülen Movement, could weaken President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ability to counter internal criticisms and pressures, particularly regarding the ongoing decline in living standards and the suppression of political opposition in Turkey. Over the years, Erdoğan has often utilized the Gülen Movement to explain some of the domestic crises facing Turkey, using certain activities of the movement to rally support for the Justice and Development Party’s policies, while simultaneously tarnishing the image of local adversaries, despite their denunciation of Gülen and his ideological leanings.
Neutralization of Ankara’s Pressure on European Nations: According to many estimates, Gülen’s death may help neutralize Turkish pressures on European countries regarding contentious issues. It is anticipated that the prominence and activities of the Gülen Movement in European countries, particularly Germany and Austria, will decline in the near future. Moreover, some elements of the Gülen Movement might seek alternative havens due to potential internal turmoil that could affect the funding allocated to the movement’s groups in Europe, thereby reducing Ankara’s arguments for pressuring European regimes to pursue the movement and its members.
Erosion of the Momentum Surrounding the 2016 Coup Memory: The events of the Summer 2016 coup have served as a key tool for the internal policies adopted by Erdoğan in recent years. The increasing use of the coup’s memory in Turkish politics has been linked to various main motivators, including reaffirming the ruling system’s strength, solidifying its mental image to reinforce its domestic influence, and tightening control over the country’s security structures. It is enough to note that the coup events are referred to as the “Anniversary of Democracy and National Unity.”
Erdoğan is keen to harness the memory of the coup to rally domestic support for Justice and Development Party policies. For instance, just before the recent commemoration of the coup on July 15, 2024, Erdoğan stated, “The resistance of the masses against the coup attempt is the greatest epic our nation has written since the War of Independence,” adding that “Much like in the War of Independence, the resolve and determination of the people saved the nation’s independence on the night of July 15.” However, Gülen’s death may diminish the significance of July 2016, especially since Gülen and his continued presence in Pennsylvania were central to Erdoğan’s speech on the anniversary.
Return of Internal Controversy Regarding the Gülen Movement: Despite Erdoğan’s efforts and the Justice and Development Party governments over the years to eradicate the influence and impact of the Gülen Movement within Turkish society through increased restrictions and surveillance, Gülen’s death, following a prolonged illness, could revive the momentum of the movement on Turkish streets and create considerable spaces of sympathy for his supporters after his passing. This is especially true given that Gülen condemned the Summer 2016 coup and that the Turkish government has not provided convincing evidence of his involvement in the coup.
It is noteworthy that Gülen still enjoys a positive reputation among various social sectors and religious classes in Turkey. Additionally, the ideological clashes between the Justice and Development Party and the secular stream provide a relative advantage to Sufi movements in Turkey, including the Gülen Movement. This scenario is further fueled by the decline in indicators of the Turkish economy and living standards, as the Gülen Movement, despite its religious character, owned substantial investments in businesses, medical clinics, educational institutions, and social services provided at nominal prices.
Organizational Repercussions
Several potential repercussions are anticipated for the Gülen Movement after Gülen’s death, notably:
The Issue of Succession: According to various estimates, the Gülen Movement may face significant challenges and internal strife regarding the transition to new leadership following Gülen’s death, particularly concerning the leadership structures of the movement in Europe and the United States. This scenario is fueled by recent internal disputes within the movement that reached unprecedented levels following Gülen’s health decline, leading to various factions emerging due to the struggle for leadership, including the group of Mustafa Özcan, the head of the “Kinak Group of Companies,” and the group of Barbaros Kojakurt, responsible for the movement’s foreign activities.
Defections from the Gülen Movement: Groups within the Gülen Movement are expected to depart following Gülen’s death due to internal conflicts and the potential disruption in the financial support necessary for the movement’s groups in some countries. This situation might drive these groups to join alternative advocacy entities or consider returning to Turkey to surrender to security agencies and acknowledge the movement’s role in the Summer 2016 coup as part of an effort to benefit from the “remorse” law introduced by the Justice and Development Party government after the coup, which allows those involved in or supporting the coup to admit their charges in exchange for reduced penalties.
Simultaneously, some elements of the movement may shift their directions or opt to operate independently in the countries they reside in, advocating Gülen’s ideas and principles without adhering to the organizational framework of the movement, which is likely to face further severe crises after Gülen’s death.
Global Presence of the Movement Diminished: All indicators suggest that the geographical presence of the Gülen Movement will decline, particularly in areas that previously served as hubs for its activities, such as Central Asia, Africa, Europe, and America. The early conflicts among the movement’s leaders over its assets indicate this decline. Notably, the Gülen Movement generates annual revenues estimated at between 200and200and250 million from private schools in the United States alone. In addition, the movement owns properties and other assets in Europe and some African and Asian countries that yield financial returns.
Shift Toward Decentralization: The management of the Gülen Movement was highly centralized during Gülen’s tenure, characterized by his charisma and significant influence across a wide range of countries, particularly in Europe and the United States. However, his death and the rising internal unrest within the movement may push for an expansion of decentralized management in the upcoming period, where each group in every country operates as an independent organization. It is possible that no new leader of the movement, should one be agreed upon, can impose his will on these groups, especially given the escalating polarization among key leaders of the movement and the emergence of rival factions seeking to assert their visions and dominance over the movement’s future directions.
In conclusion, it can be stated that the aforementioned points predominantly indicate that Gülen’s death will impose new dynamics, both regarding the Turkish president’s utilization of the Gülen Movement domestically to maneuver some of the challenges he faces—especially as he classifies Gülen and his group as terrorists, holding them responsible for the deterioration of certain political and security conditions in the country—and concerning the paths the Gülen Movement will take regarding its organizational cohesion and nature of activities.
