Western media reports have revealed that representatives of the Azawad rebels (Malian Tuaregs) and the Al-Qaeda-affiliated group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin held a meeting in March 2025, with the aim of uniting their efforts to confront the Malian army and escalate operations in the north of the country near the border with Algeria. They also agreed on administrative arrangements and the formation of a joint council composed of several jurists to resolve disputes and refer to Islamic Sharia. This raises questions about the content of these negotiations, the motivations, and the future of convergence between the two sides.
Growing Convergence
The Azawad movements in Mali are moving towards what can be considered a convergence with Al-Qaeda, represented by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, through the signing of a non-aggression agreement between “Azawad” and “Al-Qaeda.” Alghabass Ag Intalla, the president of the High Council for the Unity of Azawad, which includes former separatist rebels and is affiliated with the Azawad Movements Alliance, revealed in an audio message circulated on social media on May 17, 2024, that he had obtained authorization to secure a non-aggression agreement that allows “freedom of movement for fighters and the exchange of information about the movements of the common enemy (the Malian army and Russian Wagner fighters).”
Meanwhile, the leader of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin met with representatives of several armed groups operating in northeastern Mali. Reports indicated that the leader of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, Iyad Ag Ghaly, signed a non-aggression agreement with groups including the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (an extremist Islamic and Tuareg ethnic group with alleged ties to Ansar Dine, a separatist group). This agreement is considered the permanent strategic framework for peace, security, and development.
In addition, negotiations were held to establish a military alliance between the two sides. The Azawad movement and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin began new negotiations to enhance their convergence. Agreements have already been reached on two points: the first is the establishment of a joint mechanism for planning and executing military operations against the army and Wagner in northern Mali, and taking responsibility for them. Therefore, the Azawad movement and the Islamic groups will not fight the same enemy alone, but rather fight together.
This military alliance, which is limited to the territories of northern Mali, has a new name that has not yet been agreed upon. The second point is the agreement of the representatives of both sides on several issues, including administrative work in areas controlled by Azawad and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin.
Multiple Motivations
There are several factors driving the Azawad movement towards strengthening its alliances with Al-Qaeda, which can be highlighted according to the following points:
1- Ethnic overlaps between elements of “Azawad” and “Al-Qaeda”: Many Western estimates indicate the involvement of numerous Tuareg fighters in the ranks of the Azawad movements and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin alike. Therefore, there are ethnic overlaps and intersections that allow the two entities to enhance their convergence, especially since the Azawad Front is an alliance that includes several armed movements, most of which are Tuareg and Arab, while Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin operates in the Sahel region, follows Al-Qaeda, and is led by Iyad Ag Ghaly, who is of Tuareg descent.
2- Hostility of “Azawad” and “Al-Qaeda” towards the Malian army: This is not the first time representatives of the two groups have met, but the timing indicates preparations for a new wave of violence in northern Mali against the forces of the military council in Mali. Despite their different agendas, they meet in confronting a common enemy, the Malian forces on one hand and the fighters of the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISIS), which has entered into a competition for influence and interests with Al-Qaeda in the African Sahel region. This practically indicates that their alliance is nothing more than an alliance of interests that paves the way for power and influence sharing arrangements.
3- Confronting Russian “Wagner” as a common threat: Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin has previously called for jihad against the Russian presence in the African Sahel region, while the armed Azawad movements are engaged in combat operations against Wagner and the Malian army. This drives the Azawad movement to strengthen its military alliance with Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin.
4- Utilizing “Al-Qaeda” to enhance the influence of the Azawad movement: One of the main factors encouraging Tuareg rebels to engage in negotiations with Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin is the shift in the approach of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin itself. Over the years, the group has evolved in its tactics, messages, and administrative strategy, and improved its policies, making it a more pragmatic insurgent movement. According to sources close to the Tuareg rebels, the leadership of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin began reevaluating its stance following the American withdrawal from Afghanistan. The ability of the Taliban to establish its authority while preserving the unity of Afghan territory has become a model to emulate. Additionally, recent jihadist developments in Syria have influenced the group’s approach, prompting it to reassess its long-term goals in Mali.
Statements by prominent figures in Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, including Amadou Koufa, the leader of the Macina Katiba, and Jafar Dicko, the group’s operations commander in Burkina Faso, indicate an increasing willingness to make concessions. Their recent statements have focused on political issues rather than military conquest. A statement was issued by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, describing the military councils in the region as obstacles to regional stability. The statement called for international intervention against these governments, indicating that the group sees it as an opportunity to reposition itself as a legitimate and effective entity rather than a rebel force. This convergence of interests between the Tuareg rebels and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin has paved the way for negotiations, with both sides expressing readiness to soften their positions to achieve mutual benefit.
Possible Scenarios
There are three possible scenarios for the future of the relationship between Al-Qaeda and the Azawad movement, as follows:
1- Integration of “Azawad” and “Al-Qaeda” into a single entity: This scenario assumes that the Azawad movement will integrate into Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, and that the organization will be able to attract more fighters from the Azawad movement through the dissemination of extremist propaganda, and exploit the violations of the army against the Tuareg population in northern Mali, pushing more Azawad elements to integrate into Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin. The leadership of both organizations may find it beneficial to unite their efforts and armed struggle against the Malian army by integrating into a single entity, which is Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin.
Negotiations are still ongoing, and their outcomes must be awaited, but at this stage, the points of agreement are limited to establishing a joint military structure and an Islamic justice mechanism in northern Mali, which will be a significant and unprecedented step. Some members of the group believe that separating from Al-Qaeda may open the door to direct negotiations with Western governments, while others believe that such a step requires a religious justification, perhaps linked to a major political development, such as the official independence of Azawad or the collapse of the Malian government in Bamako.
2- Failure of convergence and operational tension: This scenario assumes that the different political agendas of the two entities will lead to an escalation of the conflict between them. Al-Qaeda seeks to establish an Islamic state and implement Sharia law in northern Mali, and has an expansionist ideology to annex more territories and expand the scope of this Islamic state. On the other hand, the Azawad movement seeks to establish a Tuareg state extending from northern Mali to include areas of Niger, southern Algeria, and Libya, which will lead to an escalation of the conflict between them. This leads to the main points of contention that still exist between the Azawad movement and Al-Qaeda. Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, for its part, rejects the “Azawad project”: jihadists fight to impose Islamic Sharia not only throughout Mali but also in Niger and Burkina Faso, and increasingly in Sahelian countries. It is logical for Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin to reject separation from Al-Qaeda.
3- Consolidation of the alliance without full integration: This scenario assumes that the two organizations will turn a blind eye to their ideological differences and maintain their existence as separate entities. Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin will continue to operate within the jihadist and extremist organizations in the region, while the Azawad movement will work as a separatist movement to defend the interests of the Tuareg in northern Mali. However, the continued escalation by the Malian army, allied with the Russian Wagner group, will drive the Azawad movement to continue coordinating its operations with Al-Qaeda in the region.
In conclusion, it can be said that the likely scenario for the future of relations between Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin and the Azawad movement is the continuation of the alliance between the two groups, especially in light of ethnic overlaps, political understandings, common interests, and logistical and financial support between the two entities, in addition to the Azawad movement’s need to coordinate its combat operations with Al-Qaeda as the army continues to escalate its military operations in northern Mali. It is unlikely that there will be an integration between the Azawad movement and Al-Qaeda; the latter is willing to support Tuareg fighters in controlling key areas, but on the condition that these areas are governed within an Islamic framework rather than an independent Tuareg state.
