After years of relative neglect of the Latin American region by successive US administrations for various reasons, it is likely that the region will receive greater attention from the elected US President Donald Trump, due to his campaign’s focus on a range of issues including irregular migration, drugs, trade, and China’s growing economic power—issues that will frequently lead Trump and his allies to look towards the countries south of the United States, with significant and crucial consequences for these nations. However, the potential impacts of Trump’s policies on Latin America depend on several factors, such as economic reliance, geographical proximity, and flows of migration and drugs.
Previous Policies
During Trump’s first term, US foreign policy towards Latin America was characterized by several notable features:
Strong Cooperation with Mexico to Combat Irregular Migration: Trump began his 2015 campaign by accusing Mexico of sending rapists to the United States and promised to force the country to pay for the construction of a new border wall. While some anticipated that the billionaire would adopt a confrontational, even aggressive, policy toward the entire region, the reality proved to be mixed; tensions did arise with Mexico, especially when Trump used threats of tariffs to secure Mexican cooperation on immigration and drug prohibition, but bilateral relations never reached a breaking point. Despite the clear ideological differences between Trump and then-leftist Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the leaders managed to establish a largely respectful and transactional relationship. Essentially, as long as López Obrador cooperated on key issues with Trump, he ordered Mexican forces to prevent migrants from heading north before reaching the US border. In return, Trump allowed López Obrador to pursue his domestic agenda largely without interference. To many’s surprise, López Obrador publicly expressed nostalgia for President Trump after Biden’s election, criticizing the Biden administration for what he viewed as a deterioration of Mexican democracy and institutions.
Friendly Relations with Right-Wing Presidents in Latin America: During his first term, Trump established friendly relations with several Latin American leaders who shared his right-wing ideological tendencies, including Iván Duque in Colombia, Mauricio Macri in Argentina, and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. Together, they led a “maximum pressure” policy towards Venezuela, imposing new sanctions, recognizing an alternative government, and even publicly flirting with the idea of a US military intervention, though this was not seen as a real possibility within his administration. These policies failed to displace Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and worsened the suffering of the Venezuelan people, contributing to a larger wave of migration in subsequent years.
Decline in Interest in Environmental Issues and Damage to Washington’s Image: Previous US priorities, such as coordinating efforts on climate change or pushing to end deforestation in the Amazon, were largely abandoned. While Trump maintained good relations with many governments, his harsh rhetoric regarding migrants and other disruptions during his presidency severely damaged the image of the US among many Latin American citizens, according to polls conducted by the Pew Research Center and others, before it began to recover under Biden. At the same time, there were extremely negative trends among citizens in major Latin American countries toward Donald Trump. A Pew survey published on June 10 revealed that 86% of Mexicans do not trust Trump to do the right thing in global affairs, with 70% in Chile and 67% in both Argentina and Colombia expressing similar sentiments.
Urgent Issues
During his campaign for a second presidential term in 2024, several issues directly related to Latin America surfaced prominently on Trump’s agenda, including:
Addressing Irregular Migration: One of Trump’s key promises is to renew focus on US border security. A significant victory margin could grant Trump a strong mandate to confront irregular migration, a major concern for Americans, through measures and solutions that will undoubtedly impact his policy towards Latin America. In fact, the number of irregular migrants tripled during Biden’s presidency, and Trump’s promise of “mass deportations” for nearly 12 million people living in the US illegally is a central theme in his campaign. While most irregular migration during his first term came from the so-called Northern Triangle—Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras—today’s migration sources are more diverse, including Venezuela, Cuba, Mexico, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, and others. As a result, Trump’s relationships with Latin American governments are likely to become more complex than before.
Latin American countries may reject the social and economic costs, as well as the potential humanitarian disaster that such mass deportations could entail. In contrast, some presidents in the region may be inclined to accept these deportations as part of a negotiating strategy with Trump, meaning that the region may not adopt a unified hardline stance against Trump’s immigration policy, as the issue represents an opportunity for some countries to improve their negotiating positions on other economic or security agenda items.
Implementing Strict Measures Against Drug Trafficking Gangs: Many of Trump’s Republican allies have pledged to start launching US military strikes against drug cartels south of the US border. In the week following his election, Trump reiterated his plans for a war on drugs against traffickers in Latin America. While Mexico and Northern Triangle countries could be obvious targets for US pressure, some countries in the region, particularly El Salvador under President Nayib Bukele, might be open to cooperating with the US in this area, given Bukele’s more stringent measures against gangs and cartels that contribute to insecurity. However, some isolationist factions within the Republican Party may prefer to avoid military entanglement abroad and may align with leaders in Latin America who are concerned about regional sovereignty.
Comprehensive Reform of US Trade Policy: The Trump administration will seek to implement comprehensive reforms to US trade policy, which would generate significant uncertainty for export-driven economies in Latin America. Trump’s plans to impose fixed import tariffs expected to range from 5% to 10% by the end of 2025 would significantly impact countries reliant on the US as an export market but lacking free trade agreements (FTAs). Ecuador serves as an example.
At the same time, countries that are more economically tied to Washington will face greater risks from changes in its trade policy. In 2023, for instance, Mexico’s exports to and imports from the US accounted for 80% and 42%, respectively, while Brazil recorded only 11% and 16%. Consequently, both Mexico and Central America will be directly affected by commercial relations and investment flows with the US under Trump, but the impact will be less pronounced in South American economies that enjoy more varied and extensive trade relations.
- Continued US-China Competition: Trump is expected to adopt a tougher stance towards China, viewing Beijing’s rise as a perceived threat to US interests. The Republican business community and Trump, who brands himself as “the tariff man,” see his trade war as a means to confront China. The country still enjoys the largest trade surplus with the US of any economy, so it was not surprising when Trump threatened to revoke its trading status as a Most Favored Nation, or specifically in the US context, to abolish “permanent normal trade relations” with China if elected.
Trump also pledged to impose tariffs on all goods imported from China to the US exceeding 60%, significantly higher than those levied during his first term. These developments will have tangible effects on Latin American countries that are partners of China.
Significant Implications
Trump’s election for a second presidential term is likely to have notable implications for Latin America as follows:
Increased Exposure to Expected Political Changes in the US: In the Trump Risk Index, compiled by The Economist’s Intelligence Unit in June 2024—where the overall risk score is based on assessments of vulnerabilities in three areas (trade, immigration, and security) expected to see significant policy changes under Trump—Mexico ranks as the most exposed overall, scoring 71.4, driven by its high exposure to trade and immigration.
Several other Latin American countries also rank among the top ten most exposed due to their economic connections (remittances from migrants) and cultural ties with the US, particularly Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Panama, El Salvador, and Honduras. Regarding security risks associated with Trump’s presidency, several Latin American nations—especially Costa Rica and Panama, which receive US military aid but spend little on defense—rank high in the Trump Risk Index.
Growing Economic and Trade Risks: Some of the US’s largest economic partners rank highly in terms of exposure to risks from potential changes in US trade policies with Trump at the helm. According to the Trump Risk Index, Mexico is among the economies most at risk, being the leading trading partner for Washington, awaiting a review of its trade agreement with the US and Canada in 2026. With Trump focusing on the US trade deficit (with Mexico being a prominent case) and his broadly transactional approach, he is likely to treat the upcoming renewal of the USMCA as a complete renegotiation, aiming to extract concessions, including further management of migration from Mexico. The Free Trade Agreement between the Dominican Republic and Central America (DR-CAFTA) may face lesser risks, given the traditional trade surplus the US enjoys with the bloc, but Trump could still use it as leverage to curb irregular migration from member countries.
Increased Pressure to Curb Migrant Flows: Trump will likely be more willing to use his “stick,” through tariffs, sanctions, or other threats, against countries he believes have failed to stop outward migration or to accept deportees. It would be misguided to assume that the relative harmony of relations with Mexico and other countries during Trump’s first term would automatically repeat; the elected president is likely to be more hardened. However, business leaders and the private sector in the US, especially those reliant on Mexico and other Latin American countries in parts of their supply chains, will press the Trump administration to avoid a complete break with these nations, understanding the downsides of protectionist trade policies and the economic harm they would cause.
Clash with Drug-Producing Countries: Anti-drug policy will likely become more significant for Trump during his second presidency. While overdose deaths slightly decreased in 2023 to around 107,000 people, this number is still more than three times the level when Trump took office for the first time in 2017. Concerns about drugs, especially fentanyl, remain pressing among Trump’s working-class base. The elected vice president, JD Vance, comes from a family devastated by addiction. All this suggests increased “tension” in relations with drug-producing countries, particularly Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. Washington’s relative tolerance under Biden for the increasing cultivation of coca is likely to face a significant backlash under Trump. Initiatives for a different kind of drug policy, as promoted by some countries like Colombia and Mexico, including the legalization of certain drugs, will encounter hostility in Washington under Trump’s presidency.
Tightening Stance Against Growing Chinese Influence in the Region: Trump is expected to lean towards pressuring Latin American countries not to accept Chinese investments in strategic or sensitive industries such as 5G or electrical infrastructure. This could impose numerous pressures on countries in the region with strong economic and trade partnerships with Beijing, whose trade with Latin America and the Caribbean grew 26-fold between 2000 and 2020, from 12billionto12billionto315 billion, alongside rising Chinese investments in the region, particularly in energy and infrastructure.
The Trump administration is expected to closely monitor Mexico’s economic relations with China, as Chinese companies increasingly invest in Mexican infrastructure and industry to leverage geographic proximity to the US. Trump views this shift as a threat, as these companies evade US tariffs by establishing operations in Mexico. This situation positions Mexico as a potential battleground in the commercial competition between the US and China, complicating the efforts of newly elected Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum to manage Mexico’s relationships with both powers.
As Trump potentially returns to a protectionist trade approach, with anticipated increases in tariffs and a renewed focus on reshoring American manufacturing jobs at the expense of Latin American economies heavily reliant on US markets; the appeal of China as a stable economic partner in the face of American trade volatility is likely to grow, with Latin American leaders expected to seek deeper ties with China to offset the economic impacts of Trump’s protectionism.
However, any shift towards China could trigger retaliatory threats from the US. The Trump administration will likely promote the narrative that Latin American countries must choose a side in this geopolitical competition. Latin America will resist this pressure as almost all countries benefit from engaging with both China and the US, while relations with both serve to hedge against any adverse policies executed by the other. Maintaining this maneuvering space could come at the expense of tensions with the Trump administration and potential reprisals.
Limited Attention to Environmental and Climate Change Issues: Some experts believe that Donald Trump’s return to the White House would have a significantly negative impact on climate change efforts, as his victory is seen as a massive obstacle to progress in reducing carbon emissions and increasing financial support for developing countries. The elected US President is known to be a climate skeptic, having described efforts to promote green energy as a “hoax.” Latin American and Caribbean countries are likely to be exposed to setbacks in US leadership on global climate issues under Trump, given the region’s significant vulnerability to climate-related disasters. This will particularly complicate US relations with Brazil, given that the South American country will host COP30 climate summit in 2025.
Trump’s efforts to undermine Biden’s green subsidies and related incentives will have significant implications, especially for Mexico’s burgeoning electric vehicle manufacturing sector. Additionally, shifting US priorities regarding green transitions will also affect the region’s commodity trade. Important mineral exporters, such as Chile, will have to deal with a slowdown in global price growth as US demand for green technologies falls. Meanwhile, Trump’s relaxation of regulations on fossil fuel-dependent products, such as combustion vehicles, will likely keep oil prices elevated for a longer duration. This will benefit oil-exporting economies (like Argentina, Ecuador, Brazil, Guyana, Colombia, and Mexico) but place a burden on the current accounts of net importers (including Chile and most Central American and Caribbean countries).
Neglect of Democracy and Human Rights Issues: Trump will downplay the Biden administration’s efforts to promote democracy and multilateral engagement, even if these initiatives are often met tepidly. Regarding the political crisis in Venezuela, some expect Trump to revert to his maximum pressure campaign from his first term, including revoking US companies’ licenses to produce and export limited quantities of Venezuelan oil.
However, imposing stricter sanctions on Venezuela under Trump may encourage outward migration from the country as economic conditions deteriorate further. Conversely, some speculate Trump might seek some type of deal with Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, under which the latter agrees to accept Venezuelan deportees while possibly receiving a larger US stake in the Venezuelan oil sector. As long as migration to the US is contained, the future of democracy in Venezuela could be regarded as less urgent than during his first term. Nicolás Maduro seems to have understood this when he spoke of a “new beginning” after Donald Trump’s victory.
Exacerbation of Political Divisions Among Countries in the Region: Trump’s presidency may have profound implications for unity and regional integration in Latin America. While some right-wing leaders, particularly in Argentina and El Salvador, welcomed Trump’s return, his policies could increase ideological and political divisions within the region. Right-leaning leaders may feel emboldened to mimic Trump’s nationalist policies and rhetoric, including in Ecuador and Paraguay. Right-wing governments may see some gains under Trump’s presidency; for example, Argentina may find a better footing in multilateral institutions led by the US, such as the International Monetary Fund. The new conservative government in Panama, which aims to curb irregular migration across its borders, may become a useful ally for Trump. Meanwhile, El Salvador seems set to remain a target of Trump’s anti-migration rhetoric, despite its government’s crackdown on criminal activity.
At the same time, leftist governments—especially those more closely allied with China, like Brazil, Chile, and Colombia—are likely to face increasing pressures. Trump’s return could inspire supporters of the far-right in Brazil, led by former President Jair Bolsonaro, who has friendly ties with Trump, potentially leading to another run for the presidency of the largest Latin American country. Additionally, Trump’s presence may complicate efforts to forge a unified Latin American stance on global issues, ranging from trade agreements to climate change. Regional cooperation is already hindered by ideological differences, and a second Trump term may further complicate collective negotiations.
In conclusion, it is probable that governments willing and able to collaborate with Trump on his top priorities—especially immigration and drugs—will maintain a relatively harmonious relationship with Washington, even if they deeply disagree with Trump on other issues. Regarding other regionally significant matters like climate change and combating organized crime, Latin American governments may have to act independently, finding new mechanisms for cooperation that do not involve Washington. Overall, Trump’s increased focus on the region will bring both opportunities and challenges for its countries, alongside a declining US interest in various issues and priorities for Latin America.
